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TANZANIA 1962 - 1982: RISE AND DECLINE OF AN 
AFRICAN MECCA 
In the 1960s 'African Socialism' emerged as the most popular 
political philosophy of the newly independent African countries. 
Though interpreted in diverse and contradictory ways, it was adoØted 
by the governments of countries as far apart as Senegal, the Ivory 
Coast, Kenya, Guinea, the Congo and Tanzania. 	As Ahmed Mohidden 
aptly states: 
To be an African Socialist or to espouse 
'African Socialism' during that period was 
one of the most respectable things for any 
Afcan leader to do. 
(Mohidden, 1981: 13) 
Nyerere's Ujamaa -the Basis of African Socialism, written in 1962, can 
be seen as part of this early post-independence euphoria. 
It was not tfntil 1967, when Nyerere proclaimed the policy of 
Socialism and Self-Reliance in the form of the Arusha Declaration, 
that Tanzania's socialist policies began to be taken seriously by the 
outside world. 	The policies of the Arusha Declaration (AD) excited 
both the interest and the imagination of Western radicals. 	Various 
reasons account for this Tanzaniophilia. 
First, the Arusha Declaration was followed by the immediate 
nationalisation of the major sectors of foreign capital in the country. 
Secondly, its egalitarian ideals were implemented in the Leadership Code 
which aimed to reduce the gap between the leaders and the led. 	This 
showed that the Tanzanian leadership was serious about socialism. Thirdly, 
Tanzania's expressions of self-reliance and its elaboration in the policy 
of Ujamaa Vijijini (rural socialism) stressed the need for a type of 
development that was rural-based and derived its dynamism from internal 
sources and communal production by peasants. 	Development would be 
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spearheaded by changes in the rural areas, the most impoverished sector 
of the country. 	This rural emphasis was a revolutionary idea in the 
mid-1960s. 	Its novelty lay in its timing. 	There was disillusionment 
with both conventional and Marxist ideas of development which had 
emphasised heavy industrialisation (Killick, 1978). 	China's success 
in rural-based development indicated that Tanzania's own attempt was 
not a practical impossibility; indeed, it was the logical solution for 
a poor country to adopt given extreme shortages of capital, technology 
and trained manpower. 
Other elements of the international context help us to understand 
why Tanzania became an 'African Mecca' for the western intellectual left. 
Mao's China was an inspiration to many intellectuals the world over, and 
Ho Chi Minh's struggle against the USA showed that poor Third World 
countries could win against imperialism. 	The 1968 student Irevolutiont 
which swept western Europe was a further product of the radical wave 
which was sweeping the world. 	The interest that has been focussed on 
Tanzania by the left can be seen as part of this 'radical ' wind of 
change. 	It was an age of idealism and optimism in which it was natural 
to believe that poor countries could break their chains by their own 
efforts. 
The adoption of the Arusha Declaration also coincided internation-
ally with a revolution in the theories of the left about development. 
In the mid-1960s theories of development shifted from their concern with 
'internal' economic and social obstacles towards a greater preoccupation 
with externally-imposed constraints and the operation of the international 
economic system (Streeten, 1977). 	Within this broad shift in interest, 
the dependency theory of underdevelopment argued that dependency on 
international capitalism actively 'underdeveloped' the peripheral 
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countries - that is, progressively impoverished their economies. As 
far as the left was concerned, Gunder Frank (1967) was the principal 
exponent of the new paradigm of dependency. 
There were certain broad similarities between the ideas expressed 
in the Arusha Declaration and those of the dependency school. 	Both put 
forward socialism as a means of developing Third World economies. Both 
emphasised social objectives in development such as the need to reduce 
inequality, to increase social services and to bring about even and 
internally-orientated development. 	Finally, both called for reliance 
on national as opposed to 'foreign' resources. 	The similarities of 
these ideas may explain why a neo-Marxist dependency framework came to 
dominate the analysis of Tanzania's development after the Arusha 
Declaration (Coulson, 1979; Saul, 1973; Rweyemamu, 1973; Shivji, 1976; 
Von Freyhold, 1979). 
It was not only the radical left that was attracted by Tanzania's 
new development path. 	Despite its relatively economic and strategic 
insignificance within the global economy, Tanzania's development since 
1967 has generated immense interest with a wide and diverse audience 
ranging from liberal and radical academics, to social democratic and 
Communist governments, as well as with multilateral aid agencies such 
as the World Bank. 	However, this interest grew from extreme optimism 
to progressive disillusionment within a time-span of less than 10 years. 
There were various distinguishing elements in the Tanzania's 
'development experience'. 	First, the Arusha Declaration had empha- 
sised agricultural development, stressing self-sufficiency in food and 
socialist rural development; and second, it had adopted a policy of 
self-reliance, social equality and socialism. 	Between 1969 and 1973 
more and more radical policies were passed which appeared to extend the 
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'revolution'. 	In the agricultural sector, the policy of promoting 
voluntary ujamaa villages was replaced by the collectivist principles 
of ujamaa established by the Presidential Circular 1/69; this policy 
stated that 'kulak' farmers were to be discriminated against so as to 
give poor peasants a chance to organise and develop themselves under 
communal production. In 1971 the policy of Mwongozo (Guidelines) was 
passed which gave workers powers to control their production processes 
and gave them security of employment. In addition, various redistri-
butive measures were passed to alleviate the poverty of the masses. 
These policies were accompanied by a strengthening of the Party, 
which became the main agent for implementing socialism. 	A vast campaign 
of mobilisation was undertaken by Party leaders in the regions, in the 
districts and in the villages to implement the policy of Ujamaa Vijijini. 
Party branches were established in factories and other work-places to 
mobilise workers to produce more. 	Meanwhile various research projects 
and seminars were conducted by the University of Oar es Salaam and other 
colleges to see how best the policies of socialism and self-reliance 
could be implemented and schools began to experiment with the policy of 
education for self-reliance. 	The period ushered in a new hope that 
the problems of poverty might be solved through political education, 
ideological development and mobilisation. 
However, Tanzanian socialism did not live up to all the expect-
ations of its supporters inside and outside the country. 	By the mid- 
1970s it became obvious that the class structure had not been radically 
transformed. 	A society that was class-less and based on the rural 
sector had not emerged. 	The very policies creating socialism had led, 
instead, to the creation of a huge bureaucratic apparatus. 	The poor 
were still weak and the strong were even more powerful. 	Furthermore, 
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Tanzania was still dependent on international capitalism both for her 
export outlets and aid. 	In fact, Tanzania was more dependent on aid 
for her internal development in 1975 than she had been prior to the 
Arusha Declaration. 	Thus, the aid component was 24.4% of total 
development expenditure in 1967, but 32.5% in 1970/71, and 62% in 1975/6 
(Hartmann, 1977). 	These features in the Tanzanian development process 
began to create serious doubts in the minds of academics and other 
interested parties. 	Further events appeared to confirm these doubts 
and led to increasing disillusionment. 
Between the mid-1970s and 1980 the Tanzanian economy was gripped 
by two very severe economic crises (1974/75 and 1979/80) manifested in 
severe balance of payment problems. 	During the same period there were 
reversals of major policies, usually followed by counter-reversal.s within 
a short period. 
In agriculture ujamaa was replaced by a policy of Villagisation 
in 1974, and around five-and-a-half million people were physically 
resettled in the space of three years. 	Force was not excluded 
(Mwapachu, 1976; Coulson, 1977; Nyerere, 1977: 42). 	Tanzania did not 
achieve her aim of self-sufficiency of food and in 1974/5 she was struck 
by a drought, which forced her to import food grains. High world prices 
of oil during the mid-1970s and imports of food grains led to a balance 
of payment crisis. 	A massive mobilisation campaign, 'Kilirno cha kufa na 
kupona', was spearheaded by the Party to increase production and avert 
starvation. 	The food situation improved and so did foreign exchange 
availability thanks largely to the coffee boom of 1976. 	During 1976- 
1978 there were moves to encourage foreign as well as local private 
investments in Tanzania. 	Mwongozo was brought to a halt and modified 
by a Bill, introduced in 1979, designed to restore managerial authority 
and labour discipline, and improve productivity in the factories. 
Radical academics viewed these policies as a sell-out; Raikes (1975), 
Mihyo (1975), Saul (1974). 
But two years later Tanzania was gripped by another severe 
balance of payment crisis. 	The 'liberalisation' policies of 1976-78 
which had favoured private capital were revised between 1979 and 
1980/81 in favour of greater control by the state of the tottering 
economy. 	Another drought, the collapse of the East African Community 
and the invasion by Idi Amin all contributed to a depletion of foreign 
exchahge reserves. 	The net level of reserves fell from US$234 million 
at the end of 1973 to minus US$286  million at the end of 1980 (World 
Bank, 1981: 55). 	The effect of the balance of payment crisis was both 
total and devastating, as the following quotations taken from the Daily 
News (Tanzania) illustrate. 	The economy was slowly grinding to a halt: 
Muhimbili faces water shortages (the national teaching hospital at 
Dar es Salaam) 
The hospital was also experiencing a serious shortage of electric 
bulbs. 	Special batteries for vital services including the 
operating theatre had long since gone defective. 
(Daily News, 17 July 1980) 
Projects lag behind 
The Parliamentary Committee which toured 11 regions to inspect 
development projects, found that many projects were delayed - 
because of financial backing from the Government, parastatal 
and regional authorities. 
(Daily News, 24 July 1980) 
Motex lays off 600 workers 
The Moshi Textile Mill (Motex) has laid off its 600 workers 
aer it failed to secure an import licence from the Bank of 
Tanzania to order thread, the major input into production. 
(Daily News, 3 October, 1980) 
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4,000 tonnes of Coffee pileup in Mbinga 
(Daily News, 25 June, 1979) 
TFC halts production 
The Tanzania Fertilizer Company stopped 
production last month due to scarcity of raw 
materials. 
(Daily News, 14 June, 1979) 
Drastic Cuts on Imports Imposed 
(Daily News, 22 June 1979) 
This situation was summarised by the Minister of Finance in the 
following manner: 
For 
the 
Co 1 
met 
Economic problems 
the oil importing developing countries 
issue is survival itself. They face 
lapse if their minimal needs are not 
urgently (Daily News, 2 October 1980) 
aggravated by inflation and higher prices as a 
result of chronic shortages of basic consumer goods have led corruption, 
demoralisation and an 'informal economy' to develop, thus rendering 
ineffective the mechanisms of control of the economy by the 'state'. 
While central authority has become increasingly ineffective (Pratt, 1979: 
229) and the economy has collapsed under the strains of the economic 
crises, life continues. 	But different forms of economic activity, 
new relationships and new values and norms are being formed, creating 
a society which is very different from Nyerere's dream. 
What has happened and how can we account for such drastic changes 
within the time-span of less than a generation? 	A first step towards 
answering this awesome question is to examine the various interpretations 
that have been offered to explain the Tanzania development experience. 
in 
SOME LEADING INTERPRETATIONS 
We can distinguish three main types of academic explanations of 
the Tanzania experience. 	First are those of the radical left, who 
have written most profusely on Tanzania's experience. 	The most 
important of these writers are Cliffe and Saul (1972, 1973), Saul (1979), 
Shivji (1976), Raikes (1975) and Von Freyhold (1979). 	Their explanations 
of the rise and failure of socialist policies typically focus on class 
structure and the inability of those in power to eliminate Tanzania's 
dependency on international capitalism. 	These writers have been greatly 
influenced by the neo-Marxist dependency approach towards development 
as well as by generic Marxist ideas about the state. 	Although they come 
from different professional backgrounds and mostly are not trained 
sociologists, nevertheless their approach could be considered 'socio-
logical' in the sense that political and even economic issues are 
analysed in ternis of social structure. 
The second type of analysis that has emerged is what may be called 
the 'pragmatic dependency' approach. 	Particularly associated with the 
writings of Reginald Green, it involves taking a dependency view of 
Tanzania without, however, embracing class analysis, Green (1974à, 1974b, 1970, 
1977a, 1979). 
The third type of approach is distinguished by a focus on political 
institutions and is dominated by political scientists. 	Most prominent 
has been Pratt's Critical Phase (1976), which explains policies largely 
in terms of Nyerere's moral values. 	But other political scientists 
such as Samoff (1970), Hopkins (1968, 1971), Tordoff (1967) and Bienen 
(1967) have focussed more closely on political structures. These writings 
are extremely useful in illuminating Tanzanian political structures, but 
In 
typically stop short of investigating their effects on development. 
One political scientist, Hyden (1980), is to some extent an exception 
in that he has gone on to examine policies of development in relation 
to political arrangements. 
The major weakness of the approach of the radical left is the 
tendency to study the Tanzanian experience through an imposed class-
analysis framework, while both the radicals and the approach of Green 
share weaknesses derived 'from the dependency approach. 	The studies by 
political scientists are more useful but their findings about political 
institutions need to be 're-interpreted' in relation to development 
problems following the lead of Hyden. 	After reviewing at greater 
length the contribution of the three approaches identified here, I shall 
explain further the argument that they all suffer from significant 
weaknesses. 
In the light of this critical review, the thesis will propose that 
it is essential to study the Tanzanian experience in terms of the process 
of policy-making itself. 	Policy-making in Tanzania has been shaped 
fundamentally not by the interests of social class forces but by 
political-institutional arrangements, particularly the emerging division 
of labour between Party and Government. 	Given this institutional 
framework, the competing conceptions of development held by those involved 
in policy formation play a significant role in their own right. 
Development as class struggle under conditions of dependency 
Unlike many African Universities, Dar es Salaam University in the 
mid-1960s attracted a core of young and dedicated intellectuals who 
supported socialism. 	They built up a much needed literature on Tanzania's 
socio-economic development. Theyviewedthe policies of the Arusha 
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Declaration as a serious attempt by the'sate' to initiate a socialist 
development process. 	For instance, SauI(1968: 168) stated, "Tanzania 
is increasingly carrying on the debate about socialism at a high level of 
sophistication". 	Their analysis was characterised by two major elements. 
They saw development in terms of the politics of the class struggle, and 
they conceived the latter in terms much influenced by dependency theory. 
These early radicals placed great emphasis on the role of ideology 
and political action as instruments of socialist construction (Cliffe 
& Saul, 1972a:l: 323). 	Their work was partly concerned with 'charting' 
out possibilities for political action. 	Idealism and a belief in the 
role of sheer political will in solving development problems were central 
features of their approach. 	This was the case, for example, in relation 
to planning. 	According to Saul, socialist planning required a 'political' 
strategy, because it involved 'political economy'. 	Planning under these 
conditions could not be viewed as simply technical or administrative. 
It should involve three factors. 	First, it should represent an ideolo- 
gical challenge to vested interests; secondly, if meaningful policies 
were to be undertaken it should establish a popular base (political 
challenge); and thirdly, it should be given sustained and progressive 
institutional expression (organisational challenge). 	Before such 
planning was undertaken, political changes were necessary to enable power 
to be allocated in such a manner that it supported the necessary changes 
(Saul 1971: 24). 
Development problems were analysed mainly in class terms: the 
key questions were to identify which forces were likely to hinder 
socialist development. 	Such an approach was necessary because it enabled 
writers to work out strategies and tactics for socialist transformation. 
In relation to the implementation of the policy of Ujamaa, for example, 
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Cliffe (1973: 2: 209) stated quite explicitly that: 	"a vast army 
of cadres will have to be recruited and trained and put into action". 
Cliffe argued that Ujamaa should be promoted throughout the country; 
that the villages should in particular be a focal point around which 
to mobilise poorer peasants against wealthier ones; and that coercion 
would be required against wealthier peasants if the policy was to succeed: 
Specifically, confrontation of the emerging 
class structure may involve the identification 
of any large farmers who may have to be expropriated, 
prevented from employing a regular labour force, 
temporarily excluded from ujamaa groups, or at 
least eliminated from decision making. 
(Cliffe 1973: 2: 203) 
As a result of this approach towards the analysis of the policy of Ujamaa, 
most of the radical academic research conducted during this early period 
was orientated towards uncovering tt -(e exploitative role of the 'kulak' 
farmers. 
Thus Attems (1968) showed that in parts of Usambara 20% of work 
was provided by hired labour. 	In Bukoba, Friedrich (1968) showed that 
6% of such work was provided by hired labour. John Sender (1974) writing 
on the Usambara and Awiti (1973) showed the existence of classes of 
wealthy African farmers based on the employment of wage labour. 	Most 
of these authors argued that the existence of these wealthier farmers 
showed that capitalist social relations of production were operating in 
Tanzania. 	As a result of this, Ujamaa could not be implemented 
voluntarily; as Cliffe states, "some elements in the rural population 
might be fundamentally opposed to the ujamaa policy, and so work against 
it or try to distort it to their own ends ... because their interests 
are threatened" 	(Cliffe, 1973: 2: 198). 
Most of the early radicals were clearly influenced by dependency 
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ideas which had argued that in order to develop it would be necessary 
to opt out of international capitalism. 	Saul 1 s criticism of the 
Dar es Salaam School of History illustrates the role of dependency ideas: 
This means that as economic growth takes 
place its cumulative effect will be the further 
sub-ordination of the colony to the requirements 
of metropolitan Europe and the.çreation of an 
increasing dependent economy. I 
Saul) 1972: Vol. 1: 66) 
Rweyemamu (1973: 91) argued that during the colonial period political 
power was used to create a dependent economy:' 
These developments created a dependency 
relationship between the colonies and their 
mother-countries: dependency on their markets, 
dependency on imports of capital goods, 
dependency on foreign entrepreneurs.... 
These conditions, Rweyemamu argued, led to the creation of perverse 
capitalist development. 
Dependency theory argued that it was only through the elimination 
of links with metropolitan countries that development could occur in 
countries like Tanzania: 
The logical policy for Tanzania is to make 
herself as independent as possible from the 
rest of the world, to develop her own internal 
industries, her own internal market, and her own 
internal transportation and distribution system. 
(Yaffey 1972: 81) 
In order to attain socialism Rweyemamu argued that: 
First and foremost it is necessary to eliminate 
Tanzanias present underdevelopment in order 
to establish an internally integrated and 
self-reliant economy. 
(Rweyemamu, 1973: 1976) 
The influence of the dependency approach on the analysis of Tanzania 
development is found not only in these writers, but also in Shivji. 
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It is not surprising that the first challenge to Cliffe & Saul's 
idealisation of Tanzania's socialist development came from a Tanzanian, 
Shivji. 	Using a similar dependency theoretical framework Shivji argued 
that the Arusha Declaration, far from representing a step towards social-
ism, incorporated the Tanzanian economy even more into international 
capitalism. 	The petite bourgeoisie, through the policies of the Arusha 
Declaration, had created and strengthened its own class base (Shivji 1976: 
79). 
The appearance of this explanation at Dar es Salaam University only 
three years after the Arusha Declaration had a major impact on explanations 
of Tanzania's socialism. 	A major part of the Provisional Council for 
Social Science Conference of East Africa (1970) held at Dar es Salaam was 
devoted to answering Shivji's interpretation. 
Shivji operated within the same basic theoretical framework as 
Cliffe and Saul. 	But Shivji inverted the problem. 	Cliffe and Saul's 
theoretical preoccupation in the mid-1960s was to chart out a path of 
socialist construction because they had accepted the policies of the Arusha 
Declaration as a serious, if vague, attempt by the state to implement 
socialism. 	The obstacles on the road towards socialism, as they saw 
them, were not the state or the social class in power, but the kulaks 
and foreign capital. 
What Shivji did was to focus attention on the nature of the social 
class in power at the national level and, as a result, to question 
whether the policies associated with the Arusha Declaration aimed to 
create sociasm. 	The policies of the Arusha Declaration were 
re-examined fñ a dependency framework. Shivji explained the failure to 
achieve the elimination of capitalism in terms of the class interests of 
the dominant groups and the nature of the state. After Shivji, most 
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radical interpretations were strongly influenced by his basic position. 
The influence of dependency ideas on the analysis of Tanzania's 
socio-economic development remained strong in the work of Shivji and his 
followers: 
It appears to me that these theoretical 
developments of underdevelopment theory 
are fully applicable to the African countries. 
(Shivji, 1976: 16) 
And: 
Liquidation of underdevelopment - poverty, 
ignorance and disease - therefore requires 
a social-political struggle against existing 
relations of production, which are responsible 
for throttling the development of productive 
forces. 
(Shivji, 1976: 18) 
Von Freyhold argued that it was Tanzania's dependency on the world market 
which was the cause of her underdevelopment: 
Conditions of stagnation were most obvious in 
those regions which had the longest history of 
trading with the world market and in those which 
had still only marginal links with it. 
(Von Freyhold, 1979: 6) 
Socialism became identified with the establishment of an 'independent 
economy', that is, independent from international capitalism. 	Any 
policies which fell short of eliminating dependency were implicitly 
condemned. 	The very rationale for the idealisation of Tanzania by 
early Marxists in the late 1960s was now used by Marxists in the 1970s 
to judge and condemn Tanzania's failure to achieve socialism and self- 
reliance. 	Disillusionment with Tanzania had begun. 
Saul lamented the failure of a self-reliant strategy in the 
following terms: 
Too often the rhetoric of self-reliance has 
not become the reality of a self-centred economy, 
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an economy which would be based upon production 
for mass needs, upon the development of a locally 
based and wholly relevant technological capacity. 
Too often the tyranny of the demand concept has 
carried the day - the investment of surplus often 
being directed first towards such immediately 
profitable domestic spheres as luxury consumption 
goods and towards immediately effective earners 
of foreign exchange as tourism, rather than 
towards structural transformation. 
(Saul 1 1979: 207) 
Raikes stated: 
Neither need one doubt that nationalisation was 
expected, in 1967, to lead to some degree of 
dis-engagement from the international economy. 
(Raikes1 1976: 19) 
Shivji's main argument was that the Arusha Declaration policies 
did not disengage Tanania from capitalism: rather they increased her 
integration into capitalism. 	The policy of Ujamaa attempted to make 
peasants produce cash crops, thus integrating them with the world 
capitalist system (IbiL106) while nationalisation led to new forms 
of relationships with multinational capital (Ibid: 165). 	Raikes 
(1975: 35) argued that Tanzania's "maintenance of a dependent export-
dominated structure of the economy makes almost impossible the trans- 
formation of production within the rural economy". 	Tanzania's 
failure to eliminate links with the world market was explained by Shivji 
and his followers in relation to the class interests of those in power. 
The study of the state was mainly a by-product of this interest in the 
nature of the social class in power. 	According to Shivji, the petty 
bourgeoisie (intellectuals, teachers) formed an alliance with peasants 
and workers to overthrow colonialism and took power (constitutionally). 
They then used state power to expropriate the 'commercial bourgeoisie'. 
The Arusha Declaration policies, argued Shivji, 
4 	 -16- 
Constitute the first open attempt on the 
part of the bureaucratic sector of the petty 
bourgeoisie to carve out an economic base 
for itself. 
• 	(Shivji, 1976: 79) 
It is a dependent bourgeoisie, and it has 
created itself an 'internal economic base'. 
(Ibid: 85) 
Von Freyhold's analysis of the state followed the same approach: 
Seen over a longer period the socialism of the 
nizers was in practice a set of strategies which 
expanded their power vis-a-vis the submerged 
classes, gave them the means to build up an 
intermediate class which supports them and put 
them into a position that made them a viable 
partner 6f the metropolitan bourgeoisie. 
(Von Freyhold, 1975: 17) 
Walter Rodney argued: 
The petty bourgeoisie intended to maintain 
their hegemony over the state apparatus. Indeed 
after 1967 they used the new policies as a means 
of reproducing themselves as a class. 
(Rodney 1975: 11) 
What is of significance is that these writers explained the 
'socialist' policies of the Arusha Declaration in terms of the class 
interests of the petty bourgeoisie who used state power to create 
their class base. 	Thus the tstatel was merely a vehicle for extending 
and consolidating their class interests. 
0. 
Saul (1975) had seen the state bureaucracy as,.,'plastic 11 category, 
largely 'petty-bourgeoisie'; by virtue of its role at the junction 
between the local economy and foreign capital, it was exposed to contra-
dictory influences - national, working class and peasant class interests 
confronting those of foreign and domestic capital in the mode of operation 
of the state (also cited in Leys 1976: 40). 
For Shivji, however: 
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With the Arusha Declaration, the state and 
state institutions (including parastatals) 
became the dominant actors in the country. 
Thus a new and more important wing of the 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie was created. 
Political power and control over property 
had now come to rest in the same class. 
(Shivji, 1976: 85) 
Von Freyhold took a similar view, emphasising the external aspect: 
Having already become a partner with international 
capital in this manner, the state in Tanzania 
moved one step further and commanded a controlling 
share of the enterprise whose profitability it 
ensurecLa demand which was easily conceded by 
investors who could continue making their profits 
on the supply of equipment and intermediate goods, 
on management contracts and sales commissions 
and on various kinds of loans. 
(Von Freyhold 1 1979: 119) 
The approach to the Tanzanian experience in terms of dependency, 
the social class interests of those in power and the state, provides 
one kind of framework for explaining how particular policies came to 
be adopted. Thus, Shivji's group saw the change of policy from Ujamaa 
to villagisation as a confirmation of their suspicion that the reality 
behind the Arusha Declaration was more complex than had been assumed 
by Cliffe and Saul. 	Von Freyhold, for instance, explained the failure 
of Ujamaa in the following terms: 
They (bureaucrats) did not contradict him (Nyerere) 
openly, first because they needed him to appease 
workers and peasants and secondly, because they 
expected that in practice the whole campaign would 
look quite different - as indeed it did. Eventually 
the bureaucracy managed to turn the slogan of Ujamaa 
into a tool which could be used for its own purpose. 
(Von Freyhold, 1979: 120) 
Reginald Green: pragmatic dependency 
The view that Tanzania was it a socialist country because of its 
failure to eliminate its dependencrelationship with iht-national 
capitalism was challenged in the 1970s by writers who may be seen as 
members of a more pragmatic school of thought. 	These writers accepted 
the dependency idea that the creation of an independent national economy 
was the ultimate goal, but they saw that exports and other links with 
the world market were necessary in order to finance development, 
especially the creation of manufacturing industry. 	Green was one of 
the main exponents of this view. 
Central to Green's conception of development was the notion of an 
independent national economy, which was equated with socialist economy. 
For Green, government policies were instruments for creating such an 
economy: 
The creation and maintenance of meaningful 
political independence requires the attainment 
of national political economies. A state 
whose economy is characterized by concentrated 
external dependence can hope to have neither a 
significant degree of control over the rate of 
growth and nature of allocation of domestic 
resources nor a high level of external credit-
ability and the national economy. 
(Green 1970.: 273) 
How does a Third World country achieve a national political economy? 
In the above article Green (1970 ) listed the elements of a strategy 
to bring about economic independence. 	This strategy presumed that 
countries like Tanzania must take the capitalist world market system 
as given and operate from there, because exports from agriculture were 
necessary to obtain the foreign exchange with which to buy capital and 
intermediate goods. 	. 
First, national self-reliance was a necessary policy, but this 
must not be taken to involve 'autarchy', which would defeat the goal of 
gaining foreign exchange. 	According to Green, self-reliance was really 
only "the awareness that only the citizens of an African state are 
primarily concerned with its welfare and progress" (Ibid: 293). 
Secondly, the state must increase taxation because it was only by this 
means that government revenue and domestic investible surplus could be 
obtained. 	Thirdly, industrialisation should be encouraged, followed 
by state control of institutions at the apex, leverage over other 
financial institutions, trade and industrial licencing, and control 
over exchange and imports (both as to levels and sources). 	Fourthly, 
there should be public sector involvement in productive activity. 
Green added three conditions to this strategy. 	First, "the 
political system which seeks to pursue these goals must demonstrate by 
example even more than by word, its commitment to austerity for itself 
and to an equitable distribution of benefits" (Ibid: 284). 	Second, 
manufacturing activities must be "orientated either to basic consumer 
goods or to simple construction materials and which are able to utilise 
largely local materials" and that outside capital was necessary but only 
to "help bridge the domestic savings-domestic-investment requirements as 
well as the foreign exchange gapu  (Ibid: 285). 	This perspective led 
Green to take a relatively indulgent view of Tanzania's development 
experience. 	According to Green, Tanzania had used its policies as 
instruments for achieving a socialist national economy. 	The national- 
isations that occurred and the subsequent development of the parastatals 
amounted to the 'replacement of foreign by nationals' and hence the 
beginning of creating a "national economy" (Green, 1977a:236). 	National 
economic integration was being pursued at every level, thus: 
During the period 1972-75, most new projects 
were concentrated on consumer goods, with low 
import content (textiles, sugar), pre-export 
processing (sisal twine, leather, cashew-nuts) 
paper and metal products (bicycles, light 
engineering), basic iron and steel. They 
therefore fit into this strategy of enhancing 
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internal linkages and reducing external 
dependence. 
(Green, 1979: 32) 
again according to Green: 
In simplistic terms the transition to socialism 
in Tanzania could be said to be nearly 
accomplished. 	Large scale economic activity 
is at least 80% in the public (or public 
majority) sector and will be 90% there by 1981. 
(Green, 1977b: 24) 
Tanzania's various policies for creating socialism had also been 
successful, according to Green. 	Thus the policy of Ujamaa was viewed 
as generally successful as late as 1974. 	Green states (1974a: 27) that 
"by the end of 1974 at least 7.500 ujamaa villages grouping about 3 
million people (30% of the agricultural self-employed) will be in 
existence compared to a handful as late as 1970" (Ibid: 27). 	In addition, 
exploitation had been eliminated and an egalitarian policy implemented, 
through a series of progressive taxation on the one hand, and by increasing 
wages for the lower income groups on the other hand (Green, 1974a). 
Finally, in Green's view: 
Tanzania has been able to pursue an energetic 
strategy of advance towards economic independence 
as an integral part of its overall development 
strategy, without massive evidence of resource 
misallocation, 	stagnation or basic social and 
political contradictions. 
(Green, 1970 : 323) 
Most of the problems which Tanzania has encountered are explained 
by Green as temporary ones, mainly the result of implementation: 
Inconsistencies and delays do exist in 
reconjiling projects and programmes with 
the strategies and goals, but these are 
specific weaknesses, not evidence that 
stated goals are not seriously meant or not 
related to key planning and management 
decisions. 
(Green, 1977a: 215) 
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Thus Green's basic position in relation toTanzania is that the 
fundamental problems facing the country are extrinsic to the main 
lines of government policy. 	What are seen by other analysts as costly 
failures reflecting the class nature of the state, appear in Green's 
work as incidental weaknesses due to problems of implementation or 
accidental factors. 
The contribution from political science 
The third type of approach to Tanzania has come from political 
scientists. 	Their interest was initially attracted by the unique 
political conditions existing in Tanzania after independence: the 
political stability which the country enjoyed and the attractive 
personality and political ideas of the President, Julius Nyerere. 
Both left-wing and liberal political scientists made early studies 
of the Party, Tanu. 	Friedman (cited in Hopkins, 1971: 65) argued that 
the Party had become a focal institution, an institution which pervades 
and dominates all other institutions. 	Bienen (1967) argued that the 
Party was "under-centralised 11 , with the centre having little power to 
affect decisions or behaviour at the local level or in national insti-
tutions. Cliffe (1972b)attributed the Party's weakness, however, not 
to organisational problems, but to a lack of ideological clarity. This 
view was supported by Saul (1973) who re-emphasised the absence of 
ideologically-minded and progressive Party members as its weakness. 
Later political scientists, mainly Tanzanians, documented the 
ascendancy of the Party towards supremacy (Msekwa: 1977) while Mwansasu 
(1979) has shown the attempts made by the Party to rectify its organi-
sational weakness through the recruitment of qualified manpower and 
through a greater emphasis on ideological training. 	The strengthening 
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of the Party, both organisationally and ideologically, has been 
considered crucial in enabling the Party to perform its functions 
under conditions of Party supremacy. 	Mfupe (1976) has looked into 
the debates of the Party Annual Meetings to assess the degree of 
democracy in the types of questions asked between 1967-1975. 
Political scientists have also studied the Government (Pratt, 1976; 
Tordoff, 1965; Hopkins, 1971, 1968). 	In The Critical Phase in Tanzania 
Pratt writes about Government mainly from the point of view of the 
political actors, notably, Nyerere. 	Earlier, Tordoff analysed 
Government structures as well as the major policies of the pre-1967 
period, and Hopkins studied Parliament. He analysed the types of 
questions that were posed and found that there were more debatesprior 
to 1965 than afterwards (Hopkins, 1968: 55). 	Rweyemamu and Hydén (1 9744)4H . 
and Belle Harris (1965-67) have provided useful documentation on how the 
administration functions under conditions of the centrality of the Party 
in development. 	An interesting point which emerges from a review of 
early political science studies is the rurring theme of conflict between 
the Party and Government. 	This evidence of conflict indicates that the 
'state' was not a homogeneous entity as.nèo-Marxist radicals and the 
pragmatic dependency theorists have assumed. 
A few political scientists have also studied policies (Collins, 
1971; Hyden, 1979, 1980). 	For instance, Hyden (1980) attempts to 
relate policies which were formulated by the Party to the type of 
developmental consequences they generated. On two major policies, 
Ujamaa (1967) and Mwongozo (1971), his writings offer a useful alternative 
to the Marxists' explanations of the. Tanzanian experience. 	Since Hyden 1 s 
writings relate significantly to the position held in this thesis, I 
shall summarise his book extensively. 
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In Beyond Ujamaa (1980) Hyden sets out an alternative explanation 
of the Tanzatian experience. He makes two major propositions. Firstly, 
he argues that capitalism failed to develop African economies. Capitalist 
policies were based on the market-economy, which aimed to integrate 
peasants into a wider socio-economic context. But the existence of the 
peasant mode of production and the !eonomy of affection' is, argues 
Hyden, evidence of the failure of capit1ism to develop African economies. 
Peasants remained autonomous from the state in the sense that they were 
not dependent on the state for their livelihood, education etc. (reproduction). 
This leads him to his second major proposition. 
Hyden further argues that the failure of policies based dri the 
market-economy necessitated the.introduction of a different policy-style, 
one which is based on a political-market. Generally speaking, policies 
based on a political-market ard formulated primarily from the point of 
view of achieving the aims of the state. 	More specifically however 
policies were made by politicians who were "more inclined to start from 
the peasant premise". 	They formulated policies which embodied the 
point of view of the peasants, that is, to receive benefits without having 
to give a return in terms of producing more. 	This created a situation 
whereby economics fed politics: 
The political market-place, unlike the economic 
market, is a typically pre-modern institution. 
Many of the deals that are entered into are 
expensive, at least as seen from the perspective 
of the capitalist or socialist mode of production. 
There is no emphasis on efficiency. In that 
respect politics in Africa is not sub-ordinated 
to the demands of the relations of production. 
It is this pre-modern articulation that makes it 
possible to claim that in Africa economics feed 
politics, as opposed to capitalist and modern 
socialist societies where economics breeds 
politics. 
4 	 (Ibid: 30) 
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But the consequences of such a process for development invariably 
include the breakdown of production, upon which the modern economy 
is dependent. 	Hyden uses the policies of Ujamaa and Mwongozo to 
illustrate this second proposition. 	In the case of the policy of 
Ujamaa the state gave peasants free social amenities in the hope that 
they would join Ujamaa villages. 	The state's attempts to alleviate 
peasants' 'exploitation' by removing poll tax, providing schools and 
dispensaries and water free of charge, providing subsidies and access 
to loans (which peasants were unable to repay) and relaxing by-laws 
regarding agricultural production, all worked against the state's 
rationality in the sense that these initiatives did not facilitate the 
state's aim of integrating the peasants into the modern economy. Instead, 
they helped the peasants to maintain their 'autonomy' vis-a-vis the state, 
because they could obtain benefits without giving anything in return. As 
Hyden states: 
The officials 'gave away' some of the policy 
instruments that over the years had served to 
make the peasants more dependent on other social 
classes. 
(Hyden, 1980: 124) 
The crux of Hyden's argument is that the state's needs for foreign exchange 
and sources of food are dependent on the peasants, but the latter are 
not dependent on the state for their reproduction. 
The second reason for the failure of Ujamaa stemmed from the 
peasant mode of production itself. The peasant mode of production was 
not capable of increased production: 
The problem is that they (peasants) are 
unwilling, and usually unable, to achieve 
it (high rate of production) at a pace 
and to the extent that other social classes 
demand of them. 
(Ibid: 125) 
Hyden concludes that: 
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Ujamaa as a radical strategy of development 
at a national level could not be reconciled. 
with its objective of promoting development 
from within the peasant mode. 
(1980: 117) 
Hyden finds similar problems with the policy of Mwongozo, which 
gave powers to workers vis-a-vis the management. 	Thus, although social 
amenities were given to the workers - for example, transport, cafeteria 
services, time-off to visit sick relatives etc. - workers did not work 
harder. 	"Their sense of socialism was that they would have more time 
for themselves and their families" (Ibid: 161). 	As a result of this, 
Mwongozo only managed to undermine the discipline, authority and economic 
criteria of evaluation which were all identified with modern organisation. 
According to Hyden, in effect the'two policies, Ujamaa and Mwongozo, failed 
because the needs of the workers and peasants were incompatible with the 
needs of the state. 
Hyden then sets out his third major proposition, namely that in 
order to develop a socialist economy it is necessary to break down 
peasants' autonomy and make them dependent on the state for their 
reproduction. 	This proposition enables him to explain the recent 
coercive measures by the Party to make peasants increase their prod- 
uction. 	According to Hyden, the failure of Mwongozo and Ujamaa does 
not signify the redundancy of the political-market. 	The political-market 
is defined thus: 
It is an approach in which the political 
ends of the regime are employed by the 
leaders to justify the use of the state 
machinery regardless of what the formal 
rules and regulations prescribe. 
(Ibid: 220) 
In this way Hyden sees the new approach of the Party as the 'correct' 
way to modernise the economy as a prelude to socialist construction; 
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that is, the increasing reliance on coercion and intimidation is the 
only 'socialist' option left. 
Hyden argues that the emphasis which has been put recently on the 
building up of a strong leadership, and the process of militarization 
of leaders in the Party which has taken place, have been in the hope 
that 'military discipline and organisation' will lessen the demands of 
the economy of affection. 	The material incentives which have been given 
to Party leaders making them at least 'one step above the highest paid 
state officials at equivalent rank' (Ibid: 171), were to enable Party 
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leaders to act as,,socialist managerial elite. 	Hyden's main argument is 
that it is necessary to strengthen the political machinery in order to 
break the autonomy of the pre-capitalist economy of affection. 
Hyden's study is a path-breaking attempt to study policies in relation 
to the political context. 	His approach focusses attention on the short- 
comings of policies themselves rather than invoking extrinsic issues to 
explain their failure. 	In this way, Hyden's work has given us a new 
understanding of why the policies of Ujamaa and Mwongozo failed and had 
to be reversed. 
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THE CASE FOR A FRESH APPROACF 
Crises of dependency theory and the inadequacies of class analysis 
We have seen how the writings of the radical left on Tanzania 
typically explain political-economic changes in terms of the class-
analysis and Tanzania's dependence vis-a-vis international capitalism. 
I believe this approach has serious inadequacies. 
In the first place writers on the Tanzania scene have not incorporated 
into their analyses now standard critiques of the dependency perspective. 
Secondly, the hypothesis derived from a class analysis of development 
policy in Tanzania do not stand up to close inspection. I shall begin 
with the first point which calls for a brief digression. 
The origins and development of dependency ideas have been well 
documented by various authors (Booth, 1975; Cardoso, 1979; Palma, 1978). 
From the analysis of these writers we can discern three major intellectual 
influences on the development of the dependency ideas. 	These were 
Marxist theories of imperialism, the Prebisch thesis and the Cuban 
Revolution. 
First, the Marxist-Lennist tradition on imperialism had argued that 
during the different historical epochs of capitalism, metropolitan 
countries had exploited the periphery. 	During the earlier stages of 
capitalist development in the centre, exploitation of the periphery took 
the form of plunder which provided the primitive accumulation of the 
centre's industrial development. 	The second type of exploitation, 
reflecting the maturation of capitalism at the centre, was characterised 
by the export of capital, competition for raw materials and monopoly. The 
third type of relationship between the centre and periphery involved a 
more complex post-co1onial relationship of dependency in which foreign 
t. 
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capital and technological dependency went to create obstacles to the 
genuine development of the periphery (Sutcliffe, 1972). 	These ideas 
of imperialism influenced the general theoretical approach of the 
dependency school, which viewed centre-periphery relationships as 
exploitative. 
The second major influence on dependency ideas was the Prebisch 
thesis. 	Raul Prebisch worked from the late 1940s with the UN Economic 
Commission for Latin Nnerica. 	The Prebisch thesis argued (in a period 
when conservative ideas about development, which emphasised the naturalness 
of concentrations on primary production, were very popular) that the 
relationship between the centre and periphery created obstacles for the 
latter's development, especially its capacity to accumulate capital. He 
identified as the principal obstacle 	adverse shifts in the terms of 
trade. 	This factor affected the capacity of the peripheral country to 
accumulate capital. 
It is important to note that during this period Prebisch was still 
working with economic variables such as capital accumulation, prices and 
productivity. 	Secondly, he did not call for the elimination of centre- 
periphery relationships; rather he called for an inward-directed 
development strategy, and for foreign investment. 
Prebisch's thesis was criticised by both the Left and the Right. 
The Left was influenced by theories of imperialism and new ideas about 
neo-colonialism, notably expressed in the work of Baran (1957). Baran's 
major argument was that the political structures of peripheral countries 
had to be radically altered in order to allow economic growth and social 
progress. 	It was necessary to break down the alliance between the feudal 
landlords, industrial royalities and the capitalist middle class. 
Although there were differences between Prebisch's and Baran's 
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ideas, there were also certain similarities. 	This was in relation 
to internal obstacles. 	Both agred that the 'feudal-imperialist 
alliance' constituted a major obstacle and both attacked the centre. 
Both agreed that their removal was a necessary factor in creating the 
conditions for development (Cardoso, 1979: 62-3). 
During the 1950s and 1960s most Latin American countries did adopt 
Prebisch's inward-oriented development strategy based on import-
substitution and foreign.capital. 	This process was facilitated 
because foreign capital had changed its emphasis, moving away from mining 
and agriculture, and beginning to invest in manufacturing industries 
(Chilocole and Edeistein, 1974; Bodenheimer, 1971). 	But by the 1960s 
the inward-directed development strategy adopted by Latin America was 
experiencing problems. 	There were adverse terms of trade conditions, 
which affected the foreign exchange balance; profit repatriation was 
taking place on an alarming scale; and the process of social marginali- 
sation that industrialisation set in motion was becoming acute. 	These 
conditions were analysed in the 1968 UNECLA Report, which argued that 
development in Latin America was 'perverse development'. 	The line of 
argument which was used drew attention to the "structural distortion 
and social malaise" which was taking place. 	This emphasis, however, 
was still situated within the centre-periphery theoretical framework 
of the Prebisch thesis. 	This new emphasis became known as the 
structural dependency conception of development (Furtado, 1970; Sunkel, 
1969). 	Among these writers there was no argument that periphery 
countries should opt out of the capitalist world market system. A more 
radical tendency was expressed in the work of Gunder Frank (1967). 
Gunder Frank, who had also worked with the UNECLA, added a new 
element to the structural dependency arguments. 	This was that it was 
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necessary to opt out of the global capitalist system if the countries 
of the periphery were to achieve development. 	He argued that capitalism 
actively underdeveloped the periphery. 	This new political emphasis, 
breaking away from international capitalism, can be traced to the 
influence of the Cuban Revolution and to a revival of the Leninist 
theory of imperialism. 	The achievement of development became a political 
struggle against capitalism and imperialism. 
As a result of this, the definition of development also changed. 
Development became equated with an autonomous type of socialist 
development, because dependency on international capitalism created under -
development. 	Mere economic growth was not considered to be development; 
as Samir Amin, succinctl.y pointed out in relation to the 'miraculous' 
performance of the Ivory Coast, "it was economic growth without deve l opmentu 
(Amin, 1973: 66). 	The idea of development changed from a focus on 
economic growth and technical considerations to do with savings, capital 
accumulation, foreign exchange, prices and production, to a broad and 
often moralistic vision, which incorporated ideas of national autonomy, 
even development and social equality (Dos Santos, 1973; Cockcroft 	et alia 
1972; Cardoso, 1972). 
Although these ideas appeared to explain many of the problems of 
Third World countries, nevertheless, a critical re-examination of 
dependency ideas shows that they were dangerously flawed. A common flaw 
is generalisation from limited evidence and drawing far-reaching conclusions 
on the basis of specific and short-lived situations. 	It has been 
argued 	(Palma, 1978) that in elaborating his theory of 
imperialism, Lenin generalised from limited and short-lived situations. 
A similar mistake was also committed by structural dependency writers in 
the 1960s. 	According to Cardoso (1979: 66) writers who analysed the 
-31- 
development process in Latin America during this period, mistook 
"the recession circle which began in early 1960s for a law implying 
the difficulty if not impossibility of development on the periphery". 
This mistake was raised to a theoretical level, that of the inability 
of capitalism to develop peripheral economies. 	As a result of this, 
critics then began to make a moral distinction between growth and 
development. 	As Cardoso states: 
The fragility of such a formulation consists 
in its mistaking the socialist critique of 
capitalism, for the inviability of capitalism 
(Cardoso, 1979: 66) 
The flaw of formulating theoretical generalisations from limited empirical 
and historical evidence is compounded by the tendency for the dependency 
approach to compete with its rivals on a political, rather than a 
theoretical basis. 	Empirical situations tend to be fitted into a fixed 
set of categories even if the latter do not explain the former; attempts 
are not made to revise the categories themselves in order to reach new 
theoretical understandings (Friedman, 1976). 	In other words, the 
political takes precedence over scientific rigour (with the obvious risk 
that conclusions derived will be wrong and any political action based on 
it misdirected). 
The inadequacies of dependency ideas emerge even more clearly 
when they are re-examined along the lines of Lall (1975). 	He states 
that if dependency theory is to be used as an explanation of underdevelopment, 
then it must fulfil two criteria. 	First, it must lay down certain 
characteristics of dependent economies which are not found in non- 
dependent ones. 	And secondly, these characteristics must be shown to 
affect adversely the course and pattern of development of the dependent 
countries. 
-32- 
Lall finds that the dependency perspective does not generate 	- 
systematic differences between 'underdeveloped' and 'advanced' economies. 
Belgium and Canada are more dependent on foreign capital and technology 
than India and Pakistan. 	The argument that Third World countries are 
forced to specialise according to static comparative advantage in the 
export of primary products or simple manufactured goods does not hold 
true either. 	Many Third World economies with MNC capital export 
manufactured goods and 	attempt to integrate their economies with 
world capitalist markets. 	Lall is therefore forced to conclude that: 
That the concept of dependence as applied to 
less developing countries is impossible to 
define and cannot be shown to be causally 
related to the continuance of underdevelopment. 
(Lall, 1975: 808) 
Ray (1973) also criticised the dependency argument by questioning the 
causal relationship between dependency and underdevelopment. According 
to Ray, the dependency argument that underdevelopment, \brought about by 
the domination of the centre on the periphery is a fallacy. 	He points 
out tbat  domination of a weaker economy, by a powerful one is not restricted 
to capta1ist societies but is also found in socialist countries. Ray's 
second point is that dependency writers tend to homogenise all effects 
of foreign capital and fail to differentiate between investments in 
different sectors of the economy, which may have different effects on 
economic development. 	Finally, Ray argues that there is an implicit 
or explicit assumption in all dependency arguments that there is an 
alternative type of development which is non-dependent. 	Ray argues 
that this assumption is fallacious. 	Market relations also operate in 
socialist countries, because all countries need to trade; thus a country 
will sell what other countries need to buy. 	In such a situation, a 
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country must re-structure its economy to its external market needs. 
This is true whether a country is socialist or capitalist. 	Weisskopf 
(1976) also finds that there is no causal relation between dependency 
and underdevelopment, although the latter has been characterised by 
inequality, high unemployment, enclave-type industries, etc. 	He states: 
My main point is that these aspects of - 
inequality, unemployment, waste and lack of 
popular sovereignity which do indeed 
characterise dependent nations - cannot 
simply be attributed to dependence per Se, 
for they are inherent in the operation of 
the capitalist mode of production whether 
or not it takes a dependent form. 
(Weisskopf, 1976: 21) 
And that, "jn the contemporary world situation dependence appears neither 
in theory or in fact to be a major independent obstacle to economic 
growth or industrialisation" (Ibid, 1976: 13). 	Thus we can see that 
dependency arguments do not stand up to serious re-examination of their 
basic cat.&saL propositions. 	Other objections have been made concerning 
the conceptual structure of the theory. 
According to Bernstein (1979) the dependency school, despite its 
radical ideology, took its underlying model of development from the 
modernisation school. 	It was a model of an idealised version of 
capitalist development portrayed as autonomous and self-centred with 
full employment and social services. 	This picture was taken as a 'norm' 
with which underdevelopment, a dis-norm, was contrasted. 	Bernstein 
(1979: 91) states: 
That world economy is as much a condition of 
existence of advance capitalist economies as 
of underdeveloped ones; that the bulk of 
international capital flows and trade takes 
place between the advanced capitalist countries; 
that production for the international market 
has been important throughout the history of 
industrial capitalism; that the internationalisation 
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of productive capital, the interpenetration 
of capitals, and the internationalisation 
of production processes, they increasingly 
entail, are of central importance to the 
advanced capitalist economies; that, in short, 
they are no more 'autonomous' than the under-
developed economies - all this is lost at the 
moment of making seif-centredness the disting-
uishing attribute of 'development'. 
(Bernstein, 1979: 91) 
Phillips has also suggested that dependency arguments rest on "a contrast 
betweeh development in the (underdeveloped countries) and an idealised 
version or type of development ... an ideal type of 'normal capitalist 
development' which serves as a measure by means of which we can recognise 
underdevelopment, an ideal type which ... does not correspond to the 
actual process of development in most of the advanced capitalist countries 
(Phillips, 1977: 11). 	Because of this elementary mistake, the dependency 
school condemned capital because it was not sufficiently 'national' (Ibid: 
Equally, one might add, exports were often viewed with contempt because 
they were taken as a mechanism of dependency on international capitalism 
(Cardoso, 1972). 
These criticisms of the dependency conception of development are 
very useful because they have shown what was intrinsically wrong with 
the theory. 	Notwithstanding this, writers on the Tanzanian scene have 
continued to work with conceptual schemes derived from dependency theory 
and have not thought through the implications of its critique. 	For 
instance, Von Freyhold (1979), Shivji (1976), Saul (1979) and Coulson 
(1979) have persisted in analysing Tanzania's policies in terms of 
either its efforts to eliminate dependency or its failure to do so. 
When the Tanzanian government under the strain of the economic crisis 
of 1974/75, was forced to find solutions, critics again argued in terms 
of the failure of the state to implement socialism (Raikes & Boesen, 
1976; Tschannerl, 1976) rather than in terms of the failure of their 
own theories. 	For the radical writers theoretical advance appears to 
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have come to a standstill as far as the interpretation of Tanzanian 
reality is concerned. 
I would argue that it is wrong to approach Tanzania's development 
experience in terms of the 'need' to break with dependency and/or 
failure to achieve this goal. 	As a second point, I would argue that 
the pattern of Tanzanian policy before and since the Arusha Declaration 
is incapable of being explained in class-interest terms. 
In the first place the radical writers do not succeed in explaining 
away apparent contradictions between the types of policies pursued and 
what one would have thought to be the class interests of those in power. 
In order to explain such 'progressive' policies as those of the Arusha 
Declaration and Mwongozo, not only Saul but also Von Freyhold and Shivji 
have to go 'outside' their own methodologies. 	Thus, whieSau'l identified 
a 'progressive wing of the petty bourgeoisie' (1975: 181, Von Freyhold is 
forced to distinguish between TMnizers" and "individual nizers" (1975: 18) 
and Shivji resorts to 'a few progressive and revolutionary leaders' (cited 
in Saul, 1975: 21). 	When it comes to explaining the failure of the 
Arusha Declaration policies to eliminate Tanzania's dependency there are 
other contradictions. 	Shivji (1976) and Von Freyhold (1979) argue that 
the state has become a partner of international capital. 	But it is far 
from clear what those in power have gained from this alliance, given 
Tanzania's chronic economic problems and stagnation. 
Secondly, the explanation of policy changes and reversals in terms 
of class struggles is unconvincing. 	For instance, Shivji explains the 
demands to replace private trade with co-operatives in terms of the 
"class-struggle between the commercial bourgeoisie and the petty- 
bourgeoisie". 	The decision to dissolve the co-operatives in 1976, 
after having replaced private trade, is also explained by Shivji in 
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terms of the class interests of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, because 
it enabled the latter "a further penetration of the economy" as a 
prelude to creating its class base on the foundation of state ownership 
(Shivji, 1976: 74-76). But how would Shivji explain the reversals of 
these policies in 1982, when the very same bureaucratic bourgeoisie 
re-instituted the co-operatives? The ethoo1;y o cs-irss 
fails to offer an adequate explanation. 
Thirdly, examples of mis-management of public funds, corruption or 
the inability of Government to take necessary action are given an 
artificial aura of rationality so that they can be explained on the 
basis of class-interests. Svendsens(1977) description of Phillip Raikes'S 
analysis of Tanzania aptly summarises the point. 	Raikes 
presents a model whereby irrational action 
in Tanzania can be explained by the interests 
of the state bureaucrats in increasing its 
income, career opportunities and power and 
control over the population. What appears to 
be odd and incompetent behaviour of officials 
turns out to be rational action as it strengthens 
the position of the bureaucratic class. 
Tp take another example, Resnick (1981: 169) outlines various types of 
aluses which have taken place in the Government: 
Some ministries failed to keep adequate records 
and at one point one ministry did not know on 
what it had spent more than $5 million over and 
above its original allocation, more than one year 
afterwards. 
The Ministry of Finance labelled the orgy of spending 
'recklessness and negligence' and warned that the 
deficits created would, at the very least, endanger 
the internal and external economic positions 
Still the ministries refused controls, and some of 
the disasters of the mid-1970s must be laid at 
their doors. 
The means of control and sanction existed, but neither 
the ministries with such power, nor the cabinet, nor 
the president, were willing to exercise them. 
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These examples are used by Resnick to illustrate how the 'privileged 
classes continued to exploit peasants and workers after 1967 ... this 
took many forms, including industrial acts for direct personal gain, 
institutional manipulation, and the use of power by relatively large 
groups to advance, consolidate, or avoid the erosion of their privilege" 
(Ibid: 166). 	Resnick thus gives a 'rational', class-interest explanation 
for the inability of the Government to assert its control but such an 
explanation ignores the fact that the Government's inaction creates the 
conditions for its own loss of legitimacy and in the long run may lead 
to its downfall. 	Plunder is different from the rational pursuit of 
class interests. 	While the latter creates conditions favoyrable to 
political stability and economic growth, the former leads to destabilisation 
and economic stagnation. 
The explanations offered by the intellectual left - to conclude - 
have failed to explain a number of issues which they themselves identified 
as central. 	An incorrect formulation of the nature and causes of Tanzania's 
economic backwardness had led to a concentration of the wrong problems and 
the proposing of unrealistic solutions. 	By postulating development as a 
necessarily independent and autonomous process, and seeing this as a 
potentially achievable alternative, these writers have deflected attention 
from real problems. 
Secondly, their stress on class-interests in analysing the adoption 
and ultimate failure of Tanzania's radical policies also produces made-
quate explanations. Nowhere is a convincing account given of the link 
between class interests and policy decisions. 	In fact, the examples 
chosen to illustrate this link fail to explain what they are supposed 
to explain. 	On this basis I would argue that radical writers have 
been unable to extend our understanding of the Tanzanian situation, and 
that they have failed to increase our knowledge of both 
developmental and theoretical issues. 	As Whitehead pointed out: 
The main evidence that a methodology is 
worn out comes when progress within it 
no longer deals with main issues. 
(cited j;fl, Moore, 1958: 111) 
Reginald Green: analysis as apologia 
While the radical intellectuals may be accused of naivety in 
their analysis of Tanzania's development, no such accusations can be 
levelled against Green. 	We saw that although Green accepted the 
dependency definition of development, equating it with the creation of 
an independent national economy, he nevertheless differed from the 
radical writers who argued that it was necessary to break off links with 
international capital. 	Green argued that the export sector was 
necessary to Tanzania because of its capacity to earn foreign exchange. 
Without foreign exchange, Tanzania could not buy the intermediate and 
capital goods needed to expand local manufacturing. 	There is, however, 
a major defect in this type of development strategy. 	This is that 
recurrent balance of payment crises are inherent within the strategy 
itself. 	This can be explained in the following manner. 	In the 
Tanzanian context, a development strategy based on agriculture for 
foreign exchange and taxation for local revenue to finance 	import- 
substitution type 	industries catering for the domestic market means 
that essentially weak sectors of the economy are made to finance demanding 
and expanding sectors of the economy. 
In relation to taxation, a limit can be reached very fast in a 
country with a very narrow tax base owing to the large size of the 
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subsistence sector. 	Relying on agriculture as,source of foreign exchange 
and government revenue is dangerous, because of its dependency on world- 
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market fluctuations and unstable weather conditions. 	Tanzania's export 
crops are also weak in terms of their purchasing power on the world 
market. 	Finally the low technological level of Tanzania's predominantly 
peasant agriculture precludes a very rapid increase in the agricultural 
surplus. 
The second type of weakness associated with financing a process of 
import-substituting industrialisation from the export of cash crops is 
outlined by Schydlowsky and Wicht (1978: 27). 
A central ten 	of import substituting 
industrialisation is that industry must grow 
at a faster rate than the primary sectors of 
the economy. 	Since industry requires imported 
raw materials as an input, its rapid growth 
means that the demand for imported inputs and 
hence for foreign exchange, will also grow 
very rapidly. 	The supply of foreign exchange, 
however, is provided by the primary sectors, 
which grow more slowly. For a time this 
divergence in rated of growth of the demand and 
supply of foreign exchange is sustainable. In 
part this is so because industry grows from a 
much smaller base than the primary sectors, and 
in part because of the foreign exchange savings 
which the import substitution process itself 
generates. The time comes, however, when the 
level of demand of raw materials has become such 
that the fast rate of industrial growthcornpletely 
outstrips the ability of the primary sectors to 
supply the foreign needs thus generated. At that 
point, a balance of payment crisis arises and the 
industry must stop growing. 
According to Schydlowsky and Wicht, the self-limiting nature of this type 
of development strategy is also self-perpetuating. 	Since the central 
policy element in the strategy of import substitution is protection, the 
prices of industrial products are above those in the international 
markets and are often not of good quality. 	The more mature the import 
substitution process the higher the industrial cost level of the 
industrial system becomes compared to world cost levels. 	When the 
balance of payments crisis occurs as the result of the divergent growth 
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rates, the country finds it difficult to export its inanufactured goods, 
since costs are too high. 
Thus Green's broad development strategy carried within it serious 
problems. 	A second major type of weakness in Green's analysis of 
Tanzania's development process is his tendency to hide and therefore 
obscure serious defects. 	We can see this in various of his writings. 
Green views problems as extrinsic to policies. 	Thus, economic 
problems tend to be viewed as having external origins. The drought 
of 1973/74 is treated as a 'natural' disaster, and no attempt is made, 
for example, to investigate the effects of low prices on production 
(1974a: 44; 1977a: 251). 	Inflation is also treated as a wholly and 
unexpected factor (1974a: 44; 1977a: 251). 	It is difficult to see 
how Green, given his commitment to import-substitution, can regard 
imported inflation as exogenous to national policy considerations. As 
a result of this methodology of viewing problems as external to policies, 
Green is unable to predict crises (1977b: 13, 23). 	For instance, in 
1977 Green wrote: 
Public finance and domestic savings are to 
pose continuing difficulties but no major 
crises over 1976-81. 
(Green, 1977b: 23) 
In 1974/75 Tanzania experienced her first major economic crisis. Green 
explained the crisis in terms of external factors. 	Thus: 
External events in late 1973 and 1974 
combining to create a major crisis for 
Tanzania. 
(Green, 1974b: 44) 
Green has found it increasingly difficult to explain away problems with 
external constraints arguments. He has been forced to acknowledge that 
certain problems may be derived from policies. For instance, he has 
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noted that political policy decisions (on major national issues) are 
often taken without official (ministerial) participation and this 
leads to low output. 	But such an approach, we are told, 
Must be weighed against the failure to 
overcome inertia and to achieve any serious 
dynamic of development which is likely with 
pure increnientalism. 
(1979: 22) 
Green has to accept that inefficiency has become a chronic problem. 
But he argues that efficiency is definable only in relation to a set of 
goals. 	When these are not complementary, efficiency cannot be evaluated 
without taking into account gains and losses in respect of each goal, 
and often as well without looking at a set of institutions and policies 
together. 	Green states: 
Tanzania has not been efficient in raising 
exports: to the extent this has reduced its 
capacity to mobilise surplus and has increased 
its dependence on foreign funds, it is relevant 
inefficiency; to the extent it was the price 
of re-orientating productive structure towards 
domestic ones, it is not. 
(1979: 40-41) 
Ithe price of re-orienting productive structures towards domestic funds 
is the stagnation of all other economic-social development, then might 
one not have expected Green to have questioned the wisdom of the goal 
itself? 
Green also resorts to blaming particular groups of people for 
policy failures. 	The 1971 mini-crisis is explained by Green in relation 
to "foreign-consultant-designed restructuring" (1980: 14). 	He does not 
blame rising consumer-goods prices on scarcity of goods, but argues that 
"the egalitariansim has led many retailers to leave, and the others to 
feel that they should raise margins to make money while they could" 
(1974a: 42). 	The tendency to explain essentially economic problems 
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of development in socio-political terms deflects attention from the 
study of those problems and therefore of their solutions. 	Finally, 
Green argues that implementation is the major cause for 
policy-failures (1974a: 31; 1977b: 25). 	Again, implementation 
problems are viewed as extrinsic to policy-making. 
Thus as late as 1979 Green could argue that Tanzania's problems 
"are problems of success and not of failure" (1979: 42) and that: 
Tanzania's record of progress towards its 
goals, and of overall efficiency in achieving 
that progress, needs no special apologies or 
rational isation. 
(Green, 1979: 42) 
Green can write the above passage without being able to grasp the irony 
of self-recognition. 	His methodology of viewing problems as extrinsic 
to policies is unable to explain Tanzanian reality. 	This situation has 
forced him to rationalise faulty and defective policies. 
From political institutions to development problems 
The work done by political scientists has been more valuable in 
comprehending the Tanzanian development experience than work done by 
other social scientists. Most of their analyses are of relevance in 
understanding crucial problems of development in Tanzania. 	For instance, 
most political scientists writing in the early 1960s highlighted the 
conflict between the Party and Government (Pratt (1976), Hopkins (1968) 
and Leys (1972: 187-195 ). 	This conflict was serious enought to warrant 
constitutional changes. 	These works show that the state in Tanzania 
was not homogeneous. 	Unfortunately, these findings have been ignored 
by other social scientists, especially the radicals who have continued 
to portray the state as a unitary entity. 	However, one of the weaknesses 
of the early political scientists has been their general inhibition about 
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studying the implications of the political system for development 
itself. 
The Tanzanian political scientists (Msekwa, 1977; Mwansasu, 1979) 
have continued the tradition of studying the Party to its fruition of 
supremacy. 	But they have failed to look into the more intricate 
problems of how the Party formulates its policies, and to look into the 
relationship between Government and Party under conditions of Party 
supremacy. 	These writers have also failed to assess the Party's 
capabilities in performing its full functions and the types of problems 
it is confronted with. 	Most of the analyses, though important because 
of the information they contain, tend to be descriptive rather than 
problem-orientated. 	In this way, they have remained of little 
theoretical or practical value to enable us to understand the problems 
of the Party. 
Hyden's study (1980) has been a great contribution to the under-
standing of the Tanzanian experience. I am sympathetic to most of 
Hyden's explanations, which are similar to the position I hold in this 
thesis. 	Our positions vis-a-vis the Marxist class analysis of the 
Tanzanian experience appear to be similar. 	Hyden's argument that it 
would be fruitful to understand the Tanzanian experience from "an analysis 
of the atua1 policy experienceu  (Hyden, 1980: 123) is similar to my 
position - as my criticisms of the radicals show. 
The second similarity between Hyden's study and my own is that he 
analysed two policies, Ujamaa and Mwongozo, and showed the consequences 
of wrong policies for development. I have attempted to use the policies 
on internal trade and private capital, as well as Ujamaa, to illustrate 
the consequences of policies which ignore economic considerations. 
But there are also divergences of view between Hyden and myself. 
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Hyden's major theoretical and empirical weakness rests on his argument 
that capitalism failed to develop the African economies, especially 
Tanzania. 	This argument is crucial in Hyden's thesis because, as we 
saw, it forms the premise upon which he builds up his whole thesis, 
namely the emergence of policies based on the political-market. 	And 
yet it is here that his arguments are weakest. 	Hyden sees the failure 
of capitalism to develop African economies in the continued existence 
of the peasant mode of production, which is self-sufficient and 
independent of the wider socio-economic system. 	As a result the 
peasants are autonomous from the state, they do not need the state 
because peasants can satisfy their needs independently of the state, 
while the latter is dependent on the peasants for foreign exchange and 
food. 	The relationship between the two has been characterised aS a tug- 
of-war, with the state trying to integrate the peasantry into commodity 
production, and the peasants resisting. 
But historical evidence on Tanzania has shown that peasants were 
'producing very effectively for the market (Coulson, 1982: 167 ). 
Although Hyden accepts this improvement in agriculture, he dismisses 
its relevance to his own arguments by stating that the petty-capitalist 
farmers were the main beneficiaries of the improvement approach" (Ibid: 
81). 	I would argue that it may be more fruitful to explain the existence 
of the peasant mode of production in Tanzania in terms of the specific 
historical factors rather than as evidence of the failure of capitalism 
to develop the economy. 	As I hope to explain in Chapter One, the lateness 
of Tanzania's integration into the world market, aggravated by the 
interruptions of historical events, hindered the process of integration 
of the peasantry into commodity production. 	In fact, it was only 
between 1950 and 1960 that commodity production could develop properly. 
.; . 
-45- 
It would appear that Hyddn did not make a distinction between the 
more specific experience of Tanzania and the idea of capitalism in 
general. 	Despite his opposition to the tendency of western analysis 
to impose their historical experience on theorisation about Africa, 
Hyden expects that capitalism should have the same effect in Tanzania 
in particular as it did in Western Europe, that is, to eliminate pre- 
capitalist relations. 	I would argue that Hyden's explanation for the 
failure of capitalism to eliminate pre-capitalist social relations in 
Tanzania defeats his own methodological principle that: 
We cannot presume a 'defined' reality a priori 
as a guide for our understanding of the African 
development problems because our models are 
built on different historical experience. 
(Hyden, 1980: 259) 
I would argue, therefore, that Hyden has not given convincing reasons 
for speaking of the failure of capitalism to develop Tanzania. This 
weakness affects his other arguments as we shall see. 
The second major weakness in Hyden's work is his failure to look 
into the struggle between the Party and Government. 	Hyden argues that 
the change of policy from reliance on the market to use of the political-
market place was brought about through the difficulty of getting at the 
peasants through market forces. 	According to Hyden: 
African politicians have tried to replace 
the market forces with a political market-
place. 
(Ibid: 30) 
The replacement of policies based on economic considerations by 
those based on political considerations was brought about, not by the 
failure of capitalism as Hyden argues, but rather by the conflict between 
the two organs of the state. 	Hyden fails to focus attention on this 
crucial relationship between the Party and Government, and appears to 
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have ignored previous writings by other political scientists on this 
subject. 	Although Hyden correctly points to the consequences of 
Ujamaa and Mwongozo, which led to the breakdown of the modern economy, 
he does not give sufficient weight to the institutional arrangements of 
policy-making in Tanzania and the specific way in which the Party 
formulates policies. 	By ignoring his earlier writings (1979) Hyden 
isolates the political-market context of policy-making from institutional 
arrangements. 
A final reservation which I have about Hyden's approach is the 
following. 	We saw that most radical writers have emphasised ideology, 
mobilisation and the creation of political cadres as instruments for 
creating socialism. 	Hyden, on the other hand, argues that these 
instruments are ineffective because the peasants are autonomous from 
the 'state': they can satisfy their basic needs independently of the 
'state'. 	This situation forces the 'state' to approach the peasants 
in the context of a zero-sum game (Ibid: 229) and, argues Hyden, it has 
forced the Party to adopt coercive and authoritarian measures to reach 
the peasants. 	In fact, Hyden states that 'sunless they apply coercive 
measures to change the premise of peasant action" (Ibid: 225), peasants' 
autonomous existence will continue and will defeat the development to a 
socialist or capitalist economy. 
But authoritarianism as a policy measuie must surely be seen as 
evidence of failure rather than as a means to success. 	It is not clear 
what levels of state violence might not be justified in these terms. 
Moreover, policies which tend to justify unpopular means by the ends 
could well undermine the political legitimacy of the Party, and hence 
alienate the very people the Party aims at supporting. 	Hyden's attempts 
to legitimise coercion as an option in development strategy should cast 
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grave doubts on some of his ideas. 
Conclusion 
In concluding this section we can say that the failure of Tanzania's 
post-Arusha policies to attain their objectives has not been satisfactorily 
explained. 	The argument of the radicals that Tanzanian socialism was 
sabotaged by the state bureaucracy is unconvincing in that it appears to 
imply that officials deliberately promoted the decline in the country's 
economic growth rate in the 1970s. 	In addition, the assumption that 
the bureaucracy and/or the state as a whole has a unitary 'character' 
seems difficult to sustain in the light of analyses by political scientists. 
The explanation offered by Green (1974a; 1974b; 1980, 1979) that 
Tanzania's pursuit of socialist and self-reliant goals was hindered 
substantially by 'external' factors of various kinds is only super-
ficially convincing. 	Tanzania is indeed dependent, as other countries 
are, on external factors such as the price of oil and other imported 
inputs. 	Together with strictly fortuitous factors such as the prevailing 
weather conditions, difficult international conditions played an undeniable 
role in Tanzania's recent development. 	However, this line of interpre- 
tation appears to ignore clear evidence suggesting that the main external 
constraints on Tanzania's development plans came into effect as a 
consequence of the policies pursued domestically. 
Hyden's explanation that the failure of policies based on economic 
considerations led to the adoption of policies based on political 
considerations is not very convincing. 	His argument that the policies 
of Ujamaa and Mwongozo failed because they were mistaken is correct but 
provides an insufficient basis for understanding the Tanzania experience. 
The persistent pursuit of inappropriate policies by rational and 
MO 
intelligent policy-makers itself has to be explained and is of 
sociological interest. 
A common feature of the radicals' and Green's interpretations 
of Tanzanian development problems is that all rely on explanatory 
considerations which are extrinsic to the basic policy options. 	Thus, 
in one form or another, the writers referred to take for granted the 
consistency and viability of dependency-influenced policies as instruments 
for creating socialism. 	Hyden has attempted to rectify this theoretical 
deficiency by arguing that the failure of Ujaniaa and Mwongozo were the 
result of intrinsic weaknesses in the policies. 	However, he adds that 
these were specific failures rather than signifying the failure of a 
particular policy-making style, which might bring him under the same 
criticisms. 	All these writers exempt key elements of the theoretical 
basis of Tanzanian policies from critical scrutiny. 	All also ignore 
the effects of the political system on the development process. 	Herein 
lies the case for a fresh approach. 	I would argue that the particular 
type of institutional arrangements evolved for policy-making and implement-
ation introduced chronic difficulties into the Tanzanian process of 
development. 
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THE THESIS: ORIENTATION, SOURCES AND STRUCTURE 
('lb' i ,,r+ 1- rn 
A major preoccupation of this thesis is with how social scientists 
have interpreted the Tanzanian development experience. This is of 
obvious interest because it can lead on to new interpretations and 
understandings of the Tanzanian experience. 	At the same time, a 
re-examination of the standard explanations becomes a theoretical 
problem to the extent that more general bodies of concepts and propos- 
itions inevitably come into play. 	The aim is to weld together empirical 
inquiry and theoretical concerns, and to subject theoretical propositions 
to critical scrutiny in the light of empirical data. 
The thesis seeks to identify the causes underlying the Tanzanian 
experience, and more specifically confronts three questions. 	First, 
which body, the Party or the Government, formulated the different policies 
at each stage between 1962 and 1982? 	Second, what conditions, including 
what theories or conceptions of development, influenced the formulation 
of these policies? 	Third, to what extent can the failure of policies 
be attributed to the conflict between the Party and the Government and 
to the conceptions of development each supported? 
The thesis will thus pursue three major themes in relation to the 
period under investigation 1962 and 1982. 	First, it will focus atterjtic 
on the relationship between the Party and the Government. 	This line of 
enquiry will help to evaluate the hypothesis that the state in Tanzan.i; 
is not the homogeneous and omnipotent entity which it has been issi:'"r1 
to be by most of those who have sought to construct theories on thc 
subject (Goulbourne, 1979a). 
The second theme is the views of development prevaiIin 
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and Government circles between 1962 and 1982. 	For the period up to 
1965, emphasis will be placed on how the Government formulated policies 
in major areas of the economy, and the Government's conception of 
development will be described. 	Government-formulated policies were 
criticised by leading Party members, especially the Regional Commissioners 
who dominated both the Party and Parliament. 	The view of development 
underlying these criticisms will be outlined. 	This line of enquiry will 
enable me to show that policies, as well as policy demands, were determined 
by the beliefs and understandings about developmental problems held by 
different groups policy-makers, but that they did not correspond to the 
class interests of those in power as has been commonly assumed. 
The third theme I propose to investigate will be the socio-economic 
consequences of the implementation of such policies. 	I hope to illustrate 
empirically the types of problems that are generated as a result of an 
institutional arrangement of policy-making after 1965 which separates 
policy-formulation from policy-implementation and tends to exclude 
economic considerations from the former. 	This line of enquiry will 
enable me to show that the problems Tanzania is experiencing are not 
merely the result of implementation difficulties, of exogenous constraints 
or of class-sabotage, but that they are inherent within the policies 
themselves. 
At one level, these three themes form a critique of the various 
academic explanations reviewed in the last section. At another level 
however, they form an alternative explanation of the Tanzanian develop- 
ment experience. 	The three themes are logically interrelated because 
each theme creates the conditions for the emergence of the next. 	As a 
result, all three themes appear in varying degrees throughout the three 
Parts into which the thesis is divided. 
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The first theme - relations between Party and Government - leads 
on to a consideration of the opposing views of development held by the 
Party and the Government respectively. 	The latter's view, I shall 
show, took economic considerations as the principal inputs into policy- 
making. 	The former based its conception of development on redistrib- 
utive goals and objectives relating to control of the economy. I argue 
that the co-existence of these two views of development created an 
ambiguous situation in Tanzania development policy despite the efforts 
of the Government to create a development consensus. 
The conflict between Party and Government which existed immediately 
after independence was resolved constitutionally in the 1965 Interim 
Constitution, which made the country a One Party State. 	The Constitution, 
however, gave the Party powers to formulate policies, while the 
Government was made responsible for their implementation. 	This 
institutional arrangement lent weight to the Party's view of development 
and to its tendency to regard economic constraints and implementation 
problems as secondary. 	In the decade after the introduction of the 
Interim Constitution, I show, this attitude hardened, and was elevated 
into a consistently 'political' approach to development. 
This leads directly to the third theme, that of the consequences 
of a style of policy-making which ignores economic considerations and 
implementation problems. 	This style came into the fore especially 
between 1969 and 1974, when the Party increasingly took responsibility 
for formulating policies and adopted an increasingly 'political' approach. 
It was consolidated by the growth of the Party to a de jure supremacy in 
1975. 	As I shall show in detail, Tanzania's development experience 
and its problems are best understood in relation to these facts. Hence, 
the economic crises of recent years are the result of these interna1 
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problems as well as of external ones, while what are commonly considered 
mere implementation problems are properly seen as the result of faulty 
policy-making. 
Sources 
The major sources which have been used for this investigation 
include policy statements from the Government and the Party (1962-1982), 
and Presidential statements about the relative roles of Government and 
Party. 	From these two sources the differing positions of the Party 
and the Government, and the official responsibility of each organ in 
policy-making, have been ascertained in a preliminary way. 
However, the interpretation of these statements and the conditions 
underlying them have been investigated further by looking at the records 
of various official bodies which discuss policies. 	These include the 
Parliamentary debates (the Hansard), some minutes of the National Executive 
Committee of the Party and those of the Central Committee of the Party, 
the Annual Conference of the Party and various Government bodies (including 
individual ministries). 	Most of this material is in Kiswahili and had 
to be translated into English. 
In addition, some 25 interviews were obtained with high-ranking 
Party and Government officials. 	The time spent on each interview was not 
less than three hours. The major theme underlying most of the questions 
was the relationship between the Party and Government in relation to 
policy-making. 	Some of the information gathered in this way cannot be 
directly attributed to individuals because of commitments to confidential- 
ity. 	Therefore references have been given using a form of words which 
indicates the approximate location and responsibilities of the interviewee 
without endangering his or her anonymity. 	A list of interviews and 
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their corresponding dates 	is contained in the appendix. Newspapers, 
The Nationalist (1962-1969) and The Daily News (1975-1981), as well as 
secondary sources have been used to fill in some gaps and check inter-
pretat ions. 
Structure 
The thesis is divided into three major parts. Parts One and Two 
make a thematic and chronological analysis of the Tanzanian experience 
from 1962 to 1982. 	Part One looks at the period before the Arusha 
Declaration when development policy-making was chiefly the province of 
Government; and Part Two covers the period 1967 to 1982 when policy- 
making was effectively in the hands of the Party. 	Throughout the two 
parts an attempt has been made to trace out consistently the three major 
themes: the relationship between the Government and the Party; the 
views on development held in the Party and in the Government, and how 
these influenced the types of policies pursued; and the types of 
problems that were generated by policies based essentially on 'political' 
considerations. 
Part Three contains case-studies of three major policy-areas, 
private capital, internal trade, and agriculture and rural development. 
In each of the case studies an attempt has been made to show the types 
of problems that are generated by a policy-making style which ignores 
the consideration of implementation problems. 	This sector-by-sector 
approach highlights in relation to specific policies and relying heavily 
on empirical materials the themes traced out in Parts One and Two, the 
relationship between Party and Government, and the contrasting views on 
development of the two organs of the state. 	In this way, Parts One and 
Two are reinforced by Part Three, and the latter is explained by the 
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first two parts. 
The Introduction has examined the three major scholarly inter-
pretations of the Tanzanian development experience, namely, the radical 
neo-Marxist position, the 'pragmatic dependency' approach and the work 
of political scientists. 	The argument has been that these interpre- 
tations have failed to give a satisfactory explanation of the Tanzanian 
experience and that there is a need for a fresh approach. 	The remainder 
of the thesis sets out the argument that the Tanzanian experience is best 
understood in relation to political-institutional arrangements and the 
contrasting views of development held by those responsible for policy-
making and implementation. 
Part One, entitled 'Party and Government Roles and Conceptions of 
Development Before the Arusha Declaration', is divided into four chapters. 
Chapter One, 'Colonial Economic and Social Policies', provides a short 
review of major policies highlighting the features which were to affect 
the relationship between the Party and Government after independence. 
Chapter Two is entitled 'Political Institutions and Conceptions of 
Development', and it examines the institutional arrangements for policy-
making and the conceptions of development prevailing in the different 
organs of the state between 1961 and 1963. 	Chapter Three, 'The First 
Five Year Plan and the Deepening of an Nnbiguous Situation', expands on 
the theme of a conflict between Party and Government expressed in 
opposing views of development. 	This chapter looks at how the Government 
argued for the acceptance of the First Five Year Plan (1964-1969) in 
Parliament and how members of the Party in turn criticised the Plan. 
The chapter also examines the 1965 Interim Constitution of the One Party 
State and its consequences for Party-Government relations and views of 
development. 	The fourth chapter, entitled 'Outcomes of Policies Before 
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the Arusha Declaration', outlines the successes and failures of Tanzanian 
development policies between 1962 and 1966 and sets out the argument 
that policies of development which were implemented as a result of 
political pressures were already creating immense problems by 1966. 
The second part of this thesis is called 'Development Policy-Making 
since Arusha: Party Ascendancy and Chronic Economic Crisis', and is 
divided into four chapters. 	Chapter Five, 'General Principles of Policy: 
The Arusha Declaration', analyses the various policies formulated as 
part of the Arusha Declaration. 	An attempt is made to examine the 
policies in terms of the President's, the Party's and the Government's 
views of development. 	It is argued that all three organs of the state 
were able to reassert their interests at different stages of the policy-
making process. 
Chapter Six, 'The Primacy of Politics in Development, 1969-1974/5 1 , 
considers the growth of the Party from de facto to de jure supremacy in 
1975 and the subsequent subordination of the Government. The most 
salient feature of this period is the adoption of a 'political' approach 
to development by all of the three organs of the state. 	A number of 
policies are analysed to illustrate this trend, implying the displacement 
of economic considerations from policy-making in new ways. 	The chapter 
argues that the real 'revolution' in Tanzanian policy occurred during 
this period and not with the Arusha Declaration as has been commonly 
assumed. 
Chapter Seven 'The Failure of Political Policy-Making andthe Economic 
Crisis of 1974-1975: Analysis of Academic Explanations'. 	This chapter 
looks at the outcomes of major policies such as Ujamaa and frongozo as 
well as at the economic crisis of 1974-1975. 	The chapter is concerned 
with the changes of policy that took place during this period and examines 
the academic and non-academic explanations that have been offered 
for these changes and for the economic crisis itself. 	The chapter 
advances the argument that the failure of major development policies 
as well as the economic crisis can be largely accounted for by the 
nature of policy-making in Tanzania, which does not give due attention 
to economic problems. 
Chapter Eight is entitled 'Party SuDremacy and Chronic Economic Crisis 
1979-1981/2'. 	It examines the 'liberalisation' type of policies 
pursued by the Government at this time and later reversed by the Party. 
It also looks into the period of economic crisis which began in 1979 
and reviews the external-versus-internal-constraints arguments put 
forward by officials in Tanzania and the multilateral financial agencies 
respectively. 	For the latest period, the argument is that the conflict 
between the Party'activists and Government still exists but that each 
organ of the state is now pursuing its own policies independently of 
the other and in different sectors of the economy. 
Part Three is entitled Policies on Private Capital, Internal Trade 
and Rural and Agricultural Development 1967-1982, and looks into three 
major areas of development policy between 1969 and 1982. The analysis 
of these parts is relatively detailed and empirical. 	However, the depth 
of analysis achieved is necessarily rather uneven, and the discussion on 
agricultural and rural development policies relies substantially on the 
secondary literature. 
This Part is divided into three chapters. Chapter Nine looks into 
the'Policy on Private Capital' from 1967 to 1982. The chapter attempts 
to show that there has been a conflict between the positions of the Party 
and the Government on the role of private capital in Tanzania. 	The 
President alternates his support between one position and the other. 
The lack of a consensus has led to conflicting measures being pursued and 
has created a de-stabilising situation. 
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ChapterTen: 'The Policy of Nationalisation of the Internal Trade System: 1967-1982 
examines policy on internal trade from 1967 to 1982. 	The three themes 
of the thesis are analysed in relation to specific policy changes which 
occurred during this fifteen-year period. 	The chapter looks at the 
nationalisation of foreign import-export trade and the creation of the 
State Trading Corporation in 1967; the Presidential Circular which 
nationalised wholesale and sub-wholesale trade in 1970; and the 
'socialisation' of the retail trade four years later. 	Each section is 
followed by an empirical analysis of the types of problems the policy 
generated in terms of its implementation. 
Chapter Eleven, 'Agricultural Growth and 	Rural Development', 
examines this sector of the economy from 1967 to 1982 paying particular 
attention to the three themes developed throughout the thesis. 	Finally, 
the case is made out that today the two organs of the state, the Party 
and the Government, are pursuing policies independently of each other. 
The findings of the thesis are summed up in a Conclusion. 
we 
PART ONE 	PARTY AND GOVERNMENT 
ROLES AND CONCEPTIONS OF 
DEVELOPMENT BEFORE THE 
ARUSHA DECLARATION 
As has been indicated in the Introduction the main concern of the 
thesis is with the interpretations of the failure of socialist 
policies initiated in the 1967 Arusha Declaration. 	However, the 
conditions which this thesis is examining as possible major contrib-
utors to this failure, that is, the conflict between the Party and 
Government and the conflicting views of development held by these 
two organs of the state developed before 1967 and particularly in 
the period between 1961 and 1967. 	It is this period with which. 
this Part is concerned. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
COLONIAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES 
This chapter is not an attempt to give a thorough socio-economic 
history of Tanzania before independence. 	Rather, it attempts to 
highlight certain socio-economic and political developments which occurred 
and which created the conditions in which differing views of development 
competed after 1961. 	Briefly, as a result of certain historical inter- 
ventions, Tanzania was less integrated into the international commodity 
exchange system in 1961 than many other Third World, including African, 
countries. 	The most salient feature of the low level of development 
was manifested in very low economic 3rOu)*\1r0t.. 	Two views of development 
emerged, one based on re-distributive ideas and control of the economy, 
and the other on economic growth based on private capital. 	These two 
views of development co-existed and competed for control of policy making. 
The analysis in this chapter is directed solely to show the conditions 
which led to the creation of the two views on development. 
When we examine Tanzania's historical economic development in the 
light of sociological theories of development four major factors assume 
significance. 	Firstly, the relatively recent movement of the Tanzanian 
economy into commodity production based on exchange; secondly, historical 
interruptions of both economic and political natures which affected the 
process and smooth development of commodity production; thirdly, a vast 
territory comprising 343,000 square miles of land making communications 
and administrationdifficult and finally, a harsh environment, associated 
with the prevalence of tse-tse fly and unreliable rainfalls in which 
agricultural activities took place. 
II 
As late as the 19th century when Egypt, Latin America and India 
were involved in production for the world market as well as in internal 
trade, Tanganyika, as it was then known, was still involved in trade 
based on plunder of ivory and slaves. 	Furthermore, the people of 
Tanganyika were still producing basically for their own subsistence 
and were divided into tribal groups. 	These facts do not deny that 
internal trade was beginning to develop (Roberts, 1969). 	But the process 
of peasantisation, that is, of producing for external and internal markets 
in a nationally defined territory, had not been established. 	This process 
only began in the 20th century but it was retarded by the intervention of 
global political and economic changes. 
In the 19th century the Oliani dynasty of Zanzibar controlled 
Tanganyika's trade of ivory and slaves but its political control of the 
mainland was weak. 	The Omani 	presence in the country was brought to 
an end when Britain allowed Germany to take over the mainland in the 
Anglo-German Treaty of 1886. 	This treaty formally introduced Germany's 
colonialism into Tanganyika, and the country became known as Deutsch 
Ost 	Afrika. 
Germany's first priority was to break the Arab monopoly of trade 
and assert its rule over the territory. 	Various economic policies 
were adopted by the Germans to replace the Arab 	influence, among these 
the replacement of the Zanzibar rupee by the German rupee, and the 
development of Dar es Salaam and Tanga ports to replace Bagamoyo. These 
measures were successful in isolating Zanzibar from its former trade 
activities. 	For instance, in 1911 Germany took 59% of the exports and 
Zanzibar only 10% compared with 22% in 1897 when 72% went to Zanzibar 
(Yaffey, 1970: 45). 
Arab interests in the mainland did not accept Germany's administration 
MIM 
because it undermined their trade links with Zanzibar. A rebellion 
known as the Abushiri rebellion 1888 and 1889 developed, which was 
crushed. 	But between 1889 and 1895 there were nine further revolts 
against the colonial administration by the peasants, which culminated 
in the Maji Maji War 1905-6. 	Thus from its colonisation to 1906, 
it took Germany nearly twenty years to merely establish its rule on 
the territory, and even then, problems of finance and manpower hindered 
total administrative control of the territory (Iliffe, 1979; Coulson, 
1982; Coupland, 1938; Yaffey, 1970; Rweyemamu, 1973). 
German colonial economic policies 
The economic aim of Germany's colonialism was to make the colony 
self-financing so that the latter would not require imperial subsidies 
for its development and would at the same time contribute to the metro-
politan economy. 	Self-f inancement of the economy meant that the 
territory had to generate its own revenue, local as well as foreign. 
This principle in economic development meant that the economy's prod-
uction had to change from subsistence to production based on exchange. 
Furthermore, in order to obtain foreign exchange with which to pay for 
imports, the colony had to produce crops which could find value on a 
foreign market. 	This process meant that the composition of crops, 
direction of trade as well as organisation of production had to be 
changed to meet the requirements of a foreign market, which, under German 
colonialism, was metropolitan Germany. 	As a result, products which were 
required by the Germans - sisal, rubber, gold - were in turn developed 
in the territory. 	Likewise, the colonial Government had to introduce 
taxation both as a means of revenue-generation and as a method of forcing 
peasants to produce for exchange. 	Thus in 1897 the German colonial 
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administration imposed a Hut Tax which could be paid in produce, cash 
or work and in 1905 a Poll Tax was introduced. 
From 1906 onwards the colonial administration tried to develop 
commodity production by promoting peasant-based agriculture activities. 
Rechenberg, for instance, the German Governor in Tanganyika (1906-1912) 
advocated the development of market infrastructure and trade as well as 
fair returns to the producers as a means of making peasants produce for 
the market. This policy was more successful than the experience of white 
settlement farming had been. 	Although by 1913 543,124 hectares of the 
best land had been alienated (Rweyemamu, 1973: 16),nevertheless, by the 
end of German rule, the territory had a diversified economy based on 
cash crops including sisal, coffee, cotton, tobacco, rubber, tea, vanilla 
and groundnuts. 	Apart from sisal which was a plantation crop, most of 
the crops were grown by peasants. 
To facilitate the development of commodity production heavy invest-
ments were required in infrastructural development. 	Between 1897 and 
1912 exports ranged from 36.4% to 63.0% of imports, indicating roughly 
the importance of the capital inflow which took place because of railway 
buildings (Yaffey, 1970: 43-45). 	For instance, the Northern Line served 
the sisal estates of the Tanga region and wasextendedto Moshi to serve 
the coffee producing areas in 1911. 	The Central Line from Dar es Salaam 
to the central region began,cxn1. aimed at exploiting peasant groundnut 
production. It reached Kigoma in 1914, and offered links to Rwanda and 
Burundi, which were then parts of Tanganyika, over to the Congo (Yaffey, 
1970: 46). 	Apart from railway construction there were various other 
development activities which took place. 	For instance, Coulson (1982: 41) 
states that, "there was considerable investment. 	Maps were drawn, roads 
were built, towns were laid out, the country was explored for minerals, 
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schools and hospitals were opened, and important advances were made 
in medical and agricultural research". 	There were also a number of 
industries established ranging from small-arms ammunition, mines, 
spices, blankets, spinning wheels and important drugs and vaccines, 
soap and candle making. 	A dock was constructed in Dar es Salaam. 
(Coulson, ibid 72-73; Yaffey, 1970: 46). 
Germany's colonial aim of making the territory self-financing 
was successful. 	Yaffey for instance states: 
As the colony developed and tax and custom 
revenues expanded, the imperial subsidy 
stagnated. A development budget relying 
substantially on local revenue emerged. 
(Yaffey, 1970: 43) 
German rule created the need for local administrative staff especially 
since finances limited the employment of German officials. 	There was 
never more than 79 European administrative staff in the districts. This 
forced the German administration to emphasise education, both literary 
and technical, for Africans (Coulson, 1982: 41). 
The significance of German colonialism of Tanzania was that it 
involved a traumatic experience for the peasants who resisted colonialism. 
The fact that it took Germany over twenty years to pacify the population 
testifies to this. 	From an economic point of view, however, it meant 
that it was only between 1905/6 - 1912, a period of only seven years, 
that commodity production based on market incentives could develop under 
conditions of relative colonial stability. 	But the fact that a develop- 
ment budget was evolved which relied mainly on local revenue also 
signified to the success of the economic policy. 
	
This success, however, was short-lived. 	World War One interrupted 
the developmental process. 	Commodity production was changed and became 
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geared to food production to feed soldiers since the War was also 
fought in the territory. 	Some of the consequences the War had on the 
population and overall effects on production has been documented by 
Iliffe. 	For instance: 
For civilians the primary emotion was fear. 
Danger existed for the civilian because 
his labour, food and local knowledge were 
needed by two armies (British and German) 
both determined to commit him to their side 
but neither able to guarantee the protection 
which made commitment safe. 
(Iliffe, 1979: 251) 
Requisition and drought produced famine and by November 1917, the worst 
famine in human memory occurred' (Iliffe, 1979: 269). 
The dislocation of colonial central authority created problems. 
There was an outbreak of smallpox, which could not be controlled and 
the tse-tse fly spread to four regions and much cultivated land reverted 
to bush. 	It was only as late as 1924 that the colony's external trade 
regained its 1912 level (Iliffe, 1979: 263-270). 	Tanzania lost ten years 
of development initiative. 
British colonial economic policies 
The economic aim of British colonialism (1919-1961) which began 
when Tanganyika was handed over to Britain as a mandate of the League 
of Nations did not differ fundamentally from that of Germany in attempting 
to make the colony self-financing as well as to make it contribute to the 
metropolitan revenue. 	Britain relied on the market and taxation to 
increase the development of cash crop production and hence its revenue 
This approach, however, was not always consistent because agaifl, global 
economic and political factors intervened to lessen its effects on 
develolpment. 	Secondly, Britain's economic policies were influenced 
by its attitude towards the territory. 	Unlike Germany, which aimed at 
making Tanganyika independent from the surrounding British territories. 
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Britain's policies aimed at linking Tanganyika progressively with 
Kenya on unfavourable terms. 
Between 1920-1924 the colonial Government concentrated on re-
establishing administrative control and getting the infrastructural 
facilities to function again. 	By 1924 the railways began to operate 
and exports attained their pre-war levels (Stephen, 1968: 41). Although 
there was a short term post-war prosperity based on high prices in the 
world market for cash crops, it was shortlived. 	The world depression 
from the late 1920s and 1930s led to loss of revenue for government. 
Revenue fell, for instance, from £2.0 million in 1929/30 to £1.7 million 
in the following year and to £1.5 million in 1931/32 (Yaffey, 1970: 55). 
The intervention of World War Two also affected commodity production: 
rural Africans had tended to move 
away from the cash economy back towards a 
subsistence way of life. 	Restricted export 
outlets, inadequate supplies and high prices 
of consumer goods, had discouraged a comp-
aratively self-sufficient peasantry from 
making such effort to obtain cash. By 1945, 
the development of a cash economy was probably 
even less advanced than it had been in 1938. 
(Erhlich, 1966: 8) 
Thus global economic and political events again disrupted Tanganyika's 
economic development. 	We could argue that between the 1930s depression 
to the after effects of the Second World War Tanganyika again lost more 
than ten years of development initiative. 	These problems were further 
aggravated by Britain's policies towards the territory. 
Britain preferred to view Tanganyika as part of her East African 
territories and measures were undertaken to integrate her into Kenya 
QM 
onAunfavourable basis especially in relation to her infrastructural 
development. 	For instance, the policy of equalisation of freight rates 
between Kenya and Tanganyika ensured that goods went through Kenya thus 
S. 
incurring revenue loss to Tanganyika's railways and ports. 	As a 
consequence derived from this policy, Kenya's railways and ports were 
further developed and improved, while those of Tanganyika were not 
(Yaffey, 1970: 57-58). 	Likewise, the customs union between Kenya! 
Tanganyika border from 1923-1967, c,citsQd.... Tanganyika to lose 
revenue to Kenya (Coulson, 1982: 73). 
A similar pattern can be SQQX1. 	in relation to industrialisation 
and the role of private capital. 	Britain reversed Germany's policy 
of promoting industries in Tanganyika but allowed Kenya to industrialise 
as early as 1923 (Coulson, 1982: 73). 	The political ambiguous status 
of Tanganyika also created uncertainty for private foreign capital. 
Thus during the inter-war period the status of Tanganyika as a mandated... 
territory of the League of Nations made it a risk area for British 
capital investments. 	These uncertainties were increased even more 
before the Second World War when handjng Tanganyika back to Germany became 
a 	real possibility (Yaffey, 1970: 37, 52). 	Thus it was only 
between late 1940s and 1950s that a limited amount of foreign invest- 
ments occurred in the country. 	Tanganyika's economic development 
occurred mainly through official grants and loans (Yaffey, 1970: 53). 
This meant that there was an interventionist role of the state in 
development. 
The period from 1945-1960 was important in Tanzania's economic 
development because it brought in a new set of conditions which allowed 
for an annual economic growth rate of about 5%. (World Bank, 1961: 25). 
Various factors account for this 'upturn' in the economy. 	First, in 
1945 the first Development Plan was drawn up. 	It was based on a ten 
year period 1946-1956 and emphasised infrastructural development. 
IiJoy- 
Secondly, the KoreanAboom  in export prices (1949-1951) helped to increase 
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funds for development. 	Thirdly, for the first time there was an 
emphasis on the policy of developing industries based on local raw 
materials for export to neighbouring countries. Both European and 
East African Asian capital was invested in Tanzania during this period. 
The major emphasis given 	the Plan was to develop the infra- 
structure, which would enable 	more'apid economic growth to take place. 
As the report of the Development Commission states: 
prime consideration has been given to 
the basic requirements upon which the 
economic development of the country must 
depend. 	Emphasis has been given, therefore, 
to communications, water supplies, and the 
development of natural resources. 
(Stephen, 1968: 80) 
There was also greater emphasis given to improving peasant agriculture 
and cattle practices. 	The Plan had about 40 schemes designed to arrest 
soil deterioration and improve productivity. 	The largest projects were 
in Sukumaland, Mbulu, Usambara, Pare and Uluguru. The character of the 
schemes varied but required culling of excess cattle, changing culti-
vation practice, bush-clearing and provision of water supplies (Stephen, 
1968: 85). 	The aim was to improve peasant production. 
The emphasis on the manufacturing sector also began to attract 
foreign capital though on a limited scale. 	Liebig Extract of Meat Ltd. 
and Metal Box were some of the examples of the few that invested in this 
area (Yaffey, 1970: 63; Coulson, 1982: 79). 	From 1959 onwards Asian 
capital began to invest in Tanzania diversifying from Kenya and Uganda 
so as to spread the risks. 	Such families as the Madhvani which had 
factories in Kenya and Uganda began to invest in Tanzania. A Tanganyikan 
Asian who began to invest in industries was 	Chandes, who built up 
the grain-milling and oil crushing industries in Tanganyika (Coulson, 
l982:'IYO). 	The manufacturing sector was thus developed by private capital. 
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By 1961 the Tanzanian economy was 	by agricultural 
activities. 	Forty per cent of money incomes was derived from exports, 
and 80% of export earnings came from the agricultural and livestock 
products against 13% of minerals (Plan 1961/2 - 1963/4: 2). 	Subsistence 
activities, however, predominated in the agricultural sector. 	About 40% 
of the Gross Domestic Product was represented by the subsistence activities. 
This reflected the economic backwardness of the c&w4nj since it was outside 
the monetary xc-yr 	Government was deprived of its produce, labour, 
revenue as well as market. The following table illustrates this: 
TABLE 1.1 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 	 £I000 
1955 	1956 	1957 	1958 	1959 	1960* 
Gross Domestic Product - Monetary 	81,760 89,335 92,941 97,945 106,231 113,8€ 
Gross Domestic Product - Subsistence64,984 63,085 69,414 69,147 	70,881 	71,5 
146,744 152,420 162,335 157,092 177,112 185,4 
Domestic Product-Monetary as per 
cent of Gross Domestic Product 
	
55.8 	58.5 	57.1 	62.3 	60.0 	61. 
*preljminary Estimate 
Source: Plan 1961-63: 4. 
The final characteristic of the economy was the interventionist role in 
development taken by the colonial government. 	About one third of total 
capital formation was made by the public sector (including the East Africa 
High Commission) and the remaining two thirds by the private sector. 	This 
is illustrated by the following figures: 
S . 
TABLE 1.2 
GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION AT MARKET PRICES 
SECTOR 	1954 
A. PRIVATE 
Building & Construction 
Monetary 	5,408 
Subsistence 4,203 
Machinery & Equipment 6,133 
IIIIi 
	
1955 	1956 	1957 	1958 	1959 	1960* 
4,323 	4,888 	5,825 	5,350 	4,328 	4,904 
4,266 	4,330 	4,603 1,681 	4,751 	4,841 
9,426 	9,073 	9,274 	,887 	9.438 11,434 
TOTAL PRIVATE 	15,744 18,015 18,291 19,699 18,918 18,517 21,179 
B. GOVERNMENT 
Building & 
Construction 6,807 7,101 7,404 7,798 7,187 7,032 7,004 
Machinery & Equipment 3,407 3,803 1,919 2,036 1,296 1,028 1,180 
10,214 10,904 9,323 9,834 8,483 8,060 8,184 
GRAND TOTAL 25,958 28,919 27,614 29,533 27,401 26,577 29,363 
*preljminary estimates 
Source: Plan 1961-63: 4. 
Public investment was mainly concentrated on the building of infra-
structure while private capital formation took place mainly in plantation 
agriculture, manufacturing, building, industry, transport and distribution 
(trade). 	The role of private capital though limited in comparison to 
Kenya, was nevertheless crucial. 
The economic conditions of Tanzania in 1961 and her economic history 
was likely to affect attitudes to development after independence. 	The 
salient feature was that almost 40% of GNP came from 	non-monetary sources 
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in 1960, capital investment came largely from public sources and 
Tanzania had suffered disadvantages both in the world and East African 
markets. 	The Tanzanian experience would be likely to create fairly 
widespread suspicion - or at least not encourage easy acceptance - of 
conventional views of economic development. 
Colonial social policies 
The social policies of the British colonial government were dominated 
by the racial division of Tanzania. The tables gives the population of 
Tanganyika divided into the major racial categories: 
Year 
1910 
1920 
1931 
1940 
1950 
1961 
1965 (est) 
TABLE 1.3 
POPULATION OF TANGANYIKA 
SELECTED YEARS, 1910-1965 
(thousands) 
African Asian Europeans 
4,700 8.7 3.7 
4,900 97 a 53 a 
5,800 32.0 8.2 
6,500 
340b 91 b 
7.730 76.8 14.9 
9,400 102.4 22.3 
10,450 120.5c 
1921 figure 
1938 figure 
1963 figure 
Source: Stephen, 1968: 31. 
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But despite the African preponderance and despite the terms of the 
Mandate which stated that Britain was 
to promote the political, economic and 
educational advancement of the inhabitants 
of the trust territories, and their progressive 
development towards self-government or independ-
ence as may be appropriate to the particular 
circumstances of each territory and its people 
(Stephen, 1968: 76) 
British social policies were governed by the principles of racism, which 
structured the allocations of funds. 	For instance, the Holmes Commission 
on the civil services of the East African territories had recommended 
and the Governor of Tanganyika had accepted the principle that junior 
and senior branches be differentiated by race (Stephen, 1968: 195). 
Until 1955 Government salaries for Africans were three-fifths those paid 
to Europeans, regardless of the job performed (Ibid). 	As a result of 
this discriniination, Europeans occupied the higher administrative positions 
of government as well as in the commercial enterprises and plantations, 
Asians occupied the middle positions as traders and clerks, while Africans 
were at the bottom of the strata consisting of workers and peasants. 
Racism thus came to consolidate the class structure that was already 
present. 
Equally, discriminatory wages and salaries as well as racism 
determined the composition of residential areas. 	There were European, 
Asian and African residential areas. 	The latter were characterised 
by over-crowding and lack of basic amenities, such as roads, drainage, 
and water supplies (Stephen, 1968: 103). 
Policies based on racial discrimination also affected the allocation 
of resources in education. 	For instance, when the colonial government 
divided funds derived from the sale of German property confiscated during 
World War Two equally among the three main races for their respective 
IIVIPA 
educational system, Nyerere pointed that 'equality' meant: 
720 shillings for each European child, 200 
shillings for each Asian child, and only 
2 shillings for each African child. 
(Stephen, 1968: 128) 
A similar principle was also used in the nomination of the unofficial 
members of the Legislative Council and Executive Council. 	The principle 
of parity of representation of the three racial groups was applied for 
the unofficial members of both Councils despite the predominance of 
Africans (Taylor, 1963: 135). 
Although the colonial government had accepted in principle that 
Tanganyika was to develop along the West African model, nevertheless, 
land alienation occurred. 	By the end of 1951 for instance, the total 
area alienated to non-Africans, including companies and missionary bodies, 
was 2,284,434 acres. 	Of this area, 1,333,487 acres were held in lease- 
hold and 950,947 acres in freehold (Taylor, 1963: 116). 	Furthermore, 
the alienated land was usually the most fertile. 
While the economic development of Tanzania in the colonial period 
did not encourage widespread acceptance of conventional views of the 
means of achieving economic growth, colonial socia1 political policies 
created the conditions in which there could be a strong emphasis on 
redistribution of wealth and opportunities at the end of colonial rule. 
The racially biased distribution of social benefits and political power 
in colonial times created the conditions for pressure for Africanisation 
not only of power but of social bençf its. 
Various quasi political assdciations emerged before 1954 such as 
the Tanganyika African Civil Servants Association (1924), the Tanganyika 
African Welfare and Commercial Assqiation in the 1930s, and the 
Tanganyika African Association (TAA. 	Most of these associations were 
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formed by teachers, junior civil servants and attempted to fight for 
better re-distributive policies. 	The TAA, for instance, became 
increasingly politically orientated. 	It rejected the idea of closer 
union with Kenya because it feared that it would lead to the domination 
by Kenya and white settlers. 	It was also involved in the Meru Land 
Case (1951) a fight against further land alienation to settlers. In 
1954 the TAA was transformed into TANU, Tanganyika African National 
Union, which 	aimed at bringing about independence under African 
majority rule. 
But the first Constitution of Tanu in 1954 reflected the concern 
with redistributive policies. 	It stated: 
Tanu will work to encourage co-operatives 
and trade unions; urge that producers get 
the best price and that consumers buy in the 
best market; help Africans establish an 
increasing share in the running and owning 
of business; establish a minimum wage and 
a system of assisted farming; and oppose 
the alienation of land. 
(Bienen, 1967: 218) 
This view continued to have strong and continuing support after inde-
pendence even though the implementation of elements of the policy (by 
some interpretations) could be in conflict with aims to achieve economic 
growth. 
In concluding this chapter, we can put forward the argument that 
the historical development of Tanzania determined to a great extent 
the major pre-occupations and priorities of the Government and the 
Party. 	While on the one hand the Government, given its institutional 
functions was involved with the problem of generating revenue through 
the expansion of productive activities and called for the growth of 
private investments, on the other hand, the Party, because of its 
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institutional functions, was calling for redistributive measures to 
change the racially underprivileged position of Africans. 	As a result, 
it attacked the Europeans and Asians who represented private capital 
and who had access to resources. 
It is important to note here the recurrence of development 
experience which occurred in Tanganyika. 	First, Tanganyika's inte- 
gration into the world system carried with it both economic benefits 
and dangers, both of which had national impact on the economy. 	When 
world market prices rose Government's revenue would equally rise; when 
they fell, Government's revenue would fall. 	This rise and fall of 
revenue in turn determined the development budget. 	Thus the economic 
advantages and disadvantages were both inherent within the system. 
Second, when there was a break-down or drastic changes in the internal 
political and economic systems peasants reverted to the subsistence 
economy. 	This took place after the Two World Wars. 	Third, the country's 
economic development was mainly undertaken by the state rather than by 
private capital. 	Finally, the country suffered from political 
uncertainties as a result of its historical development. 	These trends 
in the development experience of colonial Tanganyika may explain why 
Tanganyika was still characterised by a predominantly subsistence economy 
when she achieved her independence in 1961. 
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POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND CONCEPTIONS OF 
DEVELOPMENT 1961 - 1963 
At the time of independence political power was concentrated in 
the Government. 	Tanu had a relatively sub-ordinate role. Between 
1961 and 1963, however, Tanu's influence on policy formulation increased 
and with this its impact on the dominant conceptions of development. 
The establishment of a Presidential system of Government in 1962 created 
a third force, which mediated between the Government and the Party. This 
however, led to a more ambiguous situation in the struggle between the 
two organs of the state over the control of policy formulation. 
THREE POLITICAL ORGANS INVOLVED IN POLICY—MAKING 
Tanzania had a Parliamentary system of Government. A cabinet of 
ministers, each in charge of a Ministry and headed by a Prime Minister, 
had executive power but were responsible to Parliament (Bunge), which 
was elected by universal suffrage. 	The provinces of Tanzania each had 
administrations headed by provincial commissioners who were civil 
servants. 	Provinces were divided into districts administered by civil 
servant district commissioners responsible to the provincial commissioners. 
The Party, Tanu, had no constitutional standing in Government; 
however, from 1961 all Ministers and the vast majority of MPs were Tanu 
members. 
The Party was organised at regional and district levels with 
chairman and secretaries at these local levels. 	Local branches 
elected members of the Tanu National (Annual) meetings. 	The National 
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meeting elected a National Executive Committee (NEC), which proposed 
Tanu policies to be ratified by the National Meeting. 	Day to day 
affairs were dealt with by the Central Committee (CC). 
The position of Tanu in policy-making 
Within seven years of its formation in 1954 Tanu,under the leader-
ship of Nyerere, was able to lead the country into independence. More-
over, Tanu won the pre-independence elections of 1958 - 1959 and 1960 
with such overwhelming majorities as to make Tanzania a de facto one 
party state. 
This strength, however, concealed its weakness. 	Tanu was a 
poorly organised party. 	It lacked organisational capacity to mobilise 
the population. 	For instance, in the 1960 general elections only half 
the number of persons who were estimated as potentially eligible to 
register, actually voted (Taylor, 1963: 191; Bienen, 1967: 56). 	The 
Party lackedmanpower as well as funds. 
This organisational weakness of the Party has been noted by 
political scientists. 	Leys writes of Tanu that "it was in some respect 
a less reliable and well established organisation than its extremely 
rapid success and impressive organisational apparatus suggested" (Leys, 
1972: 189). 	Mwansasu makes a similar point in a different way when he 
shàws that Tanu annual meetings prior to 1967 were often without procedures 
or prior knowledge of the agenda: 
there was no accepted order according to 
which delegates could acquire a right to address 
the conference. 	As. a result, very often there 
was a great commotion after a delegate had 
finished speaking - there was a general rush 
to the microphone since the first to arrive 
received the right to speak. 
As a result, sustained debate was often not 
forthcoming. 	
(Mwansasu, 1979: 183) 
IVAVA 
The weakness of Tanu's capacity as an administrative and 
organisational organ has been investigated by Bienen in his Tanzania: 
Party Transformation and Economic Development (1967). 	Bienens 
argument was that TanL' 's overwhelming success despite its weak organis- 
ational capacity was the result of the existence of favourable conditions, 
which did not pose serious challenges to Tanu's growth. 	First, after 
1958 colonial policy changed from hostility to acceptance of Tanzania' 
political indpendence. 	Second, unlike Kenya and Southern Africa, 
Tanzania's whites and Asian minorities did not represent a sustained 
and unifie;threat because they were ethnically fragmented and were 
numerically too weak. 	Likewise, the crQ 	tribes in 
Tanzania prevented the emergence of super-tribal politics as occurred 
in West Africa. 	The position of tribal chiefs had been weakened by 
the 1951 system of Local Authorities. 
The absence of organised opposition was responsible for both Tanu's 
strength and its weakness: 
The elections revealed that Tanu would win 
any contest but that it had not organised 
the population to support it overwhelmingly 
at the polls. 	Its organisational strength 
had never been tested by a vigorous opposi- 
tion party which could seriously threaten it 
in a contest for votes. 	Because of the 
nature of the opposition and the nature of 
its own growth, Tanu's electoral dominance 
was deceptive: it did not illustrate Tanu's 
great strength; in fact, it reflected an 
organisational weakness. 
(Bienen, 1967: 58) 
Also: 
since a major organisational effort was 
not required to defeat the opposition to Tanu 
in the elections of 1958-1959 and 1960, res-
pectively, it is not surprising that by 1962 
Tanu was still unable to call out even a 
majority of the potential electorate. 
(Ibid: 65) 
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Tanu's weak organisational capacity was both caused and aggravated 
by the shortage of manpower. At independence most of its high leader-
ship were taken to form the Government. 	We shall analyse the composition 
of the Government later on. As a result, the Party was left with a 
weak leadership, the majority of which was composed of people who had 
not received a post-secondary education. 
Various political scientists have given us insights into the 
social characteristics of the leadership. 	For instance, they were 
farmers and traders (Tordoff, 1965: 37), primary school teachers, 
transport entrepreneurs, lorry drivers and secondary school teachers 
(Bienen, 1967: 46), police constables (Coulson, 1982: 119), taxi-drivers 
and shoemakers (interview, July 1981). 	Generally speaking, they lacked 
a professional training. 	We can make a further distinction within this 
category, between those who did possess a secondary level education and 
had become primary school teachers, and those who did not have such an 
education. 	The foriger generally became provincial secretaries during 
the independence struggle while the latter became provincial chairmen. 
The distinction is important because the provincial secretaries became 
Regional Commissioners after independence and entered national politics, 
while the provincial chairmen were confined to 'regional politics' at 
district level (Bienen, 1967: 97). 
Tanu's power was 	strengthened significantly in 1962 when 
an Act created political officers as regional and area commissioners each 
to be assisted by a civil service administration. 	It was party members 
who filled these new political roles. 	The aim of creating political 
heads in regions was to give the Party a role and also to allow the Party 
to consolidate its organisational structures in the country (Bienen, 1967: 
120-1). 	Tordoff argues, however, that the aim was to establish the 
authority of the central government throughout the country and that 
the Party was to be the main agent used by Government (Tordoff, 1967: 
98-99). 
The Regional Commissioners were recruited from the Tanu provincial 
secretaries and secondarily from the provincial chairmen. 	For instance, 
Wambura and Mwakangale were provincial secretaries who became regional 
commissioners in the 1962 appointments, while Mtaki was a provisional 
chairman who became an area commissioner and then a regional commissioner. 
They were also MPs who had been elected to the National Assembly in the 
General Election of 1960. 	By 1964, six Party secretaries at regional 
level had become regional commissioners and three area commissioners. 
Two local party chairmen became regional commissioners and five area 
commissioners (Bienen, 1967: 134-137). 
Until 1965 the Regional Commissioners were ex-officio regional 
secretaries of Tanu. 	They were delegates at the Annual Party Conference 
and members of the NEC. Some of them, such as Wambura and Mtaki were 
also elected Members of Parliament during the 1960-1964 period. The 
Regional Commissioners therefore were in a strong position to compete 
politically in national politics. Pratt descri this group of party 
activists which came to dominate politics at the national level after 
independence thus: 
Political office was very likely the only way 
in which many of them (political leaders) were 
able to earn a significant income. Few had 
professional or technical skills which would 
have made them easily employable within the 
government service and there was no large 
private sector capable of absorbing them in 
any number. For many, therefore, a loss of 
political office would have meant an eventual 
return to peasant farming. 
(Pratt, 1976: 185) 
Despite their professional handicap, Party activists were able to 
MOM 
constitute a strong pressure group on national policy formulation 
whose opinion could not easily be ignored. 
The Government 
The Cabinet was a powerful government body because it was 
responsible for policy formulation and imp1imntation of policies. 
Likewise, Parliament was also important because it was the representative 
and Legislative institution to which the Government was constitutionally 
responsible. 	As Pratt describes the government, "... each Cabinet 
Minister was individually responsible to Parliament for the administration 
and for the detailed policies of his ministry; the members of the 
Cabinet were collectively responsible to Parliament and to the country 
for the major policies of the Government" (Pratt, 1972: 226). 
All the Ministers were strong and active supporters of Tanu and 
had composed its higher leadership during the struggle against colonialism. 
This is true of the African Ministers; Jamal (Asian) and Bryceson 
(European) did not join Tanu until after independence when the constitution 
of Tanu was changed to admit non-Africans. 	But they had been effective 
supporters of the Party and had helped Tanu actively by mobilising for 
its support (Coulson, 1982: 119). 	Thus, one can see that the Cabinet 
was composed of men who had contributed in one way or another to the 
building of Tanu. 	There appeared to be no basis for conflict, therefore, 
between the Government and the Party. 
The first cabinet consisted of men whom Pratt refers to as 
'administrator politicians' because they were mainly concerned with 'the 
improvement of the social services and the economic development of the 
country' (Pratt, 1972: 234). 	All of the Ministers had had post- 
secondary education; some such as Jamal, Nyerere, Bryceson and Fundikira 
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were holders of degrees. 	All of them had held responsible positions 
either with the co-operatives (for example, Bomani was the founder of 
the Victoria Co-operative Federation) or were teachers in secondary 
schools (Eliufoo, Swai, Nyerere). 	Bryceson was a substantial farmer, 
and Jamal had strong links with family mercantile traditions. 	The 
first Cabinet incorporated men with experience of finance or wider 
development problems as well as in administration. 	This fact is 
important because, as we shall see, it may account for their common 
approach to Tanzania's economic problems. 
Conflict between the Party and Government and the emergence of an 
Executive President 
The relative power of Government vis-a-vis the Party was undermined 
from 1962 by the creation of an Executive Presidency. 	The President 
had powers above both the Party and the Cabinet and could in fact tilt 
the balance between one organ and the other. 	This situation obscured 
the conflict between the Party and Government. 
One of the chief characteristics of Tanzania since independence 
has been its political stability. 
remarkable achievement have centred 
conflicts, absence of a strong mdi 
homogeneous culture and language of 
political party, Tanu, and finally, 
Julius Nyerere (Hoskyns, 1972: 97; 
The explanations offered for this 
on the absence of major ethnic 
enyus middle class, a fairly 
Kiswahili, the popularity of the 
the good leadership of the President, 
Taylor, 1963: 223-4). 
The stability ofthe state in Tanzania however was belied by an 
intense struggle for power which began to develop as soon as the government 
was formed in 1960. 	The strugg1e emerged from an effort by the Party 
to control the Government, and particularly its policies. 	Various 
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political scientists have discussed this conflict (Pratt, 1976; Tordoff, 
1967). Leys saw the resignation of Nyerere as Chief Prime Minister in 
1962 as an attempt to avert a split between the Party and Government: 
In short, Nyerere's resignation prevented any 
kind of a show-down with the radicals which 
might have led to a counting of heads and it 
placed him in a position to prevent any further 
splits developing between the middle leadership 
of the party and the senior leaders of govern-
ment. 
(Leys, 1972: 19) 
The conflict between civil servants and politicians was, in fact, a 
Rweynamu and 
common experience in most African countries during this period (Hyden, 
1974). 	But the struggle assumed importance in Tanzania because policy - 
making procedures were not clarified and adhered to. The Government had 
the de jure right to formulate policies but the Party continued de facto 
to formulate policies while Nyerere as President had powers to override 
both organs. 
• • 
	We have seen that Tanzania had achieved its independence within 
a governmental system in which the central policy-making institution 
was the Cabinet. 	Nyerere supported the system. 	In 1960, as Chief 
Minister, he issued a Circular that said among other things, "I would 
remind you, that policy is decided by the central government and not by 
local party representatives" (Pratt, 1972: 226) and again, "I repeat 
that the responsibility for carrying out Government's policies lies with 
the civil service" (Ibid). 	In 1961, in his independence message 
Nyerere repeated the same point: 
It is the job of the government to work out an 
overall policy plan and to check the direction in 
which we move just as the Tanu National Executive 
in the past worked out the tactics of the struggle 
It (Tanu) is an organisation of the people. 
Through it the people can and must express their 
desires and worries to the Government. Through 
IM 
it the Government can and must explain to the 
people what it is doing and why. 
(Mwansasu, 1979: 174). 
But in that same year (1961) Nyerere, in defining the relation-
ship and therefore the relative power of the Party and Parliament, argued 
that the former's role was the formulation of policy, while the latter's 
was its implementation: 
At the NEC, we are deciding in broad terms 
what the Party's policy shall be, whereas in 
the National Assembly, members are discussing 
the question of exactly how, when, in what 
order of priority and so on, the agreed 
policies shall be put into effect. 
(Msekwa, 1977: 14) 
This elaboration of the Party's role in policy-making by Nyerere helps 
us understand why major policy decisions continued to be taken by the 
Party during this period and not by the Government. For instance, at 
the NEC meeting of January 1962, it was decided to make Tanganyika a 
republic: 
For it was at that meeting that it was also 
announced that Tanu had recommended to the 
Government that Tanganyika become a republic 
as soon as possible, and the Government had 
accepted that recommendation. 
(MacAuslan, 1964: 504) 
Another meeting of the NEC held from 10th to 14th February, 1963 
decided to adopt a One-Party Democracy, and authorised the President 
to set up a Commission which would consider and make suggestions for the 
appropriate structure and procedures of the Government and the Party 
which would give effect to the system of one-party state. 	This decision 
was endorsed by the Annual Conference of Tanu meeting on December 16, 
1964. 	The decision was never sent to Parliament. 	As the President 
pointed out to the Parliament: 
The decision has already been taken by the 
Party. 	The task of the Commission is 
merely to make recommendations on the form, 
structure and procedures of the one-party 
state which will be established. 
(Msekwa, 1977: 21) 
According to Msekwa this decision introduced a change in the decision-
making process whereby it was the Party which directed Government: 
no motion was introduced in the National 
Assembly inviting the Government to present 
proposals for appropriate changes in the 
constitution to make the country a one-party 
state; instead, the assignment was given to 
the Government by NEC; and when the proposals 
had been formulated by the Presidential 
Commission, they were debated only by the Party 
Organs, the task of the National Assembly 
being limited to giving legislative effect 
to what was agreed and decided by the Party. 
(Msekwa, 1977: 21) 
The contradictory statements which Nyerere issued on the Party 
and the Government, supporting each organ's responsibility for formu-
lating policy, created a confused situation, which led to a decline in 
the effectiveness of the Cabinet. 	The second factor which also under- 
mined Cabinet's effectiveness was the increasing tendency of Nyerere 
to take policy-decisions without reference to it (Pratt, 1972: 236). 
A case in point is the breaking off diplomatic relations with Britain 
and Germany (1964/65); the President took this decision without 
consultation with his Cabinet, even though it affected the funding of 
the development plan (1964-1969). 
One explanation which has been offered for the decline in the 
effectiveness of the Cabinet has come from Pratt. 	He argues that 
"neither the Presidential system (of an Executive Head) nor the One 
Party system directly undermined the role of the Cabinet" (Pratt, 1972: 
231). 	Rather a number of secondary influences were important, including, 
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first, 	the different decision making styles of the Party and the 
Government. 	The latter was based on a literatft culture, while the 
former was based on informal face-to-face discussions. 	Nyerere favoured 
the latter. 	Second, ministers did not adhere to decisions taken at 
Cabinet level; they often reversed them. 	Third, Nyerere favoured 
political activists and ministers who were strongly tied to the Party 
at the expense of ministers of other backgrounds: 
Nyerere attached more importance at that time 
to holding within the Party the leaders of 
several possibly divergent movements than he 
attached either to a more united pursuit of 
the policies of his government or to a more 
loyal and honest acceptance of Cabinet 
decisions and governmental procedures 
the persistent reluctance to discipline 
members who ignored the most obvious rules 
necessary to the smooth running of a cabinet 
must have increased tensions within the Cabinet 
and lessened its efficiency. 
(Ibid: 232) 
Although Pratt has proposed convincing causes for the ineffectiveness 
of the Cabinet, he does not realise that these causes have themselves 
to be explained. 	In fact, it is precisely in the relationship of 
conflict between the two organs of the state that we can find the 
explanation for the decline of the Cabinet. 	Pratt's over-emphasis on 
individual inter-relationships tends to obscure the conflict that existed 
between the Party and the Government. 
It is therefore difficult to sustain Pratt's view that the Party 
did not threaten the Cabinet. 	According to Pratt: 
None of the three central institutions of the 
party - the Central Committee, the National 
Executive Commmittee, or the Annual Conference - 
threatened the Cabinet as the main policy-
deciding body. 
(jbid: 299) 
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And again: 
There was no serious ideological obstacle to the 
continued reliance upon the Cabinet as the primary 
instrument of policy making. 
(Pratt, Ibid: 231) 
As I have attempted to illustrate, the control of policy-making was 
unclear. 	While the Cabinet had the constitutional right to formulate 
policies, the Party equally had a de facto right to do so. Nyerere 
gave contradictory statements, which supported in turn each of the 
organ's claims to primacy in policy-making and he had the power to 
override both. 	It is therefore difficult to sustain Pratt's arguments 
that such a situation could not have undermined the Cabinet's effectiveness. 
The Party formulated two major policies during the period 1962-64. 
These were that Tanzania become a Republic and that Tanzania become a 
One-Party State. 	Was there any instance where Nyerere took a major 
policy proposal in that period (1962-64) to the Cabinet and by-passed 
the Party? 	In fact, the Union between Zanzibar and Tanganyika in 1964 
was dealt with solely by the Government. 	At no stage was the issue of 
the Union discussed by the Party's National Executive Committee. 	More- 
over, when Nyerere presented the Agreement of the Union in Parliament on 
25th April 1964 he re-emphasised the absolute supremacy of the National 
Assembly (Msekwa, 1977: 19). 	How, then, does Msekwa explain this 
discrepancy in policy-making and the relationship between Parliament and 
the NEC? 	Msekwa argues that: 
The reason for there being no necessity to refer 
the matter to the NEC would appear to have been 
that of the general principle of the desirability 
of Tanganyika's Union with other states of Africa 
has always been the declared policy of the Party. 
Indeed, there is a provision in the Party's 
Constitution which states that one of the principal 
aims and objects of the Party is 'to see that the 
Government co-operates with other states in Africa 
: 
in bringing about African Unity. 
(Msekwa, 1977: 22) 
This explanation is weak. If everything that was in the Party's 
Constitution was to be left to be implemented by Parliament then this 
meant that policy formulation did reside with Parliament. 	If we are 
to follow Msekwa's logic, then the two policy decisions passed by the 
Party between 1962 and 1964, would have had to be taken by Parliament. 
I would argue that Nyerere took the Union issue to Parliament and 
by-passed the Party because the issue was so sensitive and required such 
delicate negotiations that only very highly qualified and experienced 
people could handle it. 	Nyerere himself dealt with the Union matter. 
According to Tordoff (1965: 86), "it seems unlikely that more than a 
handful of ministers were consulted in advance over the union between 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar". 
The President also took other major policy decisions without 
consulting the Party. 	The decision to resign as Prime Minister was taken 
unilaterally by the President. 	According to Msekwa: 
As a result of this development, which obviously 
had been unexpected and unknown to the NEC, it 
was decided to postpone discussion of most of 
the remaining items on the agenda until the 
next morning. 
(Msekwa, 1977: 24) 
Nyerere's style of switching either to the Government or to the Party is 
itself a reflection of the confused state of policy-making that existed 
during this period. 	The contradictory statements he gave in relation 
to the responsibilities for policy-making are also an indication that he 
was sandwiched between the pressures emanating from the two organs of state. 
But Nyerere also made use of the confusion in policy making. 	It 
offered him a greater degree of manoeuvrability between the two organs 
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of the state. He would take a policy issue where he thought it would 
stand the greatest chance of being accepted without major modifications, 
challenges or being mis-handled. 	He also took major decisions with 
reference to neither the Party nor the Government because the 1962 
Republican Constitution allowed him to do so. 	As he himself acknowledged 
during the 1962 debate in Parliament on the Republican Constitution 
"I have enough powers to make me a dictator" (Hansard, 1962: Col: 1105-6). 
This analysis shows that Pratt and Msekwa have tended to de-
emphasise the conflict between the Government and the Party in Tanzania. 
I have shown that the state of policy making in Tanzania was complex. 
Tanzania had a tripartite system of policy making in the sense that all 
three organs of the state formulated policies on different bases. 	Further- 
more, the Party's insistence on formulating policies was the result and 
reflection of its conflict with Government. 	We can see this conflict 
when we examine the different views of development held by Party activists 
on the one hand and Government on the other. 
CONCEPTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT 1961 - 1963 
The conflict between the Party and Government over the control of 
policy formulation was given greater importance for the development of 
Tazania because each organ had different basic views and their elaboration 
between 1961-1963 should be examined in the context of the power struggle 
dealt with previously. 
The Government's conception of development in this period followed 
conventional theories of development, which viewed economic backwardness 
OLM 
in terms of the limited extent of production based onexchange economy. 
Agriculture based on commodity production had to be fully developed so 
as to generate government revenue and to form a domestic market. 
am 
Production was viewed as a primary concern, because development was 
conceived primarily in terms of economic growth. 	The achievement of 
economic growth was seen to be essential because it created the 
capacity for financing social services. 	Government policies during 
this period were also operating within the framework of conventional 
ideas about development. 
The Government's major aim in the First Three Year Plan was to 
expand the agricultural and industrial sectors as rapidly as possible 
and at the least cost to its budget by relying mainly on private capital. 
Since economic growth played such a dominant role in the Government's 
thinking, Government placed emphasis also on other economic criteria 
such as efficiency in administration, low and efficient services to the 
consumer, the need to minimise Government recurrent expenditure and the 
need to generate a surplus. 	These concerns were given priority over 
socially-orientated types of values. 
The second major reason why Government placed emphasis on economic 
growth and on economic criteria was the result of its institutional 
responsibility. 	As a Government, in charge of a national economy, it 
had to operate in terms of recurrent and development expenditure, foreign 
exchange earnings, consumption, savings, etc. 	In other words, its 
institutional responsibility as government forced the Government to operate 
with conventional concepts of economic development. 
The Party activists on the other hand pressed for policies of re-
distribution. 	They attacked the Asians and Europeans whom they identified 
as exploiters and called for po3)-ct9 of Africanisation and co-operatives, 
to replace European expatriate '.-ffihe administration and Indian traders 
respectively. 	As a result, ty showed hostility towards private capital. 
Party activists' opposition to Government policies was therefore a 
•1 
reflection of the traditional concern of the Party to redress inequalities 
in the country. 	Political independence had to be accompqried by economic 
opportunities, albeit politically created. 	The Party activists were 
expressing the legitimate concerns of the Party, which had always fought 
for: equality and re-distributive measures to alleviate poverty. 	They 
were pressing for re-distributive policies to be incorporated as part of 
the process of development itself. 
The conflicts between the Government and Party in policy making did 
create instability in terms of developmental strategies. 	The struggle 
between the Party and Government can be seen in the different type of 
development policies which the two organs of the state offered. 	Here, 
too, Nyerere gave contradictory statements which supported both the Party 
and the Government's views of development. 
Nyerere's contradictory views ç.on a development strategy are important 
because they created the condition whereby both organs of the state could 
legitimately use Nyerere's speeches to oppose the arguments of the other. 
Equally, each organ of the state could use Nyerere's speeches to legiti-
inise its own position. 
The conflict within Nyerere sprang from the tension between the 
need to maintain a stable society without gross inequalities and, on the 
other hand, the recognition of the limited capacity for capital formation 
that existed within the country, which necessitated the encouragement of 
private capital. 	At another level, this tension reflected Nyerere's 
institutional position in society, first as President, and second, as 
Head of both the Party and the Government. 
When Nyerere addressed Parliament for th first time in 1962 he 
elaborated a broad development strategy which Tanzania was to follow. 
As the following extract indicates, thespeéch rejected a capitalist 
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development strategy: 
It is Government's intention to extend the 
co-operative into every town, every village 
and every hamlet in Tanganyika, and to enable 
these societies to undertake every kind of 
enterprise which can be run by co-operative 
effort. 
If our aim were to go into competitive business 
for profit we could set up together in partnership with 
private business to form commercial companies, which would 
be much easier and far more profitable than the 
co-operative method. 
A much better word (for co-operative) is 'ujima' 
for ujima means living and working together as 
a family. 	A way of working for the benefit of 
all. 	'Ujima' is indeed the instrument of 
ujamaa, just as the commercial company is the 
instrument of capitalism. 
All of us have agreed that we must establish a 
true socialist society in Tanganyika. Two very 
important instruments we shall use for this 
purpose are the Government itself and the 
Co-operative Movement. 
(Hansard, 1962: 17-20) 
Party activists used the above speech of Nyerere's to criticise and 
oppose the Government's policies, which rested on the need to encourage 
both foreign and local private capital to invest in the economy. 	The 
Party pressed for redistributive types of policies, such as Africanisation 
and the expansion of the co-operatives to replace the Indian trader. 
These will be discussed later when we consider the Party's views on 
development. 
But Nyerere also gave speeches which clearly indicated that private 
capital was needed to develop the economy, and that African socialism 
did not preclude investments by private capital. 	Nyerere's speech to 
the Association of Chamber of Commerce in East Africa formulated the 
problem of African Socialism in terms of distribution and not in terms 
of ownership. 	Thus: 
WA 
We are committed to a philosophy of African 
socialism and the basis of it is human 
equality: the important question is how can 
we deal with income inequalities ... First 
we must energetically pursue policies which 
will increase the amount of wealth produced 
in the country. 	Second, we must not allow 
the present income differentials to be 
sacrosanct. 
(The Standard, Feb. 11, 1963) 
The Government often used the above speech to legitimise its position 
and policies vis-a-vis the Party (see Plan 1964-69: 13). 	Throughout 
the period from 1962 to 1965 various statements by Nyerere clearly showed 
that he supported the Government's views on development and thus by 
implication, its policies. 	For instance, Nyerere supported Government 
concern for the need to maintain qualified manpower in the form of 
expatriates in the Administration and was opposed to rapid Africanisation. 
As Nyerere stated in February 1961: 
I have no intention of risking the good name 
of the government of the country just for the 
sake of Africanisation. 
(Tordoff, 1967: 195) 
The Prime Minister Kawawa also gave contradictory statements on 
the role of private capital vis-a-vis African Socialism. In a 
Parliamentary debate of 1962, Chief Mhaiki asked: "Will Government give 
the authentic explanation of Tanganyika Government being socialistic?". 
Kawawa reflects the uncertainty of the period: 
My Government is committed to the principle 
of African Socialism, that is, it is committed 
to fostering an attitude of co-operation between 
the people on the basis of individual equality. 
It is opposed to the exploitation of one man by 
another, it is opposed to discrimination of any 
kind. 
(Hansard, 1962, 257 [NO:l75]) 
But in the same debate of that year he also did not deny the role of 
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private capital in the country as his speech illustrates: 
Sir, the private sector is already here. It 
is a small sector, of course, but it is already 
here, and it is the only one which has the 
technical know-how. 	The Government is not 
going to be the sole agency for building this 
country. We can only build this country 
through a joint cooperation between the people 
and their government. 
(Hansard, 1962: 232). 
In this speech Kawawa argued that private capital was essential for 
the development of the country. 
None of the three political institutions, responsible for policy-
making, that is, the Government, the Party and the President, attempted 
to clarify and resolve the dilemma between, on the one hand, socialism 
and on the other hand, the need for private capital. 	The failure to 
resolve this dilemma theoretically also meant that the conflict between 
the two organs of the state remained politically unresolved. 	Despite 
issuing contradictory developmental strategies, both organs of the state 
could legitimately identify their positions as those of Nyerere and use 
this to counteract the other. 	A fuller analaysis of Government and 
Party views on development will illuminate this conflict further. 
The Primacy of Economics in Government's conception of development 
An analysis of the Government conception of development is important 
for this thesis not only because it explains the types of policies 
pursued but also because it illustrates an approach towards economic 
problems which contrasts with that of the Party activists. Most radical 
writers have tended to dismiss early Government policies rather than 
subject them to investigation, because they were considered 'capitalist'. 
Such criticisms fail to extend our knowledge of development problems 
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since they fail to explain why and how 'capitalist' policies were 
adopted, as well as to assess their validity in terms of alleviating 
developmental problems. 
The Government's conception of development was primarily determined 
by its institutional functions as Government. 	This took two major forms. 
First, as Government, one of its major responsibilities was to develop 
the economy on the basis of the types of resources it had or could muster. 
Secondly, it had to operate within certain pre-defined economic parameters 
in such matters as investments, savings, consumption, balance of payments 
issues, employment, etc. 	This is true of all governments, given their 
role as caretakers of national economies. 
A third major influence on the overnment's conception of development 
was no doubt the economic theories current during that period. The more 
progressive wing of economic development theory during this period was 
what I shall refer to, as the conventional view of development. Writers 
such as Nurkse (1953), Myrdal (1957) and Rosenstein-Rodan (1964) focussed 
attention on 'obstacles to growth' in Third World countries. 	Writers 
of this school emphasised various obstacles. 	For instance, Nurkse saw 
the limited capacity that existed in Third World countries for capital 
formation asAobstacle to growth. 	There was insufficient savings to 
match the requirements for investments. 	Myrdal,on the other hand, 
emphasised limited markets as an obstacle and only an expansion of 
productivity would create a market. 	This school therefore called for 
capital injection into the manufacturing sector, the modernisation of 
agriculture, which would create backward and forward linkages (Hirschman, 
1958) 	and the expansion of employment opportunities. 	They argued 
that the economy would then be transformed because the processes would 
involve a change in the structure and composition of output and employment: 
-95- 
balanced growth would be achieved. 
The main aim of these writers was to achieve economic growth in 
both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. 	Social goals such 
as health, housing, were not identified as part of the process of 
development but rather as an outcome of development. On the other hand, 
education was seen as a component relating to economic growth because of 
the need for skills. 	For instance, Lewis (1955: 1) states the case for 
seeing development in these terms quite explicitJy: "First, it should 
be noted that our subject matter is growth, and not distribution". 
These ideas were influential enough to influence the World Bank's 
policies, which changed from an emphasis on infrastructure to production, 
from projects to sectors. 	The Bank also began to see the necessity for 
the state's involvement in the tasks of national development, and it 
began to finance education because of the need for skills. 	Like the 
school of thought by which it was influenced, the World Bank also did 
not consider re-distributive policies (Adler, 1972). 	This almost 
exclusive focus on growth was to predominate for more than a decade 
(Morawetz, 1977). 
These new views on development were used as theoretical approaches 
in analysing Tanzania's economic development. 	Notable cases in point 
were the World Bank's The Economic Development of Tanganyika (1961) and 
the Arthur D. Little study, Tanganyika Industrial Development (1961). 
These studies formed the basis for the First Three Year Development Plan 
1961/2 - 1963/4, but they were also endorsed by the Government. It will 
only be necessary to give a short exposition of the World Bank and Little 
Reports, since the Three Year Plan will be analysed fully below. 
The World Bank Report began by identifying the predominant role 
of agriculture in the Tanzanian economy. 	The average annual rate of 
MAI 
growth of gross domestic product during the previous six years was 
calculated at 5%. 	The Bank pointed to the significance of agriculture 
in national development because 80% of export earnings came from agri- 
culture as against 13% from minerals. 	Development of the economy 
would have to come from the agricultural sector. 	The Report recommended 
a combination of what it called 'transformation' and 'improvement' 
approaches. 	The former was to deal with the subsistence peasants by 
attempting to re-organise their productive activities, while the latter 
was to assist the 'progressive' farmer who was already producing for the 
market through credit and extension services (World Bank, 1961: 5-8). 
The Little Report also reflected the prevalent ideas on economic 
development. It emphasised the development of the manufacturing sector, 
which was to be financed by private capital. 	The Report stated: 
The Government of Tanganyika recognises the 
importance of industrial development in 
furthering the economic progress of the 
country. The Government recognises also 
the significance of the role of the private 
investor in this development, and aims to 
encourage such investment. 
(Little, 1961: 2) 
The Report stated that private investment was essential because of 
'Government's limited resources'. 	It thus recommended that 'a favourable 
climate for private investment' should be maintained (Ibid: 3). 	Little's 
industrial strategy reflected the concern with economic growth. It had 
three major components. 	First, industrial strategy should be 
orientated towards agriculture, thus forming forward and backward linkages 
in the economy. 	The manufacturing sector was to serve as a market 
for agricultural produce, provide tools and materials to agriculture, 
and increase the incentives of producers by improving the availability 
of consumer goods and therefore creating a national domestic market. 
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Secondly, manufacturing was to reduce imports and therefore conserve 
foreign exchange. 	Thirdly, the manufacturing sector was to process 
raw materials for increased exports in order to earn 	foreign 
exchange. 	The Report stated: 
The drive for rapid economic development, 
which will increase with the country's 
independence, will seriously strain its 
foreign purchasing powers. Industrial 
processing, by up-grading the level and 
price at which raw materials are exported, 
and by substituting in part for increasing 
imports, can help keep the country's trade 
in balance and minimise the drain on foreign 
exchange and credit available in the country. 
(Little, 1961: 24) 
Finally, it also pointed to the obstacle posed by the lack of technical 
and management skills "to carry out industrial operations" (Little, 1961, 
30) and called for the establishment of business education (Little, 1961: 
34). 	These ideas were in line with the economic theories of the period. 
Viewed in the context of the 1940s and 1950s, these ideas were 'progressive', 
because they were against the ideas which argued that Third World countries 
should specialise in merely producing cash crops. 	We can now see how 
these ideas were translated into the first economic development plan 
1961/2-1963/4. 
The Primacy of Economics in Development Plan 1961/2-1963/4 
The Government's conception of development was primarily determined 
by the need to expand the rate of economic growth. 	As the objectives 
of the 1961-63/4 Plan stated: 
The problem facing Tanganyika now is that of 
laying firm foundation for (sustained economic 
growth). The same problem can also be seen in 
its many aspects of expanding the base of the 
economy, affecting a more rapid transistion from 
subsistence to monetary economy, increasing 
Ma 
production, increasing the incomes of the 
people, improving the infra-structure and 
providing training and educational 
facilities. 
The crucial choice before. the Government 
was between the sort of development plan 
which would lay foundations for a more 
rapid growth of the economy and a plan which 
would cover a very much wider field at the 
expense of slowing down the rate of growth. 
The first choice implied a concentration on 
economic projects which would yield the quickest 
and the highest returns in the near future, 
whereas the second choice meant distribution 
of scarce resources over all competing sectors 
alike. The Government's view and also the view 
of the World Bank Mission was that at this stage 
of Tanganyika's development the first choice is 
the right one. 
(URT, 1962: 7) 
As the above quotation illustrates Government made a deliberate choice 
for uneven development in order to maximise economic growth. 
This choice was determined by the state of the 
economy's development. 	What was this stage? 	Firstly, over two-thirds 
of Tanzania's population were still at subsistence level mainly producing 
for their own consumption, though an increasing number had also began 
to market some of their crops for goods and services. 	But the pre- 
dominance of the subsistence sector meant that the economy was deprived 
of their revenue, labour and produce as well as of a market. Thus only 
one third of the population was producing 60 per cent of the gross domestic 
product (Stephen, 1963: 158). 	This posed problems for capital formation. 
The country had a small taxable capacity and the Government had to depend 
mainly on revenues from import duties, excise duties, and income taxes. 
As a result, the Government could only contribute 4% towards the £24 M 
required for the Plan (Stephen, 1963: 58). 	It was this low capacity for 
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capital formation that forced the Government to consider economic growth 
as its primary objective, with emphasis on projects which were likely 
to 'yield quick returns' in terms of output and income (United Republic 
of Tanzania, 1962: 13). 
In line with this objective of achieving a high rate of economic 
growth, 60% of the £24 M •ruired in the plan was to be allocated for 
economic development while social services accounted for 20%, and the 
other 20% shared between the army, police, foreign services and others 
(URT, 1962: 13). 	Consistent with the emphasis on growth, 
agriculture and infrastructural development received the highest fundings. 
This was followed by education, which was considered as an input into 
economic growth because of the need to develop skills. 	Africans 
occupied only 26% of the senior and middle level civil service posts in 
1961 (Stephen, 1968: 160) and there was a dire shortage of technical 
manpower in such fields as doctors, engineers, teachers, agriculturalists, 
chemists, etc. (Pratt, 1967: 93-4). 
In order to cope with the shortages of manpower and capital, the 
Government evolved policies based essentially on private capital for 
agriculture, industry and trade. 	Government hoped that private capital 
would invest in production and maintain its traditional role in trade thus 
alleviating the shortages of resources in these crucial areas. - Private 
savings rather than the taxation of labour was supposed to bear the brunt 
of investment. 
We shall now turn to how the Government argued for the acceptance 
of its economic policies in Parliament, where Party activists were also 
present. Particular emphasis will be given to the three policy areas of 
agriculture, trade and manufacturing because they were integrated into a 
consistent strategy of development. 
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An analysis of official documents of this early period showsa 
very clear and direct emphasis on the need to expand production and 
productivity as a means of raising revenue and living standards generally. 
The Government's conception of development in fact centred on production 
as a process which required the investment of such economic assets as 
capital, manpower and technology. 
Bomani, Tanzania's first Minister of Finance, illustrated the 
relationship between increased production and incomes very succinctly 
when he presented his 1962/63 Annual Estimates in Parliament: 
We should always remember that a nation like 
a business or an individual can only spend what 
it earns. It earns by selling what it produces 
and it is, therefore, important that we should 
produce more, and that what we produce should 
be of good quality, and that we should be properly 
equipped to sell; for unless we sell, we cannot 
earn the money which keeps the nation alive and 
its services expanding. 
(Hansard, 1962: 45) 
Thus not only was production emphasised but also trade, which was seen 
as a twin-sister of production. 	Without trade (both internal and 
external) the effects of production would be limited. 
Bomani also drew attention in the same speech to the fact that it i 
availability of finance would have to determine to a great extent the 
adoption of projects: 
In the past our development planning, our 
choice of projects and priorities, and the 
order in which we executed them proceeded 
relatively independently of financing. From 
now, on, the reverse wUl be the case, and a, 
new approach will hav&to be adopted. 
(Ibid) 
Thus the idea was that the availability of finance would have to be 
considered a crucial input into policy-making. 	Finance for development 
was important and crucial because 'no nation can develop without capital 
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investment'; Bomani continued: 
A limit will be reached beyond which no progress 
can be made without capital investment. In the 
end there must be more capital formation each 
year to secure a satisfactory rate of economic 
growth. 
(Ibid) 
This idea led him to the problem of capital shortage in Tanganyika: 
In Tanganyika, we must face the plain truth that 
we simply haven't got enough resources of our 
own for such capital investment, and the only way 
to achieve a faster rate of economic development is 
to obtain capital from abroad. 
(Hansard, 1962: 45) 
These ideas were taken up by various Ministers in their various capacities; 
but their arguments were similar, namely that in order to expand 
production rapidly it was necessary to have private capital. 
Policy towards Internal Trade: 1961/62 - 1963/4 
The Government's policy towards internal trade was to maintain the 
existing system based on private trade, which was dominated and controlled 
by Asians. 	In 1962 officials of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
and the Treasury had requested the London Economist Intelligence Unit to 
conduct a survey of the wholesale and retail trade in Tanganyika 
Its findings may have been a contributory factor in the Government's 
decision to maintain private trade. 
We can distinguish four forms of trade which took place within the 
distribution system in Tanganyika during this period. This distinction 
is important because, as will be illustrated later, various policies at 
different times attempted to deal with the different sub-sectors of trade 
and distribution in order to eliminate the private trader. 
First there were the importers who were mainly foreign companies 
-102- 
such as Dalegty, Intrata and Wigglesworth, who were involved in 
importing capital and intermediate goods as well as cars into the 
country. 	The second form of trade was wholesale trade which was mainly 
involved in buying goods in bulk and re-selling to retailers, sub-. 
wholesalers, industrial or commercial companies, institutional organis-
ations or other wholesalers acting as agents in buying and selling 
merchandise to such persons or companies. 	Third were the sub-wholesalers 
who were mainly involved in buying from the wholesaler and packing in 
small units and selling to retailers. 	Retail trade, finally, covered 
the re-sale of these goods to the final consumer. 
The Economist Intelligence Unit's research (1962)found that the 
distribution system was very flexible because it was made up of thousands 
of private traders, stretching from major towns to the remotest villages. 
It pointed to the dominavL& position of the Asians in trade but also to 
an increasing number of Africans who were becoming traders: 
Non-African retailers were mainly in Lake Region, 
Dar es Salaam and Tanga Region, very few were 
situated in the Southern, Southern Highlands and 
West Lake Regions. Just under a third of all 
non-African retailers were located in the 12 
largest towns. The rest were widely scattered. 
On the other hand, over a fifth of all African 
traders were in the Lake Region, where 7,820 were 
licensed in 1961. 	The smallest number 2,088 
is in the Central Region. Very few African 
retailers are located in townships. 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 1962: vii) 
Thus although Asian traders were still holding a strong position in towns, 
African traders had also begun to participate in trade. Regions which 
had strong co-operatives had already pushed the Asian trader out of 
business. 
The report found that the system of trade that existed in the four 
tiers ensured that remote villages were also reached: 
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Sometimes, retailers in rural areas buy their 
supplies from sub-wholesalers in the local 
trading centres, who also sell retail. The 
transport of such goods is usually done on 
the local bus. 
(Ibid) 
In very remote villages where there was no retail trade the report 
discovered: 
Of the 16 districts with the fewest number of 
regular traders, there were 10 with over 100 
licensed itinerant traders. Hawkers provide 
the consumer with a very useful service, partic-
ularly in remote areas, and they should, 
especially in these areas, be encouraged. 
(Ibid: ix) 
The report showed that those who supplied the rural market worked on a 
very small gross,\margin, normally only 3 to.4 per cent. 	This sector 
of the trade was the most competitive in the whole distribution system 
since it serviced the low-bargaining purchasing power of the peasants. 
The report stated that the financial viability of both wholesale and 
retail trade was heavily dependent on credit: "A large part of traders' 
supplies are obtained on credit, and the amount of working capital 
employed by most traders is small" (Ibid: xxi). 	The report also found 
that where there was intense competition in both wholesale and retail 
trade, prices were kept down; but where there was little competition 
in both wholesale and retail trade, as in the Southern Region, prices 
became higher. 
The report showed that the system of trade which existed was 
extremely low-cost especially if one took into consideration the vastness 
of the territory and the poor infrastructure: 
Tanganyika has a low-cost distribution system. 
This is mainly because wage levels are low, 
!LIIt! 
distribution is a very labour-intensive 
industry, and because most traders manage to 
keep their overheads to a minimum. Most 
businesses are family concerns, and members 
are prepared to work long hours, paper work 
is minimal, advertising almost non-existent, 
premises are inexpensive and few services are 
provided for the customer. 
(Ibid: xxiv) 
It also added: 
The overall gross margin obtained by traders in 
Tanganyika is not high. 	Considering the 
difficulties of distribution, distance, small 
markets, seasonal fluctuations etc. the average 
cost of distribution is remarkably low. 
(Ibid: xx) 
The report thus found the system of Tanzania's internal trade to be 
efficient, low-cost and providing a useful service to consumers. It 
also helped in the process of development by integrating subsistence 
peasants into the monetary economy: 
Every encouragement should be given to its 
(the distribution network's) expansion, as 
its existence is essential in the process 
of change from subsistence agriculture to 
cash crop production. 
(Ibid: vi) 
The findings of the report was that private trade in Tanzania was 
cheap and efficient and that it was providing a useful development 
function to the economy. 
Policy on agricultural growth and rural development 
Between 1962 and 1966 there were two diverse views of development 
pertaining to the agricultural section in official circ1es. On the one 
hand was the Government view of agricultural development which was 
determined by its concern for economic growth. 	This view was translated 
into the policy of encouraging the 'progressive farmer' and maintaining 
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commercial farms. On the other hand, there was Nyerere's view of 
development which was expressed in a policy of village settlement. 
This approach involved the resettlement of peasants in villages so 
that social services could be made available to them. 	We shall 
consider these views and policies in greater detail and emphasis will 
be given to how Government attempted to reconcile these two views and 
policies. 
The aim of Government was to increase agricultural production 
without increasing its own share of costs. 	But such agricultural 
expansion had nevertheless to take place within the context of capital 
accumulation. 	The Minister of Agriculture, Bryceson, explained why it 
was necessary to have capital investments in agriculture: 
We have the land, we have quite a lot of energy, 
we have the knowledge but we do need the capital 
to allow us to take the best advantage of the 
very promising combination. 
If we go ahead without it, and this we certainly 
can do in a good year, we shall be able to put 
a little aside for development, but in a bad year 
we can lose that little, and perhaps slip back 
again. In that case it will take considerably 
long time to develop, and the standards of living, 
the education of our children and the health of our 
families will all suffer as a result. 
(Hansard, 1962: 284) 
Bryceson's speech illustrates very clearly Government's view of development, 
namely that the development of social services was a product of economic 
growth, and secondly, that capital was necessary in order to achieve a 
higher and faster rate of economic growth. 	Government's policy to 
achieve these aims were two-fold, first, commercial farms were to be 
maintained, and secondly, progressive farmers were to be encouraged 
through extension services, community development and access to credits. 
Furthermore, by encouraging the social class that was best equipped to 
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invest and organise production, Government hoped that it would minimise 
its own subsidies. 
In relation to the subsistence peasants, Government hoped that 
they would be gradually drawn to produce for exchange through trade. 
Di1 MP w& 
Jhaveri4 a supporter of Government's view of development voiced this 
idea when he stated: 
In order to produce more, Sir, the people 
must have an incentive. 	Unless their 
needs arise, unless their wants increase, 
they may not have any incentive to grow 
more, and therefore they must be induced 
to increase their standards of living. 
(Hansard, 1962: 255) 
Government was relying primarily on market incentives to integrate 
peasants into commodity production. It was approaching the subsistence 
peasants as consumers. 	For instance, the Minister of Agriculture, 
Bryceson, rejected the idea of enforced agricultural practice which would 
force peasants to produce according to certain acreage (Hansard, 1962: 435). 
The President on the other hand had an idea of rural development 
which he expressed in 1962 at his first speech to Parliament. Nyerere 
stated: 
If you ask me what our Government intends to 
do in the next few years, my answer is very 
simple. In the next few years, the Government 
will do everything possible to enable the 
peasants of Tanganyika to live together in 
village settlements. If you ask me why the 
Government wants the peasants to live in 
village settlements, my answer is equally very 
simple: without living in village settlements 
they cannot get the essential modern facilities. 
(Hansard, 1962: Col:7) 
Nyerere's ideas of rural development were mainly focussed on the subsistence 
peasants who were living in isolated homesteads and who formed the 
majority of the people. His view of development was based on the idea 
that it was necessary to re-allocate peasants into nucleated villages 
in order to make available social services. This view thus incorporated 
the idea of re-distribution and re-allocation of peasants residence. 
The initiative for early settlements came from Party activists 
(Hyden, 1982: 72). 	Joseph Nyerere was the Head of the Youth Wing 
and was a strong supporter of village settlement schemes. The aim was 
to channel the youth enthusiasm into constructive national building 
activities (interview,July 1981).Thus, we can conclude that the President's 
idea of re-allocation of peasants' residence and re-distributive policies 
were supported by the Party. 
We can, therefore, see that Government kept separate policies 
which dealt with separate interests, namely those which dealt with 
agricultural growth (improvement approach, 'progressive farmers') and 
those which dealt with rural development problems (transformation approach, 
scattered homestead peasants). 	By maintaining separate policies 
Government aimed at minimising conflicts as well as safeguarding its 
policy on economic growth, especially since it was not enthusiastic about 
the transformation approach (Tordoff, 1967: 93; Leys, 1973: 2, 7). 
Policy on the manufacturing sector 
Government's policy towards the manufacturing sector was to mobilise 
investments from local and foreign private capital. Again, this policy 
was a continuation of the colonial policy pursued in the 1950s. 	Both 
the Little Report and World Bank's report had recommended the encouragement 
of private investments in manufacturing sector. Kahama, Minister for 
Commerce and Industry when presenting a motion in 1961 of the Annual 
Estimates, 1962/63 spoke of the benefits of private capital to the economy 
of Tanzania. 	Such benefits, he argued, accrued to the government in the 
SURE 
form of taxation, it provided plants and building as well as giving 
people employment. He ended by saying: 
And so an investor will only invest where 
he will be assured of the most favourable 
overall return. And if we are to get our share 
of this private investment we must compete with 
the other capital importing countries in 
offering favourable terms. And as far as these 
terms are concerned those who have money to invest 
will not find the government of Tanganyika 
ungenerous 
To the world I say, then, that the government of 
Tanganyika welcomes the direct investment of 
foreign capital and that its policy is to create 
conditions which will stimulate the flow of capital 
into the country. 
(Hansard, 1962: 448) 
Thus, to conclude this section, the policies in Agriculture, 
Manufacturing and Trade sectors which Government pursued in the first 
three year plan were all based on the promotion of private capital. 
Saul argues that this was contrary to the Party's socialist ideology 
announced at independence, and calls the policies, 'a Trojan horse 
within a socialist professing state' and that there was a 'rhetorical 
commitment to neutral policy tools and a practical achievement of 
capitalist results' (cited in Botting, 1978). 	But Saul ignored the 
types of problems which faced the Government during this early period. 
As already noted, three major problems were manpower capital and 
technology. 	Government lacked the resources to expand the economy. 
The encouragement of private capital was viewed as solution to these 
problems. 
Secondly, Government policies were quite consistent with its view 
of development, which saw that economic growth was the pre-condition to 
development. 	This was in line with the conventional idea of development. 
Thirdly, the policies were also consistent with Government analysis of 
economic backwardness in Tanzania, which was viewed as a result of 
limited development in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors. The 
problem as it presented itself to Government was to expand production. 
The fastest way to achieve this was through private capital because it 
would relieve the Government of a commitment to heavy financial subsidies. 
But the Government's conception of development as well as its 
policies were criticised by Party activists. 	Criticism against Government 
policies took place in Parliament, where both Party and Government officials 
met to discuss development plans and the budget. It is now necessary to 
look into how Party activists criticised Government policies because the 
criticism also shows the view of development of the Party. 
The Party's view of develoDment 
The Party's view of development was based on the distribution of 
social benefits to Africans and on control of the economy. These two 
concerns are reflected in the major policies proposed by the Party as 
well as in its criticisms of Government policies. 
The Party's pre-occupation with distribution and control of the 
economy was affected by the historical development of colonial Tanzania. 
We saw in Chapter 1 that during colonial time Africans had been discrim-
inated against in all sectors of the economy - in the civil service, 
education, credits, loans, health, residential areas in favour of 
Europeans and Asians. 	The major aim of the Party therefore was to 
redress the racially un-balanced monopoly held by Asians and Europeans. 
This objective was enshrined in the Party Constitution of 1954. 
The hostility of Party activists to Asians was more intense in the 
middle-level leadership of the Party. 	After independence, this group 
felt threatened because of their lack of professional training. 	Many 
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of these, however, became Regional Comissioners as we have seen and 
others were appointed as principal secretaries and Ministers during the 
'Kawawa interlude' (Pratt, 1976: 121-6). 
Despite these efforts by Government, however, the hostility against 
Asians and Europeansremained. 	Pratt explains this behaviour in the 
following manner: 
The frustrated officials and the unrewarded 
activists sought their status and asserted 
their sense of their own importance by a 
continuing indulgence in the rhetoric of anLt,-
colonialism, interspersed on occasion with a 
racist hostility to the Asian and European 
minorities. 
(Pratt, 1976: 109) 
Although what Pratt says may be true for certain personalities 
nevertheless, it is also true that the Party had consistently emphasised 
re-distributive measures as part of the process of development, in contrast 
to the Government, which saw them as an outcome of development. 	Both the 
1954 and 1961 amended Tanu Constitutions emphasised distributive measures. 
The hostility shown against Europeans and Asians by Party activists was 
precisely because of their economically superior positions in society. 
In addition, precisely because Party activists knew that Africans could 
not compete on a professional basis with non-Africans, they pressed for 
policies of re-distribution such as the policies of Africanisation, and 
of the replacement of the private traders by the co-operatives - to be 
included as development objectives themselves. 	The improvement in the 
socio-economic conditions and living standards of Africans were development 
objectives in the same sense as a higher rate of economic growth was for 
Government. 
This position of the Party can help us understand why the Party 
became so concerned with problems of distribution to an extent of ignoring 
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production problems, why it pressed for AfricanisatiOn of the economy 
irrespective of consideration of problems of manpower and capital. 
The Party 	pressed for policies which would reverse the 
concentration of income and resources4 previously privileged groups. 
As a result, it identified the Asians as the exploiting group in the 
country. 
The Party's concern with distribution can be seen, for instance, in 
the 1963 NEC meeting, which expressed opposition to private traders: 
NEC meeting expressed great opposition to the 
current practice of allowing experienced 
capitalists to compete in trade with young 
wananchi (citizens) trading organisations, as 
a result of which these young organisations got 
utterly discouraged and failed. 
It was necessary to stop this competition in 
order to encourage those wananchi who are ready 
to co-operate. 
(Msekwa, 1977: 26) 
A similar concern as that expressed above appears again in 1963 NEC 
meeting held between 10-14th January; on its agenda was the following 
item, "The problem of food shortage in the country". 
It was recorded that the meeting specifically 
directed the Government to make suitable 
arrangements which would enable Wananchi (citizens) 
to get their foodstuffs at a reasonable price 
without being exploited by those individuals who 
are engaged in the trade of foodstuffs. 	For 
that reason it w.directed that the Government 
alone should undertake the purchasing and selling 
of foodstuffs throughout the country through 
COSATA. 
(Msekwa, 1977: 28) 
These two meetings with their emphasis on distribution are 
indicative of the Party's concern with trade matters. 	They also 
illustrate other important factors of the Party's attitude towards 
policy making. 	First, the Party did not look into problems of 
-112- 
production as a cause of food shortages. 	Secondly, the Party did not 
make any form of assessment as to whether COSATA was capable of organ-
ising the distribution of food nationally. 	Thirdly, the Partys 
concern with trade led it to view profits as a forqi of exploitation. 
the 
The costs of maintaining trade by/private trader was often not considered. 
This led to the belief that state organisations could undertake trade 
without costs, or if it did have costs, somehow these would not be 
passed on to the consumers. 
We shall now examine Party activistscriticisms of Government 
policies based on the 1961/2-1963/4 Development Plan. 	The Party 
activists used the ideas of African Socialism, first erijinciated by 
Nyerere in 1962, to oppose the Government policies, which were based on 
private capital. 	Most frequently, Party activists ideas were expressed 
in terms of distribution of social and economic benefits: 
But deputy Speaker, Sir, how many Africans 
in this country own sisal estates? None. If 
we want to make this a socialist country and 
at the same time be very democratic, I think, 
Sir, we must consider how we are going to cause 
our national economy to be shared more equally 
between the haves and have-nots. 
(Hansard, 1962: 256) 
The poverty of the masses was often taken to be caused by the capitalist 
and petty traders and the belief prevailed that if the wealth were to be 
distributed then it would solve the problems of poverty. 	These ideas 
can be seen when we look into how the activists criticised each of 
several main areas of government policy from 1962-1963/4. 
Party activists' attitude towards the policy of internal trade 
The Party activists opposed government policies of maintaining 
the private trader. 	As we saw, the policy of internal trade 
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was seen by Government as an integral part o4' its policy of production. 
An efficient and inexpensive system of internal trade was necessary in 
order to create a domestic market as well as to boost production. 
Government was therefore against a rapid expansion of the co-operative 
system because of the lack of manpower. 
Party activists however pressed for the elimination of the private 
trader in favour of the co-operatives. They pressed for price-control, 
they favoured the confinement of goods to the co-operative as an attempt 
to push the private trader out of the market. Mtaki, called for the 
co-operatives to replace the private trader: 
The Government has already decided that thpI'f. 
of Tanganyika would be socialism 	if there is 
any team of middle men who would try, whethe.':i;'V";': 
is an individual middle man or group of middle 
men, trying let down the Government policy of 
co-operatives, we should have strict measures'...,. 
I mean that property of these middle men sho'uId 
be seized and also they should be deported 
(Hansard, 1962:' 898) 
Throughout the period 1962-1963/4 there were pressures exerted on the 
Government to control private shops. 	Most frequently expressed was the 
demand for price control and withdrawal of licences to private shopkeepers. 
(Hansard, 1962, 1963, 1964). 
Party activists therefore criticised government policy of internal 
trade on all fronts: the policy itself, which encouraged private trade 
to compete withthe cooperatives/the idea of price control which opposed 
the idea of a market economy. The Party activists were pressing for 
the co-operatives to replace the private trader. These ideas, as we 
have seen, had been discussed in Party meetings of 1963 which indicate 
the strong feelings of the Party activists towards the private trader. 
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Party activists 1 attitude towards the policy of private capital 
The reaction of the Party activists to the role of private capital 
in the economy was initiated when the Minister of Commerce and Industry, 
Kahama, spoke of the benefits of private capital when he presented his 
motion in Parliament in 1962. 	This motion provoked an intense and 
contradictory type of debate on the role of private capital.' 
It is interesting to note that the two most vocal members of the 
Party, Wambura and Mwanjisi (the Parliamentary secretary to the Prime 
Minister's office) blamed the Asians for not investing their moneys 
the language used, at the same time, illustrates the antagonism against 
the Asian. Wambura had this to tell the Asian community: 
I think the time has come when our friends who 
fonn almost a hundred percent of the private 
capital formation in this country have got to 
tell us where they stand. If they think that 
our government has not been able to make its 
policy clear, then they had better say so. If 
they think Tanganyika is not a place for them, 
and the place where they are going to live for 
ever, they had better say so. It is time for 
them to decide where they are going to live. 
They should straight away now start investing 
it and those who are not prepared to invest it 
must make up their minds and go, Mr. Speaker, Sir. 
(Hansard, 1962: 202) 
While Mwanjisi echoed similar view: 
Do these communities (Asian) need more assurance 
than those given to them for the last eight years? 
Do these people think that it is a good thing that 
the economic fortunes of 10 million souls should 
depend upon the caprice of 100,000 people? 	Do they 
think that this Government will continue to pay 
attention to the sentiments and fears of 100,000 
who have all the money and all the education, and 
leave uncared for the fortunes of 10 million people 
who have all the ignorance, poverty and disease? 
If they cannot give the money free, it must be taken 
away from them. Socialism demands that a man must 
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contribute to the development of his country 
according to his ability. 
(Hansard, 1962: 174) 
More serious questions however were posed by Baghdellah in relation 
to foreign capital: 
One of the dangers Sir, is if the Government or 
the people themselves in the form of a co-operative 
is in partnership with foreign investment there 
is always the likelihood of the country's economy 
being dictated to in the way these foreign 
investors might wish ... then it is quite easy for 
both the prices to go up and up and the investors 
to claim or to force government to continue giving 
them safeguards. 
(Hansard, 1962: 452) 
While Tunze asked the Minister of Commerce: 
How can you have big business without economic 
colonialism? 
(Ibid: 457) 
Party activists' attitude towards manpower policy 
The Party pressed for the policy of Africanisation of the civil 
administration. 	This policy was extremely sensitive because on the 
one hand, Government needed to maintain the efficiency of the admini-
stration and on the other hand, there was mounting political pressure 
to Africanise the civil service as fast as possible (Tordoff, 1967: 
97-98; Pratt, 1976: 124-6). 
Nyerere in 1960 as Chief Minister before independence, attempted 
to clarify the dilemma between the need for Africanisation and the need 
for manpower when he laid down in a parliamentary debate in October of 
that year the policy of the Government. 	First, that every vacancy 
should, if possible, be filled by an appointment made locally. Secondly, 
that in the case of new appointments African candidates of Tanganyika 
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should have prior claim to consideration. 	And thirdly, only if no 
suitably qualified Tanganyika African candidate was available would 
other candidates be considered (Hansard: 36 Session, 19.10.1960). 
But the disparity between non-Africans and Africans in employment 
were very real. In 1960, the non-Africans, with 4 per cent of all 
salaried employees, accounted for 37 per cent of the total annual wages 
bill and still held 2,700 of the top 3,800 civil service posts (Stephen, 
1968: 152). 	Since most of the middle level politicians as well as other 
Africans, could not qualify on the basis of qualification, the problem 
remained, and mounting pressures by Party activists were exerted to 
Africanise the administration. 	For instance, the demand to Africanise 
the civil service was formulated by Mwakangale, a Regional Commissioner, 
in the following manner: 
We want other Ministries (as the Ministry of 
Home Affairs had africanised the top positions) 
to do the same without delay. We are being 
told that there are no people to take such posts. 
Do you really think that an African with Standard 
10 or more years experience cannot act as 
Commissioner of Police or Prisons? 	Do you mean 
that he cannot really do the job? These are the 
tactics which were used by the imperialists or 
colonialists ... I would just ask the Government 
to try and africanise all the top-most posts. 
(Hansard, 1962: 220) 
In conclusion, these speeches by the. Party activists in their 
criticisms of Government policies illustrate the Party's view of develop-
ment, which was based on the idea ofXdistribution  and the identification 
of groups who had privileged access to resources. 
Party activists showed strongly-held convictions concerning social 
justice and the dignity of the common men, but they also showed highly 
simplistic notions of social and economic change and an optimistic self- 
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assurance of their capacity to bring about changes. Thus most of the 
speeches implied that if the wealth owned by Asians were redistributed, 
poverty would be eliminated. 	Finally, the strongly held convictions 
of Party activists on issues of redistribution and socialism often 
prevented the discussion of production problems and of the need for 
manpower and capital. 	On the few occasions when attempts were made 
4 
to direct the debate into this crucial area, the debate regressed into 
emotionalism. 2 Thus the opportunity was missed when both G&vernment 
and Party could have come to grips with the problems posed by, on the, 
one hand, Party's demands for redistributive policies and the idea pf 
socialism, and on the other hand, Government's need for manpower and 
private capital, for economic growth. 
The opposing views of development held by the Party .àndernment 
led to an ambiguous situation, which in turn came to affect 	è'nment 
It 
policies based on private capital. 	This situation will now be discussed. 
THE CREATION OF AN AMBIGUOUS SITUATION 
The conflict between the Party and Government over the role of 
private capital in developmental strategy led to an ambiguous situation, 
which affected the rate of investment. This situation was mentioned by 
the Minister of Finance as early as 1962: 
Although the main reason for the shortfall of 
indirect taxation (a shortfall of £300,000) 
is to be found in the natural disasters we 
have suffered, it would be unwise not to admit 
that a lack of confidence and a feeling of 
uncertainty -has cbñtributed also the slowing 
down of our economic growth and the fall in 
our revenue. 
And: 
One of the tasks to which the Government must 
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address itself is how to resolve these 
uncertainties - and in this task it will 
need the help and co-operation of all 
persons in responsible positions. 
(Hansard, 1962: 46, emphasis added) 
The Minister of Finance's speech provoked an intense debate as to 
the causes of 'a lack of confidence'. 	This debate is illustrative 
of the Party and Government views on development. 	Supporters of 
Government development policies explained the lack of confidence in 
terms of the Party activists' attitudes towards private capital. Party 
activists on the other hand offered other types of explanation 
Hodgson, a supporter of government development policies, elaborated 
on the potential amount which was lost due to the lack of confidence: 
I approached the Management Committee of 
Dar es Salaam Chamber of Commerce, who I 
thought, would be the most likely people to 
have access to figures of this kind, through 
their association with otherçhamber.sof 
Commerce and other bodies of,nature. Although, 
of course, they said they could not give exact 
figures - exact figures could not be obtained - 
but a reliable estimate, if I can describe it 
as that, is that since from the loss of capital 
leav1ng the country has amounted to £5m, and 
the loss of potential investment which might 
otherwise have come in, totals about £15m, 
so lat it is a matter that I know the Minister 
of 	 nance regards as a serious one. 
(Hansard, 1962: 305) 
Hodgson ended his speech by saying that investors would wait and see 
'until it was established by actions clearer than words exactly what 
Tanganyika's policy is and that policy is endorsed by all the people of 
the country' (Hansard, 1962: 311). 
Vasey, the Economic Adviser to the Government, put himself in the 
shoes of a private investor and stated that: 
I then wonder whether indeed the moment I am 
in (as an investor) and I begin to make a 
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profit, I am going to be accused of exploitation, 
and I am going to be threatened with national-
isation. 
(Hansard, 1962: 478) 
Hodgson also commented on certain anti-capitalist speeches made in 
Parliament in the following manner: 
Sir, that certain speeches on Friday and Monday 
would be interpreted overseas, almost at any 
rate, as venom against expatriate capitalist 
exploiters. 	That Sir, does not encourage the 
capitalist to invest his money in a country 
like this. But I think (those speeches) might 
be described as either ill-advised or ignorant 
or inexperienced or irresponsible or in some 
quarters a mixture of all four. 
(Hansard, 1962: 310) 
Supporters of the Government's view of development thus saw the lack 
of confidence by the investors as a result of the party activists' attitude 
towards private capital. Kapilima, for instance, a strong critic of 
Government's view of development, admitted during a debate that "Government 
has been telling us all the time not to make irre sponsible speeches because 
the would-be investors would be scared" (Hansard, 1962: 486). 	Chief 
Mhaiki was more blunt: 
Now what sort of socialism do we want to introduce 
into this country. 	To make all goods, all things, 
all property in this country common? Naturally, 
people who have money of their own, must be afraid 
of bringing it here. 
(Hansard, 1962: 234-244) 
Hodgson re-emphasised the same point: 
If there is any sense of uncertainty, people are 
not going to bring in such capital until complete 
confidence is restored 
(Hansard, 1963: 310) 
These arguments from supporters of Government policies were opposed by a 
number of Party activists, who offered a different explanation of the 
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'lack of confidence' shown by private capital. 
Wambura, for instance, explained that the lack of investment was 
quite natural. It was 'mere hesitation' by foreign capital rather than 
an indication of 'lack of confidence'. He continued: 
Now, even if I were a businessman, I would 
naturally hesitate during this transitional 
period. 
(Hansard, 1962: 198-200) 
Various political changes have occurred, he explained, among these were 
that in 1960 responsible government was achieved, in 1961 independence, 
and possibly in 1962 a republic. 	The Prime Minister, Kawawa saw the 
'lack of confidence' as a result of the 'gross misinterpretation of our 
nation by some people and their flat refusal to accept our explanations 
for them' (Hansard, 1962: 226). 
Minister Bryceson, however, pointed out that whether the 'lack of 
investment' was the result of 'mere hesitation' or '1ack.of confidence', 
there was not much difference: 
The fact is (he said) call it what you like, 
we are not getting the investment that we need 
in order, to help us develop our economy 
(Hansard, 1962: 284) 
Laxman, another Government supporter, came up with suggestions asked for 
by the Minister of Finance in his speech, which would assist in resolving 
the uncertainties. He proposed that the state must intervene in the 
economy; secondly, the government must demarcate lines between private, 
co-operative and state capital: and fourthly, there must be a Ministry 
of Economic Planning. 	Laxman stated: 
Above all, we must do one thing and that is to 
demarcate the role which private capital is to 
play and the way private capital is to fit in our 
image of African Socialism. Private enterprise 
and private capital, the moment these are 
C 
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mentioned they bring to different people 
different connotations. It is important, therefore 
that the Government should make it clear as to how 
and where private enterprises fits in the economic 
fabric of this country. Even more than that we 
must make it quite clear as to where co-operative 
effort on the part of the people of this country 
ends and where private enterprise takes over. 
What I would like to see is the formulation of a 
policy by government which puts out in no uncertain 
terms, the reliefs, the advantages and the aid and 
assistance which this government would give to outside 
capital. 
(Hansard, 1962: 162) 
Laxman's suggestions are important because they were taken into 
consideration by Government. 	As the Prime Minister, Kawawa answered: 
As I have said, Government is delighted with 
the suggestion of the Hon. Member (Laxman), 
and we are going to consider this matter quite 
seriously, so that our people should know where 
we are going. 
(Hansard, 1962: 230) 
The Government attempted to ease the ambiguous situation by evolving 
policies between 1962-1963 which would satisfy the needs of Government 
in terms of economic growth and which, on the other hand, would accommodate 
Party activists' pressures and demands. 	This can be seen in the very 
careful manner in which Government formulated its policies. Government 
gave in to Party pressures in two major areas, namely on Africanisation 
and on the co-operatives; but it held firm on the issue of private 
foreign investments. 
African isation 
Government initiated the Africanisation Commission and its Report 
(1962a) advised the government that the feelings in the Party shared by 
some members of the Government was that the racial imbalance in the public 
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service arising from historic factors should be redressed by giving 
preference to Africans (Tordoff, 1967: 195). 
The Commission's findings therefore tended to support the Party 
activists' view, namely that re-distributive policies in the form of 
African isation should be incorporated as part of developmental, objectives. 
The process of Africanisation was also greatly eKpP_oUte_cL by the 
resignation of Nyerere as Prime Minister in 1962. Expatriate resignation 
jumped from 15 percent to 40 percent (Stephen, 1968: 160). 	By 1964 the 
issue of 'Africanisation was no longer a political problem' (Tordoff, 1967: 
202). 
Co-operatives: 1963 
We have already seen that another major area of contention between 
Party activists and senior Government officials was in the area of 
internal trade. Party activists pressed for the expansion of the co-
operative system to replace that based on private trade, in order to 
remove Asian control. 
To accommodate these political pressures, the Government changed 
the Co-operative Societies Ordinance in 1963 so that the Registrar 
of Co-operative Societies "no longer had the final power to refuse to 
register a co-operative because he was not satisfied as to its viability; 
in the future such decisions were to be subjected to reversal by a 
Minister carrying out a political policy" 	(United Republic of Tanzania, 
1966: 15). 
As a result of this change in the ordinance, registered co-operatives 
increased from 657 in 1961 to 1,533 by the end of April 1966. (Ibid: 15). 
In the urban areas government formed a consumer co-operative known as 
COSATA, which was a step towards replacing the Asian shopkeepers. 
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The Government therefore changed two major policies during this 
early period in order to accommodate political pressures, emanating 
from Party activists. 	Government sacrificed efficiency and manpower, 
both in the administration and in the co-operatives, for political 
stability and in order to bring about a consensus on development policies. 
Foreign Investment (Protection) Bill: 1963 
But the Government did not give in to political pressures on the 
issue of foreign investments. In 1963 the Government issued an Act 
which was to protect foreign business in the case of eventual national-
isation. 	This Act was an attempt by Government to allay the fears of 
private foreign capital over nationalisation so as to make them increase 
their investments. 
Government passed the Foreign Investment (Protection) Bill (FIPA) 
in 1963, which gave guarantees to foreign capital. Section 6 of the Act 
states that in case of compulsory acquisitions: 
The full and fair value of such enterprise 
or property shall be ascertained and the 
holder of a certificate relating to such 
enterprise shall be paid a proportion 
specified in his certificate as the approved 
proportion. 
The Bill also allowed for the repatriation of profits after taxation 
in an approved foreign country and at the prevailing official rate of 
exchange. 	It also stated that the Minister of Finance is empowered to 
issue certificates to foreign nationals who invest foreign assets (or 
re-invest their profits) in Tanganyika, if he is satisfied that the object 
of the investment will benefit the country (URT, 1963: 2). Government 
therefore did not give in to Party pressures on the issue of foreign 
private investments. 	Government's views on development which was 
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centred on increasing and expanding production saw that foreign capital 
was essential in achieving this aim. 	Government did not therefore 
compromise its development 	aim on achieving a high rate of economic 
growth. 
The nature of the three policies discussed here - Africanisation, 
policy on the Co-operative and the policy on foreign investments - as 
well as their timing (between 1962-63) clearly indicates that the 
Government wanted to remove the tensions which existed between itself 
and the Party. 	This tension, as already illustrated, was expressed in 
terms of opposition to Government's development policies. By appeasing 
political demands in the policy of Africanisation and Co-operatives, 
Government hoped that a developmental consensus, a pre-condition for 
stability and effective development planning, would be reached. 
We shall explore further the Government's attempts to resolve 
conflicts in development strategy between itself and the Party when we 
consider the 	Five Year Plan 1964 - 1969 in Chapter 3. 
An implication of my analysis is that, although the Party was not 
constitutionally involved in the foniiulation of development policies 
F1 
during this period, nevertheless, the Government did accommodate political 
demands into policy-making. 	In two crucial areas, on the policy of 
Africanisation and on the Co-operatives, Government gave in to pressures 
from the Party. 3 	This would indicate that Rweyemamu is not correct 
when he argues that since Tanu was not involved in the formulation of the 
First Five Year Plan (1964-1969), the Plan did "not address itself to 
any political changes" (Rweyemamu, 1973: 51). 
These concessions to the Party can be seen not simply as a long 
term and stable compromise but as creating the conditions firstly for 
continuing conflict over the power to formulate development policy between 
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the Party and the Government and secondly for serious contradictions 
to emerge in these policies. 	Either the Party would use the 
concessions to try to make further inroads into the power of Government, 
or else a Party policy on Africanisation and on the Co-operatives would 
co-exist with a Government policy on private investment. Since the 
policies of the Party and the Government were based on fundamentally 
different (and possibly conflicting) views of development a serious 
contradiction could emerge. 
Conclusion 
In 1962 Tanzania had a tripartite system of policy making operating 
under a Tanu umbrella. There was the Tanu Government which was able to 
formulate policies on a de jure basis, the Party which formulated policies 
on a de facto basis and the President of both the Party and Government 
who had powers to supersede both organs and formulate policies independ-
ently. 	Notwithstanding the unchallenged position of Tanu in the country, 
the Party and Government were involved in a conflict. 	Although the 
President was sandwiched between the two sides in this conflict, he often 
used his position to mediate between them by alternating his support 
between the two organs and thereby maintaining stability, because each 
organ could identify with the President. 
The conflict between the Party and Government found its most vocal 
expression in opposing views of development, the Government's view of 
development was similar to the conventional view of development which 
saw the economic backwardness of the country as the result of the limited 
extent of production for exchange. 	Its major concern was to achieve 
economic growth. 	Government evolved policies in major sectors of the 
economy such as trade, agriculture, manufacturing which relied on private 
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capital, both foreign and local. 	Government hoped by these policies 
to achieve a higher rate of economic growth which would enable it to 
improve living standards and meet other social goals. The Government 1 s 
conception of development was consistent with its institutional functions 
as caretaker of the national economy. 
Party activists criticised Government policies because they promoted 
capitalism and also because they strengthened social classes that were 
already in privileged positions, namely, the Asians and Europeans. 	They 
called for re-distributive policies, for Africanisation, and for the 
replacement of the Asian trader bythe cooperatives. In articulating 
these demands, the Party activists were also expressing a view of 
development which was based essentially on re-distributive ideas; re-
distributive measures were seen as central to, if not the essence of, 
development. 	The President's position on the other hand, while accepting 
the Party activists' demands for re-distribution did not exclude him from 
supporting the Government's policy on private capital. 
The conflict between the Party and Government created uncertainties 
in development, since it appeared that the Government lacked the political 
support of its Party. 	Moreover, the Party was constitutionally weak, 
nevertheless party activists constituted a strong pressure group, whose 
criticisms and demands could not easily be ignored. 	Thus between 1962- 
1963, Government gave in to Party pressures on the issue of Africanisation 
and modified its policy on the Co-operatives, but it stood firm on the 
role of private capital, which was considered essential to the achievement 
of economic growth. It passed the policy of FIPA to encourage foreign 
investment by offering protection in case of nationalisation. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Ernst Vasey, the first Economic Adviser to the Government attempted 
to show that all countries, whether capitalist or socialist required 
capital to develop: 
What indeed do you mean by the word capitalist? 
What do you mean by the word, capital? 
(Hansard, 1962: 468) 
He went on to elaborate: 
Capital is used and needed as much in any communist 
system as in a capitalistic system. 	You may give it 
a different name. It may take a different form. But 
capital is that part of our expenditure which is 
essential for development but which does not 
constitute recurring expenditure. And I would suggest 
to the Hon. Members of this House that they should, 
in fact, re-think, or at any rate, not use these 
slogans until they have thoughas to what is the 
basic factor involved. 
(Hansard, 1962: 471) 
He continued: 
Capital is not something to condemn. In the modern 
sense even in the socialistic sense, capital plays 
a necessary part with labour in the production of 
wealth and one without the other cannot be effective. 
This is the lesson of the modern world. This partner-
ship of labour and capital is just so essential a 
part of the creation of wealth and important indeed 
that we need it in this country. 
(Ibid) 
He mentioned that the eastern bloc were not advanced as the capitalist 
countries. It was this point which appeared to infuriate the party 
activists, such as Kapilima and Wambura who rose up to challenge 
Vasey's speech. 	Unfortunately, they only managed to focus on Vasey's 
motives of trying to discredit socialism. 	In other words, they failed 
to bring forward arguments which could have proven Vasey's statement 
wrong. 	This necessitated the intervention of the Deputy Speaker to 
remind the members that Standing Order 59, Section 9, did not allow 
a member to impute motives to any other Hon. Member, and finally that 
Standing Order 19 does not allow a member to dispute the decision of 
the Chair. 	Wambura continued however to challenge the Deputy 
Speaker in Parliament, whose decision is always final. 	This in 
turn led to the intervention of the Minister of Justice. (Hansard, 
1962: 476-493). 
The significance of this debate is that party activists were angered 
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by Vasey's speech because it argued that capitalist societies were 
more developed than socialist ones. 	This statement was taken to 
mean, notably by Wambura and Mtaki, an attack against socialism. 
But they were unable to criticise or formulate a thorough counter- 
argument against Vasey. 	Their inability to do so is reflected in 
their continuously falling back on the motives of Vasey, which in 
turn necessitated the intervention of the Deputy Speaker since it 
was contravening Parliamentary rules. 	But the crucial question 
which was posed by Vasey, the difference between capitalists and 
capital within the context of Tanzaniaeconomic problems, t&S not 
discussed at all. 
e.g. The episode discussed in Note 1. 
In addition, beginning from 1962 a fair progressive taxation was 
adopted. 	The Poll tax was abolished and replaced by a personal 
tax system, under which people with an income of less than 
Shs 2,0001- per annum were exempt from tax ... (cited in Rweyemamu, 
1973: 50). 	These measures do show that Government between 1962-63 
did incorporate a limited degree of re-distributive measures. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN AND THE DEEPENING 
OF AN AMBIGUOUS SITUATION 
In the last chapter we saw that there was a conflict over 
development strategy between the Party and the Government. 	We saw that 
the Government's development strategy was based on the need to expand 
production by encouraging local and foreign capital as well as to maintain 
efficiency in the administration by maintaining expatriates. Initially, 
these policies received support from the President. 	But Government 
policies were attacked by the Party activists on the grounds that they 
ran counter to the policy of African Socialism. 	The conflict over 
development strategy between the two organs of the state created an 
ambiguous situation which was discussed in the 1962 Parliament. 	In 
response to this situation, the Government attempted to resolve the 
uncertainties by evolving policies which would meet both Party demands 
and Government needs. 
The same aim of attempting to achieve a consensus over development 
policies between the Government and the Party also structure the principles 
governing the first Five Year Development Plan, 1964-1969. 	Government 
attempted to strike a balance between on the one hand, the Party activists' 
demands for control of the economy and redistributive measures, and on the 
other, Government's needs for economic growth and manpower considerations. 
But GQvernment failed to appease political demands. The Party 
activists continued to criticise Government's policies on the grounds that 
they were not socialist. 	The struggle between the two organs of the 
state was not resolved. 
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The conflict between the Party and the Government was only resolved 
constitutionally with the enactment of the 1965 Interim Constitution 
which_separated the functions of policy making from its implementation. 
The new Constitution gave powers for policy-making to the Party and the 
responsibility for their implementation to the Government. It weakened 
the Government and strengthened the Party. 
GOVERNMENT: AFRICAN SOCIALISM WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF PRIVATE CAPITAL 
Party activists criticised Government policies 1961-1963 because 
they 	e based on the encouragement of private capital and therefore 
contrry.tothe ideas of African Socialism. 	But in the 1964-1969 Plan 
the Government was arguing for the acceptance of its policies on the 
basis of African Socialism. 	How then did Government interpret the 
idea of African socialism? 	Some insights can be gained by the various 
speeches of Ministers. 
Most senior members of Government when presenting the First Five 
Year Plan (1964-1969) to Parliament defined socialism in terms of 
distribution and not ownership. 	The Minister of Finance, Bomani, when 
presenting the first Budget of the First Five Year Plan stated that 
African Socialism was "concerned with the people's need to control the 
development of their country through the constitutional means available 
to their Government". 	He explained further that control of the economy 
could be exercised by government through the various indirect mechanisms 
such as taxation, regulation of the monetary system, encouragement of 
co-operatives and economic planning. 	Such mechanisms could assist the 
government to achieve the distribution of wealth and provision of increased 
social services. 	Bomani then stated: 
Socialism is not only concerned with the 
Oslo 
control of economic development and with 
the distribution of wealth. It is also 
concerned with the expansion of wealth, 
with the growth of output, with the raising 
of incomes, with the increase of welfare. 
And here we must be utterly realistic and 
completely frank with ourselves. 	We must 
recognise that throughout the five year 
period of the Plan and for many years ahead 
we must as a nation concentrate all our 
endeavours on the investment of effort and 
savings, on investment in industry, on 
investment in roads and railways, in 
education and health of our children. 
(Hansard, 1964: 24) 
Bomani was thus emphasising the need to expand productive activities. 
But in order to achieve such investments in terms of capital, machinery, 
expertise, Tanzania, he explained, would require the assistance of 
"development finances from our friends in overseas countries" (Hansard, 
1964: 24). 
The Minister for State in the President's Office, Jamal, argued 
that Socialism meant the expansion of production: 
What we must constantly tell ourselves is that 
revolutions ought to have clear objectives and 
there should be a definite course set for 
attaining these objectives. To have revolutions 
just for the sake of having them is to commit 
• 	a deception on our people. They will never 
forgive us for it 	Let us always remember that. 
He then went on to emphasise the need for production: 
In the highly technological and competitive 
world of today our objectives must enable us 
to stand on our own, not merely as a techni- 
cality through membership of the United Nations 
or recognition by other sovereign states of the 
world, but in reality. This means production 
and more production at prices wrucfl internally 
lead to real and ever-increasing savings for 
further investment and, externally, enable us to 
pay in the most effective way for all that we 
shall need to import to revolutionise our 
economy. 
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Jamal then pointed to three economic factors, which he said would 
"determine our success and will demonstrate.whether we understand the 
enormity of the task which we have undertaken ahead of us". 	These 
three factors were, the magnitude and extension of production, the cost 
of such production and the size of savings for investment in schemes and 
projects leading to further production. 	Jamal then warned that: 
To attempt to produce without regard to cost 
of production can be self-defeating and 
retrograde effort. To produce to the maximum 
extent at the lowest possible cost and then 
not to save for further investment will be 
equally frustrating and could lead to 
stagnation. 
He continued: 
This is not a matter of Eastern or Western 
• ideologies and 'isms'. These are stark 
economic facts staring us in the face. Ignore 
them if we will, it can only be at our own 
peril. 	Every single activity, every attitude, 
every approach of ours must be determined by 
the recognition of these realities. We are not 
the only struggling developing country in the 
world nor are we the most gifted and favoured 
of them all. 
(Hansard, 1964: 69) 
Thus Jamal's speech clearly pointed to the need for economic production 
and the necessity for its expansion. 	Chief Fundikira in the same 
Budget speech also explained the idea of African Socialism in terms of 
the needs of an echange economy, which required that everyone must 
make a contribution towards production. 	He pointed to two ways in 
which wealth could be distributed under conditions of African Socialism 
situated within the context of an exchange economy. 	These were firstly, 
to allow opportunities for employment and fair wages. to all workers and 
to pay fair prices to the primary producers and secondly, to distribute 
wealth through the welfare services. 
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Fundikira also pointed to the dangers of confusing African 
Socialism with African Communalism. 	The latter refed to a situation 
whereby a number of people do not contribute extensively to the exchange-
economy but Hexpect  to share equally in the wealth which is produced by 
those who are more actively engaged in economic activities" (Hansard, 1964: 
247). 
These speeches indicate that Government's position in terms of 
development ideas was modified to accommodate Party pressures on re-
distribution. 	By 1964, redistribution was considered by Government to 
be important and it was incorporated into the Development Plan. This 
is in contrast to the 1961/62 Plan where the primary aim was on economic 
growth at the expense of redistributive policies. 'However, Government 
still maintained its traditional concern over the need to expand production 
as well as the need for private capital. 
The major aim which structured the First Five Year Development Plan 
1964-1969 was an attempt to maintain a balance between redistributive 
measures and the need to expand production. 	The Plan attempted to 
define the spheres of activities of public and private sectors in the 
commercial and industrial areas. 	The objective was to accommodate 
Party requirements, especially regarding the role of the co-operatives 
vis-a-vis the Indian traders, and to Hensure  the equitable distribution 
of wealth in the country" (URT, 1964: 14). 	On the other hand, 
the Government maintained the role of private local and foreign capital 
in the 1964-69 Plan but it was down-graded from 60% (1961/2 - 1963) to 
47% of total capital expenditure. 	Thus while in the First Three Year 
Plan, the public sector undertook only 40% of development expenditure, 
in the 1964-69 Plan it was to undertake 52% of public expenditure. 
Nevertheless private capital was considered to be crucial in 
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development. The Private sector was supposed to finance £116 million 
towards development. 	Government's reliance on the private sector 
(48%) was seen to be essential by government precisely because of its 
recognition of the economy's limited capacity to generate and expand 
production through reliance on its own internal resources. 	Tanzania 
lacked manpower, capital and organisational experience. By encouraging 
foreign and local capitalists to invest, government hoped that the burden of 
generating the necessary revenue would come from private investment 
rather than from individual labour through taxation. 	It was held that 
only through capital investment in production could a higher rate of 
capital formation be achieved which could finance the infrastructure of 
health, education, housing which were orientated towards supporting 
labour since the majority of the population fell into that category. 
The main objectives of the Plan were defined,('as: 
to raise per capita annual income from 
£19.6s to £45. 
to be fully self-sufficient in trained manpower 
requirements. 
to raise the expectation of 1i1'e from between 
35 to 40 years to 50 years. 
These objectives illustrate that there was an emphasis on health and 
education. 	But the need to expand production as a means of overcoming 
the problem of poverty was overwhelmingly stressed: 
The paradox of Tanganyika is that it is a 
country of 10 million people, possessing not 
inconsiderable natural resources, enjoying 
climatic and health conditions that are not 
abnormal for Africa and yet, in terms of 
average per capita incomes (under £20) it finds 
itself amongst the poorest of the nations in 
this continent. 
(United Republic of Tanzania, 1964: 7) 
What were the causes of this poverty? The Plan identified as the'first 
problem, the absence of a manufacturing base and the predominance of the 
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subsistence sector. 	Thus, "during the years 1960-62, 80 percent of 
non-food consumer goods purchased by Tanganyikans were imported and 
80 percent of foodstuffs consumed did not pass through any market 
economy" (URT, 1964: 7). 	Secondly, the weakness of the distributive 
and transport sectors hindered the creation of a domestic market (Ibid: 11). 
The absence of a domestic market was further aggravated by the existence 
of the subsistence peasants: 
80% of Tanganyikan consumers are peasant farmers 
and it is their effective demand for consumer 
and producer goods which sets the limits to the 
scope and diversity of the domestic market and, 
consequently, sets the pace for the expansion 
of the non-agricultural sectors. 
(United Republic of Tanzania, 1964: 12). 
Another major obstacle to accelerated economic growth was 	the lack 
of manpower especially in education and in the technical training of 
the people. 	For instance, the Plan pointed that in 1963 only 1.7 percent 
of the school age population attended Form 1 to IV (1964-1969: 12). 
Finally, the Plan pointed to the necessity of changes towards greater 
equality in the income structure, and stated that economic growth 
should be used by government to contribute to a more equitable distribution 
of income in society. 
The major solution to the problems outlined by the Plan was increased 
production, which would require private capital because: 
there is an upper limit to the investment 
capacity of the Government, owing on the one 
hand to the low level of domestic resources and 
on the other to constraints upon its ability 
to service overseas borrowings, the economy of 
the country will continue to rely to an 
appreciable extent upon the private sector to 
accomplish the necessary accretion of capital. 
(Ibid: 	13) 
The Plan envisaged a form of mixed economy where "the private sector will 
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be given all reasonable guarantees for carrying out its business in 
conditions sufficiently attractive to induce the re-investment of 
profits in Tanganyika and an inflow of new investments from abroad" 
(Ibid: 14). 
In order to ensure the equitable distribution of wealth within the 
country, the Plan envisaged the "expansion of the co-operative movement 
and the promotion of Government participation in industry and commerce 
in the form of joint ventures.(Ibid: 14). 	Furthermore, the Plan 
demarcated the spheres of activities of each sector. 	Thus the 
co-operativeswould take 40% of trade leaving 60% to private trade, while 
that of the manufacturing sector would rely mainly on the initiatives of 
private capital. 	We shall examine more closely the individual policies 
later on 
Thus basically, Government attempted to add a re-distributive 
measure and partial state ownership on top of the conventional ideas of 
development, which emphasised economic growth and private capital. 
How the Government applied its general conception of development to 
specific sections in the Five Year Plan will now be examined. 
Internal trade 
Government's policy on internal trade was to expand the network 
of retail trade into the remotest areas by encouraging Africans to 
participate as traders. In 1964 there were 45,000 retail licences issued, 
and over 35,000 were held by Africans (Hansard, 1964: 624). 	The plan 
aimed also to have the co-operative movement secure 10% by volume of 
turnover of retail trade by 1970 and later on 30% to 40% of the total 
volume. 	Once this was achieved, Government hoped that retail trade 
would revert to free competition. 	Sixty percent of the trade would 
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still be in the hands of private traders. 	Likewise in the wholesale 
of consumer goods, Government hoped that COSATA, a co-operative 
consumer society would secure 10% of total turnover by 1970. COSATA 
was also to be given distributive rights over consumer goods made and 
sold locally by industries in which there was government participation. 
Government's aims therefore was for a gradual transfer of trade to the 
co-operatives, because it considered organisational capacity crucial in 
implementation. 
The Minister of Commerce and Co-operatives when presenting the 
Annual Estimates for 1964/65 on Commerce and Co-operative Policy 
emphasised the importance of commerce to the economy: 
The urgent call to our nation is, therefore, 
for increased production at home which will 
raise the people's standard of living, whilst 
increased trade to foreign countries - instead 
of pleading for aid from them - will enhance 
our national dignity, personality and 
prosperity. 
(Hansard, 1964: 623) 
This view was consistent with the Government view on development which 
viewed trade as an integral aspect of development because it integrated 
subsistence peasants into the exchange economy and because of the need 
for foreign exchange. 	The Minister also expressed full support for 
the co-operative, COSATA: but he added: 
I must make it quite clear that as the Minister 
responsible I am here to encourage the 
establishment of successful co-operatives only, 
and not just a mushroom of hay-wire prestige 
co-operatives. 
(Ibid) 
He explained that some people accused the government of not having greater 
ambition, that the target of securing 10% of the retail trade by 
co-operatives within the next five years was too modest. But he argued: 
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I wonder, Sir, if Hon. Members are fully aware 
of the scale of operations required to achieve 
even this figure; are they aware, for example, 
that there were 45,000 retail licences issued 
in this country, 35,000 of which incidentally 
have been issued to Africans? Allowing for a 
thrice times turnover no less than 4,000 
co-operative shops would be needed to secure 
30% of trade. The small turnover and scattered 
nature of existing small shops make rural coverage 
of co-operatives most difficult as overheads 
cannot compete with family management. 
(Ibid) 
He continued: 
Rapid as has been the expansion of our co-operative 
movement since independence, it is only fair to 
inform the House that less than half of the 
secretaries of our primary societies have received 
any co-operative training whatever, and quite a 
number of them have either seen a jail sentence 
or are still there cooling their castle building 
ambitions! 
(Ibid) 
It would appear that Government was against a rapid take-over of trade 
because of the weakness within the co-operatives themselves: 
Maybe, this is somehow revolutionary, but it is 
dangerous to do such a thing. It was even 
dangerous to the masses. We have got to remember 
that when a human being wants sugar, he wants to 
get sugar, if he wants to buy a piece of soap, 
he wants to get a piece of soap. Now if perhaps 
we just confiscate things and then announce to 
the masses that they should have them buy from 
our people, while our people are not experienced 
then maybe things will be scarce; the masses will 
be the first to complain, saying you merely 
brought us problems. 
(Hansard, 1964: 630) 
By incorporating implementation problems in policy thinking Government 
hesitated to replace the private trader by the co-operative. 	These fears 
were again expressed by the Minister: 
It is Government's policy to have a lot of things 
sold through Cosata and other co-operatives for 
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the benefit of the masses. But we do not 
have enough manpower. 
I want to remind you that if we undertake 
to do something very rapidly we can fall. 
(Hansard, 1964: 207) 
Government was, therefore, against rapid nationalisation of trade because 
of its realisation that, given the absence of implementation capacity, 
the policy might cause more problems. 	Government feared that a dis- 
ruption of trade might affect production since peasants would have no 
incentive to produce for exchange. 	Failure in production would in turn 
undermine the policy of economic growth, upon which Government's major 
objective were based. 	Finally, private trade was considerably cheaper 
for the state coffers since the expenses involved such as transportation, 
insurance, storage and administrative overheads were borne by private 
capital itself and not by the Government. Given all these reasons, Government 
considered it rational in terms of Tanzania's economic interests to 
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maintain 60% of retail trade on/private basis. 
Emphasis on external, trade 
As already illustrated, the Government's conception of development 
emphasised external trade as an important factor in development because 
of the need for foreign exchange. Thus the 1st Five Year Plan maintained 
the Marketing Boards for the individual cash crops. 	This was a 
recognition of the need to have specialised and efficient export organi- 
sation. 	The emphasis on external trade was, in fact, emphasised by the 
Ris  
In selling to the world market the produce 
Boards will have to be competitive with 
sellers in other countries and contracts 
with individual buyers that have already 
been established. Here they will be able 
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to appoint as their agents organisations 
which have the necessary expert knowledge 
of world market terms and conditions and 
adequate resources to carry out their 
operations. It will also explore possi-
bilities of non-traditional markets. 
(United Republic of Tanzania, 1964: 42) 
The emphasis given on exports can also be seen in its proposal to form 
an Exporter 	Association (with an Export Promotion Council) covering 
Tanganyika's exportsand comprising representatives from Government 
Ministers, industry, the produce boards and other commercial organs, 
"as part of the general policy of intensifying export promotion 
(URT, 1964: 22).We could argue on this basis that Government had an 
export policy. 
Agricultural policies: 1964-1969 
In agriculture, the Plan adopted policies which did not differ 
greatly from those of 1961-1963. 	The major and overriding aim in this 
sector was to increase production. 
First, the 1964-1969 plan allowed for the continuation of commercial 
farmingof large-scale estates, which had been established during colonial 
times. 	Many of these were owned by foreigners, who constituted less 
than one percent of the total population, but as the President pointed 
out: 
They account for some forty percent of 
the value of our exports. 
These estates have both the capital and 
the technicians that are needed to increase 
output, and we need increased output, and 
we need an increase from them. 
(Ibid: X) 
The significance of their numbers is that they did not pose any political 
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threat because it was easier to control them but at the same time, 
their contribution to the national economy was significant. 
Furthermore, the Plan expected the private sector to invest over 
£8m in primary rural activities. 	The expansion of the rural sector's 
monetary output during the five years of the Plan was expected to proceed 
at an average annual rate of about 7 percent per annum which was expected 
to raise the value of its output by over £40m between 1960-62. 
The Government also maintained its 1961 policy of the improvement 
approach which encouraged the progressive farmers through extension 
services and access to credits. 	Subsistence peasants on the other 
hand were considered to be an obstacle because they were not fully 
integrated into the exchange economy. 	The Plan thus aimed at discouraging 
the self-sufficiency of the subsistence peasants by encouraging them to 
specialise in one or two cash crops. 	The Plan envisaged that the subsis- 
tence sector's contribution of about 32% of GDP in the years 1960-62 would 
shrink to 22% by 1970 and to a mere 14% by 1980 (Plan 1964-69: 22). 
Government relied on trade to integrate subsistence peasants into 
the money economy. 	But it was also directing the transformation approach 
onto this category of peasants. 	Its goal was to introduce technical, 
social and legal systems of land tenure which allowed the exercise of 
'modern agricultural techniques based on relatively high productivity'. 
Nyerere outlined his vision of the transformation approach: 
Volunteers coming to these new areas will 
be becoming modern farmers in every sense; 
they will use machinery and perhaps 
irrigation because the land tenure will be 
such as to ensure areas permanently large 
enough to justify the investment; they 
will have to follow laid-down crop rotations; 
and they will live in villages, going daily 
to their shambas. 
(URT, 1964: x) 
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goods, which would integrate peasants into the monetary economy. The 
development of the manufacturing sector was to be spearheaded by private 
capital. 
Policy towards private capital 
Government policies relied substantially on the role of private 
capital both in agriculture, trade and in the manufacturing sector. 
In the latter sector, private capital was to play a substantial role in 
its development. In order to achieve the implementation of the manu-
facturing development, Government envisaged that three quarters of 
investment in industries would be undertaken by private agents, both local 
and foreign. 	About £116 million was expected to come from the private 
sector if the Plan was to be achieved.' 
Although the Government supported private foreign capital it was 
nevertheless prepared to assert greater control to check the outflow 
of capital. In 1965 the Exchange Control was introduced which was 
successful in curtailing the outflow of capital (Yaffey, 1970: 81). 
This strongly indicates that Government did not adopt a laissez-faire 
attitude towards foreign capital at the expense of national interests. 
A special department, the Sectoral Relations Committee, was set up early 
in 1966 in the Ministry of Economic Planning to co-ordinate the affairs 
of government and those of private capital as well as to instil 
confidence in private capital: 
Its membership includes Development Plan 
(wIlJch provides the Secretariat ), repre-
sertives from the private sector and all 
ministries connected with the private 
sector. 
The idea in setting up this committee was to 
facilitate easy communication between the 
private sector and the Government so that 
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The Rural Settlement Commission (RSC) (1963) was given charge of this 
policy. It was administered by the Ministry of Lands, Settlement and 
Water. The RSC evolved pilot schemes to implement the transformation 
approach which aimed at breaking with traditional farming 	. (Wood, 
1965). 
Policy towards the manufacturing sector 
The 1964-1969 Paan placed great stress on the development of the 
manufacturing sector. 	The manufacturing sector provided a crucial 
linkage with the agricultural sector and a mechanism through which 
peasants would be integrated into a domestic market. 	Government thus 
gave a high priority to this sector because it was also an area which 
could generate a higher rate of capital formation: 
It is estimated in the Plan that more than 
50 million will be invested in manufacturing 
and processing industry between now and 1970 
and that output in the industrial sector will 
grow by almost 15% per year. 
We intend to stimulate the whole pace of 
economic and social change by building up an 
industrial base which will not only process 
our exports of agricultural commodities, but 
will provide a much wider range of manufactured 
goods for the benefit of consumers in this 
country. If we are to reach the ambitious 
targets which we have set outselves, we shall 
continue to require plant and equipment, finance 
and technical assistance from overseas countries. 
(Hansard, 1964: 29) 
The policy for developing a manufacturing base in Tanzania was based on 
establishing firstly, industries to process agricultural produce and 
secondly import-substitution projects such as assembly plants for trucks 
and consumer goods. 	The aim was to minimise the transportation bottle- 
necks which existed in the country and increase the consumption of consumer 
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Government could constantly be kept informed 
of the progress taking place in the private 
sector as well as its problems. 
It was hoped that frequent contacts with the 
private sector would sustain a favourable 
investment climate because the problems 
arising between Government and the private 
sector would be solved mutually. 
(Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Development Planning, 1967). 
Another kind of encouragement given to local capital by the Government 
was the formation of a Local Production Promotion Council, whose 
objective was to give "priority support to local manufacturers, 
processors and traders whenever purchases are to be made". The Principal 
Secretary to the Ministry of Commerce and Co-operativecexplained further: 
To demonstrate the practical nature of the 
Government's interest in the setting up of 
the local Product Promotion Council, the 
Minister of Commerce and Co-operatives 
proposes to allocate up to £1,5000 towards 
the costs of the Council's Activity during 
the current financial year. 
(The Nationalist, October 27, 1965) 
The idea of the Council was approved by about 60 representatives from 
private industry and commerce and from Ministries and Government bodies 
(Ibid). 	Government's initiative to boost the morale of local private 
capital was well received by the business community, as remarks by the 
President of Dar es Salaam MerchanE Chamber, Diwani, showed: 
My Chamber would be prepared to co-operate with 
the Government in this kind of work and I am 
sure this statement will be received well in 
local business circles. 
(The Nationalist, March 5, 1965) 
These institutional mechanisms are an indication that Government considered 
the investments from private local capital to be crucial and that it 
arranged to coordinate private capital 'activities with those of national 
development. 	By 1964 Government wâs systematising its policy towards 
ft 
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private capital which had begun in 1962 andAclarified  in the 1963 FIPA 
Investment Act. 
Policy on manpower 
Another area in which Government re-asserted itself vis-a-vis 
the Party was in its policy on manpower. 	In this case the policy of 
Government won out because of Nyerere's intervention. It was estimated 
that in the Government sector alone - excluding all teachers, police 
and nurses, there was a need of 1,002 qualified people in various fields 
(URT,1964: 86). 	When Nyerere addressed the General Assembly when the new 
budget was presented, he explained Government policy in the following 
manner: 
I know that this recruitment from outside is 
unpopular with us. 	None of us like it, and we 
have in fact lost many experienced administrators 
and technicians because we desired to Africanise 
our civil service. 
We have now passed the stage when it was a 
matter of national pride just to see an African 
in a high position; now we are able to take 
pride in this only when the officer concerned 
is doing efficiently the job we want done. 
(URT; 1964: xii) 
Nyerere supported Government policy. 	In 1964 the President redefined 
the policy of Africanisation (Pratt, 1972: 236) to mean localisation, 
that is, the recruitment of Tanzanians irrespective of their ethnic 
origins. 	This was an attempt to meet Government's needs for manpower. 
A year later, in 1965, a policy statement was issued which explained the 
policy of localisation. 	Its arguments show an attempt to balance the 
political demands expressed by the Party activists on the one hand and 
those of Government in the other, in its economi demands for manpower 
and capital. 
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The policy statement on localisation began by stating that it was 
Government's determination to 	the economy: "There can be no 
compromise on our national aim to get real control of the Tanzanian 
economy by the people of this country"; it then went on to state that 
the virtual monopoly of business and commerce which was now held by 
foreign monopoly of business and minority communities would have to be 
broken. 	But the statement continued: 
It must be broken not by destroying what 
exists but by the policies adopted in our 
expansion. These must be such that we 
gradually extend the collectively-owned 
sector of the economy and thus ensure both 
growth itself and the capability of the 
economy to serve the national interests at 
all times. 
(The Nationalist, March 16, 1965) 
In this way, the policy of Africanisation was supposed to allay the 
fears of private capital and manpower. 	The policy warned against the 
dangers of attempting to Africanise management with untrained people. 
It stated: 
This would be as disastrous to the economy 
of the country as the Africanisation of 
hospitals with witch doctors would be to 
the health of the nation. 
(Ibid) 
The policy statement then pointed to the bottle-necks which were hampering 
economic development. 	These were the "shortage of manpower, skills and 
experience, local finance to cover the Focal costs of a productive 
investment or 	commercial undertakings". 	The statement specifically 
argued that these factors were available in the Asian community. "Tanu, 
the government, the parastatal organisations, and the co-operatives", 
the statement continued, "should now quite deliberately take advantage 
of this existing local managerial and technical know-how and this local 
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finance". 	The statement ended with the following words: 
We must emphasise this need to throw our 
bucket where we are in our search for men 
and money in our war against poverty. 
The Nationalist, March 16, 1965) 
The way in which the policy statement argued its case clearly showed that 
it was attempting to maintain a balance between the economic needs for 
capital, manpower and the political pressures from the Party. 	Secondly, 
it also attempted to allay the fears of private local capital and manpower 
by arguing that there was still a place for them notwithstanding 
Africanisation. 	It is pertinent to note the comments of the leader of 
the Nationalist Paper: 
The policy statement, however, makes it 
clear that the Government does not intend 
to stifle private investment in this country. 
The evidence of this fact remains in the 
guarantees and other safeguards offered for 
private investments by the government. 
(The Nationalist, March 16, 1965) 
The policy statement can, therefore, be seen as an attempt to assist 
Government policies of development ... by removing the restrictions which 
had been imposed by the policy of Africanisation. This policy, however, 
did not emerge from the Cabinet. 	Nyerere, according to Pratt, issued 
it independently without the Cabinet's knowledge (Pratt, 1972: 236). This 
fact indicates two important points. 	First, 	that the Presidency was 
an institution of policy-making and as such, the President could issue 
- 	policy independently of both the Cabinet and the Party. 	Secondly, this 
function gave him a balancing role between the two organs of the state. 
In other words, he could 'tip' the balance towards either organ. In this 
case, the policy of localisation tipped the balance towards the Government 
in 1965 since it reflected its major concerns for capital and manpower in 
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economic development. 	Finally, the policy reflects also the view of 
development which Nyerere held during this period and which was similar 
to that held by the Government. 
It is worth noting in passing that at this time the President 
also gave support to the Government's policy on private capital as well 
as its overall emphasis on economic growth. 	Thus: 
We shall achieve this increased prosperity 
if we expand our production of goods. We 
shall become more wealthy by producing more 
wealth. By no other means. 
(URT, 1964: ix) 
And on private capital, Nyerere stated: 
Private investors can provide this quantity of 
money. 	They will do so only if they believe 
that they can make a profit and that they will 
be allowed to export their profit if they wish 
to do so. 	These conditions we must accept;. we 
can do nothing about them. The question we must 
ask ourselves in every separate case is whether 
we also benefit in proportion. When we benefit - 
by increased employment opportunities, by 
increasing government revenue, by the increase 
of wealth produced locally and so on, then we 
should welcome private enterprise as much as 
we welcome loans from friends abroad. 
This is one of those matters about which we must 
start with the world as we find it. To be truly 
revolutionary we must be absolutely realistic and 
use what opportunities the world provides. 
(Ibid: xiv) 
Equally so, Nyerere supported Government's policy on exports: 
No country owes Tanzania a living, we have to 
earn it for ourselves. 	Sentiment will not make 
people buy our goods if they do not want them, 
it is our responsibility, tofind, and to supply 
every possible market. 
(The Nationa1it, Febrary 2, 1965) 
Nyerere's speeches firstly illustrate that he supported Government's 
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policies and priorities. But more important, the speeches also 
illustrate that Nyerere was operating within the conventional view of 
development. We could argue that both Nyerere and Government used a 
similar approach towards analysing development issues. 
PARTY ACTIVISTS CRITICISM OF THE 1964-1969 PLAN 
Plan not Socialist 
Party activists criticised the Plan because it was not socialist. 
While some party activists focussed on the issue of equality others 
focussed attention on the need of the state to control the economy. 
Thus, the Plan, party activists argued, did not foster equality: 
Sheikh Thabiti Kombo: 
Our attack throughout these years has been 
because of the masses and our life conditions 
We can no longer stand and see individuals 
benefit at the cost of others, we want to see 
the masses benefit. 
(Hansard, 1964: 13-14) 
Diwani: 
Mr. Speaker, I would like to mention that a 
socialist policy in a socialist country aims 
many times at raising the standard of those 
who have none. The danger in our country today 
is that there is no equality within the country, 
96% out of 100% of our people are poor. 
(Ibid: 	133-4) 
Mtaki: 
The basis of socialism states that the 
means of production must be in the hands 
of the state or the masses. 
(Hansard, 1964: 89) 
Siyovelwa: 
Now if you think of our policy here, all the 
means of production should be ours as a 
whole. 
(Hansard, 1964 
Party activists used the term Socialism and African Socialism inter-
changeably. 	Siyovelwa, a Party activist remarked on this issue: 
There are those others in African countries 
who believe in scientific socialism, and 
those who believe in African socialism. 
Most of us, most of the MPs are confused, 
our brains are in turmoil ... One advocates 
scientific socialism today, and tomorrow 
he advocates African Socialism. 
(Hansard, 1964: 789) 
The inter-changeability of these terminologies indicates therefore that 
the problem of socialism had not been clearly defined by the Party, the 
President or the Government. 	Nyerere's Ujamaa: the Basis of African 
Socialism (1962) had referred to African Socialism and not to scientific 
socialism. 	While one can argue that those who used the term African 
Socialism to criticise Government policies derived their legitimacy from 
Nyerere's ideas of 1962, it is difficult to argue likewise for those who 
criticised the plan on the basis of scientific socialism, which was 
equated with state ownership of the means of production. 
What is important, however, is that Party activists' criticism of the 
Development Plan clearly shows that they failed to take into consideration 
the type of problems which Government was attempting to solve. It would 
also appear that Government's attempts to explain these problems to the 
Party activists when the ministers were presenting their policies failed 
to impress the Party activists. 	We can appreciate my arguments further 
when we see how Party activists criticised the individual policies. 
Party activists attitude towards private capital 
We saw that Government policies relied substantially on private 
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capital especially in the manufacturing sector. Party activists 
criticised this policy on many issues, ranging from profit-loss accruing 
to the country. exploitation and national loss of control of the economy. 
These ideas were expressed in various forms by party activists: 
Siyovelwa: 
What I want to ask is, where does this 
profit go to? We benefit from the taxes 
imposed and collected by the government 
from these people. But where does the 
remainder, after all taxes, go to? Who 
owns these industries? 	The owners are 
abroad and own shares in these industries. 
All the profit acquired after all taxes 
are expropriated, go abroad as dividends 
among those who own shares and they get 
enormous profits. 
(Hansard, 1964: 152) 
Sheikh Thabiti Kombo: 
Capitalist Itriv2_ on the sweat of the 
masses. In the industrial sector I stress 
that the capitalist should not be left free 
(laughter) - to install a plant for his 
own benefit. 
(Hansard, 1964: 181) 
Nitaki pointed to the dangers of loss of national control of the economy 
as a result of foreign capital: 
This allows the expropriation of large 
amounts of money abroad - this is 
dangerous, because it removes the economy 
from our control and usually the cure is 
only one, that is, to close down all 
insurance companies, to remain with only 
one, which belongs to the state of 
Tanganyika. 
(Hansard, 1964: 211) 
Diwani, another strong Party activist also emphasised the same point of 
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loss of national control of the economy: 
(that) the 60% of investment will be 
held by private sector and owners will be 
ruled by their own aims and targets, and 
these targets may not be to the advantage 
of the nation ... All the industries, Sir, 
must of necessity serve the national goal, 
and if this is the case, then it is 
essential Sir, that the Government is in a 
position to hold the chain of destiny of 
these industries. And I suggest that the 
Government both control the profit margins 
as well as the targets of production. 
(Hansard, 1964: 126) 
Mtaki voiced the same idea: 
All the existing insurance are foreign, 
they are company insurance. In a country 
like this, aspiring for socialism, such 
foreign insurance, many times are against 
socialism 
I could request that all Banks in 
Tanganyika today have got to be nationalised, 
irtead there should be the National Bank. 
(Hansard, 1964: 210-211) 
Party activists articulated a strong hostility hwo,.ycA foreign capital. 
They feared that it would lead to the loss of control of the national 
economy as well as lead to profit-repatriation, thus depriving the nation 
of investable surplus funds. 	This same concern with control and an 
anti-profit attitudew. again voiced in the form of criticisms against 
Government's policy on internal trade. 
Party activists' criticisms against the policy of internal trade 
As we have seen, Government policy on internal trade allowed up to 
40% of retail trade to be conducted by co-operatives leaving 60% in the 
hands of private traders. Governient had opposed a rapid replacement of 
private trade by co-operatives on the grounds that the latter were not 
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well equipped to handle trade nationally. 	This policy was criticised 
by Party activists: 
Wambura: 
We are allowing competition between private 
and co-operatives. I personally think that 
this is not fair because if we have opted for 
• 
	
	socialism, it is not enough to be mere 
idealists, it is better to be full socialists, 
we should agree to be 100% socialist - why 
should co-operatives compete with individual 
enterprises? 
(Hansard, 1964: 73) 
IV 
it is obvious that most of the enterprises 
even today are still being held by Indians 
and their sub-ordinates. Perhaps it would be 
better to request them, if not possible to 
force them, to hand over some of their shops 
to the masses, to enable them to start 
co-operative shops for their benefit. 
(Hansard, 1964: 117) 
Sarwatt: 
Is it still the government po1icy to 
eradicate the• 'petty bourgeoise' in trade, 
that is, themiddlemen, and to stabilise 
the co-operati ves? 
(Hansard, 1964: 559) 
P. Mbogo: 
These people are great thieves, this is why 
they have been able to build storey houses, 
shops, cars etc. 	Prices have got to be 
controlled. 
(Hansard, 1964: 647) 
Thus the hostility against the Indian trader was still present, though it 
was couched in ideological terms. 	Party activists still pressed for 
the total replacement of private trade by the co-operatives. 
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The criticisms by Party activists of Government policies 1964-69 
illustrate that they were still expressing the same ideas in 1964 as they 
had done in 1962, with the qualification that antagonism against the 
Asian trader was increasingly expressed in socialist ideological terms. 
Party activists were still arguing for re-distributive policies on the 
basis of equality as well as for the need to control the economy. 	These 
two major ideas constitute the traditional concern of the Party activists. 
The persistence of these ideas up to 1964 shows that, unlike the 
Government which had modified its policies to accommodate Party demands, 
the Party activists did not modify their ideas so as to accommodate the 
Government's preoccupation with economic growth. 	The criticism of 
the Party activists of Government policies illustrate a singular lack of 
concern regarding problems of production, capital, manpower, expenditure 
in development processes. 	By pressing for re-distributive policies 
and control of the economy irrespective of their economic consequences, 
the Party activists acted as if they were an opposition Party rather than 
a Party whose Government was in power. 
Finally, Party activists' criticisms clearly showed that the 
Government failed to appease political pressures and that the conflict 
between the two organs of state had not been resolved. 	This conflict 
could only be resolved constitutionally, to which we shall now turn. 
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THE 1965 INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF THE ONE PARTY STATE 
The One Party State Constitution was enacted on 10th July 1965. 
One of its major aims was an attempt to resolve the conflict which 
characterised Government and Party relations from 1961. 	That the conflict 
between the two organs of the state posed a serious political problem was 
reflected in Nyerere's instructions to the Presidential Commission on the 
One Party State: "Should the Bunge and National Executive Council both 
continue to exist?' 	If so, what should be the relationship and the 
division of powers between them?". The Commission was directed to find 
a "working relationship between the Party and Government" (Hopkins, 1968: 
18). 
The Presidential Commission on the One Party State recommended, first, 
that Tanzania should be a de jure One Party system under Tanu; secondly, 
that the nomination to Parliament must be a member of Tanu; and thirdly, 
that two members, nominated by the Party should stand for election in 
Parliament. 	Voters have a choice of two people to represent national 
policies. 	What is important for our thesis, however, is the relationship 
between the Party and Government. 
The Commission attempted to solve the conflict between the two 
organs of the state by separating policy formulation from implementation. 
It gave powers for policy-making to the Party and those of implementation 
to Government. 	As the Report on the One Party State .states the conflict 
between the two organs of the state was resolved in the following manner: 
The NEC is concerned with the formulation of 
the broad lines of policy - the National Assembly 
on the other hand is primarily concerned with 
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the more detailed tasks of giving 
legislative measures and exercising 
vigilent control over all aspects of 
Government expenditure. 
(Pratt, 1976: 214) 
In order to enhance the role of the Party in policy-making, the 
Presidential Commission on the One Party State also recommended that the 
National Executive Council of the Party be given powers of summoning 
witnesses, taking evidence and requiring the production of documents to 
be presented to the NEC, as well as be given the powers to penalise anyo 
for disobeying the Party's summons. 	These recommendations were enacted 
in the Constitution under the legal provision Act No. 49 of 1965. Previ 
to this, such powers and privileges had been granted only to Parliament. 
The 1965 Constitution thus not only made Tanu the only political Party, 
but it also made it more powerful than Parliament. Bienen comments on 
this change: 
If anything, the NEC has become a more important 
organ than it was before 1965, its scope and power 
have increased, and it has begun to function in 
Government capacities. 
(Bienen, 1967: 198) 
How can we explain this change especially since we know that there was 
a conflict between the Party and Government? Who were the members who 
constituted the Presidential Commission? Pratt gives us an insight to 
the members of the Commission: 
Nyerere selected the members of the Commission 
extremely carefully. The Commission was 
chaired by Kawawa and included four other 
African Members of Parliament, including 
Oscar Kambona, the Secretary General of 
Tanu. The other members were an Asian and 
European Member of Parliament, four senior 
African civil servants and Roland Brown, 
the trusted expatriate Attorney-General. 
One of the civil servants, 4Anion Nsekela, was 
named by the President to serve as Secretary 
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to the Commission. 	Nyerere had not excluded 
those in the party who had wanted an olig-
archic pattern of rule but he had been careful 
to establish a Commission which would not be 
dominated by them. 
(Pratt, 1976: 203) 
In the Commission therefore there were two strong Party 'men', 
Kawawa and Kambona, but the latter, according to Pratt 'stopped attending 
the Commission meetings and did not sign the final report' (Pratt, 1976: 
203). 	Although Kawawa was a strong Party man and was the Commission's 
chairman, it is difficult to attribute the strengthening of the Party to 
him alone, since the Commission had also very strong minded civil servants. 
We must remember that there were various interrelated problems 
which the Commission were involved in. 	Two major ones were the mechanisms 
of a de jure one party, and the second the relationship between the two 
organs of the state. 	The sub-ordination of government did not occur as 
a result of a de jure one party state but on the second account. According 
to MacAuslan, the Presidential Report in fact wanted to make the Parliament 
a 'strong, vital, questioning and articulated' organ but that 'it 
unwittingly gave more powers to the NEC' (MacAuslan, 1972: 206). 	When 
separating the functions of policy-making from its implementation and 
giving the former to the Party and the latter to Government, the Commission 
appears to have assumed that real power resided in the implementation 
process. 	The civil servants did not realise the extent to which real 
power resided in policy-making, through the determination of major 
development priorities. 	This is one explanation why a Commission which 
was staffed mainly by civil servants gave away Government powers to the 
Party. 
The Commission's solution of dividing the functions of policy-making 
and implementation between the Party and Government respectively did 
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resolve after a fashion the conflict between the two organs of the state. 
By separating their functions the two organs of the state were now meant 
to function as a homogeneous entity since the tensions that characterised 
their relationship 1961-1965 were removed. 	Nyerere expressed this 
intention when he stated: 
Under the new constitution the integration 
of Tanu and Government machinery makes it 
possible for clear co-operation to develop 
without the danger of over-lapping. By our 
new system we have demonstrated finally that 
the conflicts between Tanu and the Civil 
Service, and between Tanu and the institutions 
of central Government, are out of date. 
(Nyerere, 1965: 4) 
Nyerere repeated the same point about unity between the two organs of the 
state when he said: 
There can be no room for difference or division - 
This is our time of emergency and until our 
war against poverty, ignorance and disease 
has been won, we should not let our unity be 
destroyed by a desire to follow somebody elses 
'book of rules'. 
(The National Ethic in One Party 
cited in Hopkins, 1968: 48 
The Party, Tanu, was powerful by 1965 not only because it was the only 
political party allowed but more important because it had legal powers 
to formulate policies. 	In turn, the Government was weakened. As Pratt 
also noted, "by 1965 the Cabinet no longer occupied a central position 
within the government system as it had occupied during the period 1962-64" 
(Pratt, 1972: 233). 
However, the institutional arrangement of dividing policy-making 
from its implementation also strengthened the Party's traditional position 
of not considering problems of implementation or of economic growth in 
policy-making. 	These problems were now formally considered to be the 
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concern of Government. 	The Party's position of disregarding economic 
requirements was now legitimised and consolidated by the Constitution. 
The problems of implementation which, under the Constitution, became 
the concerns of Government, were not considered to be the problems of 
the Party. This institutional arrangement of policy-making was also 
accompanied by the strengthening of the Party activists' view of development. 
The Presidential Commission on the One party state gave recommend-
ations on development, which reflected Government's views of development. 
For instance, the Commission recommended that the Tanu Constitution should 
require members to support a government devoted to, among other things: 
encouraging private enterprises where this 
is directly towards the benefit of the 
whole country. 
(cited in Bienen, 1967: 256) 
But when the Constitution was adopted in 1965, this clause was dropped 
and among others, there were added: 
That in order to ensure economic justice the 
State must have effective control over the 
principal means of production. 
and: 
That it is the responsibility of the State to 
intervene actively in the economic life of the 
Nation so as to ensure the well-being of all 
citizens and so as to prevent the exploitation 
of one person by another or one group by 
another, and so as to prevent the accumulation 
of wealth to an extent which is inconsistent 
with the existence of a class-less society. 
To see that wherever possible the Government 
itself directly participates in the economic 
development of this country. 
(Bienen, 1967: 256) 
The major concerns of the Party activists, namely the ideas of control 
of the economy, redistribUtive policies, which had been expressed in 
Parliament between 1962-1965 and which were used to oppose Government 
views of development, were now incorporated and became part of the 
Constitution of Tanzania. 
The Party, as we have seen, had since its very existence fought 
and pressed for re-distributive policies to improve the socio-economic 
position of Africans in society. 	These demands led to modification 
in Government's policies and re-distributive aims were incorporated in 
the 1964-1969 Plan as part of the process of development. But Government 
continued to maintain the role of private capital both in the trade, 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors because it was unwilling to 
compromise its policy on economic growth. 	Nyerere's early ideas on 
socialism showed more concern with problems of inequality and saw the 
necessity for re-distributive policies. 	But his position allowed him 
to support Government policies especially on the role of private capital 
and on the need to recruit efficient manpower. 	Thus the inclusion 
of re-distributive ideas into the Interim Constitution by 1965 reflected 
the general agreement of the three major political institutions, namely, 
the Party, the President and the Government. 
But the situation is more complex when we look into the ideas expressec 
in the 1965 Interim Constitution which called for the state to control 
the means of production. 	As we have seen, the arguments of senior 
Government officials opposed a total and rapid assumption of control 
over the economy because it argued that the Government lacked the resources 
to sustain and manage state expansion of economic activities. Nyerere's 
arguments and position also appeared to support Government's stand on 
this issue. It would appear, therefore, that the major influence for 
Fi 
for the inclusion of ideas of state control over the economy came from 
Party activists. 	The exclusion of the clause on private capital from 
the Constitution (which Bienen cites) further indicates that senior 
members of the Government did not have the sort of influence with the 
Party in 1965 that they had at the time of the framing of the 1961 Tanu 
Constitution. 	In this way, Government's view of development was under- 
mined further. But more crucial and significant for our thesis was that 
the problem posed by the Government's need for economic growth and for 
manpower on the one hand and the Party's demands for state control of the 
economy on the other, was never resolved. 
What seems strange in the light of the last paragraph is that there 
is no evidence to suggest that ideas about state control of the economy 
and its implications for development were at all discussed at Party 
meetings after independence. 	Party activists appear to have reserved 
socialistic ideas merely for criticising Government policies in Parliament. 
Particularly surprising, the subject of state control was not discussed 
in the 1965 Party meeting (the year in which the Interim Constitution was 
drawn up), which was held on 20th September at Msimbasi Community Centre, 
Dar es Salaam (Tanu, Minutes: :1965). 
The evidence suggests, then, that the problem of development posed 
by the idea of state control of the economy within the context of chronic 
problems of shortage of capital and manpower had not been seriously 
considered. 	This argument would appear to be substantiated by the 
following event - in 1966 Nyerere was going to appoint a Commission of 
Enquiry to study the whole issue of socialism and its relation to 
development (Hopkins, 1968: 100). 	That the President wanted to appoint 
the Commission in 1966, that is, a year after the Interim Constitution, 
strongly suggests that the clause on state control of the economy (and 
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by implication, the exclusion of private capital in development) raised 
very serious difficulties for Government. The Commission never took 
place because it was pre-empted by the Arusha Declaration. 
Conclusion 
In concluding this chapter we can state that the Government failed 
to appease political pressures and to win support for its policies from 
the Party activists - despite the concessions it had made in the 1964-1969 
Development Plan. 	The Party activists criticised Government policies 
because they were not socialist. 	They called for the control of the 
economy and the replacement of the private trader by the co-operatives. 
Government was against the premature replacement of private trade by the 
co-operatives because the latter lacked the capacity to undertake trade 
nationally. 
On the last point, it is worth stressing that the Government's 
reluctance did not rise from opposition to the co-operatives or from 
class interest. 	In fact, the Cabinet during this period had Ministers 
such as Bomani and Kasambala who had been strongly identified with the 
co-operative movements and it would have been to their class interest to 
replace the private Asian trader. 	Equally important, Government was 
against the rapid expansion of the state sector which the Party activists 
were demanding because it lacked the resources to manage a centralised 
state economy. 	Ironically enough, Government does not appear to have 
seen state control of the economy as an opportunity for it to strengthen 
its own position and increase its own bureaucratic powers and status. 
And on the other hand, the Party, which was demanding the control of the 
economy and therefore the growth of the bureaucracy, had in fact very 
little to gain in material terms. 	Thus in different ways both the Party 
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and the Government might be said to have been arguing against their 
respective self-interests. 
This must throw doubt on Shivji and Von Freyhold's contention that 
Party and Government were united in seekingto consolidate themselves as 
a bureaucratic class based on the extension of state control over the 
economy. 	In seeing the state as a homogeneous body, Shivji and Von 
Freyhold overlook the clash of policies between the two main organs of 
the state, namely, the Party and Government. In representing the interests 
of the different actors as those of an emergent bureaucratic class, they 
oversimplify the proccupations and perceptions involved on both sides. 
* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 
The conflict between the two organs of the state was only resolved 
constitutionally by the 1965 Interim Constitution, which gave powers to 
formulate policies to the Party, making the Government responsible for 
policy-implementation. 	This separation of functions between policy 
formulation and its implementation also placed an institutional wedge 
between 'politics' and 'economics' of policies, the longer-term developmental 
consequences of which will be analysed in Part II. 
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FOOTNOTE 
1. G. Kahama, Minister for Commerce and Industry spoke of the need to 
encourage foreign capital (Hansard, 1964: 526-7). 	He stated 
that: 
But here Mr. Speaker, I must offer a word 
of explanation to our own people: when we 
have a positive policy of Africanisation; 
and when we are desperately anxious to 
develop our own resources; and when we 
fully appreciate the dangers of political 
pressures resulting from the injection of 
foreign funds; it may strike some of my 
non Friends in this House as frustrating 
that we have to rely on foreign investment 
at all. 
He then pointed that these three things which "the people of 
Tanganyika must realize - and which must be fully grasped and understood" - 
The first one is that the expectation of 
reasonable rate of return is an absolute 
necessity if foreign capital is to be 
attracted. 
The second is that the earning of a 
reasonable rate of return by an investor 
costs this country nothing, and third is 
that the Government can impose conditions 
which will safeguard our people from 
exploitation, or alternatively can, through 
our Development Corperation or the 
Tanganyika Development Finance Company, 
insist upon some form of financial 
participation by the Government which will 
give us the power to see that such industrial-
isation is developed upon the lines of our 
own choosing. 
(Hansard, 1964: 526-527) 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
OUTCOMES OF POLICIES BEFORE THE ARUSHA DECLARATION 
In this chapter we shall examine the outcomes of the policies 
pursued by the Government during the half-decade starting in 1962. 
These policies, we have seen, were challenged on political grounds by 
an increasingly powerfulparty. 	The political struggle between the 
Party and Government in terms of policy-making was resolved in 1965 in 
favour of the Party. 	Likewise, the Party was able to assert its view 
of development, based on redistribution and state control of the economy, 
in the 1965 Constitution. 	By 1965 therefore the Party was in a much 
stronger position vis-a-vis the Government than it had been in 1961. 
Nevertheless, an examination of Government policies in this period shows 
that they did achieve a certain degree of success in economic terms 
despite the difficulties under which it was operating. 
The Cabinet during this period was also operating under difficult 
conditions. 	Pratt (1967) has analysed some of the problems in economic 
planning. 	There was the initial problem of inexperience among the 
Ministers in their new tasks. 	There was a lack of basic information 
and statistic pertaining to new soclo-economic conditions which made 
policy-making difficult. 	In addition, there were manpower problems, 
instability of world market prices, adverse weather conditions and the 
effects of the 1964/65 foreign policy crisis, which led to the withdrawal 
of aid upon which the Plan depended. 
The 1964/65 foreign policy crisis affected the Government's 
development strategy, which had been based on promised aid. 	Tanzania 
quarrelled with West Germany over the Hallstein doctrines; with Britain 
on the latter's handling of the UDI crisis in Rhodesia and twice with 
MIMI 
the USA, once when Tanzania believed the USA to be involved in a plot 
against her and again when US diplomats were deported over America's 
policy towards Vietnam. 	These disputes led to a loss of aid which 
affected the fundings of the Second Five Year Development Plan 1964-1969 
(Hartmann, 1977; Nyerere, 1967). 	A second setback was a drought in 
1965 which affected production of various crops. In addition world 
market prices for sisal, cotton and coffee fell in 1965 (Pratt, 1967: 
41). 	A third setback was the Arusha Declaration which affected the 
inflow of private capital. 
Thus there were serious problems which created obstacles to the 
full implementation of the Plan; but there was also economic success 
in areas where Government policies were adhered to in implementation. 
Government's policies were most successful in agriculture and in the 
manufacturing area. The success of its policy on private capital was 
curtailed by political events. 	Before we consider the individual outcomes 
in these areas, it will be best to consider the overall outcome of the 
1964-1969 Plan. 
SUCCESS OF ECONOMIC POLICIES 
Although the Plan had aimed for a 6.7% economic growth rate the 
actual rate achieved was only 5%. 	This, however, was not a mean 
achievement if we bear in mind the conditions under which the Government 
was operating during the Plan's (1964-69) implementation. 	Secondly, 
when foreign funds were not forthcoming, Government was able to mobilise 
65% of development funds from internal resources. 	As Nyerere explained: 
We forecast that about 22% of the Central 
Government expenditure and about 48% of the 
total investment expenditure would come from 
local sources; for the rest, we were relying 
on external assistance. In fact, however, 
out of a total expenditure only slightly smaller 
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in money terms than that planned, more 
than 65% of the Central Government capital 
expenditure was financed from domestic 
sources, and something like 70% of the 
total investment spending came from within 
Tanzania. 
(URT, 1969: x) 
Nyerere's acknowledgement of the success of the First Five Year.  
Development Plan (1964-1969) is reflected in the following statement: 
In particular wediscovered at the end of 
that Plan that We' had been pursuing a 
policy of self-reliance long before we 
officially adopted it. 
(Nyerere, 1970: 5) 
Attempts by radicals to argue that the 1962-1967 tcapitalist' policies 
failed are not supported by evidence, either on overall economic 
performance or in regard to particular sectors. 
Agricultural production 
With the exception of sisal and groundnuts, there was an increase 
of cash crop production. 	The Minister of Finance had this to say in 
relation to the marketed cash crops 
Since 1960/62 the growth in marketed 
agricultural output has risen to around 
6% per annum, compared to 3.5% in the 
1954/61 period. 
(URT, 1969: x) 
Thus the growth in marketed agricultural crops was higher during the 
First Five Year Plan (1964-1969) than it had been during colonial times. 
The decline in sisal production was the result of a fall in the world 
market price. 	In the case of groundnuts the price was so low that 
producers switched over to other crops, incide.a1ly showing that 
peasants did respond to market prices as the GOvernment had argued. 
(URT, 1969: xiv, 15). 
SIM 
The achievements in the area of agricultural production in this 
period cannot be separated from Government policies to encourage the 
progressive farmer and commercial farming, since these sectors were 
making major contributions to marketed production. 	As Nyerere noted: 
In the First Plan we talked only in terms 
of increased production and our efforts 
were directed at encouraging greater output, 
even when this meant helping individual 
peasants to become employers of labour. 
(IJRT, 1969: 	ix) 
The Government's approach to achieving higher agricultural production was 
therefore successful in economic terms. 
Manufacturing sector 
If we consider that Tanzania had begun with a very low manufacture 
base, which accounted for only 4% of G.D.P. in 1960/62, then the 
achievements of this sector during this period were not negligible. Most 
of the industries were of a processing type or linked to import-substitution. 
Of the 569 establishments employing 10 or more persons in 1965, only 18% 
were established before 1946. 	About half of the total establishments 
(48%) were begun between 1946-1960; and over one-third of the total 
were begun after independence (Rweyemamu, 1973: 112). 	Both Asian and 
multi-national capital invested in the manufacturing sector (Coulson, 1982: 
172). 	As a result, industrial growth was over 10% per annum, after 
allowing for price increase which compared to the growth of 5.8% per 
annum in the period 1956-61 (URT, 1969: 15) 
Foreign private capital 
The outcome of Government's policy on foreign investment was very 
much influenced by the political climate and events. As the figures 
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in Table 4.1 illustrate, the inflow of foreign investment was 
haphazard. 	
TABLE 4.1 
Gross profits outflows and net inflows of private 
capital 1961-1968 
Year Profit Capital 
outflows inflows 
(Million (Million 
shillings) shillings) 
1961 71.2 50 
1962 73 58 
1963 123 155 
1964 93 79 
1965 110 -6 
1966 114 138 
1967 159 -66 
1968 114 76 
TOTAL 857.2 484 
Source: J. Rweyemamu, 'The political economy of foreign investments 
in the underdeveloped countries', African Review, 
1 1 (1971), 115. 
quoted in Coulson, 1982: 174. 
The limited capital inflow which took place in 1962-63 was the 
result of the 'uncertainties' which were discussed in Parliament in 
1962 and which were resolved in the enactment of the Foreign Investmehts 
Protection Act (1963). 	As a result, capital inflows exceeded outflows 
by the margin of 32 million shillings. The period 1964-65 was charact-
erised by a greater outflow which can be accounted for by the foreign 
policy crisis and the mutiny of 1964. 	The situation, however, improved 
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in 1966, when a higher capital inflow occurred, because the Governnient's 
evident success in stabilising the political situation in the aftermath 
of the mutiny. However, this situation was again reversed in 1967 and 
1968 as the result of the Arusha Declaration. 
DIFFICULTIES IN IMPLEMENTING PARTY ACTIVISTS' DEMANDS 
Other policies which were implemented between 1962 to 1966 failed 
and had to be abandoned. 	Yet others generated problems which could 
not be solved. 	We shall examine three such policies, namely the Village 
Settlement Programme (VSS); the policy of rapid expansion of the 
co-operatives and the policy of Africanisation. A major theme under-
pinning these three policies was the political pressures made by the 
Party for their implementation by the Government. 
The failure of the Vi1lace Settlement Prociramme 
We saw that initially the Government had expressed doubts about 
the VSS programme because of the high costs of funds it would require 
but that it acquiesced. By 1966 the policy of VSS had to be abandoned 
because it was a failure. 	The scheme failed, as Government had anti- 
cipated, because of its over-capitalisation. 	The high capital overcost 
of £150,000 per farmer was too much for Government, the policy of 
mechanisation was un-economic and the scheme failed because it also bred 
an over-dependence on government resources (World Bank, 1977: IV: 15). 
The Second Vice President, Kawawa, also emphasised the scheme's highly 
capitalised nature as a reason for its failure (cited in Hyden, 1980: 74). 
A British Mission report, the Ross Report explained the failure 
of the VSS programme in the following manner: 
One contributory factor to the failure of 
the settlement programme was the inadequacy 
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of the technical organisation responsible 
for the execution of the programme. 
(cited in Georgulas, 1967: 3) 
Georgulas (1967)has given us an insight into the types of problems the 
Rural Settlement Commission Agency experienced while implementing the 
VSS programme. 	Georgulas found that there was intervention by poli- 
ticians when the policy was being implemented and that politicians 
frequently ignored technical and administrative constraints involved in 
the process of implementation. 	Thus, "often, politicians and admini- 
strators were not aware of each other's needs" (Georgulas, 1967: 3); 
and again: 
It is reasonable to assume that the 
politician's lack of formal education 
and their limited relevant working 
experience inclined them towards a 
rationalism which was not necessarily 
orientated towards scientific and 
empirically based reasoning. 
(Ibid: 122) 
Politicians viewed village settlement as part of the development drive 
and they pressed the administrators to increase the numbers of village 
settlements. For instance: 
In October 1963 the Agency was requested 
by the Vice President to increase its 
initial programme to 150 and to provide 
assistance to 80 other schemes. By November 
the same year, the agency was asked to 
increase these to 200 and 160 respectively 
for the same five year period. 	Later in 
early 1964 these instructions were revised 
and the number of proposed settlements were 
first reduced to 60 and subsequently 
increased to 74. 
(Ibid: 130) 
Politicians pressures to expand village settlements faster than what had 
been planned for by the Agency was explained in the following manner: 
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The politician's ignorance of the 
technical limitations to development 
coupled with their lack of appreciation 
for these limitations, as well as with 
their fear of political capitulation, 
frequently perpetuates drives which aim 
to attain development goals which are 
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. 
(Georgulas, 1967: 128) 
The pressures to increase village settlement schemes were not 
accompanied by further allocation of funds nor were there any explanations 
to the RSC agency for the departure from the original policy, which had 
been based on the consideration of technical and economic constraints. 
Thus when the agency attempted to reduce costs of, building houses by 
using temporary materials (so that it could stretch the funds to more 
settlements), the President rejected the idea. 	The Agency then had to 
adopt a different formula where it would provide houses, frames and a 
permanent roof and the settler was expected to build it. The settlers 
rejected this formula (Georgulas, 1967: 134). 
Georguals' analysis of the failure of the VSS programme does throw 
light on the intervention of political factors in the process of develop-
ment. 	However, the failure and subsequent abandonment of the VSS 
programme did not affect production mainly because,it was marginal to 
production. 	Moreover, the practice of evolving di1ferent policies to 
cater for different sorts of agricultural producers helped to minimise 
the risk of policy failure from the point of view of the agricultural 
economy as a whole. 
Problems in the co-operatives 
We have seen that the Government, in order to appease political 
demands, changed the Co-operative Societies Ordinance in 1963. 
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Co-operatives could be registered for political reasons rather than 
simply on the basis of viability. 	The change in the Ordinance removed 
the restrictions and co-operatives increased from 657 in 1961 to 1,533 
by the end of April, 1966. 	The aim of the Party in exerting these 
demands was to replace the Asian trader with the co-operative system. 
But by 1965 the co-operatives had immense problems and the 
President instituted a Presidential Committee of Enquiry into the 
Co-operative Movement and Marketing Boards. 	The Report began by 
investigating the complaints of the peasants about the co-operatives. 
It quoted these: 
We complain of the continuous economic 
plunder which we endure from the corrupted 
employers and committeemen of the 
Co-operative societies and Unions whose 
behaviour no person on earth can long 
tolerate. 
(URT, 1966: 13) 
The Report suggested that co-operative inefficiency and corruption were 
the direct result of a political decision to expand the co-operative 
movement without taking into consideration manpower problems: the 
Governmentts co-operative development division found it difficult to 
train people as fast as the expansion was taking place: 
There were 157 men in four grades in 1960, 
and by 1st May 1966, their numbers had grown 
to 331 in 7 grades; but of this total only 
137 were fully trained. 12 were wholly 
untrained and 57 had had no more instruction 
than a 14 week course. 	Nevertheless, this 
partly trained Division was spread thinly, 
one man for each 9 co-operatives in 1966, 
compared with one for 6 five years earlier. 
The difficulties of supervision were 
compounded by inadequacy of transport. 
URT, 1966: 29) 
The Report also stated that it was extremely difficult to train a 
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society secretary rarely with "more than Standard VIII education and 
sometimes only Standard VI, in such matters as the handling of book-
keeping, weighing and storage facilities etc.". The Report continued: 
Often the secretary is completely new to 
the concept of employment and to the 
handling of other people's money. 
(Ibid, 29) 
One of the major causes of the failure of the co-operatives was political 
interference: 
final basic defect is the susceptibility 
of the co-operative movement to political 
interference. We have already mentioned 
the political decision to accelerate the 
growth of the co-operatives, this decision, 
however, sound in intents, has been mis-
interpreted so as to justify exaggerated 
demands for the premature registration of 
societies, a root cause of the present 
problems. 	Political interference is also 
manifested in the deployment by commissioners 
of the scarce personnel and scarcer vehicles 
of the co-operative Development Division. 
(Ibid: 51) 
Similar problems affected the urban consumer shops, COSATA, which party 
activists had called for to replace the Indian retail shop-keeper. The 
Report found: 
It will be noted that a defect with respect 
to COSATA is the same defect we have observed 
in the case of many of the newer agricultural 
societies: the formation of a co-operative 
as a result of a policy determination from 
above without adequate demand for the society 
on the part of those expected or required 
to use its service. 
A consequence of this defect is inadequate 
interest in the society, a higher costs which 
must be passed along to the public one way 
or another (i.e. through higher prices or a 
public subsidy). This is noboom to the 
farmers, to the urban consumers, or to the 
co-operative movement,and is a practice which 
should be resisted. 
(Ibid: 184) 
It is pertinent to note that the reasons for the failure of the 
co-operatives as a result of over-expansion regardless of economic 
considerations had been anticipated by senior Government officials as 
the parliamentary debates between 1962-1965 illustrated. 
Africanisation 
We saw that Government gave in to political demands for rapid 
Africanisation and within four years, it was no longer a political 
problem . Government accepted the inevitable drop of standards that 
was involved in such a rapid process of Africanisation. 	Nyerere, for 
instance, regarded any attempts to ensure that Africans were as qualified 
academically and professionally as the Europeans and Asians before they 
were appointed to senior posts as "misapplied idealism" (Abedeji, 1971: 17). 
The lowering of standards manifested itself in the educational 
background of the members of the administrative service and staff grade 
officers. Only 18% of the principal secretaries and administrative 
officers had received a university education. 	Eighty percent of them 
had no post-secondary education at all. 	Most of the principal 
secretaries 	had less experience than the Ministers whom they wQQ.. 
Sln. (Abedeji, 1971: 19). 	By 1967 the problem of inefficiency 
in the administration was a cause for concern. An Ad Hoc Committee was 
established to review the selection, recruitment and training arrangements 
for the administrative service. It referred to the unsatisfactory 
experience of admitting officers to the Administrative class from the 
Executive class and concluded that it was unrealistic to expect such 
officers to perform successfully (Establishment Circular, No. 15, 1968 
cited in Abedeji, 1971: 19). 	The Government, therefore, sacrificed 
efficiency in its own administration and came thereby to limit its own 
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effectiveness. 	As Abedeji (1971: 20) states "Tanzania will have an 
administrative service which will be a hindrance to economic development. 
One of the basic requirements of public administration is competence". 
To sum up this section, the three major policies - the Village 
Settlement Programme, the policy of Africanisation and the policy on 
the Co-operatives - failed to achieve their ends because they were 
transformed by the Party's intervention in a way which negated their 
economic rationale and functions. 	There has been a tendency by radical 
writers to criticise policies which consider economics as 'capitalist' 
or 'apolitical'. 	Saul's (1966) criticism of the Report on the Enquiry 
into the Co-operative Movement is symptomatic of this type of analysis. 
For instance, Saul states: 
In strongly urging the isolation of the 
co-operative movement from any political 
influence, it is not too much to say that, 
for better or worse, the Committee members 
have written a profoundly apolitical even 
anti-political document. 
This is perhaps surprising in a country like 
Tanzania which has chosen as a strategy for 
development to unite relevant groups and 
agencies in'development front' this being 
postulated upon joint and co-ordinated 
efforts under the leadership of a political 
party. 
(Saul, 1966: 4) 
Radical writers tended to view a 'political' approach as implying the 
non-existence of economic considerations. 	Their analyses have taken 
politics' as a substitute for economic understanding. But as will be 
shown throughout the thesis, politics complements but can never sub-
stitute for economic understanding in development. 
-177- 
CONCLUSION TO PART ONE 
We can conclude that between 1962-1965 Tanzania had a tripartite 
system of policy-making. 	This system created uncertainties in policy- 
making because each organ of the state - the Government, the Party and 
the Presidency - was able to formulate policy on a different basis. 
Constitutionally, while the Government was more powerful than the Party, 
the Presidency was more powerful than the Government. 	This state of 
policy-making was made more complex by the conflict between the Government 
and the Party, which was expressed in two opposing views of development. 
The Presidency attempted to maintain a balance between the two organs of 
state, sometimes favouring one, sometimes supporting the other. 
The Government's view of development, which had similarities 
with the conventional conception of development, called for investments 
from private local and foreign capital to expand production because of 
shortages of capital and manpower within the country. 	The major aim 
of the Government was to achieve economic growth. 	This view of develop- 
ment, however, was opposed by the Party activists, who called for policies 
of re-distribution and for state control of the economy. 	Although 
Nyerere supported Government's position, nevertheless the latter modified 
its aims to incorporate the Party activists' demands in an attempt to 
create a consensus in development thinking, a pre-requisite for development 
planning. These attempts by the Government failed and the conflict 
between the two organs of the state remained. 	Thus the state in Tanzania 
was not the homogeneous entity some writers have presented it as, and 
the stability it appeared to enjoy concealed an intense struggle between 
the two organs of the state. 
The 1965 Interim Constitution was partly an attempt to solve the 
conflict between the Party and Government. 	This was achieved by 
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strengthening the constitutional position of the Party vis-a-vis 
Government and by an institutional separation of functions between 
the Party and Government. 	The former became responsible for policy 
formulation while the latter was given responsibility for its imple- 
mentation. 	The 1965 Constitution attempted to solve the conflict 
between the two organs of the state, not by unifying their interests 
but by dividing them and keeping them apart. 
This institutional arrangement for policy-making and implementation, 
however, introduced a de-stabilising element into Tanzanian development. 
It created conditions whereby the Party could formulate policies taking 
into consideration only 'political' factors - that is, taking the economics 
of the policy to be the responsibility of Government by virtue of 
the latter's responsibility (duty) for implementation. 	The Party would 
attribute policy failures to poor implementation, while the Government 
would blame the Party for faulty policy-making. 	A fuller analysis of 
these problems will be considered in Part II. 
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Part II 	•DEVELOPMENT POLICY-MAKING SINCE 
ARUSHA: PARTY ASCENDANCY AND 
CHRONIC ECONOMIC CRISIS 
This part has two themes. 	First s 	policies from the Arusha 
Declaration onwards will be analysed. 	The consequences of Party 
supremacy in policy formulation will be examined in the ways that the 
Arusha Declaration was interpreted and extended from 1967 and in the 
outcomes of these policies in the 1974-1975 economic crisis and the 
crises at the end of the 1970s. 	This element of the analysis will be 
a continuation of the approach taken in Part 1. 
The second theme is the examination of the explanations that have 
been offered for the economic crisis of 1974-1975 and the later crisis 
in the light of the policy-making analysis that has been undertaken in 
this thesis. 
The two themes cannot be separated easily. The analysis of explan-
ations follows immediately on the description of the outcomes of policies 
leading to the 1974-1975 crisis in Chapter VII since it is on this crisis 
that so many of the interpretations have focussed. 	Events after 1975 
are then considered in Chapter VIII as a means of further evaluating the 
explanations offered in this thesis and in other interpretations. 
However, a more continuous analysis of policies in particular 
areas for the whole period up to 1982 will be undertaken in Part III. 
SM 
CHAPTER FIVE 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF POLICY: THE ARUSHA DECLARATION 
Most writers on Tanzania's political economy have recognised that 
the 1967 Arusha Declaration constituted a watershed in her development. 
The nationalisation of foreign capital together with the Leadership Code 
have been recognised as important in Tanzania's policies of socialism. 
Interpretations of these actions by the early radicals, who viewed these 
policies as 'socialist' differed from those of the later radicals, who 
argued that they created an economic base for the bureaucratic class to 
consolidate its powers. However, while interpretations of the Arusha 
Declaration have differed, recognition of its importance in Tanzania's 
history has not been disputed. 
The Arusha Declaration also has significance in terms of policy-
making in Tanzania. 	It shows that Nyerere was an independent agent of 
policy-making, not simply responding to pressures from either the Party 
or Government. 	Nyerere could be considered as an initiator, himself 
acting independently of both organs of the state. 	At the same time, he 
could also support both organs. The intricate and complex policy-making 
roles of Nyerere can best be illustrated by an investigation of the process 
by which the Arusha Declaration was in turn conceived, accepted, formulated, 
passed, discussed and clarified. 
An investigation of this complex process will also help to bring 
out the different concerns and priorities of the Party, the Government 
and the President himself. It will be argued that although Nyerere's 
priorities in the Arusha Declaration were different from those of the 
other two organs of the state, nevertheless, the outcome of the 
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Declaration in January 1967 led to the further strengthening of the 
Party's position and view of development vis-a-vis that of Government. 
It will also be shown that the same year, Nyerere was attempting 
to explain the Arusha Declaration in the light of the Government con-
ception of development as well as to re-assert the Government's major 
priorities. 	This apparently contradictory position on the part of 
Nyerere indicates firstly that he was attempting to maintain a balance 
between political and economic needs, and secondly, that Nyerere had not 
totally abandoned his conventional view of development. 
My position therefore differs from that of those Marxists who have 
explained the policies of the Arusha Declaration in terms of class 
interests (Shivji, 1976). 	I also differ from Pratt's explanations 
which have over-emphasised Nyerere's moral principles (Pratt, 1976). 
Nyerere's overriding concern was the maintenance of political stability. 
This will be shown in this chapter. 
THE SIGNIFICANr.E OF THE ARUSHA DECLARATION 
The origins of the Declaration: 
Nyerere as an independent organ of policy-making 
The Arusha Declaration was drafted by Nyèrere himself, though it 
was sent to the Party for discussion and acceptance in accordance with 
the 1965 Interim Constitution which made policy-making the responsibility 
of the Party. 	The Government was not consulted over the new policies 
40- 
and was concerned over the manner in whichdecision on nationalisation, 
for instance was taken. 	As Pratt illustrates: 
At a single, hurriedly called Saturday 
Cabinet meeting on 6 February 1967, 
Nyerere sought Cabinet approval for a 
substantial number of nationalisations. 
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All of this occurred without any detailed 
planning by the relevant Ministries, 
without any full Cabinet discussion based 
upon a detailed briefing and without any 
proper legal preparation. 
(Pratt, 1976: 238) 
They (Jamal and Bomani) were very uneasy 
about the hasty and unprepared way in which 
the nationalisations were done but they 
were not basically hostile to them. They 
greeted the proposals as Nyerere later 
recalled 'not with horror but with concern'. 
(Pratt, 1976: 241) 
Therefore we can see that the ideas of the Arusha Declaration did not 
originate from Government. 	Did they then come from the Party? 	This 
would have been a more logical source because Party activists had 
L 
criticised Government policies because they were not soci aists. But 
Msekwa, for instance, notes that the 1967 agenda of the NEC did "not have 
on it the policy of socialism and self reliance" (Msekwa, 1977: 38), 
while Mwansasu comments thus: 
even on an issue of this magnitude 
members received no advance notice; 
they went to these meetings without 
having either thought about the issues 
or discussed them in local party circles. 
(Mwansasu, 1979: 184) 
Therefore we can conclude that the pressures for the Arusha Declaration 
did not originate from the Party. 	It is therefore necessary to look 
to the President, the third policy-making institution. 
We have seen that no organised political force was the source of 
the Arusha Declaration. 	There was also no foreign exchange crisis. 
As we saw in the last chapter,foreign capital did begin to come in after 
1965 and local capital was being invested in the manufacturing sector. 
And: 
And: 
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But inevitably class inequalities were beginning to emerge. 	There was 
a proliferation of Mercedes-Benz bought on loans by Ministers and their 
parliamentary secretaries, as well as the building of houses for rental 
purposes (Pratt, 1976: 235). 	There was a tendency towards conspicuous 
consumption. The material benefits for workers and peasants on the 
other hand were not as rapid. 	There was public disillusionment because 
not everyone was getting richer (interview with senior Government official, 
June, 1981). 
The student crisis (1966) was another factor which had a profound 
impact on Nyerere's mind. In October of that year 400 students from 
the University of Dar es Salaam marched to the State House to protest 
against the newly established National Service scheme, which required 
secondary school and university graduates to undergo five months of 
military training followed by 18 months in which they would work at their 
jobs but receive only 40% of their salaries (tax free) (Coulson, 1982: 181). 
Nyerere was argered by the stupid arrogance of this newly educated 
social group. 	Foremost in his mind was the question "What kind of a 
country are we building?" (Pratt, 1976: 234). 	The students were 
expelled. 
A final crisis which had an impact on Nyerere and led to the 
Arusha Declaration was the foreign policy crisis of 1964/65 which led 
to withdrawals of aid. 	It illustrated that dependency on foreign sources 
was dangerous since it could be withdrawn at any time. Both these 
circumstances - increasing distance between leaders and masses, and the 
vulnerability of the economy's dependence on foreign capital - were 
seen as potential sources of political instability. 
The 1960s was a period of intense political instability in Africa; 
no fewer than 26 of the 35 African States experienced some form of military 
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intervention. 	During 1965 and 1966 there were nine military coups 
in Africa (Jacob, 1971: 169); Nyerere was greatly shocked when Nkrumah 
was overthrown. 	He stated: 
What is happening in Africa? What are 
the coups about? The last four months 
have seen changes of governments in many 
African countries. The latest has been 
in Ghana. What is behind all this 
(The Nationalist, March 1, 1966) 
And Nkrumah writing from exile cautioned African leaders of the dangers 
of foreign intervention to political stability: 
Wherever we turn, we are in trouble 
If we stand up against foreign 
intervention we are assailed 
If we receive foreign aid and investment 
we are liable to come under their 
domination and control. If we welcome 
foreign intervention and assistance they 
bring in their wake confusion and turn 
our people against us. 
(The Nationalist, March 9, 1966) 
In an article of March 4, 1966, Minister Babu, writing under the 
pseudonym of Pressman, pinpointed the dangers of political instability 
threatening Africa: 
In Africa we are helplessly watching Smith, 
Verwoerd and Salazar and now the army 
take-overs, adding to making the confusion 
worse confounded. 
What are we to do? Are we to sit back and 
let unfavourable events overtake us without 
lifting a finger to influence them to our 
favour? 
(The Nationalist, March 4, 1966) 
Babu was a close confident of Nyerere's and an acute observer of political 
events. We can assume that the danger of political instability facing 
Africa in general, as well as their relevance to Tanzania, were discussed 
SURE 
since both men were interested in political and foreign policy issues. 
The problem of political stability was foremost in Nyerere's mind. 
/ 
His concern over inequality and class conflict was also part of this 
greater concern for political stability,an analysis of the newspaper, 
The Nationalist, during the period 1966-67 indicates. 	This is illustrated 
by Nyerere's speech in Ma-'L.a island where for the first time the President 
used a class analysis of exploitation. 	This speech marks the beginning 
of Nyerere's radicalism. 	Because of its significance I quote at length 
from the newspaper summary of the speech: 
Mwalimu said Tanzania would not tolerate 
seeing its people being divided into 
exploited and exploiter classes. Mwalimu 
said that Tanzania had chosen to pursue 
socialist policies in order to bring 
equality among her people. "Each and every 
individual must toil to earn his living 
and not simply exploit others" he said. 
Dividing people into exploiters and exploited 
classes was very dangerous and in fact had 
brought many problems and troubles in other 
parts of the world, the President explained. 
Speaking about leadership, Mwalimu said that 
leaders should never use their positions to 
benefit themselves. "Sterner measures will 
be taken against any leader found using his 
position to acquire wealth". 
(The Nationalist, February 7, 1966) 
The Arusha Declaration was conceived. 	By January 1967, and before 
the policy was sent to the NEC meeting for discussion , it was evident, 
given the following statements, from the newspaper, The Nationalist, 
that the higher leadership had already accepted the policy of socialism: 
'Nyerere Hits at Exploiters' - The Nationalist, January 9, 1967. 
'Its Time for Take-Over' - Kambona, the General Secretary of 
the Party. - The Nationalist, January 20, 1967. 
Although Nyerere was preoccupied with problems of political instab-
ility and foreign policy concerns, he was also very worried about economic 
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development. He was concerned about the effects of the withdrawal of 
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aid on the development of the First,Year Plan. 	Two informants who 
were closely associated with Nyerere during this period, emphasised that 
after the crisis had occurred, Nyerere apparently posed himself the 
question - Now what? 	A number of development projects had been 
abandoned; Nyerere was afraid of losing the momentum of development. 
According to these two interviewees, Nyerere had to arrest the problem - 
a shock treatment was required (interview with former Government official 
and Party official, June, 1981). 	For Nyerere, the Arusha Declaration 
was to be among other things a development strategy, which would be 
based on mobilisation of the people. 
President's Opening Speech and final Party document 
At the 26-28 January 1967 meeting of the NEC held in Arusha, 
Nyerere gave an unpublished opening speech in hich he outlined broadly 
and in popular language the ideas of socialism and self-reliance, which 
were to form the basis of the Arusha Declaration policies. His pre-
occupation with foreign-policy issues, political stability and the use 
of labour to counteract the effects of lack of capital were expressed in 
his opening speech. 
The President posed the question: Is Tanzania really independent? 
He said that in the country there were many economic linkages with 
countries such as Germany and America and that it was these 'linkages' 
which led to exploitation. He stated: 
It must be Tanu's and the Government's policy 
to reject exploitation nor do we want 
Tanzania to exploit another country. 
(Tanu, NEC Minutes, 1967) 
The postulation of the problem of exploitation in ternis of economic linkages 
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between foreign capital and Tanzania brought the President closer to 
the ideas of the Party activists. 	He re-emphasised this point again 
when he posed the questions: 
How about money coming from outside Tanzania? 
We must not depend on money to bring us 
development. 
(Ibid) 
The rejection of capital as an active catalyst in development brought 
him to emphasise labour instead: 
The progress of a country is br4bught 
about by the people, not by money. Money 
is the result, not the foundation of 
development. 
(Ibid) 
The mobilisation of labour required the participation of the Party and 
Nyerere spoke of the need to strengthen the Party as a development agent. 
Nyerere also stressed that there should be no exploitation within 
the country. 	His definition of exploitation was based on the employment 
of labour which allowed the generation and appropriation of profits (Ibid). 
Nyerere reinforced his arguments on exploitation by arguing that income 
differentials were not necessary because man's basic needs did not differ 
from one to another: Nyerere stated that pay differentials were not 
consistent with the policy of socialism (Ujamaa) (Ibid). 	This moral 
justification for the attack on income differentials brought him to 
the Leadership Code. He stated: 
One works and one gets a fair pay. 
The ability to work must not be turned 
into a marketed commodity, it must be 
that one is serving the state and the 
state pays one a subsistence income plus 
a bit more for purchasing cigarettes. 
(Ibid) 
He ended his speech by stating that it was possible for Government to 
stop exploitation: 
The Government should be called upon to 
act for we now enter the path of lJjamaa. 
I know the Government will accept this 
call and will fulfil it as well as observing 
any problems that will emerge. 
(Tanu, NEC Minutes, 1967) 
Nyerere developed his ideas consistently, and used both political 
and moral arguments to convince his audience to accept the policy of 
socialism and self-reliance. 	Socialism was equated with the idea of 
elimination of exploitation, and self-reliance was implied in the idea 
of activating labour in development. 	But Nyerere's major concern under - 
lying these ideas was to create political stability. He wanted to avoid 
the development of gross income inequality in Tanzania, as happened in 
West Africa. 	We can see this further when Nyerere himself explained the 
significance of the Arusha Declaration. 
Nyerere used nationalisation of foreign capital, which he knew was 
popular with the Party activists, to pave the way for their acceptance 
of the conditions for leadership: 
Nationalisation, well very little - what 
is there to nationalise in Tanzania 
I think it (nationalisation) has prepared 
the mood for everything. It is very 
difficult after nationalisation to oppose 
self-reliance or to oppose the conditions 
of leadership 
(The Nationalist, March 6, 1967) 
Nyerere saw the policy of self-reliance and the conditions of leadership 
as the most important factors; 	nationalisation was secondary, 'although 
it got more publicity than the other ingredients of the Arusha Declaration' 
(Nationalist, March 6, 1967). 	For instance, Nyerere again re-emphasised 
his point that the biggest challenge in the policies of the Arusha 
Declaration was not nationalisation but self-reliance (Tanu, Dar es Salaam, 
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1967: 15). 	Nyerere saw the need for an uncorrupted leadership and 
equality between the masses and the leaders as pre-requisites for 
political stability. 	The fact that Nyerere did not consider national- 
isation as the most important factor indicates that he was still working 
within a conventional view of development. 	Nyerere's priorities as 
Head of State were concerned more with stability than with either 
red istributive questions or economic growth per se. 
Nyerere's priorities and concern with political stability never-
theless strengthened the Party's position vis-a-vis that of Government. 
First, 	Nyerere's call for nationalisation of foreign capital and 
egalitarian policies added weight to the Party's view of development. 
Secondly, Nyerere's emphasis on mobilisation strengthened the Party's 
role in development. 
The President's Opening Speech also paved the way for Party activists 
to super-impose their ideas on development onto Nyerere's concern for 
political stability. 	We can see this when we compare the Arusha 
Declaration and Nyerere's ideas in the Opening Speech. 
The Party's position was strengthened by the Committee of Eight 
which was appointed by the NEC meeting at Arusha to study the President's 
speech and gives its recommendations to the NEC (Tanu Minute No. 77, 
26-28 January, 1967). 	This committee appears to have influenced the final 
published form of the Arusha Declaration. 	The chairperson of the Committee 
of Eight was Barongo who was Regional Commissioner and at one point also 
a junior minister to the Ministry of Agriculture. 	The Agenda was 
divided into three parts; the first part dealt with the policy of Ujariaa 
(Socialism), the second part with the policy of self-reliance, and the 
third part with the strengthening of Tanu (Tanu Minutes of the NEC, Arusha, 
1967). 
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The Committee of Eight's discussion of Nyerere's ideas is 
important because of its influence on the ideas of the Arusha Declaration 
as we have come to know them. 	We shall see how a development strategy 
was evolved from Nyerere's concerns of political stability. 	We can do 
this by comparing Nyerere's ideas given in his Opening Speech and the 
final form of the Arusha Declaration policies. 	These will be analysed 
under different headings, because they also illustrate the conflict with 
Government's policies and concerns. 
The policy of socialism 
The final published version of the Arusha Declaration begins with a 
definition of socialism: 
A truly socialist state is one in which all 
people are workers and in which neither 
capitalism nor feudalism exists. It does 
not have two classes of people, a lower 
class composed of people who work for their 
living, and an upper class of people who live 
on the work of others. In a really socialist 
country no person exploits another. 
(Nyerere, 1968: 233) 
The definition of socialism was explicitly given in terms of classes based 
on ownership of the means of production. 	In this sense it was definitely 
at variance with the conception of African Socialism based on re-distributive 
policies which had been upheld by the Government, some Party members and 
most importantly, the President. 
The Party's definition of socialism in terms of ownership led to 
the policy of nationalisation as its logical conclusion. 	Under socialism: 
The major means of production and exchange 
are under the control of the peasants and 
workers. 
(Nyerere, 1968: 233) 
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Thus the Party gave greater emphasis to nationalisation than Nyerere 
had done. 	By doing so, the Party was able to undermine Government's 
view of development which was based on private capital. 	We can see 
this further when we analyse the Arusha Declaration policies towards 
foreign private capital. 
The policy statement of the Arusha Declaration towards foreign 
capital was explicit; it rejected it although accepting that it was needed 
for economic growth: 
It is true we need these enterprises. 
We have even passed an Act of Parliament 
protecting foreign investments in this 
country. Our aim is to make foreign 
investors feel that Tanzania is a good 
place in which to invest because investments 
would be safe and profitable, and the profit 
can be taken out of the country without 
difficulty. 
(Nyerere, 1968: 240) 
The above quotation directly refers to Government's view of development 
and its concern for economic growth. The Party rejected this position 
of Government because of profit-repatriation: 
Could we agree to leave the economy of 
our country in the hands of foreigners 
who would take the profits back to 
their countries? 
(Ibid) 
This view directly reflects Party activists' concern with profit 
repatriation. 	But the document went on to assert political arguments 
also. 	Thus: 
How can we dejend upon gifts, loans and 
investments from foreign countries and 
foreign companies without endangering our 
independence? ... The truth is that we 
cannot. 
(Ibid) 
The rejection of aid, loans and private investments reflected closely 
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Nyerere's foreign policy concerns as expressed in his Opening Speech. 
Finally the document rejected the use of foreign capital because it would 
endanger not only independence but also the creation of socialism: 
*The policy of inviting a chain of 
capitalists to come and establish 
industries in our country might succeed 
in giving us all the industries we need, 
but it would also succeed in preventing 
the establishment of socialism. 
(Ibid: 241) 
Thus the establishment of socialism was postulated as an anti-thesis 
to foreign capital. 
The Arusha Declaration gave a higher priority to agriculture and 
down-graded the manufacturing sector. 	This aspect of the new development 
strategy was absent in Nyerere's Opening Speech, suggesting that it can be 
attributed wholly to the Committee's recommendation. 	It was also an 
explicit attack on the Government's policies which since 1961 had consist-
ently emphasised the development of industries (see Three Year and Five 
Year Plan). 	The Arusha Declaration stated: 
The mistake we are making is to think 
that development begins with industries. 
(Nyerere, 1968: 241) 
Two reasons which are interrelated can explain this policy shift. Firstly, 
the chairperson of the Committee of Eight was Barongo, who had been a 
junior minister for Agriculture. 	The heavy bias towards agriculture 
at the expense of the manufacturing sector may perhaps be attributed in 
part to his influence. 	Secondly, the Party had always shown more 
interest in the agricultural sector because it was in this sector that 
the majority of the population were involved, and because Party 
administration and structures were established in rural areas. 	Thirdly, 
since the Arusha Declaration had rejected the policy of encouraging 
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foreign capital investment, it was logical to de-emphasise manufacturing 
since this was the sector which was most dependent on private capital. 
The policy of self-reliance 
The policy on self-reliance, unlike that on socialism, was completely 
based on Nyerere's ideas given at the Opening Speech. 	There was no 
modification but nor was there any form of elaboration, especially in 
its methods of achieving a self-reliant economy. 
The Declaration began with the assertion that the aim of self-
reliance was "to move the people from a state of poverty to a state of 
prosperity". 	But this process must not depend on money. The attitude 
that "money is the basis of development and that without money we cannot 
develop is wrong" (Ibid: 235). 	It was wrong because Tanzania was a 
poor country and it did not have money, which were the weapons of the 
economic powerful countries. 	The policy paper further argued that 
calling on the Government to spend more money without increasing taxation 
was equally wrong: 
demanding for more milk from a cow while 
insisting that the cow should not be 
milked again. 
(Ibid, 1968: 237) 
This argument took the Government's concern of lack of resources into 
consideration for the first time in this document. 	On the other hand, 
foreign private capital was rejected because: 
Independence means self-reliance. Independence 
cannot be real if a nation depends upon gifts 
and loans from another for its development. 
(Ibid: 239) 
All these ideas drew their roots from Nyerere's Opening Speech. 	The 
policy paper then outlined a strategy of development which was based on 
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the assets which Tanzania possessed, that is, the people, land, good 
policies and good leadership. 	It also emphasised hard work and 
intelligence. 	But again, these ideas were put forward by Nyerere in 
his Opening Speech. 
Not only this but those concerned with the agenda on self-reliance 
failed to reformulate Nyerere's ideas into a development strategy. The 
document merely restated Nyerere's ideas without studying or elaborating 
their implications in developmental terms. 
Strengthening of the Party 
The third part of the Agenda dealt with the strengthening of the 
Party. 	Nyerere's idea of a self-reliant economy was based on the idea 
of mobilisation of labour. 	Although Nyerere did not elaborate very 
much on this idea nevertheless it was implicit in his notion of a self- 
reliant economy. 	If there was no capital, then labour, the only other 
alternative, had to be used to generate wealth. 
In a meeting of the Regional Commissioners held at Arusha on 24th 
January 1967, just prior to the NEC meeting, Nyerere had explicitly 
stated that Tanu must step up political education and orientation for 
its leaders, party cadres and party members (The Nationalist, January 24th, 
1967). 	Two days later but before the NEC meeting, Pressman sketched 
out a development strategy based on mobilisation: 
Our approach to National planning will accordingly 
be transformed. Instead of emphasising 
foreign investments and private capital, 
we shall emphasis mass mnobilisation and 
self-reliance. 
In order to make this policy effective, 
the masses i.e. the workers and peasants 
must be in a position of leadership in the 
party and state organs so that the party 
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and state reflect the interests, the 
experience and the feelings of the 
masses. 
Hence, training of cadres from among 
the masses becomes the first priority 
in our National Planning. 
(The Nation1ist, January 27, 1967) 
But there was no policy document which emerged from the Party on how 
to strengthen the Party in order to enable it to undertakemoi1isation 
as a developmental instrument. 	A month later we have the first 
statement on how the Party was going to be strengthened: 
Party branches are to be set up in all 
government Ministries, Local Government 
bocLes, industries and organisation in 
order to enable the people to get a 
thorough teaching of Party's ideas as 
outlined in the Arusha Declaration. 
When already established, the Party 
branches will study the Arusha 
Declaration, its implications and how 
"it can be effectively implemented - 
in the Ministries, Local Government, 
industries and organisations throughout 
the country". 
(The Nationalist, February 5, 1967) 
The second paragraph of the above quotation clearly illustrates the 
failure of the policy at the NEC level. 	Partly as a result of this 
deficiency, the Party Annual Meeting held in Mwanza in September-October 
1967 emphasised that attention should be given to political education. 
Minute 90 stated: 
NEC should create a department of political 
education in the Party's Headquarters in 
order to train leaders, party members and 
the people in general on political education. 
(Tanu, Party Annual Minutes, 1967) 
We could argue on this basis that the Party failed to evolve a policy on 
how to strengthen the Party in order to implement mobilisation systematically 
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and constructively. 	The emphasis on party branches and political 
education was not a sufficient condition for a self-reliant strategy 
capable of meeting the Government's need for economic growth. 
Finally, the Committee of Eight also failed to elaborate further 
on the notion of 'good leadership', which was closely related to the 
notion of mobilisation and strengthening of the Party. 	Nyerere's 
definition of good leadership which meant that leaders should not have 
more than one salary or income was considered sufficient (Nyerere, 1968: 
249); other factors such as a leader's capacity to mobilise people (without 
coercion), to instill confidence in the Party or to solve practical 
development problems, were not considered. 
We can therefore conclude that the Committee of Eight and the NEC 
meeting at Arusha in 1967 were able to strengthen the Party activists' 
position in areas which Nyerere had not given a very high priority (i.e. 
in the matter of nationalisation) but did not elaborate on areas which 
Nyerere had considered crucial, namely, policies of self-reliance, of 
good leadership, and of strengthening the Party in order to undertake 
mobilisation. 	The rejection of an industrial development policy in the 
Arusha Declaration also shows that policy-makers had not seriously 
considered the implications of a development strategy which was merely 
based on agriculture. 
These deficiencies within the policies of self-reliance, socialism, 
mobilisation, made the policy of the Arusha Declaration unworkable. 
For instance, the failure to find a consistent policy on mobilisation 
affected the policy of self-reliance which made the policy of socialism 
unworkable. 	For example, the Party failed to evolve a development 
strategy based on mobilisation which could contribute revenue or 
contribute towards expenditure and thus make the economy self-reliant 
and socialist. 	The Party merely criticised Government's policies 	of 
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obtaining funds from private sources but did not elaborate on how it 
could obtain these from internal sources - apart from taxation, which 
it criticised. 	The statement that self-reliance is based on the land, 
the people, good leadership, intelligence and hard work is a tautolo- 
gical statement rather than a development strategy. The lattermustbe based 
on the assumption that land, good leadership, people, intelligence 
and hard work existed in the first place! 	Thus the weaknesses of the 
Party activists was shown by their inability to consider development as 
a process which required economic inputs. This oversight hindered the 
formulation of a viable strategy in the Arusha Declaration. 
The policy of Ujamaa 
Ujamaa has been traced to Maoist influences on the basis that 
Nyerere returned from China in 1965 greatly impressed with Mao's 
rural-based development (The Nationalist, February 26, 1965). 	Mapolu 
(1973) has also pointed to similarities between Nyerere's Ujamaa and 
Robert Owen's Villages of Cooperatives. 	Musti (1978) argues that the 
experience of the Ruvuma village schemes was influential. 	To acknowledge 
these influences is not to deny that Nyerere himself had also always 
been preoccupied with problems of rural development; and the policy of 
Ujamaa can be seen as a logical development of his own ideas, matured 
by wider experiences, which helped him to see 'old' ideas in a new light. 
An important question which I wish to pose is why Nyerere did not 
adopt the policy of Ujamaa until September 1967. 	The policy of Ujamaa 
has always been seen as part of the Arusha Declaration package but as 
we have seen, it was first mooted at the Mwanza meeting, not at the 
Arusha NEC meeting. 
It can now be established that Nyerere did not have in mind the 
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policy of Ujamaa gural development) in January 1967 when he was at 
c. 
the NEC meeting. 	There is no evidence of the policy of Ujamaa ('ural 
development) in his Opening Speech, nor is there evidence to suggest 
that the NEC discussed the ideas of communal production as a means of 
achieving self-reliance. 	Second, the ideas of communal production 
in agriculture were equally not discussed at the Party Special meeting 
held at Dar es Salaam in February-March 1967. 	As we shall see later 
in this chapter, district members of the Party argued that the prohibition 
of recruiting labour as a result of the leadership code, would make it 
difficult for rural-based Party leaders to undertake agricultural 
activities and this would in turn constrain agricultural growth. 	In 
the discussion of this issue I argued that Nyererets answer avoided 
the problem posed by the District Party leaders. On this basis, I 
would argue that Nyerere had not thought of communal production as a 
solutionto the political requirements of the leadership code and the 
economl: requirement for increased production at this meeting. 	This 
solution in the form of Ujamaa policy only crystalised between April - 
August i because he first outlined the policy at the Party Annual Conference 
September 1967, held at Mwanza. 	As we shall see, moreover, the President's 
speeh on the policy of Ujarnaa showed a certain tentativeness; it was 
more of an expression of associated ideas rather than an exposition of 
a systematic approach towards policy. 	It raised more questions than it 
could answer. 
In September 1967 at the Party Annual Conference in Mwanza, Nyerere 
outlined the policy of Ujamaa: , rural development. He stated: 
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Our aim is to make sure that, people 
in Tanzania should live together and 
work together communally, to the extent 
that every family co-operates with 
another for the nation's benefit. 
The only difference between people's 
income in these communal villages, will 
be a result of his own efforts and not 
through exploitation. 
(Tanu, Mwanza, 1967: 49) 
The aim was to develop rural life on the principles of equality, 
co-operation and democracy. 	The objective was to organise rural life 
on a village basis and on the principle that the land would be 'our land', 
the crops 'our crops', apdthe herd 'our herd'. 	Living in a village, 
he re-emphasised, would also enable the development of social services 
to take place (Tanu, Mwanza, 1967: 50). 	But Nyerere stressed that 
ujamaa had to be voluntary: 
For we are not simply trying to organise 
increased production; we are trying to 
introduce a whole new way of life for the 
majority of our people. 	This can only be 
done once the people understand its 
purposes and voluntarily decide to parti-
cipate. 
(Ibid) 
Since the policy was voluntary, it did not appear to overtly clash with 
Government's interests and priorities. 
Debates over the Arusha Declaration in the Party and the Government 
Although the President could be considered an independent organ of 
policy-making as well as an initiator, Nyerere took the Arusha Declaration 
proposal to the NEC, the highest policy organ of the Party.. The Arusha 
Declaration therefore came out as a policy document of the Party. 
The second major important organ of the Party which discussed the 
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Arusha Declaration was the Special Annual Conference held at 
Dar es Salaam on February 27 to March 3 1967. 	Members of the Annual 
Conference included nominated district and regional Party secretaries, 
members of the NEC, MPs and Central Committee members. 	Another meeting 
of the Annual Conference was also held in September of that year in 
Mwanza, at which further elaborations on the Arusha Declaration were 
made. 
The Arusha Declaration was also discussed by Parliament at its 
sessions of 1967. 	We have records of the discussions at the two Party 
Annual Conference and of the Parliamentary discussions, but have no 
written record of the discussions which occurred at the NEC and in the 
Cabinet, since these meetings were not public. 	In these two areas I 
have therefore relied on interviews to see how the Arusha Declaration 
was discussed. 	An examination of the types of questions raised in these 
discussions may throw light on how major development issues were posed 
in Tanzania. 
Two major pre-occupations appear to have predominated in both the 
discussions held in the Party circles and those in Parliament. 	These 
were the effects of the Leadership Code on the personal welfare of the 
leaders, and demands for further nationalisation, especially of local 
capital. 	A major characteristic of these discussions both in the Party 
and in Parliament was that the new policies were not debated thoroughly 
or systematically evaluated, especially in terms of their implications 
for development strategy. 	When an important issue on policy impli- 
cation was raised, there was a tendency for the person to be either 
rebuked or ridiculed. 	This occurred both in Parliament and in the 
Party meetings. 
Discussions at the NEC were mainly debates which were held in camera. 
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It would appear from an interview conducted by the author with one 
of the leading members of the Party who was present at the NEC meeting 
at Arusha, but who was not part of the Committee of Eight, that discussion 
of the President's Opening speech was very lively and Party members 
discussed all its political and economic aspects and implications. It 
also appears that Party members expressed an overwhelming 	conviction 
and confidence in the peasants' and workers' enthusiasm to generate 
development, and in the possibility of sustaining economic expansion on 
the basis of the state sector (interview, June 1981). 	According to the 
interviews, senior Party officials at the NEC were aware of the problem 
of shortages of manpower and other economic constraints, but it was 
argued that socialism was a political decision, which had to be made. 
The economic problems that derived from this decision, as well as the 
intricate problems of management etc., would be confronted during imple-
mentation phase. 	Party officials argued that if Tanzania had waited 
until all her economic problems were solved, then the Party would not have 
been able to take any major political decisions, least of all, taking 
the country's independence (two interviews with high ranking Party 
officials, June 1981). 
Under the 1965 Constitution the Cabinet was responsible for the 
implementation of policies. 	How was the Arusha Declaration discussed 
in the Cabinet? 	According to a former minister interviewed by the 
author: 
The Arusha Declaration interrupted Commerce, 
it brought confusion, private capital stopped 
investments. 
And: 
The discussion at Cabinet in relation to 
private capital and its role in development 
was general. 	Nobody knew what to do. One 
-202- 
minister tried to establish government 
statement on private capital but was 
stopped by the President. 
(interview July 1981) 
According to another source: 
No preparations were made over the 
running of the Banks - it could have been 
disastrous ... but helped by Indian 
managers and some people from the University 
who rushed to assist 
(interview with senior Government 
official, June 1981) 
In an interview with a senior official of the Ministry of Economic 
Development and Planning: 
The AD introduced a strong element of 
uncertainty because there were undefined 
criteria in terms of the role of private 
capital in Tanzania. 
(interview, July 1981) 
On the policy of Ujamaa and its relationship to agricultural development: 
Nobody knew what it was 
it was never discussed at Cabinet level 
(interview with former minister, 
July 1981) 
It would therefore appear that the Arusha Declaration created uncertainties 
for Government's policies, especially those which relied on private capital 
to achieve economic growth. Most ministers were left to manage as best 
they could and to wait for the situation to clarify itself. 
We have seen that in two major organs of the state, the National 
Executive Council and the Cabinet, the discussions of the Arusha 
Declaration as a development strategy were one-sided, in different ways. 
The NEC discussed in only a very restricted way the economic implications 
of the Arusha Declaration, whereas in the Cabinet the discussion was cut 
short because of the 'political' status of the document. 	How were these 
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problems then discussed at the Annual Meetings of the Party and in 
Parliament? Since these organs showed similar pre-occupations, I 
have examined them together. 
The participants in the meetings could be divided into three 
groups in terms of their responses to the proposals. The first group 
showed greater interest in the effects of the Leadership Code on their 
personal welfare. 	These were mainly district Party secretaries. 	But 
the same attitude was also present in Parliament. 	The second group, 
presumably the more 'radical', pressed for the nationalisation of local 
private capital. 	This concern was expressed both in Parliament and in 
the Special Meeting of the Party. 	The third group, containing the more 
educated and higher-ranking officials of the Party, focussed attention 
on the contradictions between policies of the Arusha Declaration and the 
goal of socialism. 
The first group were mainly composed of the lower hierarchical 
officials of the Party who were district secretaries. 	Since most of them 
were in villages, they had farms and were thus affected by the conditions 
of Leadership, which stipulated that leaders should not have an income, 
other than from their salaries. 	The second factor which also concerned 
these leaders was the idea that recruitment of labour was a form of 
exploitation. 	When Nyerere opened the Special Annual Conference at 
Dar es Salaam he returned to the theme of his Arusha speech, making an 
explicit relation between recruitment of labour and exploitation: 
What is exploitation? We explained. 
First we said exploitation is depending 
on others, that is on the sweat of others 
to earn your living. 	For example you have 
a shamba which people cultivate, at the 
ido,f the year you get a due, but you don't 
CiUltivate; or you have cars working there, 
at 'the end you get a due, but you don't 
drivéthem.yourself 
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One group is that of capitalists, then 
there is that of the bourgeoisie who own 
land and buildings. 
(Tanu, Dar es Salaam, 1967: 4) 
S. Hassani (Geita) appeared to voice the concern of many when he stated: 
Mr. Chairman, this question of exploitation 
is cracking our heads. We have been unable 
to define it exhaustively, since we are not 
told, how many people a plantation owner is 
allowed to have on that plantation or whether 
he should work on it alone. 
(Tanu, Dar es Salaam, 1967: 36) 
Another delegate tried to circumvent the problem of exploitation by 
arguing: 
Mr. Chairman, you could develop 200 acres 
or more, sow seeds, when the time to weed 
comes, and you have to finish weeding in a 
week's time - can you (then) use the labour 
of the youth around to do the job, youth 
who will be employed by someone else when 
they are through with your work? Is it 
allowed? (applause) ... No one could say 
'I have my employees', not at all. 
(Ibid: 68) 
It is interesting to see how the Chairman, Nyerere, answered 
these questions: 
What does he want to be told? Whom do you 
want to help you for six months .. (laughter) 
i.e. he stays for six months on your land, 
why shouldn 1 t he work on his? (laughter). 
And you are the leader, you are obliged to 
urge the people to better their lives, how do 
they do this, if they are to work six months 
for you - picking your tea? (laughter). 
(Ibid: 70) 
Nyerere concentrated on the personal interests which were involved in 
such questions. 	He commented: 
I thoughtyou'd come here to discuss about 
ujamaa policy, but you have come here to 
talk about your farms and your houses and 
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your water supplies. (laughter). 
(Ibid: 70) 
He then pointed out that the condition of being a Tanu leader was that 
the person had either to be a peasant or a worker. A peasant, Nyerere 
pointed Out, was not a farmer, who employed labour: 
A peasant is a person who cultivates land 
with his own hands: A Tanu leader must 
be a 'peasant', one who works on land 
oneself or a worker. 
(Ibid: 75) 
But Nyerere failed to offer an adequate explanation of how the cycle 
of agricultural production could be undertaken without recourse to the 
recruitment of labour. 	A few attempted to formulate the problem in 
terms of agricultural production generally. 	Thus, Rajabu Saleh Tambwe 
(Tabora) had this to say: 
You say yourself that, 'peasants should 
expand agriculture', How do we do this? 
We can plant, can we harvest? (appLcutse). 
(Ibid: 49) 
Meanwhile, John Mhaville, a delegate from North Njombe pointed out that 
even on an acre of tea a man and wife need labour to harvest. (Ibid: 80). 
The serious implications of the prohibition of labour for agri-
cultural growth were not pursued at this Meeting because the policy of 
Ujamaa in Agriculture had not been formulated at this stage. Not until 
the Mwanza meeting in September of that year was the policy approved. 
What is important to note, however, is that Party members in the rural 
areas were concerned about the prohibition of recruitment of labour 
because they were more knowledgeable about agricultural conditions. 
Members of Parliament also raised issues on the direct effects of 
the Leadership Code on their welfare. 	These questions, however, were 
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written down, submitted to Nyerere for reply, and then published with 
ti'e replies (The Nationalist, July 1967). But unlike those of the 
aistrict Party officials, these questions related mainly to the idea 
of personal monetary investments: 
How can a man guarantee education for his 
children in the event of his death or loss 
of job if he cannot invest his savings? 
If a man sells his second house, what does 
he do with the money if he is not allowed 
to invest it and enjoy the income from the 
investment? 
How can a man make provision for his old 
age when he is too old to farm? 
An interesting fact about these questions is that not one question was 
posed in relation to the implications the Arusha Declaration would have 
on economic growth. 	This is in contrast to the Party district secretaries 
who at least attempted to relate the problems of agricultural growth to 
the policy of the Arusha Declaration. 
We have seen that throughout the period 1961-66 the role of private 
local capital was criticised in Parliament. Both in Parliament and at 
the Special Meeting of the Party, demands were made to nationalise private 
trade, which was mainly in the hands of the Asians. 	There were demands 
expressed for the nationalisation of the wholesale trade. 	Kasella 
Elantu, for instance, called for the nationalisation of houses (Tanu, Dar 
es Salaam, 1967: 91). 	The demands to nationalise private local trade 
were made again in Parliament in that year (for instance, Kwilasa, Hansard, 
1967: 446), while Ali Migeyo asked the Minister of Industry: 
If Tanzania is a republic and has decided 
to nationalise industries it should 
nationalise all of them. 
(Hansard, 1967: 228) 
Masaha suggested that the Ministry of Industry should not only promote 
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industries but also own them itself (Ibid: 222), and Mtauka stated: 
People made processions that day because 
they knew fully that if the economy is 
in the hands of the masses who reside in 
that country, they will benefit. 	Masses 
believed that they will get a benefit 
in trader 
(Hansard, 1967: 79) 
As we have seen, nationalisation of local capital was one of the major 
traditional concerns of Party activists. 	Many members thought that 
state trade would lead to greater material benefits, for the consumer. 
Thus for instance, in the discussion of the Insurance(Vesting Interests 
and Regulations) Bill, 1967, Rusimbi called for uniform pan-territorial 
prices. He explained that differential prices were the result of 
transportation costs, but he argued that the geographical location of 
remote areas was the result of God; he therefore expressed the hope 
that the Arusha Declaration would rectify differential prices (Hansard, 
1967: 51). 	In the discussion of the National Agricultural Products 
Board (Vesting Interest) Bill, 1967, Magotti told the House that because 
private business was taxed, it had resulted in higher prices, but since 
these industries were now nationalised, they would not pay taxes, and 
the price of products would, therefore, be low (Hansard, 1967: 65). This 
brought the Minister of Finance immediately to his feet to inform •the 
House that there was no reason why state organisations should be exempted 
from taxation (Hansard, 1967: 67). 
The third group was mainly higher-ranking Party officials who 
focussed attention on the discrepancies between the policies of the 
Arusha Declaration and the goal of socialism. 	One contradiction was 
that while the Leadership Code of the Arusha Declaration prohibited 
leaders from accumulating wealth, it allowed non-leaders to do so. The 
Iwo 
second contradiction was that the Arusha Declaration conceptualised 
socialism as 'faith', which meant that people who did not believe in 
socialism could opt out of its demands. Thus, for instance, Siyovelewa 
argued: 
It has been advocated that we as leaders 
should begin, doing what? We have all 
agreed to a socialist policy, we want 
to give up all our property, what do we 
do with those who are outside? - those 
who are not leaders? You cannot argue 
with a rich man, in front of a hungry 
man. 
(Tanu, Dar es Salaam, 1967: 55/66) 
He continued: 
We claim that socialism is faith, an 
individual faith. 	If this is so, there 
is no need for us to hold discussions for 
faith is undefinable. Faith is personal 
and it differs. 
(Ibid) 
Meanwhile Mhando stated: 
That no country in the world which after 
its ruling party had decided that the 
policy of the party and the government 
would be socialism the people were left to 
volunteer on the matter. Everywhere it 
was through force. 
(Tanu, 1967 DSM: 57) 
By raising the problem to a theoretical level, this group was also able 
to expose the contradictions within the Arusha Declaration, namely on 
the one hand, its policy of socialism and on the other hand, the fact 
that it left local capital unnationalised. 	It was thus an implicit 
criticism of the limited nature of the Arusha Declaration, especially in 
its relation to private local capital. 
For different reasons, therefore, the discussions held both at 
the Special Meeting of the Party and Parliament of that year concentrated 
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on matters other than the developmental implications of the pol.icy of 
Socialism and Self-reliance. 	How do we account for this situation 
where major new policies are not thoroughly discussed? 	First, the 
policy of Socialism and Self-reliance had already been formally approved 
by the NEC before the discussions were held in the other forums. 	This 
limited the type of debates that could take place. On the other hand, 
the continuous demands expressed for the nationalisation of private local 
capital would indicate that it was not a major practice of the Party 
activists to give sufficient weight to economic constraints and imple-
mentation problems in policy-making and discussions. 
However, a more critical approach towards the discussion of policies 
may have been limited by the fear of being ridiculed. This applied both 
in the Party and in Parliament. 	Attempts to raise serious development 
implications in relation to the policies of the Arusha Declaration were 
very few. 	Two instances occurred, one in Parliament and one in the 
Party meetings, and both were defused. 	We shall first consider the 
type of issues that were raised in the Party. 
After the President had outlined the policy of Ujara at the Mwariza 
Annual Conference, Chief Fundikira raised issues about the relationship 
between communal production and the exchange economy. 	He explained that 
communal production occurred in a traditional society because the economy 
was based on subsistence. 	He explained that the nature of subsistence 
economy where food was based on use-value enable people to share the 
food. 	Likewise, houses were not made of materials which cost money but 
only labour was needed to build a simple house. 	Subsistence economy 
enable people to work and live together communally (Tanu, Mwanza, 1967: 125). 
Fundikira pointed out that the economic conditions governing social 
life had changed. 	Money now characterised the economy. For instance, 
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building a house required specialised knowledge, as well as differentiated 
skills, for the different components of the house. 	Everything had a 
monetary cost. 	Food, cash crops or cattle also had monetary value. A 
labourer would need to be paid with money because it offered him a 
greater degree of flexibility compared with payment in kind. 	Fundikira 
argued that Africa was late in developing because of the existence of 
the subsistence economy: 
We have been left behind by people of 
other nations maybe because they had 
changed their methods of farming; of 
course exploitation played a part but 
then, that is a different matter since 
it relates to the distribution of actual 
income, but I am referring to the 
creation of wealth itself. 
(Tanu, Mwanza, 1967: 128) 
Fundikira then spoke of the entreprenural characteristics of a progressive 
farmer, who was able to employ labour, pay them and would have to wait a 
year for his harvest. 	Within that period the rains may not have come 
and he would lose. 	But labourers would prefer to have a steady income 
rather than take risks. He added that the government could take further 
measures to protect the labourer against the entrepreneur by safeguarding 
their wages. 
Chief Fundikira's speech illustrates the conventional view of 
aL 
development, that economic backwardness was the result ofjsubsistence 
economy; that exploitation was a result of the absence of redistributive 
policies rather than a matter of ownership and that the major problem was 
to expand production. 	But its major significance is that it attempted 
to discuss the implications of the policy of communal production as 
propounded by the policy of Lljamaa within the context of an exchange 
economy. 	This speech was criticised by the Second Vice President Kawawa. 
-211- 
The Second Vice-President pointed out lJjamaa would be different from 
traditional communal production; but unfortunately he did not elaborate 
further on the nature of the differences. He merely stated that: 
The policy of Ujamaa is that we are 
all brothers, if you all can agree that 
we can live together, then we have 
already become brothers. 
(Tanu, Mwanza, 1967: 139) 
Kawawa rejected Fundikira's idea that bourgeois farmers were necessary 
in order to produce a surplus and hence develop. 	He also rejected 
Fundikira's explanations of the causes of Africas' backwardness and 
said that it was the result of capitalist exploitation (Ibid: 140). 
Finally he argued that discipline was indeed necessary and that: 
Several meetings have set up laws of 
minimum acreage, of about an acre a 
person. You have got to work. 
Development cannot be a matter of 
personal choice only. 
(Tanu, Mwanza, 1967: 142) 
Kawawa's arguments relied mainly on moralism and convictions and expressed 
what might be termed a 'political' approach to development. 
In Parliament a similar tendency can be observed to deflate 
criticisms or attempts to examine developmental implications of policies. 
Senior government officials in Parliament reminded the Members of Parliament 
of the need to discipline themselves. 	For instance, Minister Bomani 
specifically called for self-restraint among the MP5 "to prevent 
imperialist press from exploiting disagreements between Parliament and 
Government, thereby sowing confusion among the public" (The Nationalist, 
June 27, 1967). 
An MP stated that the failure of COSATA, the urban consumer 
co-operative, in 1966 was the result of lack of manpower and expressed 
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the hope that a similar experience would not befall nationalisation 
(Hansard, 1967: 49). 	The Minister of Commerce, Trade and Co-operatives 
admonished those who questioned how nationalisation was going to help 
the peasants and workers: 
We are busy shouting, we have instituted 
the Arusha Declaration, we have demonstrated 
and held meetings at Arnautoglu, and today 
we come here and ask each other "Well, how 
would this matter benefit us?" 
Mr. Speaker, I fail to understand this logic 
nor do I think any Tanu delegate - and they 
are all Tanu delegates - can ask such questions 
because this matters comes from Tanu 
The very delegate who came from Arusha comes 
here today and asks "But, how would this 
help us?'. 
(Hansard, 1967 
As the Minister implied in the above speech, such questions should have 
been discussed by the Members in Arusha where the policy was passed. 
This clearly indicated that Parliament was no longer the forum for the 
discussion of policies. It also shows that top members of the Government 
gave their support to Party policies in Parliament and did not encourage 
any criticisms to emerge. 
Although Government did not allow members to pose embarrassing 
questions which could not be dealt with anyway in Parliament, nevertheless, 
they themselves were aware of the problems. 	For instance, the same 
Minister of Commerce, Trade and 	Cooperatives when presenting the 
State Trading Corporation (Establishment and Vesting of Interest) Bill 
to Parliament (as the result of the nationalisation of the import and 
export firms), pointed to the need to maintain efficiency in the light 
of manpower problems. 	He stated: 
We are quick in shouting that we will 
build socialism, we are quick in saying 
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that we should nationalise certain things, 
but the administering or running of these 
things is the greatest problem. 
And in other socialist countries, that have 
passed similar actions as ours, passed a 
law to the effect that anyone given these 
jobs in trade by the government to administer, 
if found to carry an illicit trade or 
involvement in bribery, is to be shot. Why? 
Because the capital involved is not an 
individual's nor that of a rich man, if you 
steal, you steal from the whole country, the 
whole nation, and a poor nation such as ours! 
(Hansard, 1967: 42) 
Thus implicitly the Minister of Commerce, Trade and 	Cooperatives was 
drawing attention to the problems of management. 
REASSERTION OF GOVERNMENT'S PRIORITIES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
We saw that the policies of the Arusha Declartion conflicted with 
Government's concerns for economic growth, especially in relation to 
private capital and manpower. 	The Party and Government discussions did 
not consider the economic implications of the policy of socialism and 
self reliance within the context of problems of capital and manpower. 
At the same time, members in both Parliament and in the Party Annual 
Conference held at Dar es Salaani pressed for the nationalisation of local 
capital. 	When certain individuals did attempt to raise issues of economic 
growth, they were rebuffed. 
Nevertheless, the Government's concern for economic growth had not 
yet lost its influence with the President. 	In February 1967 there were 
further clarifications on the policy of socialism and self-reliance which 
were meant to resolve the conflict between political needs and economic 
requirements. 	Whether or not the result of a direct intervention by 
members of the Government, the arguments reflected the Government's 
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conception of development and its priorities. 	This suggests that 
Nyerere had not abandoned totally conventional ideas on development, and 
that he was still attempting to maintain a balance between the Party and 
Government. 
It is not surprising that the first policy paper to clarify the 
Arusha Declaration policies of socialism and self-reliance was on the 
role of private capital. 	The policy paper Public Ownership in Tanzania 
stated that its aim was to. "make clear the areas where public ownership 
and control are required, and the areas where private investment is, and 
will be, welcomed". (Nyerere, 1968: 27). 	It began by stating that the 
list of firms which was affected by the Arusha Declaration was small: 
It is small because, in the words of 
Norman Manley, 'You can't nationalise 
nothing'. 	The potential of Tanzania is 
still undeveloped; our real task is to 
develop it. For this we need hard and 
intelligent work, and some capital. 
(Nyerere, 1968: 254, emphasis added) 
This clearly illustrates the Government's conception that the major economic 
problem was to expand production and that capital was necessary. 	The 
policy paper then continued: 
Does this imply that Tanzania is no longer 
interested in receiving capital aid from 
abroad, or in receiving private investment - 
either foreign or local? It is obvious that 
it does not mean that ... We shall not depend 
upon overseas aid to the extent of bending 
our political, economic or social policies 
in the.iope of getting it ... But we shall try 
to getin order that we may hasten our economic 
progress, and that it may act as a catalyst to 
our own effort. 
Similarly with private enterprise: we have 
rejected the domination of private enterprise; 
but we shall continue to welcome private 
investment in all those areas not reserved 
for Goverñmént in the Arusha Declaration. 
(Nyerere, 1968: 254, emphasis added) 
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In this way, Government was able to intervene and forestall further 
nationalisations by arguing that private investment wci..s still needed. 
The policy paper Public Ownership in Tanzania then outlined three 
categories of ownership. 	First was wholly government-owned enterprises, 
including the banking, insurance andAimport-export  sector. 	These had 
been nationalised under the Arusha Declaration. 	Second was joint owner- 
ship ventures between Government and private investors and third was 
enterprises based entirely on private investment. 
The second major area in which Government reasserted its interests 
was manpower. The same policy paper argued that ownership did not imply 
management, which meant skilled staff: 
But policy has to be implemented. This 
is done by management and staff together, 
and taking an industry under Government 
ownership or control does not eliminate 
the needfor skilled work and astute 
commercial expertise. We shall be asking 
the existing managers to continue in their 
present work 
(Nyerere, 1968: 256) 
Thus Government was able to reassert its concerns on the need for private 
capital and manpower in development. 	As a result of this, the FIPA Act 
was not repealed. 	The President accepted Government's position because 
the policy paper on Public Ownership in Tanzania became a policy statement 
and was included as part of the Arusha Declaration, although it was 
written a month after the NEC Arusha meeting. 
As a result of this policy clarification of the role of private 
capital, the Government was able to make a public announcement in order 
to allay the fears of private capital. 	The Minister for Commerce, 
Industry and Cooperatives, whose ministry was most involved with private 
investors, addressed a 	meeting of the country's Chamber of Commerce 
in Dar es Salaam and stated: 
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It will perhaps help to clear the air 
(he said) if I repeat the categorical 
assurance already given by the President 
and re-iterated in Parliament, to the 
effect that the limited nationalisation 
programme undertaken by the Government 
has now been completed. No more national-
isation will take place: full and fair 
compensation will of course be paid to 
all concerned. 
He stated that he was therefore able to 
say that all remaining channels of 
distribution, i.e. wholesale, sub-
wholesale, and retail distribution outlets 
will not be affected and "there is no 
need for any further speculation whatsoever 
regarding their future". 
(The Nationalist, February 21, 1967) 
A month later, Government granted full rebates on custom duties on 
imported raw materials for local industries; this was a bid to encourage 
local industries to export their products but it can also be seen as an 
attempt to instil confidence in private capital (The Nationalist, March 12, 
1967). 
Nyerere's explanation and re-interpretation of the Arusha Declaration 
In 1967 Nyerere was against the nationalisation of local capital 
and his arguments reflect his conventional view of development which 
supported Government's position because it took problems of implementation 
and capacity as inputs into policy-making. 	For instance, in relation 
to the policy of nationalising internal trade Nyerere pointed out at the 
Dar es Salaam Party Annual Conference that the country lacked the capacity 
to handle and distribute internal trade on a national basis; secondly, 
private wholesale and retail trade offered a valuable service to the 
consumer (Tanu, Dar es Salaam, 1967: 71). 	Nyerere stated: 
these middlemen do work ... in spite 
of the commission they get -even if the 
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shops were government controlled still 
you will need to get these people who 
will take the goods to the consumer. 
If you touch distribution at this stage, 
the supply/circulation of goods will 
cease: if you touch these distributors 
who have the expertise - for every 
occupation has an expert, we have several 
tribes in our country ... The Sukuma are 
proficient in cotton cultivation; the 
Chaga and the Haya specialise in coffee; 
the Masai are skilled in rjsing cattle 
and our Asian tribe are experts at 
running shops 
An Asian in a shop is equivalent to a 
Masai in raising cattle (laughter). Now 
to move an Asian and ask him to raise 
cattle and a Masai to run a shop (laughter) 
you will only do that for self-amusement - 
but it is not a constructive way of running 
things. 
(Ibid: 104/5) 
Nyerere argued that if the state were to nationalise internal trade there 
would be demonstrations, not to congratulate the state but to demand, 
'where is bread?' because nationalisation of internal trade would create 
congestion of goods (Ibid: 71). 
In his arguments against rapid nationalisation Nyerere made a 
distinction between realism and idealism. He argued that to have idealism 
without realism is stupidity. He stated: 
A true idealist is one whose one eye 
aims in the direction of his journey 
and the second eye is aimed at the 
path, it sees mud, thorns, ant-hills 
and hills. 
But the idealism of a distant vision 
only is blindness for you can fall in 
a pit. 
(Ibid: 96) 
Nyerere said that the Arusha Declaration was a policy of intent, Tanzania 
was not a socialist country but it showed a vision of where Tanzania was 
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intending to progress. The road towards socialism had to be negotiated 
through the reality of the present situation. In this speech Nyerere 
was attempting to point to the practical problems of development in 
such areas as capital and manpower shortages which prevent rapid 
nationalisation. 	Nyerere reiterated the same point, that of considering 
the problems of capacity in policy making, when he said that, in the 
formulation of the Arusha Declaration it was necessary to pose the 
question, "How much can we do, how far can we go?". He then asked "Why 
did we not go full-speed and nationalise everything? We cannot go full 
speed, where are the lieutenants of full-speed socialism?" (Ibid: 99). 
Nyerere further argued that to have gone 'full-speed' would not have been 
revolutionary but it would have become adventurist and opportunis (Ibid: 
100). 	He then went on to elaborate the method of assessing capabilities 
or reality and the difference between scientific socialism and adventurism 
or emotionalism. 
One thing I am not at variance with those 
who call themselves scientific socialist 
is their method of investigating the reality, 
in that you do not do something because you 
fancy it, no not at all, except because that 
action is predicted by the state of affairs; 
its determined by prevailing circumstances, 
the prevailing situation: then that prevailing 
situation is the determinant of your action. 
You simply do not decide to act because of 
your imagination. That is not science, that 
is emotionalism or it is adnturism or it is 
opportunism, but it is not scientific 
socialism. 
If you are to study things scientifically you 
have to say, I have studied and seen the 
conditions as such, those I have studied and 
seen as such, although my beliefs suggest so 
and so, facts suggest otherwise, I therefore 
choose this action on the basis of facts not 
on the figment of my imagination. 
That's one thing ... that I would like honourable 
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Tanu members to learn, the purpose of 
wanting to know the facts, - facts, facts, 
do not ignore facts and make a decision 
intuitively. 
(Ibid: 103, emphasis added) 
In the Mwanza conference, •Nyerere's Opening Speech emphasised 
Tanzania's poverty and the need to expand production. 	Tanzania's 
economic backwardness and problems were viewed by Nyerere in this speech 
as the result of limited production rather than in terms of exploitation 
or profit appropriation. 
Nyerere stated that Tanzania was a poor country and the problem 
of distribution of wealth was like sharing one rabbit between 10 people: 
The reason for the poverty is that we do 
not produce enough, to enable all of us 
to live a respectable life. We are like 
10 hunters who seek to divide one tiny 
rabbit ... There is no way in which to 
increase our wealth'except by increasing 
our production. 
The Government could, since it is very easy, 
order the Bank of Tanzania to print lots of 
bank notes and to give everyone a whole 
sack of notes annually, however, this would not 
be able to increase our wealth at all. You 
do not increase wealth through an increase 
in printing notes 
(Tanu, Mwanza, 1967: 40) 
Nyerere here was directly speaking to the Party activists, who did not 
share Government's view of development, because Nyerere continued: 
Tanu leaders should realise the extent of 
our poverty ... At times, people get 
carried away when they see a few driving 
their cars and they begin to believe that 
there is great wealth in certain parts of 
the country and that the poverty that 
exists, is due to its unequal distribution 
or exploitation 
(Ibid: 41) 
Nyerere then stated that: 
If all the wealth of this country were to 
be collected together and then equally 
divided to each and every Tanzanian then 
everyone would get things worth 525/-
only. And the payment of this sum would 
not be each month either. 
(Ibid: 42) 
Thus even if we were to divide our 
resources our poverty would remain 
the same. 
There is no way we can increase our 
wealth without first increasing our 
produce. 
(Ibid: 41-42) 
This speech clearly sets out the argument that redistribution of resources 
would not eliminate poverty because what was to be redistributed was very 
little. 	Improvements in living standards could only come from economic 
growth. 	As we have seen, this view and its arguments had been held by 
the Government consistently since 1961. 	Nyerere's speech therefore is an 
implicit criticism of the Party's view of development which was wholly 
based on redistribution of resources and control of the economy. 
Nevertheless, Nyerere had incorporated a limited idea of redistribution, 
which he had imposed on his conventional ideas of development, as can be 
seen in his arguments for nationalisation and progressive taxation: 
But the real problem in Tanzania is not 
redistribution between the rich and the 
poor, but a fair distribution of wealth, 
of contribution to national expenses, 
between the very poor and the poor, between 
the man who can barely feed himself and 
the man who can barely clothe himself. 
(Ibid: 43) 
Nyerere's Opening Speech in Mwanza therefore shows that he was still 
operating within a conventional view of development though he had added 
an element of redistributive ideas onto it. 
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At the Mwanza meeting, Nyerere also made an important clarification 
on the question of self-reliance. 	Certain people, he said, thought 
that self-reliance meant self-sufficiency in manpower and financial 
resources. It meant nothing of the kind. 	"Self-reliance meant that 
the country had to make the maximum use of available resources" (The 
Nationalist, October 18, 1967). 	Nyerere stated: 
The Arusha Declaration suggested that 
our aim should be to build a self-
reliant socialist state. It didn't 
bring self-reliance nor socialism on 
its own. We will only achieve that goal 
by working intelligently and hard. 	The 
AD did not bring miracles, nor was it a 
miracle itself, it did not ad our 
productivity nor bring rain when we needed 
it. It did not educate people nor did it 
better our situation through miracles. 
(Tanu, Mwanza, 1967: 31) 
He then defined a self-reliance development strategy thus: 
It means to choose a different path of 
development independent of people of 
foreign nations. It means to agree to 
cooperate with other countries and to 
be prepared to give and receive aid. It 
means to accept that foreign aid can 
enhance the progress of our projects. 
But it also means that our (development) 
path must be the one which we Tanzanians 
can afford. 
(Tanu, Mwanza, 1967: 36) 
In relation to the need for foreign manpower, Nyerere stated: 
We should ask ourselves, if it is logical 
to have inexperienced Tanzanians just 
because they are Tanzanians, rather than 
have foreign expatriates. 
To employ an inefficient person just 
because he is a Tanzanian when the job he 
has to do is crucial for our development, 
is not self-reliance it is stupidity. 
The Nationalist, October 18, 1967) 
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In relation to foreign aid Nyerere stated that the Arusha Declaration 
was not against aid (Tanu, Mwanza, 1967: 33). 
But Nyerere was against private commercial farming and was responsible 
for undermining Government's policy on this matter after the Arusha 
Declaration. 	The Minister for Lands and Settlement had discussed the 
problem of large-scale capitalist farms at the Cabinet and it was decided 
that they were not to be nationalised but that attempts should be made 
to integrate them into the national economy by making them contribute to 
the building of satellite village/farms and co-operatives around their 
farms. 	The Tanganyika Farmers Association agreed to assist in the 
development of these satellite villages in terms of expertise and to act 
as marketing agents as a means of reducing transportation bottlenecks 
and infusing into village farms good husbandry methods. It appears that 
this proposal was discussed and accepted in principle by the Cabinet 
after the Arusha Declaration had been passed (interview with former 
Cabinet Minister, June 1981). 	This would indicate that firstly, Government 
was still attempting to maintain commercial farms because of their 
contribution to GDP, although the Government was attempting to integrate 
commercial farming, which were enclaves, into the wider agricultural 
communities, by making them contribute towards the peasant economy. But 
Nyerere went to Tanga and told the Tanganyika Farmers Association that 
there was no room for private farming (interview with same). 	Since the 
policy of Ujamaa was not discussed at Cabinet level, the Minister of 
Agriculture continued to emphasise its traditional policy of encouraging 
cash crop production for foreign exchange based on the progressive farmers: 
this policy was 	consistent with the policy of Ujamaa because Nyerere's 
policy was not antagonistic to small-scale capitalist farmers (Tanu, 
Mwanza, 1967: 51). 	He stated: 
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We must seek their co-operation, and 
integrate them into the new socialist 
agriculture by showing them that their 
best interests will be served by this 
development. 
For energy and initiative such as these 
farmers have displayed will be very 
important to our progress. We need these 
people, we must not (arrest the trend) 
by persecuting the progressive farmers! 
(Ibid) 
To conclude this section, the clarifications issued on the policies 
of the Arusha Declaration show that Government was very successful in 
persuading Nyerere to prevent the Arusha Declaration policy becoming too 
extreme, particularly in relation to the role of private local and foreign 
capital, and manpower. 	Government was successful partly because the 
Party failed to take the initiative in elaborating a consistent policy 
on self-reliance based on mobilisation, and it offered no solution to the 
problem of shortage of manpower. 	Government's success was also the 
result of Nyerere's own acceptance of some of the Government's main 
preoccupations. 	It confirms that Nyerere had not totally abandoned the 
idea that economic considerations were important in development policy-
making. 
rnNri iic.TnN 
The analysis of the Arusha Declaration in this chapter raises a 
number of theoretical issues which are of relevance to the Tanzanian 
debate. 	In order to understand these issues it is best to view them 
within the context of the theoretical discussions reviewed in the 
Introduction. 
We saw in the Introduction that Shivji explained Tanzanlia's policies 
in terms of class interests. 	He argued, for instance, that the Arusha 
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Declaration policies "constituted the first open attempt on the part 
of the bureaucratic sector of the petty bourgeoisie to carve out an 
economic base for itself" (Shivji, 1976: 79). 	Shivji's arguments rest 
on the Marxist? theoretical approach which views the state as omnipotent 
and homogeneous. 
My analysis and investigation, however, indicates that the Arusha 
Declaration was more complex than Shivji's propositions allow. In the 
first place, it was not an qct but a process. There was a tripartite 
system in which Government, Party and President were involved in various 
ways in policy-making, had different concerns and were able to exert 
different influences on the process . 	 These organs were pre-occupied 
with different problems and priorities, and, as the analysis of this 
chapter shows, each was able to super-impose and re-interpret the Arusha 
Declaration at different stages of its development. 	Nyerere's Opening 
Speech was chiefly concerned with political stability and he accordingly 
gave greater emphasis to the policy of Self-Reliance and the Leadership 
Code. 	The Party, however, during its discussions at the NEC, gave 
nationalisation a greater emphasis because it expressed their major 
interest, control of the economy. 	When the policies of Arusha were 
clarified, the Government was successful to some extent in restoring the 
centrality of problems of economic growth. 	This process illustrates that 
the state was not functioning as a homogeneous entity but rather as 
different entities which were able to intervene at different stages with 
different priorities in the formulation and clarification of policy. 
Von Freyhold (1979), Shivji (1976) and Saul (1979) have attempted 
to explain certain policies, such as the Leadership Code which curtailed 
the material interests of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie ) in terms of the 
actions of a few progressive leaders. In other words, finding certain 
-225- 
policies to be inconsistent with class-interest explanations they have souoht 
to explain them in terms of individual actions. 	My analysis of a 
tripartite system with each organ having different priorities offers a 
better explanation of such complexities because it can account for the 
contradictions involved in policy-making more rationally and consistently. 
As a second major point, my investigation has shown that the Arusha 
Declaration policies cannot be understood in terms of class interests. 
The two organs of the state held conflicting views of development. The 
organ which sponsored the policies of nationalisation, namely the Party, 
had in fact very little to gain in terms of class interests; and the 
iQ. 
organ which opposedjParty's policies had more to gain from the creation 
of 'an economic base for itself'. 	This being the case, it is more 
fruitful to try and understand policies in terms of the view of development 
a particular organ of state was sponsoring. 
Throughout the analysis, I have attiipted to illustrate that the 
two major organs of the state held contradictory views of development. 
The Government's conception of development was based on economic growth, 
ihich was viewed as a necessary component of the process of development. 
Government's major concern was to expand production, and it evolved 
policies of development accordingly. 	It also considered implementation 
problems as inputs into policy-making. 	Party activists, on the other 
hand, thought that re-distributive policies and control of the economy 
should be considered as central developmental objectives, and they pressed 
for such policies. 	The Arusha Declaration offered them their unique 
chance to have nationalisation incorporated as a central element in socialist 
development. 	Party activists criticised the limited aims of the Arusha 
Declaration and pressed for the nationalisation of local capital. 
But the President supported Government's pre-occupation concerning 
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capital and manpower and this prevented a further radicalisation of 
the policy. 	Thus despite the 1965 Interim Constitution which stipulated 
that the Party was responsible for policy-making, Government was able to 
exert its influence on policy-making. 	This was made possible through 
the President. 	This indicates that the Presidency held an important 
mediating role between the two organs of the state and that his 
institutional functions as -iead of both organs enabled him to maintain 
a balance between Government and Party's demands. 
Various political scientists have tended to over-simplify these 
complexities of the Tanzanian political system, either by de-emphasising 
conflicts (Msekwa, 1977) or by over-emphasising Nyerere's moral principles 
(Pratt, 1976). 	My analysis shows that Nyerere was primarily a political 
animal, able to assess political situations and to act independently of 
the two organs of the state. 	The contradictory speeches Nyerere gave, 
for instance at the NEC in Arusha, where he emphasised the problem of 
exploitation, and at Mwanza in that same year, when he emphasised the 
need to expand production, show both his dilemma and his ability to 
maintain a balance between the two organs of the state. By attempting 
to reduce such a complex political situation to one actor - in the case of 
Msekwa, the Party and in the case of Pratt, Nyerere - these authors leave 
us with an over-simplified picture of the process from which the Arusha 
Declaration emerged. 
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FOOTNOTE 
1. As with 	that the cJoor 4 . a rural-based strategy was principally Nyerere's doing and was a reflection of Maoist ideas 
on 	if 4. ideas had been that influential he would have incorporated them in his opening speech. Thus although Nyerere 
had always favoured a rural bias, during 1966 and 1967 his major 
preoccupations were mainly with political stability. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE PRIMACY OF POLITICS IN DEVELOPMENT 1969-1974 
According to the standard view of recent development policy-making 
in Tanzania, the Arusha Declaration is the principal watershed leading 
to the adoption of more radical policies. 	I would argue that while the 
Arusha Declaration represents an important departure, a more important 
turning-point comes in 1969 and 1970/71. 	In 1969-1974, I would argue, 
there was a break from the principles underlying Tanzania's policies 
during the whole of the period 1962-1968. 	The new period can be under- 
stood in terms of the principle I shall call the primacy of politics in 
development. 
This new approach saw development in terms of class struggle: the 
more class struggle there was, the more socialist development was achieved 
This proposition had two major corollaries. 	The first was that the 
Party came to be seen as the major agent in implementing socialist 
development; the second was a tendency to formulate policies of develop-
ment without adequate regard to economic constraints. 	In this chapter 
we shall see how the Party was strengthened to assume leadership in 
socialist development and how it evolved an approach to development policy 
making which systematically underrated the importance of economic variable 
A second major element characterising the period 1969-1974 and 
distinguishing it from the whole of the previous period, was the progressi 
adoption in Government circles of a new view of development in terms of 
removing dependency on international capitalism. 	This view of developmen 
received support from the President and these shifts in the Government 
and the Presidency complemented the Party's orientation and the overall 
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move towards a more 'political' approach to development. 
In this chapter we shall see how the conventional view of development 
of the Government (1962-1968) progressively changed and became a minority 
view within the mainstream of official thinking. 	This group was no 
longer able to influence Party policies through the President because 
the latter had changed his ideas. 	Together with the overall adoption 
of a 'political' approach to development, this was reflected in the types 
of policies pursued during this period as well as in the principles 
structuring the Second Five Year Plan (1969-1974). 
POLITICAL-INSTITUTJONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
We saw in Chapter Two that the Party was a weak institution when 
Tanzania achieved its independence. 	Bienen concluded that Tanu 
does not provide an institution which 
can transform the economy and make 
itself more effective in the process; 
it is too weak and too loose and has too 
few material and human resources to tackle 
development problems. 
(Bienen, 1967: 407) 
Most of the radicals would have argued also that socialist reconstruction 
required 
a strong centralised party capable of 
unerringly directing Government agencies 
and the people towards a socialist goal. 
(Cliffe, 1972b:267) 
Cl iffe end Saul ,for instance, emphasised the need for clarity in ideolo-
gical orientation of the Party because 'politicalisation' was viewed as 
a necessary instrument in implementing socialist development: 
politicalisation has appeared to be 
an important aspect of the solution to many 
problems of the development front, and it is 
-230- 
also clear that the political party 
must be the major vehicle of that 
politicalisation. 
Such a party must be characterised in 
turn by an effective organisation and 
ideological coherence if it is to accomplish 
its twin tasks: to engage and involve the 
mass of the people, while simultaneously 
raising their level of consciousness - 
educating them, that is, to a heightened 
awareness of the context of imperialism and 
'historical backwardness' within which the 
development effort must take place. 
(Cliffe & Saul., 1972a:323) 
The same authors in the same article argued that: 
it is again evident that there is a 
parallel need for further institutional 
creativity - with respect, in particular, 
to consolidating and clarifying Tanu's 
role as an agency with responsibilities 
for education, planning and impl'ementation, 
as a force for socialism, and as a framework 
for popular participation, and as the core 
around which a more effective front can be 
structured.. 
(Ibid: 324) 
The great stress given to the strengthening of the Party by the 
radical writers was because of the types of policies they were advocating. 
As we have seen in the Introduction, radical writers called for policies 
based on the class struggle; the more class struggle there was, the more 
socialist development the country achieved. 	Cliffe for instance, called 
for more wide-ranging and radical policies than the initial ones of the 
Arusha Declaration: 
If they are to contribute to an overall 
strategy of socialist development, new 
policies will have to be worked out for 
the financial, trading and manufacturing 
sector. 
(Cliffe, 1972b:268) 
The Party was seen as a logical agent for implementing policies based on 
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class struggle. 	The analysis of the radicals as well as their emphasis 
on the need to strengthen the Party appeared to be supported by polit-
ical events which occurred between 1969-1974. 
The consolidation of the Party 1969 - 1974/75 
We have seen that the 1965 Interim Constitution had turned the 
country into a One-Party State and it had given the Party powers to 
formulate policies. In October 1967 the NEC was given new powers to 
expel Party members. 	In 1969 an amendment to the constitution of Tanu 
was effected which provided for the establishment of Tanu branches in 
work-places where there were more than 50 Party members, or in Ujamaa 
villages. 	These mechanisms gave the Party means of ensuring compliance 
by Party members in work-places, complementing the cell system (1965), 
which ensured compliance at the point of residence. 	Thus by 1969 the 
Party had means of controlling the population's behaviour at the most 
strategic points of social existence - at work and in the home. 	Running 
parallel to this strengthening of the powers of the Party, the structures 
of the Party were extended down to the cell (1965) and branch (1969) levels. 
Unlike in 1961, the Party by 1969 and 1970 was strong, with a growing 
bureaucracy. 	Kjekshus commented on the development of the Party structures 
in the following manner: 
The net effect will be the expansion of 
the Party bureaucracy (paid party secretaries) 
to the branch level and in the industries. 
This means that the central bureaucracy of 
the Party, which has so far been numerically 
modest in the extreme (Msekwa: 1967) will 
continue to expand into the localities. 
Along with the decentralised state personnel 
(which may reach the ward level through the 
extension services) this will add up to a 
formidable bureaucratic presence. The 
extensive re-organisation of settlement 
patterns in large parts of the country 
-232- 
through Ujamaa and villagisation policies 
had made the bureaucratic presence a 
bigger reality at the grass roots and this 
may emerge as the most decisive element in 
Tanzania in the 1970s. 
(Kjekshus, 1976: 2) 
Finally, activities of such groups as Women, Youth, and Workers were also 
placed under the Party's auspices. 
In 1971 the Party issued the Guidelines (Mwongozo) which clarified 
the Party's aims and role. 	The main aim of the Party was defined as 
establishing its presence at all levels within the society. Paragraphs 
12-14 defined the functions of the Party in the following way: 
defining the national goals as well as issuing 
directives and guildelines of implementation. 
politicising, organising and mobilising the people. 
overseeing and supervising the work of all public 
institutions charged with the task of implementing 
the policies laid down. 
reviewing the record of performance of these 
institutions. 
(Mwongozo, 1971: 4-5, emphasis added) 
The Party also had control of security in the form of the proposed People's 
Militia (Mwongozo, 1971: 8). 	Thus by 1971 the Party had assumed 
considerable powers and functions in addition to those allowed by the 
1965 Interim Constitution These new functions included 
directing the implementation of policies and the supervision and control 
of government institutions; and the Party penetrated into matters of 
security by establishing a people's militia. 	This created a situation 
of de facto Party supremacy. 
Three years later in November 1974 at the National Executive Meeting 
at Musoma, the NEC declared Party Supremacy and Parliament gave legal 
backing to this declaration. 	Parliament passed the Interim Constitution 
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of Tanzania (Amendment) Act No. 2, 1975, the relevant clause of which 
read, "The functions of all the organs of the State of the United 
Republic shall be performed under the auspices of the Party" (cited in 
Mwansasu, 1979: 170). 
The increasing intervention of the Party in public life led many 
people, including the Party members themselves, to think that the Party 
would replace the Government. Nyerere explained the issue thus: 
There are people who think that if the 
Party governs it would be strong but I 
say that it is not true. Should the Party 
and Government merge into one, it is the 
Party which gets transformed and becomes 
the Government. The Government would never 
be transformed and become the Party. What 
is transformed is the Party and not the 
Government. 	The Government has one 
characteristic, it never gets transformed 
It is possible for a country not to have a 
party; but you cannot have a country without 
a government. 
(Mwansasu, 1979: 176) 
Between 1970 and 1974 the Party was unusually active in formulating 
policies. 	New policies were formulated for sectors ranging from the 
nationalisation of local capital, to education, industry and agriculture. 
Common themes expressed in many of these policies, particularly with 
respect to the decision to nationalise local capital were to achieve 
greater social equality, to increase the role of the state, to lessen 
the use of market criteria and to make the Party the implementor of 
socialist transformation. 	The conception underlying these themes was 
the Party's attitude of viewing socialist development as essentially a 
'political' problem. 
It could be argued that the formulation of the political policies 
of development as well as their implementation during this period showed 
that the Party was successful in replacing Government's conception of 
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development as well as its priorities. 	The emphasis and priorities 
in development moved away from problems of revenue generation, savings, 
manpower considerations to class struggle, state control of the economy, 
mobilisation and ideology. 
The subordination of Government 
The Government was affected by the process which culminated in the 
establishment of Party Supremacy in a number of ways. 	First , the role 
of Parliament was downgraded and it ceased to become a forum for debating 
policies. 	Second, since the Party was increasingly active in policy 
formulation the role of Government in policy-assessment was also made 
redundant. 	Policies came to be accepted and implemented by the Government 
because they were 'political' and therefore above resource considerations. 
Thirdly, by making the Party supreme vis-a-vis the Government, it eroded 
the political authority of the Cabinet, making it more difficult for 
Government to exercise control over its own agencies. 	This factor has 
been complicated because supervision is supposed to be vested in the Party. 
Parliament: 	A number of political scientists (IfcAuslan, 1972; Tordoff, 
1965; Msekwa, 1977) have documented the change that had already occurred 
in Parliament as a result of the 1965 Interim Constitution. 	Kjekshus 
describes the consequences of the subordination of Parliament thus: 
disagreements have been muffled, 
criticisms softened, and efforts made 
generally to keep the parliamentary 
arena open for compromise and accommodation, 
with a clear expectation that MPs should 
adjust to the Party's lead. 
(Kjekshus, 1974: 28) 
Kjekshus (1974b: 79) noted that Parliament changed from a vigorous and 
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assertive institution to one which was "restricted to an august replay 
of consensus themes worked out in the process of Party deliberations 
of policy measures". 
A few members of Parliament voiced their concern at the whittling 
away of the powers of the legislature. 	For instance in 1968 Chogga 
insisted: 
I am telling this House that it is Bunge 
which is supreme, and not Tanu 
(Hansard, 1968: 34) 
Meanwhile Ali Migyo stated: 
For sometimes, I see that it is the Government 
which is leading Tanu, and at other times, 
I see that Tanu wants to lead the Government. 
Therefore, when the mover of this motion 
gets up to reply, I would like him to help 
me understand this matter: which institution 
is leading, Bunge, the Government or Tanu? 
(cited in Msekwa, 1977: 48) 
The Second Vice-President, Kawawa replied that "in a One Party democracy 
the Party is supreme all the way" (Msekwa, 1977: 48). 
In 1968 the Party expelled a number of its members. Those expelled 
automatically lost their seats in Parliament. 	Hopkins explained: 
Among those MP's who were most critical 
according to the analysis of speeches in 
1965-1966 period, by December 1968 nine 
had lost their Assembly seats for political 
reasons, either by virtue of being expelled 
from the Party or because of political 
detention or exile. 
(Hopkins, 1971: 147) 
This action by the Party, noted Hopkins, had a sobering effect on others 
and marked the eclipse of ParliamentTM (Ibid). 	Van Velzen (1973: 263) 
concluded that the expulsions illustrated that "the Party had made it 
abundantly clear that it would not tolerate any challenge to its supremacy"; 
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while Kjekshus (1974: 32) stated: 
The expulsions demonstrated that the political 
elite was under the absolute control of the 
Party, now the ultimate judge of popular 
representatives. 	They also confirmed that 
the Party was the sole policy maker, and that 
the Bunge had a sub-ordinate and technical 
role as a legislature. 
In 1971 the subordinate and technical role of Parliament was confirmed 
by the Party's Guifielines (Mwongozo) which defined the role and duties 
of Parliament: 
I. Enacting laws 
Supervising the Government's implementation of 
various development plans; 
Asking questions and making queries over government 
and public corporations in Parliament; 
To deliver the masses' view tolGovernment, and 
to communicate to the citizens the Government 
plans and ideas; 
To discuss and affirm the annual government 
budget. 
As Goulborne (1979: 22) states, Parliament's tasks were now "restricted 
to rubber stamping decisions taken elsewhere because it is still, in 
legal terms, the body responsible for effecting Jegislation of a certain 
type". 
The supervisory role of Parliament was alstaken over by the Party. 
For instance, in 1971, there was a great public outcry against shortages 
of goods and a Select Committee was appointed by Parliament to investigate 
these problems. 	But since then, Select Committees have not been used - 
despite the magnitude of problems which people have had to endure in 
many fields of life. 	In an interview, a senior official in the Parliament 
office explained that "this activity (of supervision/investigation) has 
now been taken over by the Party" (interview with official in Parliament 
Office, July 1981). 
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The Cabinet and its relationship to the Party: 	In principle, the Cabinet 
is the nerve-centre of Government. The Cabinet is the mechanism which 
allows for the co-ordination of activities within the Government and is 
responsible for the implementation of the policies of the Party as well 
as those formulated by the Government itself. 	Within the Cabinet there 
is an Economic Commission of the Cabinet (ECC) composed of the most 
strategic ministries such as those of the Ministers of Finance, Agriculture, 
Economic Development and Planning, and Industry. 	The chairman of the 
ECC is the President. 
Since 1965, the Cabinet has been required to report to the Party 
through the Central Committee and the National Executive Committee; 
if there are any problems in a particular portfolio, then the Minister 
concerned is called to explain in the Central Committee and these explan-
ations reach the National Executive which in turn gives guidance (interview 
with senior civil servant, June 1981). 	In 1970 this mechanism of 
communication was strengthened when the Party decided that all major 
government decisions and all Cabinet papers must be sent to the Chief 
Executive Secretary of the Party (interview with Party official, July 1981). 
Thus, by the early 1970s the Party had the right to interview senior 
government officials over specific issues, to have access to official 
documents and to see Cabinet papers. 
The Government on the other hand, had no reciprocal rights vis-a-vis 
the Party. 	It could not question or discuss policy-making with the 
Party: 
No Government view is represented in the 
Party. If a Minister happens to be at 
policy level, and gives his opinion, he 
will do so as an individual, not as 
Government. 
-238- 
Government as such cannot have a view 
which is separate from the Party; this 
would be a contradiction. 
(interview with senior Government 
official, June 1981) 
The increasingly real separation of functions between policy-making and 
implementation between the two organs of the state effectively isolated 
the Government from influencing policy-making in Tanzania during 1969-1974. 
This meant that the agent which was most knowledgeable about the economy 
was, in fact, excluded from policy-making. 	While Government might have 
limited influence over those policies which reached Cabinet for discussion 
in terms of planning their implementation (Hyder), 1979a:100)it had no 
control whatsoever over policies passed and implemented by the Party but 
which affected production. 
Finally the form of 'consultation' conducted by Party officials with 
individual senior Government officials over specific issues was often 
resented by the latter because it was often carried out as if it were an 
interrogation (interview with senior Government officials, July 1981). 
This method of 'consultation' was also ineffective from the point of view 
of the Party. 	According to a Party official, the Government official 
consulted over a certain policy would not give a true picture of the 
implications involved because of fear of opposing a powerful Party 
individual who might be sponsoring that particular policy (interview with 
Party official, July 1981). 	We can conclude that while the Cabinet's 
effectiveness was greatly reduced as thb result of the new arrangements, 
the types of co-ordination between the Party and Government based on 
'interviews' was ineffective for both organs of the state. 
The effectiveness of the Cabinet as an institutional mechanism for 
evolving policies as solutions to problems, for co-ordinating and planning 
Mcke 
policies in relation to expenditure and manpower considerations, and for 
considering the very complex issue of timing within a political, social 
and economic context, had been made virtually redundant. 	Furthermore, 
not all Party policies reached the Cabinet for discussion even in terms 
of implementation. 	Thus the policies of Ujamaa (1967), Villagisation 
(1973) and Politics is Agriculture (1972) were not sent to the Cabinet 
for discussions at all. 	Universal Primary Education (1976),the 
Socialisation of Trade Policy (1967-1979) and Mwongozo (1971), on the 
other hand, were sent to the Cabinet for discussion and implementation. 
In the case of Mwongozo (1971) the policy went to the Cabinet because of 
the legal aspects of establishing a people's militia. 	There were no 
firm criteria. 	It appears that if a basic policy had complicated 
implications in terms of finance, law or manpower requirements, then it 
would go before the Cabinet. 	But the discussion of those policies which 
did go to the Cabinet would not focus on the principle involved in the 
policy but rather on the logistics of its implementation in relation to 
the How, When and Where inputs (interview with State House official, 
June 1981). 	This meant that the Government could not influence the 
principle of the policy even though it might conflict with problems of 
implementation. 	It also meant that since policy formulation was outside 
the control of Government, the Government was unable to conduct research 
as a prelude to policy changes or to evaluate the validity of the policy 
in terms of the problem to be solved. 
The Cabinet and its relationship to Government agencies: 	The normal 
procedure under which the Cabinet operates in relation to its responsibilities 
for sub-policy-making, is that a particular ministry which is concerned 
with implementing a policy or sub-policy drafts a three-page paper outlining 
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the problem and how the particular policy sets out to alleviate it. 
The draft has to outline the financial requirements of the policy. 
This draft is then submitted to the ECC Secretariat 14 days prior to 
the meeting of the Cabinet. 	The draft is also circulated to all the 
ministries for comments prior to being discussed at the Cabinet meeting. 
This procedure allows for the views of the other ministries as well as 
comments from the ECC Secretariate to be taken into consideration at 
the Cabinet meeting (interview with senior Government official, July 1981). 
This method allows for the co-ordination of policy-activities, expenditure 
allocations and planning of resources. 
One of the main roles of the Cabinet is its supervisory functions 
over ministerial responsibilities. 	Once the Cabinet has made a decision, 
the ministry concerned has to implement it and inform the Cabinet of its 
progress. 	Equally, each ministry which is a parent to a parastatal 
organisation has the duty to inform the Cabinet of the progress or problems 
of the parastatal. 	In this way, the Government knows of the exact 
progress and problems of each policy and of each sector of the economy. 
It would appear, however, that this procedure was not adhered to. 
According to a well-placed source, many ministries failed to inform the 
Cabinet of the progress of their parastatals, or a specific policy or 
project which was adopted by the ministries themselves. 	Another common 
problem was the tendency of certain ministries to jump the procedure of 
obtaining approval from the Cabinet and seek support for their policies 
from the President. 	As most policies have financial implications, the 
practice has come to defeat the whole principle of planning because it 
allows for the mushrooming of resources from left, right and centre in an 
uncoordinated, unchecked and unplanned fashion. 	This practice has come 
to reduce the value of the Cabinet as a coordinating mechanism in 
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development. 
The Cabinet had also changed its methods of policy-consideration. 
The following interview illustrates the change that has occurred: 
Q. What factors are decisive to make 
the Cabinet reach a decision. 
A. Let us give the Minister a try. 
It also depends on his presentation and 
ability to answer questions ... so the 
meeting decides. 
Q. Can you give me an example of such Cabinet 
decisions? 
A. Yes. Before 1971, we had Marketing Boards, which 
were mainly involved in only one activity, namely the 
marketing of cash crops for exports abroad. In 1971 
the Minister for Agriculture and his Principal Secretary 
presented a Cabinet paper which argued that it would be 
a good idea to have one organisation which would deal 
and specialise with all aspects of a particular crop, 
that is, from its research on seed development, to 
production and marketing. 
The Cabinet thought it was a good idea and the 
Marketing Boards were dissolved and Crop Authorities 
were instituted. 
(interview with senior Government 
official, July 1981) 
Discussions of major policies as well as the actual policy-decisions were 
not made in the context of resources or capacity-considerations, but were 
taken on the basis of personal convictions. 	Another example which may 
fall within this category is the policy of the Village Training Programme 
for Village Management (1976). 	The policy-recommendation argued that 
one of the major causes for village economic problems was the absence of 
expertise at the village level. 	Villages suffered from skill-deficiencies, 
because expertise was located mainly at the centre, regions and districts. 
The draft paper outlining the policy argued that there was a need to bring 
expertise to bear on production, which is located at village-level. 
According to a well-placed official, most of the strategic ministries 
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concerned with revenue-generation such as the Ministries of Agriculture, 
Treasury, Industry and Mines and the State House, voiced their concern 
because the programme involved increasing the bureaucracy and increasing 
expenditure. 	These twin problems had become acute enough during this 
period for the Director of Planning to have instructed all ministries 
to cut down their expenses. 	But despite this recommendation, the 
programme was adopted. 	Such practices have made it difficult for the 
Government to reduce recurrent expenditure in order to increase development 
expenditure. 	Thus the Cabinet itself appears not to have been exempt 
from the practice of fonnulating sub-policies in isolation from the 
concrete capabilities of the nation. 
One explanation which may account for this weakness is that the 
Cabinet as a Cabinet is no longer a powerful institution even vis-a-vis 
its own agencies. A second reason is that there is a tendency for policies 
to be identified with particular personalities and there has been a switch 
from a collective form of decision-making based on research to personalised 
debates. 	This has weakened the Cabinet's authority. 	Under the new 
situation there is a lot of lobbying for a certain policy, thus turning 
sub-policies into 'political' issues. 	It would appear that ministers 
who have reservations about policy proposals are afraid of speaking their 
minds more forcefully for fear of creating ill-feelings among their 
colleagues; they may give their professional advice as to the likely 
consequences of a policy but they are unlikely to fight or oppose a policy 
to an extent of having it reversed (interview with senior Government 
official, July 1981). 
We can therefore conclude that the Cabinet during this period was 
not an effective institution and it lacked the powers and authority to 
assert its control and discipline its own governmental agencies. Ministries 
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and other government agencies do not consider that the Cabinet is an 
institution with powers to discipline them. 
Sub-policies changed by Government to accommodate Party's ideology: occasion-
ally the Government attempted to change previous policies and practice 
to accommodate the political guidelines defined by the Party. 	For 
instance, in 1974 there was a resolution by Government for a multi-purpose 
agricultural staff, to bring it in line with the ideology of the country 
as propounded by the Musoma Declaration. 
Our curricula and our train 	system as 
a whole should respond to changing needs 
and changing circumstances in our country. 
Our curricula should particularly respond 
to changes in our rural setting and rural 
development strategies. 	Following the 
Arusha Declaration, Musorna Declaration, 
for examples changes 	had to be made 
in our curricula to take account of the new 
policy changes. 
(Kilimo, 1980a) 
Under the previous system of training in extension serviceçfor agricultural 
students, 80% of the contenof the curriculum was devoted to basic 
agricultural science. It was based on a two year training 
This system was changed to one which combined Agricultural and 
Veterinary courses into one combined course, the 'Agro-Vet' Service course. 
As a result, the teaching materials for each courseQreseverely reduced 
so as to combine two separate diciplines into one course. 	But the 
training period for the new course remained the same as in the previous 
system. 	The aim of the two combined subjects was meant to simplify 
the work of the extension worker in a manner which would enable him/her 
to cope with all agricultural and livestock problems. 	It was also hoped 
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that such an inter-disciplinary approach would help the peasants by 
reducing the burden of making him contact so many specialised extension 
officers. (Kilimo, 1980a). 
The decision to rationalise through amalgamating developmental 
functions calls to mind the arguments used for the creation of the 
Crop Authorities. 	It stems from a view of development which gives 
little importance to specialisation of functions and to professionalism 
as well as economic concerns such as efficiency and capacity. 
Party attitudes towards policy-making 
Theconsolidation and growth of the Party during this period was 
accompanied by an increasing role of the Party in policy-making. The 
policies of the period were aimed at solving a variety of problems; 
nevertheless a common feature was the 'political' character of the policies, 
in the sense that 'political' considerations were given predominance over 
economic ones. 
Rapid Nationalisation: 	We have seen that immense pressures were 
exerted by Party activists in favour of the nationalisation of local capital. 
In 1967 Nyerere had rejected the policy of rapid nationalisation because 
of implementation problems (Tanu, Dar es Salaam, 1967: 114). 	But the 
bitter attacks against the Asians continued to be expressed by the Party 
activists throughout the 1969-1971 period as shown in both Party meetings 
and in Parliament. 	Thus: 
Kassella Bantu: The Indians exploit us too much 
and you are afraid of the Indians. 
(Tanu, 1970: 184, cited in frWupe,1976 
Mhando: 	It is better to disturb one's wound 
than to have it disturbed by somebody 
else. 
(Tanu, 1970: 180, cited in Mfupe, 1976 
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Similar attacks against the Asians were also voiced in Parliament. For 
instance, Kwilasa called for the nationalisation of wholesale trade 
and of houses (Hansard, 1969: 92). 
By 1969 the President appeared to have accepted the principle of 
rapid nationalisation. 	Thus: 
Wholesale trade will be nationalised and 
retail trade too will be under co-operatives 
in villages... 
These co-operatives will gradually take over 
retail trade (applause) after proving that 
they have the ability to serve the people well. 
(Tanu, 1969: 38) 
A year later in 1970 wholesale trade was nationalised. The President 
explained the nationalisation of wholesale and sub-wholesale trade in 
terms of "preventing a small group of people from controlling a large 
section of the economy on which people depend" (The Nationalist, February 6, 
1970). 	Between 1971 and 1974 citizen-owned industries and rented 
buildings were nationalised. 
Mwongozo: 1971: 	Although Mwongozo did emphasise the importance of 
economics in such issues as conserving foreign exchange, and savings 
(Mwongozo, 1971: 10) nevertheless, its greatest impact was on workers 
relations vis-a-vis management. 	In 1971 the Party passed the policy 
of Mwongozo which superseded the Workers' Council established in 1969. 
The aim of Mwongozo was to give workers rights and powers to control their 
own production process. 	Para. 28 of Mwongozo illustrates the emphasis 
given to 'political' considerations: 
For people who have been slaves or have 
been oppressed, exploited and disregarded 
by colonialism or capitalism, 'development' 
means 'liberation'. Any action that gives 
them more control of their own 
affairs is an action for development, 
even if it does not offer them better 
health or more bread. 	Any action that 
reduces their say Th determing their own 
affairs or running their own lives is 
not development and'retards them even if 
the action brings them a little better 
health and a little more bread - if 
development is to benefit the people, the 
people must participate in considering, 
planning and implementation of their own 
development plans. 
(T.A.N.U. Guidelines, 1971: 9, 
emphasis added) 
One of the major reasons for Mwongozo was to replace economic 
criteria in production with a political approach. 	The Party aimed to 
achieve this through the workers. As Hyden states, "the party leadership 
were in the position of forcing the managers to obey political instructions 
or otherwise be exposed and forced to quit". 	(Hyden, 1980: 1959). It is 
worth noting in passing that Saul saw Mwongozo as a crucial document in 
crystallizing worker consciousness and in legitimizing, even demanding, 
the unleashing of popular pressures against oligarchical tendencies on 
the part of wielders of state power ("leaders") (Saul, 1979: 186). Shivji 
too saw Mwongozo as the product of the most left-wing members of the Party 
who were able to push through officially radical policies (Shivji, 1976: 125). 
Decentralisation, 1972: 	The policy of Decentralisation was initiated by 
the President as Head of the Government rather than by the Party. 
Decentralisation was a popular idea in the 1960s because of the need felt 
by many African countries ior a new system which would have a greater 
capacity to solve problems (iweyemamu & Hyden, 1975: 150). Inl960thePresident 
instructed Nsekela, a senior civil servant, to make a study of the 
possibility of introducing decentralisation in Tanzania. The recommendation 
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given by Nsekela was against decentralisation. 	But the idea was again 
revived in the 1970s and this time the Government commissioned the US 
ttKinsey Corporation to undertake the study. 	They were given different 
terms of reference and the consultants recommended decentralisation 
(interview, senior Government official, July 1981). 
Thcrwere basically two major reasons for decentralisation. 	The 
first was the concern for solving local problems which were made difficult 
in a vast territory with poor infrastructural facilities: 
The centre of power and supervision was 
in Oar es Salaam and these could not 
supervise local problems efficiently. 
In addition, when you went to Oar es 
Salaam to consult over a problem 
it was also a problem, because you had 
to consult different ministries, Maji 
(Water), Kilimo (Agriculture) and there 
was no centre as such but rather centres 
of power, which again aggravated the 
problem of implementation. Accountability 
should also be closer to the people. 
(Interview with Regional Commissioner, 
July 1981) 
The second reason was to enhance the effectiveness of the Party in 
development. 	Hyden explains that "in Zambia and Tanzania the problem 
was tackled by allowing stronger party control over the administration 
at the regional, district or local levels" (Rweyemarnu&Hyden ,1975: 150). Theaim 
was to enhance the capacity of the political leaders to implement development; 
"for the first time, there was a strong, well-paid party bureaucracy at 
regional, district, divisional, and ward level" (Coulson, 1982: 254). The 
Regional Commissioners had access to the technical know-how of the 
representatives of the technical ministries who were now based in the regions. 
A Prime Minister's Office was created to co-ordinate all decentralised 
planning and administration in the regions. 	The ministries based in 
Oar es Salaam were excluded from regional development. 	Government 
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therefore changed the administrative structures to enhance Party 
leaders' roles in development. 
Politics is Agriculture, 1972: 	At the NEC meeting in Iringa the Party 
adopted the policy of Politics is Agriculture, which called for all 
political leaders to learn the basis of good husbandry in their areas so 
that they could give the peasants practical assistance in addition to 
exhortation . 	This policy restated the need to increase production of 
food crops and cash crops. 
Re-location of the Capital from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma, 1973: 	Another 
major decision taken by the Party was to move the capital from Dar es 
Salaam to Dodoma. 	This idea was proposed by Joseph Nyerere in the 
Parliament of 1966 but the Minister for Economic Affairs and Development 
Plan argued against the proposal on the basis that "many other productive 
projects would have to be stopped and neither Dodoma nor Dar es Salaam 
would benefit" (The Nationalist, March 1st, 1966). 
But in 1972 the decision to move the capital to Dodoma was revived 
by the Party, and after "careful considerations" (Msekwa, 1977: 52), it 
was decided that: 
The NEC resolves that the capital be 
moved to Dodoma and that the move be 
completed within a period of 10 years. 
This decision is final and the Government 
is hereby directed to take immediate 
action for its implementation. 
(Msekwa, 1977: 53) 
There were two major reasons which appear to have promoted the decision to 
transfer the capital from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma. 	The first was security. 
It was believed that Dar es Saleam, being a port, was more vulnerable to 
attack. 	This view may have received extra credibility when Guinea 
Iraea 
was invaded by mercenaries in 1970. 	The second and more important 
reason, however, was that the Party felt that there was a need to 
'weld together' the various regions and to look 'inward' rather than 
'outward' to neighbouring countries (interview with senior Government 
official, July 1981). 
The Musoma Declaration, 1974: 	The Party passed the Musoma Declaration 
at the NEC meeting in 1974 when it met to discuss the success and failure 
in implementing the policy of Education for Self-Reliance (1967). 	The 
rulings at Musoma were that: 
universal primary education be achieved within three 
years, that is, by November 1977; 
secondary education should be expanded and curricula 
should be diversified and opportunities for vocational 
training multiplied so that secondary level institutions 
could better provide terminal education; 
for academically eligible students entry into university 
should not occur immediately after Form 6, but only 
after the student has completed two years in a job and 
received a satisfactory report from his employer and 
his Tanu branch; and 
less weight should be given to final examination. 
(cited in World Bank, 1977:1:36) 
The Musoma Declaration illustrates the traditional concern of the 
Party for redistributive policies and for asserting its control over 
public affairs. 	The call for universal primary education to be completed 
within three years was brought about because of the policy of limited 
villagisation which was taking place between 1971-1973. 	New villages 
requested schools for the children and the Party had to meet these needs 
(interview with senior Party Official, July 1981). 	But there was also 
an element of control in the Musoma Declaration, especially in relation 
to secondary school graduates aspiring touniversity. 	Goulbourne has 
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explained the element of control in the following manner: "The Party 
is strategically placed as gateman into the University without in fact 
seeming to directly impinge on the internal autonomy of the educational 
system" (Goulbourne, 1979: 14). 
Party resolutions: 	The Tanu Guidelinesof 1971 (Mwongozo) made two 
resolutions: these were that the basic social services must be equitably 
distributed throughout the country, and secondly, that there should be an 
increase in Government planning effort and financial allocations in regions 
with low per capita incomes. (see Annual Plan 1971/72, 55 para 2). 	These 
resolutions clearly reflected the Party's prioritisation of redistributive 
policies. 
A major characteristic of the policies of this period was an apparent 
disregard for economic considerations. In particular, the problem of 
increasing recurrent expenditure for the Government and the shortage of 
manpower were not considered as constraints on policy-making. Moreover, 
increasing production was de-emphasised in relation to the goal of creating 
socialist organisations. 	This de-emphasis occurred in both the two main 
productive sectors, agriculture and industry, with the policies of Ujamaa 
and Mwongozo respectively. 	A similar tendency can be observed in the 
Musoma Declaration where educational criteria were subordinated to 
ideological ones, and manpower considerations and financial constraints 
were set aside in setting a timetable for meeting social needs. 
It is on this basis that I have argued that the period 1969-74 can be 
understood in terms of the principle of the primacy of politics in development. 
As already explained, the new approach saw development in terms of the 
class struggle, and the Party's role was to formulate policies which 
furthered the class struggle and the raising of class consciousness. 	By 
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this method the Party believed that it was transforming the economy into 
a socialist country. 	Nyerere summarised the situation correctly when 
he explained: 
But we are a One Party State. It is the 
Party as defined in the Constitution which 
lays down the policies on the basis of which 
we legislate and run the Government of this 
country 
By practice our Party leads the nation. 	The 
Arusha Declaration, Mwongozo, Politics is 
Agriculture, the Policy of Small Industries, 
the emphasis on irrigation, Decentralisation, 
the recent educational changes, all stem from 
our recognition that the Party is the real 
leader of the country. 
When the Party has laid down a policy our custom 
is to make every effort to implement that policy. 
Our laws, our administration, our various 
endeavours to expand the economy and so on are 
all intended to implement the policies of the 
Party and all involve a recognition that the 
Party has a right to supervise that imple-
mentation. This has been our belief; this 
has been our practice. 
(Nyerere, 1975) 
THE INFLUENCE OF DEPENDENCY THEORY ON GOVERNMENT 
We have seen in the Introduction that the University of Dar es Salaam 
was greatly influenced during the late 1960s and early 1970s by the 
dependency perspective. 	It created an intellectual climate in which 
more sophisticated forms of interpretation of the ideas of socialism and 
self-reliance were able to flourish. 	Intellectually inclined leaders 
such as the President and Minister Babu were susceptible to this intellectual 
climate. 	But dependency ideas were also able to penetrate the estab- 
lishment in a more direct manner. 	This was through the recruitment of 
university-trained intellectuals into the Government. The most prominent 
of these, J. Rweyemamu, was appointed the Economic Adviser of the President 
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in 1971. 
We saw in the Introduction that Rweyemamu called for a capital 
goods industry in his book Underdevelopment and Industrialisation in Tanzania 
(1973) and argued that such a strategy would enable Tanzania to break out 
of her dependent status and create a national independent economy. This 
strategy known as the Basic Industrial strategy or BIS, was incorporated 
into the Third Five Year Development Plan (1975-1980) and forms the basis 
for the long-tern 20-year plan of 1981-2000 (Long Term Plan, 1981-2000). 
The aim of BIS was to re-structure production and eliminate dependence 
on outside forces; industry was seen as the principal agent of structural 
transformation and self-reliance. 	The colonial pattern of trade 
fostered dependence; it resulted in an economic structure in which 
Tanzania produced what it did not consume and consumed what it did not 
produce. 	The aim of the BIS was to transform the structure of the economy 
by bringing production and consumption into line, by using domestic 
resources for domestic needs. 	The basic needs of food, shelter, clothing, 
health services, transportation and capital goods would all be produced 
by using domestic resources as far as possible. 1 	In this way a direct 
link came to be established between the ideas of dependency and actual 
pal icies. 
The second type of influence of the dependency thesis on Tanzania 
can be seen in the methodology of analysing economic problems which was 
increasingly adopted. The following is a quotation from the Economic 
Survey 1970-71 in its review of the first year of the Second Plan 1969-
1974: 
Continuing the transijion from a lop-sided 
economy to an internally integrated national 
economy, the period since the Arusha 
Declaration has been of great progress. Out- 
sta'vc(ing changes have taken place in three 
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broad fronts. 	Firstly, public ownership 
of the major means of production and 
financial institutions has proceeded apace, 
culminating more recently in public owner-
ship of the wholesale trade and the major 
rental properties. Secondly, there have been 
rapid institutional and structural changes 
essential for the socialist transformation 
in the economic, cultural and social fields. 
Thirdly, the country has been investing at 
an accelerating rate in its basic social and 
economic infrastructure, concentrating on 
Primary and Secondary schools, higher education, 
highway bridges and other forms of transport-
ation, water supply, storage electric power 
and administration. 
There was a healthy decline in foreign private 
investments in areas where this was deliberately 
discouraged as part of the national policy. 
Self-reliance became more of a reality over the 
years although a great deal remains to be done 
in order to fully implement our policy of self-
reliance and economic integration with a view of 
redressing the still excessively externally-
orientated economy inherited from our colonial 
past. 
(URT, 1971: 1) 
The above quotation shows the unmistakable influence of dependency ideas 
replacing conventional ideas of development in the Government's analysis 
of problems of economic development. 
Government proponents of the dependency theory (who viewed Tanzania's 
links with the world market as a sign of its dependency and as exploit-
ative) were a source of worry to those members of Government who were 
concerned about Tanzania's foreign exchange reserves. 	For instance, 
the Minister of Finance tried to explain that socialist development in 
an economy like Tanzania could not be equated with fewer links with the 
world market because of the need for foreign exchange. 	External trade 
was essential for development. Minister Jamal stated in 1969: 
The smaller the size of the economy 
the more dependent a country is on 
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external trade both for purpose of 
survival and for development. 
(Hansard, 1969: 430) 
Minister Jamal pointed out that foreign exchange was: 
the surest guarantee of our independence 
of actions and, in fact, of our ability 
to pursue a self-reliant economic policy 
insulated from short-term fluctuations 
in our export earnings, or temporary set- 
backs in our efforts to secure external 
finance on the most advantageous ternis 
possible. 
We have accepted obligations for the 
future which must be discharged through 
increased productivity and increased 
production, particularly for exports. 
and: 
We shall not pretend that self-reliance and 
self-sufficiency are one and the same thing. 
We recognise that they are not, and we know 
we are increasingly part of an inter-dependent 
world. 
(Ibid: 430-439) 
Jamal 's arguments for the need or exports shows that he was attempting 
to convince an audience in Parliament which thought that exports were 
not essential for a self-reliant and socialist economy. Equally, the 
Bank of Tanzania (BOT) re-affirmed continuously the need for exports. 
Thus: 
The main problem (of balance of payments) 
in this connection is the fact that the 
country has not yet achieved a sustained 
and high rate of growth of exports. 
Above all, there is really a need for a 
dynamic export drive both for our traditional 
exports and particularly for our manufactured. oocks 
(Bank of Tanzania, 1972: 10) 
A more urgent message was again repeated by the Bank of Tanzania in 1973: 
Furthermore, it is a matter of some concern 
that local production has not been expanding 
at a satisfactory rate. Although industrial 
production has been gaining in some lines, 
agricultural production remains virtually 
stagnant. Money supply has also continued 
to rise rather too strongly. Experience 
in other countries would indicate that if 
such a development is not matched with 
increased output soon enough , it would 
start causing difficulties by way of price 
increases. For the time being it is 
possible to meet the situation through 
price controls. In the long run, however, 
it is difficult to hold prices in check 
in this manner. 
In the opinion of the Bank it is necessary 
to step up production in the economy to 
prevent the possibility of a widespread 
inflation. For this, it is necessary to 
increase investment in the economy, partic-
ularly of the quick-yielding type, and also 
to raise labour productivity. In this 
connection it is necessaryto,re-consider 
the role of foreign exchange in the economy. 
(Bank of Tanzania, 1973: 11, 
emphasis added) 
In 1974 the Bank of Tanzania's Economic and Operations Report again stated 
that "A consistent export strategy has ... been lacking" (1974: 9). 
It would, therefore, appear that between 1969-1974 - apart from 
the Minister of Finance and the Bank of Tanzania - there was no clear 
appreciation in Government circles of the role of foreign exchange in 
development. 	The absence after 1969 of such a crucial policy as one for 
promoting exports can only be explained rationally by the influence of 
the dependency thesis, which was unable to reconcile the ideology of 
socialism and self-reliance with the economic realities of increased links 
with capitalist economies and the world market. 	The co-existence of 
the two views of development, namely the dependency and the conventional 
views, would indicate that between 1969-1974 the Government's conception 
of development was no longer homogeneous, as it had been between 1962-1967. 
The dependency thesis was the most popular and appeared to be the 
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ideologically acceptable view of development. This was so, first, 
because Nyerere was himself sympathetic to such ideas as his speeches 
will illustrate, and because it had affinities with the ideology of 
socialism and self-reliance. 	The conventional view of development as 
expressed by Jamal and the Bank of Tanzania was considered during this 
period reactionary. 
NYERERE'S CHANGED CONCEPTION OF DEVELOPMENT 
We have seen that up to 1969 Nyerere still held a conventional view 
of development. Onto that theory, from mid-1965, he added a new element; 
without abandoning conventional ideas about economic growth and the 
need for private capital, he added a re-distributive element. 	In 1967, 
in the Arusha Declaration policies, Nyerere was still maintaining that 
balance. 	The theoretical balance he maintained was one dimension of 
political balance he was holding between the Government and the Party. 
But from 1969 onwards, Nyerere abandoned this balance - both 
politically and theoretically. 	At a theoretical level, Nyerere began 
to work within a dependency framework. 	In 1969 he assumed that external 
capital created economic underdevelopment and that class struggle was 
essential to bringing about socialist development. 	From 1970 onwards, 
he continued to favour the dependency view, but now in a form which gave 
less emphasis to class struggle. 
The Presidential Circular 1/69 on Ujamaa il,lustrates that Nyerere's 
ideas on socialist development had radically changed, especially on rural 
development. 	We saw that in 1967 when Nyerere introduced the policy of 
Ujamaa at the Tanu Annual Conference in Mwanza, he had stated that the 
progressive farmers were not to be persecuted and that Ujamaa was to be 
voluntary. 	On this basis, I argued, that the policy of Ujamaa as outlined 
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in 1967 was still able to accommodate the Government's need for agri-
cultural growth, which was dependent on the progressive farmer. It also 
showed that Nyerere in 1967 still thought in terms of conventional ideas 
of economic growth. 
Two years later, however, Nyerere had changed his mind. The 
Presidential Circular on Ujamaa looked upon the progressive farmers as 
an obstacle to the creation of Ujamea villages and called for discrim-
ination against individual producers in terms of inputs, credits, etc., 
in favour of Ujamaa villages: 
We have to give (Ujamaa Villages) priority 
in all our credit, servicing and extension 
services - at the expense of the individual 
producer if necessary. 
Co-operative farming and production must be 
looked upon as the main source of economic 
growth in the rural areas - where the vast 
majority of our people live and work and will 
continue to live and work in the foreseeable 
future. 
All Government policies should be argued at 
discouraging the continuation of private 
individual farming. 
(Collins, 1971: 3.22) 
The policy of Ujamaa in 1969 was a different policy from that of 1967 
in two crucial areas. 	First, it discriminated against the progressive 
farmers, and second, the creation of Ujamaa villages was to be imple-
mented throughout the country in a "frontal attack" (1969-74: xvii). 
It would appear that in proceeding with the Presidential Circular, 
Nyerere rejected the advice given by his economic advisors. We know for 
instance, that Rene Dumont's report Tanzanian Agriculture after the Arusha 
Declaration (1969) can be seen as an anticipated and implicit criticism 
of Presidential Circular 1/69. 	For instance, the report considered 
progressive farmers as "a group indispensable for the modernisation of 
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agriculture" (Dumont, 1969: 3) and as "capable of setting in motion the 
progress of the whole agricultural community, if they are not discouraged 
11 
(Ibid: 11). 
In relation to private farming, Dumont wrote: 
such private investment seems to us highly 
desirable. In this country, people have 
too much taken to the habit of thinking 
that the State should provide for nearly 
all investments. As its resources are and 
always will be very limited, such an 
attitude holds up general progress. 
One must therefore try and encourage - 
especially at the present stage of development 
- the said private investments, which here 
are of a family and not of a capitalist 
character. 
(Ibid: 23) 
Finally: 
Development requires that people can become 
rich to a certain extent by hard and 
prolonged work and by economy. 
(Dumont, 1969: 34) 
Dumont's report was an attempt to restate the economic benefits accruing 
from the encouragement of progressive farmers. 
Nyerere also rejected the advice given to him by senior government 
officials. 	According to Pratt: 
those people who were involved in the 
planning of the Second Development Plan, 
such as Jamal, Msuya, Dickson Nkembo, 
Brian van Arkadie, Hellenier, Svendsen, 
warned the President that a 'frontal 
approach to ujamaa was beyond the 
capability of both the government and 
the Party and that the smallscale peasant 
farming was more efficient and compatible 
with socialist strategy. 
(Pratt, 1972: 424) 
Finally, I was unable to find any clear evidence to show that the pressures 
for the Presidential Circular 1/69 came from the Party. 	This was in 
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contrast to the pressures leading up to the nationalisation of trade, 
which are documented in Party and parliamentary debates. It seems, 
therefore, that there were few pressures and little favourable advice 
given to the President from either the Party or Government on this issue. 
A possible exception was the analysis of the radicals at the 
University of Dar es Salaam. 	They did identify the progressive farmer 
as an exploiter and as an obstacle to the creation of Ujamaa villages 
(Cliffe, 1973: 2: 203), and they concluded that more 'radical' policies 
were required to eliminate capitalist social relations of production. 
Just how directly the radicals at the University influenced Nyerere's 
thinking remains a matter for conjecture. 
In 1969 Nyerere also began to place greater emphasis on the creation 
of a socialist organisation even if this might lead to decline in 
production: 
For example, when we were giving aid, we 
aided industrious peasants who has developed 
100 or 200 acres, and has employed labourers. 
We therefore make him a modern farmer, at that 
time we were bent on production and not on the 
manner of production. 	This situation has 
changed... 
The Ujamea policy introduced by the Party in 
October 1969 marked the beginning of this 
change. Thischange has clearly shown that, 
this new plansbasic aim is villagisation in 
a socialist way. 
(Tanu, 1969: 25; also see 
Plan 1969-1974: ix) 
As the above quotation illustrates, Nyerere had accepted changed priorities 
in development. 	The change from his traditional concern with immediate 
economic benefits to long-term political goals can also be seen in Nyerere's 
ideas when he compared the opponents of relocation of theCapital from 
Dar es Salaam to Dodoma with peasant opponents of villagisation. 	Both, 
he said, "put a permanent house and a good shamba" before "the long-term 
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benefits of living together' (cited in Departrñent of Sociology, University 
of Dar es Salaam, 1980: 31). 	Nyerere's new conception of development 
incorporated an elerrlent which de-emphasised immediate economic benefits 
for deferred political goals. 	From 1970 onwards, finally, Nyerere 
began to voice ideas which were very close to the ideas of dependency 
writers. 	First, international capitalism was rejected because it did 
not allow for national independence for third worldeconomies, since it 
led to foreign owned and controlled interests in the peripheries. Second, 
capitalism was rejected on a class basis, because it led to exploitation 
of the workers: 
Indeed,(Africa) often discovers that there 
is no such thing as a national economy at all! 
Instead, there exists in its land various 
economic activities which are owned by people 
outside its jurisdiction, which are directed 
at external needs, and which are run in the 
interests of external economic powers. 
(Nyerere, 1976: 5) 
For the purpose of capitalist enterprise 
is the making of profit. To do this, the 
capitalist must keep his costs of production 
as low as possible, and get the maximum 
return from the sale of the products. In 
other words, he must pay the lowest wages 
for which he can get workers, and charge the 
maximum price at which he can sell the goods 
produced. 
(Nyerere, 1978) 
Thus dependence on international capitalism was postulated in terms of 
creating obstacles to the emergence of a national economy. 
Economic growth which was considered to be the pre-condition to 
development before 1967 was now considered unfavourably thus: 
there are Third World countries which 
accept their neo-colonial status, and even 
glorify in it. They point to the statistics 
of their Gross National Product as an example 
of what can be gained from it - rather in 
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the manner of a high class prostitute 
glorifying in her furs and jewels. 
(Nyerere, 1976: 6) 
The point to note is that Nyerere's conception of development changed 
radically after 1969. 	This change was in the direction of a 'political' 
approach towards development, premised on the idea that capitalism could 
not develop Third World national economies, that it created classes and 
was exploitative. 	Where capitalism did produce economic growth, Nyerere 
argued that such growth was not development. 
Nyerere's changed conception of development can perhaps be explained 
in the following way. 	We know (Pratt, 1976) that Nyerere as an individual 
had a very strong moral streak in his views of development. It is possible 
that he became receptive to the dependency thesis because of the latter's 
moral critique of capitalism. 	This may explain why Nyerere abandoned 
conventional cum re-distributive ideas of development, which appeared to 
legitimise capitalism and therefore by implication, inequality and social 
injustice. 
PRINCIPLES DETERMINING THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1969-1974 
As we have seen, the prevailing conception of development in Tanzania 
as well as the methods of achieving the process of development began to 
change in 1969 from its earlier focus on economic growth and pre-occupation 
with economic considerations of capital formation and manpower, to 
encompass a more generalised vision of socialist development. The new 
conception viewed socialist development as a process of liberation from 
oppression, exploitation, inequality and dependency.Supporters of the 
dependency view called for control and planning to bring about even and 
internally-oriented development. 	The Party called for control of 
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the economy in order to give the 'state' power to protect the weak 
against the strong,' as well as to safeguard the economy from external 
forces. 	They also called for mobilisation of the people to increase 
production rather than to al.i4i material incentives to control workers. 
And the President called for communal prodution to remove inequalities 
in development. 
This approach towards development was a fusion of various ideas 
which came together during this period and which found expression in the 
Second Five Year Development Plan. 	An analysis of these ideas as 
manifested in the Plan shows that they were drawn from the Party's 
traditional and new concerns, as well as from Nyerere and the section of 
Government which was most influenced by the dependency thesis. 
Party's influence in the Second Five Year Plan 
We saw in earlier chapters that the 1962-66 Government had placed 
great emphasis on economic growth and that various policies were evolved 
to expand production as rapidly as possible. 	The Party's nationalisation 
was successful in changing Government's conception of development because 
it led to the down-grading of private capital and made the state sector 
the major agent for development and accumulation of capital. 	The role 
of private capital was demoted and confined to consumption orientated 
activities. 	The Second Plan stated: 
Thus, private sector investment remains 
dominant in housing and other real estates, 
road transport and the construction industry, 
but is no longer crucial to the basic 
industrial and agricultural investment 
programmes of the country. 
(URT, 1969: 212) 
When Nyerere introduced the Plan at the 1969 Party Annual Conference, he 
was able to state that: 
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according to the Arusha Declaration 
a great part of industrial work, will be 
done by public corporations (Applause). 
Individuals will only remain with 16% of 
the industrial undertakings (Applause). 
It is intended that, most among these, 
will be small industries which require a 
few employees. It is also hoped that, 
employees and co-operatives will 
co-pperate to work on these industries. 
(Tanu, 1969: 31) 
The extent of the change from private to state (ownership) can be seen in 
the fact that wh•,e in 1965 the private sector accounted for 60% of all 
monetary fixed capital formation, by 1970 its share had fallen to under 
30% and by 1973 the public sector was representative for more than three-
quarters of monetized fixed capital formation (World Bank, Main Report, 
1977: 38). 	The following table illustrates the growth of parastatals: 
Parastatals No. of firms 	No. of employees 
1967 (after the AD) 64 26,000 
1968 73 34,690 
1969 78 49,925 
1970 85 54,613 
1971 99 67,880 
1972 104 68,329 
1973 117 71,576 
1974 142 80,057 
1975 142 83,376 
1976 135 96,269 
1977 159 105,875 
Source: World Bank, Dar es Salaam, July 1981. 
As we can see from the figures the vast expansion of parastatals took place 
between 1969 and 1974, and not in 1967 with the Arusha Declaration. 
The policy of rapid nationalisation and parastatal growth was effective 
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in undermining Government's concern for efficiency and manpower constraints. 
Minister of Finance Jamal, for instance, alluded to the problems of man-
power posed in the policy of rapid nationalisation when he presented the 
1969/70 Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure: 
All the calculations of the Treasury 
officials as to the availability of 
resources, both for recurrent as well as 
development expenditure, could go wrong 
in a big way, in one direction or another, 
depending on the performance of these 
state institutions in the years which 
lie immediately ahead of us. 
The cumulative success of all these 
institutions will be greater than the sum 
of successes of these institutions taken 
separately. 	And by the same token, let 
us warn ourselves, that the failures of a 
few, of even a single key institution will 
inevitably be passed on to the others, and 
thus to the entire economy. 
If the National Bank of Commerce fails, we 
all fail, if the SIC fails, the National 
Bank of Commerce cannot remain unaffected as 
indeed will the consumers, not even the 
National Development Corporation can remain 
untouched, because its distributional 
channels will be affected severely, and so on. 
We have taken upon ourselves heavy tasks. 
It is a good thing to remind ourselves of the 
heavy stakes involved. This is one sure way 
of doing battle with the danger. 
(Hansard, 1969: 434) 
Nyerere's influence on the Plan 
Nyerere's major input into the Second Development Plan was in the 
policy of Ujamaa Vijijini. 	This policy meant a new emphasis on the 
creation of socialist organisations. 	As Nyerere explained it in the 
Second Development Plan: 
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The policy of Ujamaa Vijijini which was 
adopted by the Party in October 1967 
meant the beginning of a change; gradually 
we are moving towards a programme of inte-
grated rural development which leads in 
the direction of the kind of socialist 
society we are trying to create. 	This 
changed policy is fully reflected in the 
new Plan, which has socialist rural 
development at its very core. 
(URT, 1969: 	ix) 
The policy overturned the Government's previous policy of relying on the 
progressive farmer for agricultural growth. 	As the Second Plan stated,' 
"emphasis on development through the individual farmer, which has been the 
basis of previous extension practice, will be ended ( URT, 1969-74: 29). 
The Second Development Plan also emphasised mobilisation as an 
instrument for the implementation of Ujamaa but attempted to give it a 
more economic explanation. 	Thus: "For the future the government is 
emphasising self-help, ujamaa village development, with the maximum 
mobilisation of local leadership" (Ibid: 21). 	And: 'The kind of 
help they (ujaniaa villages) need is ideological and organisational as much 
as material. 	They need to know how a ujamaa village works, to discuss 
the concrete problems of organisation, to recognise the importance of savings 
and to learn improved agricultural techniques" 	(Ibid: 28), 	emphasis 
added). 	Thus the Government attempted to relate the political concept of 
mobilisation to the process of production. 
Although Ujamaa was to be implemented by the Party (The Nationalist, 
September 25, 1969), there was no Party document which gave further 
clarification to the concept of mobilisation in relation to Ujamaa. 	It 
fell to the Government to explain it. 	The practice of implementing 
development policies through mobilisation (Ujamaa,1969; Mwongozo, 1971; 
Politics is Agriculture, 1972) indicated that the methods of achieving 
increased production had changed from reliance on trade and material 
incentives to political instruments. 
Influence of Government proponents of the underdevelopment thesis 
We can discern two major influences on the Plan stemming from 
supporters of the dependency thesis within the Government. 	The first 
concerns the role of exports. 	Unlike the First Five Year Plan (1964-1969), 
which had a very unambiguous attitude towards exports, the Second 
Development Plan showed an ambivalent attitude. For instance, the Plan 
stated: 
Care will have to be taken not to over- 
produce sisal, coffee, pyrethrum and fire-
cured tomacco, all of which face limited 
markets. 
(URT, 1969: 4) 
The case for de-emphasising exports was based on the following analysis: 
In the past, rural development had a 
heavy colonial bias. 	Cashcrops" were 
grown mainly for export overseas, while 
rural needs for manufactured commodities 
were met from imports. Thus the pace 
of development was determined by the 
condition of foreign markets and the 
prices at which imports could be obtained 
- over neither of which did Tanzania have 
any control. With the growth of domestic 
urban food markets, the shift in emphasis 
in policy towards food production and 
the expansion of the range of goods manu- 
factured in Tanzania the colonial economic 
pattern will be modified by increased 
internal trade. 
(URT, 1969: 6) 
The point to note is that the development of the export sector and the 
enlargement of the internal market were postulated as contradictory 
objectives rather than as mutualre.inforcing developmental goals. 
This lack of emphasis on exports would indicate that those who had cal1ed 
for an export strategy in development such as the Minister of Finance 
and the Governor of the Bank of Tanzania, were in a minority during this 
period. 
The second major influence of the Government proponents of the 
dependency thesis can be seen in the policy on intermediate and capital 
goods industry which made its appearance in the Second Five Year Development 
Plan (URT, 1969: 62). 	The rationale for creating an intermediate 
c'otoi. 
andgoods industry in Tanzania as opposed to limiting import-substitution 
to consumer goods manufacturing as in the first Five Year Plan (1964-69), 
was given in the following manner: 
When the process of import substitution 
for simple consumer goods manufactured is 
completed, the domestic growth in demand 
for these goods is limited by the rate of 
growth of the overall economy. Many of 
the consumer goods industries created at 
the first stage produce only a small part 
of the final product with domestic materials, 
using a high proportion of imported materials 
and creating a domestic market for new types 
of imports. 	Export possibilities are 
limited, because other developing countries 
have established similar industries. 
(Ibid: 62) 
The Plan argued against conventional arguments in relation to the smallness 
of the national market in the following manner. By the turn of the century: 
the population of the three East African 
countries alone will increase to at least 
60,600,000 and with increases in per 
capita incomes total output will rise to 
Shs 70,000 million (at today's prices). 
(Ibid: 62) 
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In relation to the conventional argument that the high level of technology 
necessary for this level of industrial development is absent in Tanzania, 
the Plan stated that: 
Limits placed on industrial development 
by the scarcity of technical know-how 
existed in most industrialised countries 
when they began the process of 
industrial isat ion. 
The reasons industrial countries have 
the techniques is that they acquired them 
in the process of industrialisation. The 
early stages of industrialisation must aim 
to increase technological know-how as much 
as to expand industrial output as a whole. 
(Ibid: 62) 
A NOR Consult (1973: 31) was Less sanguine about Tanzania's industrial 
development potential. 
We can therefore see that during this period conventional economic 
principles were downgraded in favour of goals derived from a dependency 
view of development. 	The Second Five Year Plan summarised the aim of 
development as follows: 
The Second Plan also aims to achieve structural 
change in the economy to provide the basis 
for sustained growth over the long period. 
The objective is to create a high investment, 
high growth economy in which, on the one hand, 
rural mobilisation and social change have laid 
the foundation for continuing agricultural 
expansion, while on the other hand, efficient 
investment institutions have been developed 
to provide a local basis for industrial growth. 
Seen in this light, although increased output 
during the five years of the Plan period is 
important, the critical objective is to create 
an economy capable of high growth over the 
long period. 	The strategy of rural development 
should eliminate those bottlenecks in agricultural 
production which have checked development in many 
economies. Further, if the parastatals are 
able to act as source of local investment 
initiative, then the undue dependence on foreign 
investment, which is the root cause of industrial 
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stagnation, will be avoided. 
(Ibid: 2, emphasis added) 
CONCLUSION 
The above analysis of the Second Development Plan 1969-1974 indicates 
the influence of the Party's vision of socialism as control of the economy, 
as well as its traditional concern with redistributive measures. It also 
illustrates the influence of neo-Marxist dependency ideas with their 
emphasis on class struggle in the rural areas and the need to restructure 
the economy away from its dependency on international capitalism. 	In 
relation to the ideas of class struggle, the Presidential Circular 1/69 
discriminated against the progressive farmers and Mwongozo (1971). 	discrim- 
inated against the managers. 	In relation to the idea of restructuring 
dependency relations, the policy of creating a capital-goods industry 
was an attempt to create an inward-oriented independent economy. Exports 
were also downgraded. 	Supporters of the dependency thesis within the 
Government were able to give a more sophisticated theoretical explanation 
of the Party's policy of Socialism and Self-Reliance during this period. 
Thus all the three organs of the state - President, Party and 
Government (temporarily under the sway of proponents of the dependency 
thesis) - were for different reasons operating within a 'political 
approach to development. 	For the Party, the policy of rapid national- 
isation of local capital was undertaken irrespective of the economic 
consequences. 	Nyerere's Presidential Circular on Ujamaa and the Party's 
Mwongozo were also issued with little consideration to their impact on 
production. 	In relation to the Government supporters of dependency a new 
attitude towards development was adopted, where current problems of imple-
mentation were transposed with future potentials. 
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All three organs of the state, for different theoretical reasons, 
gave political goals priority over present economic needs and constraints. 
In other words, they took what I am calling a 'political' approach towards 
development. 	The ideology of development that prevailed during this 
period had a bias against exports, and a bias against professionalism 
and specialisation; there was a mistrust of economic management and a 
disregard of the foreign balance and fiscal matters in the development 
processes. 	On this basis I conclude that the real, watershed in Tanzania's 
'revolution' occurred between 1969-1974 and not: in 1967 with the Arusha 
Declaration as has been commonly assumed. 	Durihg1969-1974 the whole 
pattern of development thinking in Tanzania was changed. 
The absence of a serious foreign exchange crisis during this period 
helped to nurture this ideology of development. 	Unfortunately, the 
pattern of thinking with its lack of concern for economic inputs and 
discipline continued long enough to become uncontrollable and the result 
was the crisis of 1974/75 and the eventual reversal of several key policies. 
This will now be examined. 
BOOM 
FOOTNOTE 
1. Minister Babu, the then Minister for Economic Affairs and Development 
Planning wrote in the Tanzania Supplement of the Financial Times, 
December 9, 1971, calling for an 'inward-strategy' of development. 
(Financial Times, London, 1971). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE FAILURE OF 'POLITICAL' POLICY-MAKING AND THE 
ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 1974-5 
We saw in the last chapter that the Party was successful in sub-
ordinating Government politically as well as in replacing the early 
economic orientated policies of the Government with its own. 	The 
'political' approach towards development which was adopted between 1969-1974 
included such elements as lessening dependence on foreign influences, 
extending state control of the economy, lessening the use of market forces, 
and relying on ideology and mobilisation to increase production. 
From the mid 1970s, however, important sectors of the economy experienced 
problems and difficulties. 	In 1974-1975 Tanzania had a severe balance-of- 
payments crisis. 	In this chapter I shall explore the connection between 
the types of policies chosen between 1969-1974 and the events of 1974-5. 
I shall also be examining the various explanations which have been offered 
in the literature for the Tanzanian economic crisis of the mid-1970s. 
POLICY FAILURES AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 1974-75 
From Ujamaa to villagisation 
The 1969 policy of creating Ujamaa villages by a 'frontal approach' 
had uneven success. 	Ujamaa was more successful in regions which were 
poorer and characterised by scattered homesteads than in the richer regions 
where settled agriculture and cash crops had already developed. Thus: 
As of March 1973 about one third of the total 
number of. villages were located in only two 
regions while five regions which together 
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contributed less than 25% of 1969 GOP 
accounted for over 60% of villages with 
nearly 70% of total village production. 
Conversely, the six most affluent regions, 
which contributed over 50% of 1969 GOP, 
accounted for only about 15% of the 
number of villages and less than 10% of 
the ujamaa population. 
(World Bank, Vi, 1977: 18) 
The Ujamaa movement appeared to have reached a point of stagnation 
and Nyerere saw the solution in a distinct policy, that of Villagisation. 
At the NEC meeting of the Party in 1972, the President presented the idea 
of Villagisation. 	He argued that it was possible to separate the idea of 
"living together" from that of "working together on a communal farm", and 
that these two could be tackled at different stages (Msekwa, 1977: 63). 
Nyerere's arguments for separating the two facets of Ujamaa and tackling 
them in different stages was an implicit acceptance that the policy of 
Ujamaa Vijijini as outlined in the Presidential Circular (1969) had failed 
as of that specific time. 
The policy of villagisation was accepted by the NEC and in 1973 the 
Party Conference directed that by the end of 1976 the whole rural popu-
lation should live in villages (Coulson, 1982: 249). 	Operation Vijiji 
moved 11 million people in a space of merely two years (Fortmann, 1978: v). 
The use of force was not precluded (Mwapachu, 1976; Coulson, 1977; 
Nyerere, 1977: 42). 	Matan'o gives a graphic description: 
Many peasants in Ichungu were taken by surprise 
to see armed militia-men climbing on top of 
their houses, taking away the thatch, in some 
cases, the iron sheets were torn off, doors and 
windows removed or smashed to pieces; houses 
pulled down in some cases 
Their homes having been destroyed and the people 
having received orders to move with all their 
property to the village building sites that same 
day; they moved with chickens, children, wives, 
cattle, goats and sheep, with beds and bedding, 
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some of them settled under the trees for 
shelter provided they were within the 
village sites 
While the Operation was going on the leaders 
failed to even control the militia men or 
given them proper guidance. At Pemba and 
Kyorubu villages some militia men looted 
the property of the peasants. There have 
been occasions when the militia men have 
even opened fire at a passenger bus and a 
lorry wounding and killing travellers in 
North Mara. 
(Matango, 1971: 17-29) 
Another observer wrote: 
In certain areas where the militia did not 
strike, people rushed in panic to build 
temporary accommodation in unplanned village 
sites. The entire division was in motion. 
Moving, moving in panic to the unplanned 
village sites. Thus creating new villages 
in areas which are not even surveyed, no 
water, no school, or dispensary - virtually 
no facility to maintain the population there 
or any plan to bring any, but only to serve 
the purpose of moving into the Development 
villages. This haphazard, skimble-skamble 
movement has created problems which need 
urgent government attention and resources. 
(Mwapachu, 1976: 1-6) 
These quotations show the fear and insecurity which peasants experienced 
throughout the nation during the implementation of Operation Vijiji. 
Mwonqozo and its demise 
The policy of Mwongozo led to a number of strikes which began around 
February 1971 and by September 1973 had involved about half of the labour 
force engaged in the manufacturing iidustry. 	One of the major consequences 
was that Mwongozo "effectively destroyed the flimsy fabric of modern 
organisation that had been institutionalised in Tanzania" (Hyden, 1980: 166). 
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CPolitics is Agriculture(1972) 
We saw that in 1972 the Party called for leaders to acquaint 
themselves with agricultural practice, but Nyerere's comments are indicative 
of its problems: 
Many of our leaders know nothing about 
agriculture. What is more, they don't 
want to learn. 
(Nyerere, 1977: 20) 
Decentral isat ion 
The policy of decentralisation increased the recurrent costs/?xpenditure 
to the Government and led to decrease in development expenditure. 	The 
following table shows this. 
TABLE NO. 7.1 
Share of Regions in Government Expenditure 
per cent 
1972/73 	1973/74 1974/75 1 1975/762 1976/77 
Recurrent: 	30.1 29.1 27.4 27.3 26.6 
Development: 	7.1 14.6 13.9 14.0 10.0 
Total: 	22.5 24.0 22.5 21.9 20.3 
Note: 1. Provisional Actuals 
Revised Estimates 
Budget Estimates 
Source: World Bank Main Report, 1977: 67) 
This means that in the long run the narrow economic base would not be able 
to sustain the growth of the bureaucracy. 
Parastatals 
We saw in the policy of rapid nationalisation that occurred between 
1969-1974 that there was a proliferation of parastatals, which became 
the main agency responsible for generating economic growth. 	But a study 
conducted by the Ministry of Finance in 1974 of 24 parastatals showed 
that by the end of 1973, they "had accumulated Shs 178m in losses which 
accounted for 91 per cent of the total capital allocated to these 
companies, that is, 195 million shillingsu  (Minister of Finance, 1976, 
36:9). 	In the 1975 speech to the National Assembly, the Minister of 
Finance, Msuya warned that: 
Those parastatals which fail to generate 
surpluses will have to be closed down. 
(Minister of Finance, 1975: 73:10) 
The growth of the state sector also increased the rate of recurrent 
expenditure. 	The problem where consumption of revenue exceeded its 
generation was summarised by the Minister of Finance: 
In the last five years Government Recurrent 
Expenditure has increased at a rate of 
approximately 27% per year. During the same 
period the average increase in GDP has been 
17%. These statistics do tell a story. 
(Minister of Finance, 1976: 91:18) 
The Minister explained: 
it remains an inescapable fact that such 
building up of administration, especially if 
undertaken with the speed that we did, is 
bound to commit us to recurrent expenditure on 
an expanding scale. 	When cost inflation is 
added to it, the situation gets more burdensome 
in terms of resource requirements to meet these 
continuing commitments. 
No country can afford to carry an increasing 
burden of a recurrent nature beyond a certain 
limit at a certain time, and at the same time 
save for investment in new development. At 
some point we have to add up the total situation. 
(Minister of Finance, 1976: 90:18) 
In 1967 the public sector in Tanzania was not very big; in 1975 it was 
much enlarged and a heavy burden. 	The parastatals failed to provide any 
surplus to the Government in order to finance the social services of the 
-277- 
public sector and some did not cover their own costs, and had to depend 
instead on subsidies from Government (Nyirabu, 1980: 4). 
Economic Performance 
Tanzania's agricultural sector was in serious difficulties. The 
average rate of growth of total agricultural production in real terms 
from 1964-1975 was only 2.8% per annum - compared to a rate of growth 
of 4.8% for total GDP. 	Since the population was growing at an estimated 
2.8% per year, the expansion of production was only sufficient to keep up 
with population growth (World Bank, 1977, IV: 9). 	The following table 
shows, moreover, that the rate of growth of agricultural production, and 
particularly of its marketed components, declined steadily between the 
mid-1960s and the mid-1970s. 
TABLE 7.2 
Average Annual Growth Rates of Agricultural Production 
1964-1969 1969-1973 1973-1975 1964-1975 
Subs i stence 
Production 2.9 4.0 4.0 3.4 
Monetary 
Production 3.8 2.6 1.3 2.1 
Total 
Production 3.3 2.9 1.5 2.8 
Source: World Bank, 1977, IV: 9 
This poor performance in the agricultural sector affected both food and 
cash crop production. 	In 1974 Tanzania had to import 440,000 tons of 
foodgrains. 	Maize imports alone amounted to 29,000 tons compared to an 
average of 36,500 tons in 1970-73. 	The total food import bill rose from 
274 million shillings in 1973 to over a billion shillings in 1974 (World 
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Bank, 1977: 72). 	Coupled with high import bills, Tanzania's main 
foreign exchange earner, the export sector based on cash crop production, 
was equally in serious trouble. 	In the period of the Second Five Year 
Plan agricultural exports stagnated: 
From 1965-67 to 1971-73 the total volume 
of Tanzania's six major primary exports 
(cotton, coffee, sisal, cashew nuts, tea 
and tobacco) actually declined by 5%. 
This was followed by further declines of 
15% in 1974 and 3% in 1975; thus by 1975 
Tanzania was exporting 21% less of these 
commodities than the average of ten years 
before. 
(World Bank, 1977: 29) 
Declining cash crop production in turn affected the manufacturing 
sector. 	Thus between 1974-1975 manufacturing output virtually stagnated 
although demand was high. 	This was largely due to supply problems: 
shortages of locally produced raw materials owing to agricultural production 
problems; breakdowns in water and electricity; and shortage of spare parts 
and transport owing to the shortage of foreign exchange. The following 
figuresillustrate the growth and stagnation of the manufacturing sector. 
As we shall see there was an impressive rate of real growth in the manu-
facturing sector but it was disrupted first by the mini-crisis of 1970/71 
and then by the economic crisis of 1974-1975. 
The weaknesses, problems and declining economic growth performance 
of the economy impaired its ability to respond effectively when confronted 
with the exogenous intervention of adverse weather conditions and 
rocketing prices of oil. 	The latter triggered the descent of the economy 
into disorganisation via a severe balance-of-payments crisis. 
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The Drought: 	Between 1973 and 1974 Tanzania experienced a severe 
drought which affected production. 	Thus between 1972 and 1974 the 
production of maize declined by over 20%. 	Paddy and wheat production 
also declined. 	The decline in food production necessitated the import 
of food. The drought also affected cash crop production. Thus volumes 
of coffee, cotton and sisal exports declined by 32%, 20% and 18% 
respectively, and overall export volume declined by more than 20% 
(World Bank, 1977: 73). 
Increase in petroleum prices: 	The increase in petroleum prices and the 
general world inflation in manufactured and capital goods raised average 
import prices to Tanzania by over 60% (Ibid, 72). 
Crisis of 1974/75: 	The consequences of the aggregate led to a balance 
of payment crisis. 	The trade surplus of some T.shs 130m per year in 
1965-1967 (under the First Five Year Plan) was converted into a deficit 
of over T.shs 1,000m per year in 1971-1973, then soared to T.shs 2,500m 
in 1974 and T.shs 3,000m in 1975, following the drought (World Bank, 1977: 
28). 	This situation created the 1974/75 crisis. 
We can therefore see that Tanzania was in serious difficulties - 
the popular policies of Ujamaa and Mwongozo had been replaced by the more 
authoritarian policy of villagisation and the re-assertion of managerial 
authority in work-places; parastatals were failing to produce adequate 
surpluses; industries were working at under-capacity; exports were 
stagnating; famine was an immediate threat; and in 1974 and 1975 Tanzania 
had 	severe balance of payment problems. 
What were the causes of this dismal development experience? Why did 
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Tanzania's acclaimed policies fail to achieve their objectives? 	Before 
trying to give answers to these questions, it will be useful to examine 
once again some of the standard explanations offered to account for 
Tanzania's failure to achieve an independent socialist and self-reliant 
economy. 
ACADEMIC EXPLANATIONS FOR THE FAILURE OF UJAMAA AND MWONGOzp 
How did the academics explain these problems? 	Most academic 
explanations of Tanzania's 'failure' to achieve socialist development 
have focussed on, first , the reversal of policies of Ujamaa and Mwongozo; 
and secondly, the general political economy of Tanzania, specifically, 
its links with international capitalism. 
Von Freyhold's Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania explained the failure of 
ujamaa in terms of class strugie. The policy of ujamaa was sabotaged 
by bureaucrats and the state. 	Ujamaa failed because "there was no 
proposal to recruit and train political cadres" to undertake the mobil- 
isation of the peasantry. 	Ujamaa was not a 'political' concept. 	Von 
Freyhold also attempted to link the failure of ujamaa to the intervention 
of metropolitan interests. 	Thus the bureaucrats in Tanzania who 
sabotaged the policy of ujamaa were linked with the metropolitan bourg-
eoisie and the World Bank: 
The state and its managerial functionaries 
(through the expansion of the state sector) 
put themselves in the place of the local 
bourgeoisie and collaborated with the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie (in the form of 
the multi-national firms and capitalist 
aid agencies) to co-operate in joint ventures. 
And: 
Having already become a partner of inter- 
national capital in this manner, the state 
in Tanzania moved one step further and 
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demanded a controlling share of the 
enterprise whose profitability it ensured. 
And: 	
They (bureaucrats) did not contradict him 
(Nyerere) openly, first because they needed 
him to appease workers and peasants and 
secondly, because they expected that in 
practice the whole campaign would look quite 
different - as indeed it was. 	Eventually, 
the bureaucracy managed to turn the slogan 
of Ujamaa into a tool which could be used 
for its own purpose. 
(Von Freyhold, 1979: 120) 
Raikes (1973) also argued that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie wrecked 
the policy of ujamaa because they feared a socialist transformation would 
threaten their social status. 	Shivji (1976: 107) saw the policy of ujamaa 
as "a continuation of the preceding agricultural policies" in its attempts 
to "accelerate the process of monetariation". 	According to Shivji, the 
policy of Ujamaa was not a political q qestion involving class struggle 
(Ibid: 107) but an attempt by the bureaucratic class to consolidate and 
integrate the Tanzanian economy into international capitalism. Although 
radical writers may differ in their emphasis as to the intentions of 
ujamaa, all appear to be in agreement that the policy failed because of 
class struggle and more specifically, because of the class interests of 
the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. 
Mwon g ozo 
The radicals have also explained Government's actions to restore 
discipline in factories and other work-places in terms of class struggle. 
For instance, they argued that the state withdrew its support from the 
working class (Mapolu, 1976; Miyo, 1975). 	In this way, they argued, the 
radical policy of Mwongozo was defeated. 
U 
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Failure to eliminate links with international capital 
Radical writers saw the failure of Tanzania's overall socialist 
development as a result of her links with international capitalism. 	Saul 
for instance, argued that the investment of surplus often being directed 
first toward such immediately profitable domestic spheres as luxury 
consumption goods and toward such immediately effective earners of foreign 
exchange as tourism, rather than towards structural transformation" 
(Saul, 1979: 207). 
Von Freyhold argued that the increasing role of the state sector in 
agriculture, external and internal trade, banking, insurance, and its 
control of prices and finances, gave it powers to nurture itself "with 
surplus drained from the private sector". 	But this state control, argued 
Von Freyhold was not socialism because: 
The working class in Tanzania had never 
seized state power, the expansion of the 
state economy could certainly not be 
explained as a move to assure the predominance 
of the working class. The state economy 
was not the creation of the working class 
but the creation of a petit bourgeoisie 
which tried to gain an economic base by 
integrating metropolitan capital into 
peripheral state capitalism. 
(Von Freyhold, 1979: 119) 
And the "peasants, who were to lay the golden eggs for the system, were 
thus put under the control of international finance capital, the World 
Bank, in particular" (Von Freyhold, 1979: 120). 	Under these conditions, 
Von Freyhold argued, a political revolution was necessary: 
The first step towards a transformation 
of the state economy and the peasant 
economy would have had to be a political 
change, a change putting workers and 
peasants in power. 
(Ibid: 121) 
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Parastata is 
Problems of the parastatals have also been analysed in 'class' 
terms by the radicals. 	John Loxley and John Saul (1975) saw that the 
major problems besetting the parastatais were the reflection of the 
characteristics of the political economy of Tanzania. 	Tanzania's lack 
of a theory of imperialism and the class nature of the society have 
"blurred the possibilities for progressive advance, namely, the leader-
ship's inability to confront the realities of class struggle as another 
crucial ideological weakness" (1975: 62). 	Thus the weakness at the 
ideological level help to forestall the definition of a coherent radical 
strategy of development and industrialisation (Ibid). 
Problems of parastatals were viewed as the result of an "over-
emphasis on the technical aspects of management" (Loxley & Saul, 1975: 75). 
These writers argued that "the nationalisation of the major modern sector 
means of production in Tanzania was not accompanied by a complete break 
with western capitalism" and the state firms relied heavily on foreign 
borrowing and on foreign management. 	But they argued that even if foreign 
management were to be replaced, it would not lead to the introduction of 
socialist production relations, which could only be achieved by creating 
politically aware Tanzanian managers and "in the final analysis a committed 
cadre of Tanzanian socialist managers must be one crucial component of a 
solution to the management problems of parastatals" (Ibid: 71-75). 
Thus, like the failure of Ujamaa Vijijini and Mwongozo, the problems 
of the parastatals were also explained in terms of class analysis and 
class-interests. 	The solutions to these problems were sought in a more 
and more 'political' approach, that is, the creation of political cadres. 
The failure of these specific policies was in turn explained by the 
radicals in relation to the political economy of Tanzania. 
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For the radicals therefore, far-reaching and almost impossible 
political changes had to occur first, before 'development' could be 
achieved. 
It is difficult in retrospect, to see what kind of economic 
development the radicals were calling for. 	The political approach toward 
development disregarded the need for economic management. The radicals 
did not seem to have a clear understanding of some of the basic mechanisrns 
by which the economy worked. Being hardly able to perceive the economic 
structures and requirements of the economy, they were certainly unable to 
transform the economy. They substituted politics for economic knowledge, 
thus negating the economic rationale in development. 
EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 1974/1975 
It is interesting to note that while the radical academics contribut 
an explanation ofsorts for modifications or changes in specific policies, 
they have remained. silent over the general economic crisis of 1974/75. Thi 
is not surprising,Jnce the analysis of the crisis would have forced many 
of them to re-examing their own theoretical assumptions. 	The debate on 
the 1974/75 crisis is mainly between the Government and the non-radical 
academics, which is also an indication that the debate on Tanzania has 
progressed from the neo-Marxist dependency approach of the radicals to the 11 
consideration of economic factors. 	The divide is now between the external 
and internal constraints arguments. 	We shall examine these debates. 
External constraints arguments 
Official explanations of the crisis have focussed attention on the 
drought conditions and petroleum prices as reasons for the 1974/75 crisis. 
The argument behind the external constraints explanation of the crisis is 
that if these exogenous factors had not occurred, Tanzania would not 
have experienced such a crisis. 	Implicit in this argument is the idea 
that internal factors such as official policies were not to blame but 
that the effectiveness of policies were sabotaged by the intervention of 
external factors, which were beyond the contro1 of Tanzania. The following 
speech of Nyerere illustrates the external constraints argument very well: 
there are three major reasons for our 
present difficulties. They are the rapid 
inflation rate in the developed world, 
the sudden and large increase in the price 
of oil and petroleum products, and the 
drought which caused widespread crop 
failures and animal deaths in our country 
the three adverse economic factors I 
have already mentioned - none of which were 
within our control - we were not able to 
maintain our rate of expansion last year. 
(Nyerere, 1975: 4) 
The Minister of Finance stressed similar factors: 
Since 1974 Tanzania has faced an 
increasingly difficult economic and 
financial situation. In that year the 
economy suffered from both a large 
shortfall in food production due to 
drought and the initial shock of the 
sharp increase in world oil prices. 
(cited in Agency for Development, 1980: 
49) 
Internal constraints: policy deficiencies 
A number of academic writers, mainly economists, have explained the 
economic crisis of 1974/75 in terms of policy deficiencies. Lofchie (1976) 
argued that the shortfall in agricultural production was the result of 
mistaken policies and not the result of drought. 	Basing his arguments 
on the analysis of meteorological data, he explained that there was a 
severe shortfall of rainfall in 1973 which could have led to a reduction 
of the maize crop by about 20% but that in 1974 there was adequate rainfall. 
Peasants resisted communal production in the policy of Ujamaa Vijijini 
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and there was a failure to encourage production oftraditional export 
crops. 	Thus Lofchie argued that the fall in agricultural production 
was the result of peasant resistance to ujamaa, low producer prices and 
other misguided policies. 	In another article entitled Agrarian Crisis 
and Economic Liberalisation in Tanzania (1978) Lofchie argued that ujamaa 
was the cause of food crisis. 
Since collectively villagisation had 
been the cornerstone of Tanzania's rural 
policy for the preceding five years, it 
seemed obvious to conclude that this bore 
some responsibility for the food crisis. 
(Lofchie, 1978: 452) 
Hyden on the other hand was reluctant to draw a cauSal relationship 
between ujamaa and the fall in agricultural production. 	He conceded 
that the failure of ujamaa to increase production was the result of the 
deficiencies within the policy itself (Hyden, 1980: 119, 124) but he was 
categorical in rejecting the argument that villagisation was the principal 
cause of Tanzania's decline in agricultural production in the mid-1970s 
(Hyden, 1980: 146). 
Ellis (1979) on the other hand, showed that the cashewnut production 
declined considerably from 1974 despite favçurable international prices. 
He stated: 
that in the case of cashewnuts no 
justification for depressing the level 
of producer prices can be found in the 
international market situation confronting 
Tanzania. 
(Ellis, 1979: 11) 
Yet despite these favourable conditions operating at the world market, the 
cashewnut producers were paid very poorly. 
The real producer price of cashews fell 
continuously from 1969/70 through to 
1977/78, by which time it was between 35% 
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Since collectively villagisation had 
been the cornerstone of Tanzania's rural 
policy for the preceding five years, it 
seemed obvious to conclude that this bore 
some responsibility for the food crisis. 
(Lofchie, 1978: 452) 
Hyden on the other hand was reluctant to draw a causal relationship 
between ujamaa and the fall in agricultural production. 	He conceded 
that the failure of ujamaa to increase production was the result of the 
deficiencies within the policy itself (Hyden, 1980: 119, 124) but he was 
categorical in rejecting the argument that villagisation was the principal 
cause of Tanzania's decline in agricultural production in the niid-1970s 
(Hyden, 1980: 146). 
Ellis (1979) on the other hand, showed that the cashewnut production 
declined considerably from 1974 despite favourable international prices. 
He stated: 
that in the case of cashewnuts no 
justification for depressing the level 
of producer prices can be found in the 
international market situation confronting 
Tanzania. 
(Ellis, 1979: 11) 
Yet despite these favourable conditions operating at the world market, the 
cashewnut producers were paid very poorly. 
The real producer price of cashews fell 
continuously from 1969/70 through to 
1977/78, by which time it was between 35% 
and 47% of the level prevailing 9 years 
earlier. 
(Ellis, 1979: 11) 
Ellis' research therefore shows that world market conditions cannot be 
accepted as a valid reason for the decline of this crop; rather it was 
internal factors, namely, the prices paid to producers. 	The second 
reason was the impact of the villagisation programme: it separated the 
cashewnut producers from the sites of their trees: 
This not only increased the travel 
time required to tend to cashew trees 
but also substantially affected the 
economics of combining cashew production 
with other cropping activities. 
(Ellis, Ibid: 15) 
But Ellis also pointed to the process of dis-accumulation of the capital 
stock which began before the policy of villagisation took place. 	He 
argued that the decline in production should be seen more in the context of: 
the outcome of a progressively more intense 
squeeze between the rising labour cost of 
cas.hew cultivation imposed by villagisation 
and the falling level of real producer prices. 
(Ibid: 20) 
In another study, entitled An Economic Analysis of the Coffee Industry in 
Tanzania 1969/70 - 1978/79: Towards a Higher and more stable producer prices, 
Ellis again argued that internal factors such as prices, export taxes, and 
the Coffee Crop Authority's expenses progressively reduced the real income 
of the peasants. 
Ellis' study is also important because of his attempt to relate 
these processes to the fall in export production and the loss of foreign 
exchange. 	For instance, in relation to the decline of cashewnut production 
Ellis stated: 
At international market prices prevailing 
in 1978, the industry could have generated 
foreign exchange earnings of the order of 
T.sh 550-600 million, whereas the actual 
outcome in that year was T.Shs 229 million 
for all cashew products combined. 
(Ellis, 1980: 2) 
In this way, Ellis illustrated the significance of the export sector for 
national development. 
Explanations of Tanzania's problems in terms of 'internal' factors 
have been implicitly criticised in the explanations offered by Green, 
Rwegasira and Van Arkadie, in their book entitled, Economic Shocks and 
National Policy Making: Tanzania in the 1970s (1980). 	These writers 
explained the crisis of 1974-1975 in relation to external factors or 
'exogenjus shocks', which were "extended drought conditions compounded by 
oil and related price increases on international markets". 	The authors 
argued that the 1974-1975 crisis was "mainly a result of events outside 
the influence of domestic policies" (1980:, 	23). 	This argument is therefor 
similar to the official one. 
But thauthors also concede the validity of five general criticisms 
of the government's approach, thus indicating that internal factors were 
also responsible for the crisis. 	First, there was no coherent strategy 
or view of the role of exports at the decision making leve' from 1967 to 
1971 (Ibid: 87). 	Later when it was accepted that exports were necessary 
to achieve a self-reliant strategy there was "neither a co-ordinated 
project list nor a strategy with targets, instruments and resources set 
out" (Ibid: 96). 	Second, until the mid 1970s, industrial strategy "tended 
to contain a systematic a priori basis against pre-export processing of 
(raw material exports) and to assume that ... export and domestic manu- 
facturing were inherently unrelated" (Ibd: 88). 	Third and fourth, 
serious efforts to build up a number of feasible new agricultural exports 
were not made in the 1967-1974 period, and systematic research on exportablE 
and other crops "has made at most a sporadic recovery since about 197511 
(lbid: 89). 	Lastly, but most significantly: 
The standard Tanzanian pattern of 
institutional development by crisis 
resolution appears, at least in 
retrospect, to have had a built-in 
bias against exports. 
(Green et alia, 1980: 89) 
The pument of Green et alia that exogenjus factors were responsible 
for the crisis cannot easily be accepted. 	Although they conceded the 
importance of the five internal factors 	mentioned, nevertheless, 
their methodological approach de-emphasises their significance. First, 
they have a tendency to underplay mistakes which were the direct result 
of policies. 	For instance, between 1969-1974 there was a vast expansion 
of the state sector despite the problems and shortages of skilled manpower 
and capital. 	Between 1970 and 1971 there was a sharp deterioration in 
the current account of the balance of payments (Green, 1980: 7). 	Green 
and his fellow authors offer this explanation: 
What is of particular interest for our 
purpose, however, is the fact that these 
pressures mainly originated from expansion 
in internal demand in the economy whose 
supply side was rather weak. 
(Ibid: 8) 
And: 
that the Tanzanian economy was emerging 
into a new period in which much tighter 
short-term planning of credit, balance of 
payments and various categories:of democratic 
spending would be required. 
(Ibid:) 
Intrinsic problems which emerge as a result of policy-making are merely 
reduced to 'short-term' planning problems. 	This can also be seen in the 
explanation of the 1970-1971 mini-crisis. 	They concede that the State 
Trading Corporation contributed to the 1970-71 crisis but only after: 
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an abortive foreign-consultant-designed 
restructuring, supplied shortages, drained 
foreign reserves and achieved deficits. 
(Ibid: 14) 
As I hope to illustrate in the case study, the collapse of the State 
Trading Corporation was mainly the result of policy-making in Tanzania. 
Green and his co-writers state that the 1974 crisis was foreseeable 
by late 1973. 	First, agricultural and particularly grain output in 1973 
had been poor and world grain prices were exploding; second, there was 
poor export performance; third, oil prices had risen sharply since 1973. 
We are told, however, that these signs were blurred, but again it is 
admitted that there was "poor communication of critical data which should 
have been available to the technical and decision taking process sooner" 
(Ibid: 17). 	They concluded: "Thus at the beginning of 1974, no strategic 
re-thinking was in hand, nor even seriously advocated" (Ibid: 17, emphasis 
added). 	What does seem interesting is that these authors do not 
probleniatise this "poor communication". 	In retrospect, it seems very 
strange indeed that conditions like a drought and deteriorating agricultural 
growth rates could have taken the whole decision making process based on 
the three organs of state by surprise. 
Throughout the period 1969-1974, the Minister of Finance in his 
speeches had continuously called attention to the fall in production, 
especially of cash crops, because of his concern with balance of payment 
problems. 	Furthermore, during the same period, the Bank of Tanzania's 
Operational Report continuously called for the need to reconsider the 
export sector and to evolve an export policy. 	In the 1972 NEC meeting 
the problem of declining agriculture was discussed and the policy of 
Politics is Agriculture was adopted to boost production. Thus Green's 
explanations that 'critical data' was not made available cannot be accepted. 
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In fact, according to the Constitution,the Party has access to all major 
official documents. 	Critical data was made available both in Parliament, 
Cabinet and the NEC - the major decision-making bodies. But why was 
there no strategic re-thinking? 	We shall consider this problem separately 
later on, since it has relevance to the major pre-occupations of the thesis. 
The major problem with the work of Green and his co-writers is their 
continuous tendency to deflect attention from crucial problems in Tanzanian 
development. Mistakes in policies are rapidly acknowledged and downgraded, 
thus de-emphasising their cruciality. 	An additional objection relates 
to the distinction made between the 'micro efficiency' of policies, "that 
is, the allocative efficiency of measures as tested against consumer-
sovereignty criteria", and the 'macro-efficiency' of policies, which is 
"their effectiveness in furthering the particular goals adopted by the 
Tanzanian Government" (Ibid: ix). 	This distinction implies that mistakes 
entailing high economic costs are acceptable to the extent that they 
further social and political goals of the government. 	This way of 
evaluating policies both implies that economic maximisation is of 
secondary importance and serves to absolve policies from critical re-
examination in the light of their economic consequences. 
I would conclude that both the radical dependency and the pragmatic 
dependency views have failed to offer us an adequate explanation of the 
Tanzanian experience. 	Though different, their methodologies attempt to 
avoid coming to grips with crucial development problems. 
Evaluation of the Internal and External Constraints explanations 
We saw that official explanation for the 1974/75 fall in agricultural 
production was explained in terms of the drought conditions which prevailed 
in Tanzania from 1973/74 period. But as we have seen the rate of growth 
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of agricultural production was already in decline before the drought 
had begun. 
A study conducted at the request of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Food and Co-operatives found that the rate of growth began to fall 
after 1967 and 1968. 	The study Agricultural Marketing in Tanzania 
stated "there are strong reasons to believe that internal pricing and 
marketing policies both on export and domestic products also are 
presenting serious obstacles to growth" (Krisel et alia, 1970: 1). 
• 	In the case of export commodities such as 
cashewnuts and oilseeds, returns to farmers 
have been 15-20% lower than they would have 
been under previous marketing institutions 
and their margins. 
(Kriesel, 1970: 1) 
In the light of the above, it is plausible to argue that had there been 
no drought, Tanzania would still have to spend foreign exchange to import 
food. 
Another argument which has been used in the official external 
constraints case is poor world prices for cash crops. 	But while figures 
for export crops show a declining long-run trend, world market prices 
for all export prices rose between 1971 and 1974, some booming in 1974. 
Yet the volume of exports of cotton and sisal, Tanzania's main export 
commodities, did not increase signficantly, with four of the nine leading 
exports showing lower volumes in 1972 compared to 1967. 	The years of the 
drought and villagisation, 1973 and 1974, were poor in terms of production 
for all but tobacco and tea (Resnick, 1981: 128). 	This argument also 
supports Ellis' conclusion concerning coffee and cashewnut production that 
world prices cannot account for the poor performance in agricultural 
production. 
If we accept the argument that internal policies were largely 
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responsible for the crisis of 1974/75, then we must question these 
policies. 	I shall pose two questions to illustrate my point. 	We saw 
in Chapter Six that one of the major aims of the 'political' policies 
was to lessen dependence on foreign influences. And as Jamal noted in 
1969, one of the surest ways to achieve this was by avoiding balance of 
payments deficits, which would lead to heavy foreign debts. The question 
is, then, why were exports not encouraged? 	The second question, which 
is indirectly related to the first, relates to equality. 	We saw in the 
previous chapter that equality and improving rural living standards were 
strong themes underlying most policies - but why then were prices paid 
to the producers kept so low for so long? 	The maintenance of low 
agricultural prices not only negated the social aims but also affected 
the economic aims of reducing dependency since the stagnation of exports 
led to a balance of payment crisis. 
The basic argument here, once again, is that the policy-making 
arrangements of 1969-1974 excluded the careful consideration of the 
economic implications of policies, encouraging a concentration on purely 
'political' aspects. 	This approach has also been noted by Hyden. 
Hyden (1979: 6), for instance, saw that the mode of policy-making had 
the following features. 	Firstly, the first feature of the policy-making 
style was to maximise as many social values as possible through policies 
which serve to mobilise new resources for their very achievement. Secondly, 
policy-makers decided without first having obtained full and detailed 
knowledge of possible consequences of their decisions. 	Full understanding 
of what can be done or cannot be achieved with existing resources was 
not sought as a precondition for making a policy. The third feature of 
the policy-making style was the unwillingness of policy makers to use the 
past as a source of guidance for the future. 	In Beyond Ujamaa (1980) 
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Hyden states that policy-making based on a political market (as opposed 
to an economic market) "are essentially social or political ... they do 
not carry any objective economic values ... There is no emphasis on 
effciency" (Hyden, 1980: 30). 	These characteristics of policy-making 
were evident in all the three organs of the state. 	Each organ for 
different and complex reasons explained at length in Chapter Six, gave 
greater emphasis to social and political goals than to economics. 
The question raised earlier of why there was no 'strategic re-thinking" 
in response to the initial signs of the crisis to come can also be explained 
in these terms. 	Those who expressed most concern about economic problems 
and who might have led such a re-examination of policies (Minister of 
Finance Jamal, Bank of Tanzania) were in a clear minority in this period. 
CONCLUSION 
In concluding this chapter I would put forward the argument that 
the economic problems of Tanzania culminating in the balance of payments 
crisis of 1974/75 were mainly the result of internal factors, which 
weakened the economy's capacity to cope with adverse external conditions. 
These in turn aggravated the economic problems even more by exposing the 
extreme weaknesses of the various sectors. 
I would argue further that the 'political' policies pursued between 
1969-1974 were misguided in the sense that they failed to consider economics 
as inputs into policy-making. 	As we saw in this chapter, the outcomes 
of these policies were the destabilisation and weakening of productive 
processes, the opposite of what had been hoped for. 	(An acute observer 
such as Jamal, for instance, had anticipated the results as far back as 
1969 as his speeches illustrate). 	This served to negate the very 
political aims of the Party. 	The 'political' nature of the policies 
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came to negate the economic aspects of development and because the. 
created more problems and difficulties for the masses as well as f 
the economy, this in turn defeated the political objective of alley 
social problems. A more enlightened and sensitive leadership mig 
have interpreted 'political' to include the consideration of economi 
and thus have evolved different policies to achieve similar politica 
goals. 
But misguided policies themselves need to be explained. We saw 
Chapter Six that all three organs of the state - for different practic 
and theoretical reasons - adopted and pursued a 'political' approach 
towards development. 	This homogeneity explains why misguided policie 
were pursued consistently in Tanzania, at least up to 1974. 	The Gover 
compromised its traditional concern for economic growth, while the 
Presidency abandoned its role as a mediator between economic needs and 
requirements and political demands. 	Policy-makers at the Party, while 
sensitive to social problems, lacked an elementary knowledge of how the 
economy worked as well as to the nature and role of policies. This 
weakness among Party members at policy-making levels was further 
encouraged by the institutional arrangements for policy-making, which 
separated formulation from implementation. 
These two features, the attitudes of Party members and the 
institutional context, explains why further 'political' policies were 
pursued by the Party during 1974 and 1975, which was a period of immense 
economic strains. 	The next chapter will examine these measures, as well 
as how the homogeneous outlook on development of the three organs of the 
state began to fall apart under the impact of chronic economic crisis. 
C 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
PARTY SUPREMACY AND CHRONIC ECONOMIC CRISIS, 1974-1982 
In the last chapter we saw the consequences for the development 
process of an approach to policy-making which downgraded economic issues. 
The policies formulated by the three organs of the state during 1969-1974 
had ambitious social and political objectives but they lacked economic 
consistency and, as a result, weakened the economy's capacity to cope 
with exogenous factors. 	Public sector expansion was weak because it was 
not built upon sound economic grounds; agricultural production stagnated 
and by 1974/75, Tanzania faced both food and foreign exchange crises. On 
this basis I have argued that the policies pursued between 1969-1974 were 
responsible for weakening the economy's capacity to cope with adverse 
external conditions. 
In this chapter I shall develop two major themes. 	First I shall 
examine how the homogeneous approach towards development held by the thre 
organs of the state during the early 1970s broke down as the result of th 
1974/75 crisis. 	I hope to show that the 1974/75 crisis had important 
effects on the Government. It led the Government to resume an active 
role in policy-making on a de facto basis, and within Government circles 
a more production-orientated view of development began to reassert itself 
over the 'political' view. 	Meanwhile, the Party, I hope to show, contin 
to make policies based on a 'political' approach towards development. Th 
policies related mainly to trade and redistributive measures, reflecting 
the Party's traditional concerns. 	Once again, therefore, the situation 
during the period 1975/76 - 1982 reflected the contradictory co-existence 
of two views of development at the decision-making level in Tanzania. 
sm 
Unlike the situation of the 1960s, however, the Government and the Party 
continued to make policies regarding different sectors of the economy 
based on their own view of development. 	The two organs of the state 
were not so much debating policies, but rather each organ was going a 
different way in different areas. 	The President, the third policy-making 
institution, resumed his fluctuation between the two views of development, 
depending now mainly on the severity of the foreign exchange crisis at a 
given moment. 
Second, I shall examine the second major crisis which began in 1979 
and will review the different explanations which have been offered. The 
discussion will relate mainly to the external versus internal constraints 
issue. 	I shall argue that the external constraints argument for the 
crisis is misleading and an inadequate basis for understanding Tanzania's 
second crisis. 	Indeed, as the crisis became progressively more extreme, 
both the Government and the Party modified their positions to accept that 
internal factors were equally respsible for the crisis. 	But I shall 
propose that this unity is fragile concealing contradictory approaches towards 
solving the crisis. 	Thus, I shall propose, Tanzania is not merely facing 
a foreign balance crisis; rather the latter is an indication of more 
serious problems affecting the whole economy. 	Each sector of the economy 
is pervaded by intense problems, only some of which may be attributed to 
foreign-exchange problems. In fact, a healthy foreign exchange situation 
would only conceal and prolong the weakness within the economy. 	A crisis 
of this magnitude, I shall argue, can only be explained in relation to the 
internal structures and processes of development. 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR POLICY-MAKING 1975-1982 
We saw in Chapter Six that in 1975 Party Supremacy was formally established 
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in Tanzania. 	Furthermore, in addition to the Party's constitutional 
rights to formulate policies, it had in the process, also gained con-
siderably more powers, especially from the Mwongozo of 1971. These powers 
extended from the supervision and control of all Government agencies to 
the issuing of guidance pertaining to the implementation of policies. 
By 1975, as a result, it appeared to many observers that the Government 
lacked rights, duties and even a role in society. 
Nyerere was aware of this problem, as the following speech illustrates: 
It is quite possible that when some Tanu 
leaders talk about the supremacy of the 
Party they do not want there to be any 
distinction between the Party and the 
Government, that the Party should involve 
itself directly in performing the functions 
of administration. We might be thinking 
that if the Party performed these functions, 
it would become more powerful. However, 
this is not true for should the Party assume 
these functions, it would atrophy. 
(cited in Mwansasu, 1979: 175) 
According to Mwansasu, Nyerere sought to correct this view (that the Party 
should absorb Government functions) and "the new constitutional amendment 
reflects his judgement that the two institutions must be kept distinct 
and separate, with the party being supreme but not interfering directly 
in the activities of the Government" (Mwansasu, 1979: 175). 	The new 
clarification of Party-Government relations was explained in a Party 
document entitled Chama Kushika Hatamu (1975) (Party Supremacy). It is 
also pertinent to note that this document redefined the Regional Commissioners' 
roles. 	Up to 1975, their posts had involved responsibilities to both the 
Party and Government, but in 1975, they became responsible primarily to the 
Party (Chama KushikaHatamu, 1975: 2). 
Wecan therefore see the President intervening at the policy-making 
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level to reassert the rights and duties of the Government under the concept 
of Party Supremacy. 	This clarification by the President of the role of 
the Government seems to be a modification of the 1971 Mwongozo aims and 
objectives of the Party and its relationship to the Government. In 1975 
Nyerere was arguing for the two organs of the state to remain quite 
distinct from each other. 	This was an implicit recognition of the need 
to have both organs in society; but more important, I would argue, was 
Nyerere's realisation that government was very essential. 	As he stated, 
"It is possible for a country not to have a Party; but you cannot have 
a country without a government. 	Never! 	Such a Government could be 
socialist or capitalist, good or bad, but it will have to be there" (cited 
in Mwansasu, 1979: 176). 
Once again we see here the President as an independent policy-making 
institution, intervening to maintain a balance between the Party and 
Government. 	This role of the Presidency has remained an important 
balancing influence between the Party and Government relations. 	As Head 
of both organs of the State and sitting in both the higher level policy-
making decisions, the President is aware of problems from both side and 
has the power to allow Government to modify policies to meet implementation 
problems. 	This role of the Presidency was continuously stressed to me as 
a positive and necessary factor in Government-Party relations (interview 
with Government official, July 1981). 	This role of the President may be 
lost with the new Party proposals (1980) to change the constitution and 
create two separate Heads for the Party and Government (CCM, 1980: 53). 
Important changes also took place in the mid-1970sin the organisation of 
the Party. 	Tanu had had no secretariat and the major co-ordinating 
mechanism linking the Party with the Government was the President in his 
capacity as head of both organs. 	This co-ordination greatly improved 
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following the establishment of Chama Cha Mapinduzi in 1977. 
Chama Cha Mapinduzi has established a Secretariat with five 
Standing Committees which are responsible for the major socio-economic 
activities in the country. 	This allows the Secretariat to deal in a 
more serious way with the problems and activities of the different sectors 
of national life. 	The Party Secretariat commissions research into 
specific issues, most of which are conceived from practical problems 
originating from villages, districts, regions or the national level, for 
instance, from parastatals and other institutions. 
The Party Secretariat attempts to investigate each problem in depth 
and attempts to look at the problem from various angles. 	This is often 
done by inviting the actors concerned for interviews and consulting the 
relevant data from all sectors of the economy. 	The Secretariat then 
sends its recommendations to the Central Committee, which has a mandate 
to make decisions. 	Those recommendations which need policies are then 
forwarded to the National Executive Committee for action (interview with 
member of Party Secretariat, July 1981). 	My interviews suggested that 
the new division of functions between the Secretariat and the Central 
Committee may lead to a better understanding of problems, which may in 
turn improve policy-making. 	This has also been enhanced by the educational 
backgrounds of the members of the Secretariat, who represent the newer and 
more technocratic element in the Party. 
The NEC on the other hand, is still dominated by politicians who 
lack a professional training. 	This feature of Tanu appears to be carried 
on at the CCM NEC. 	My interviews suggested that there is a potential 
conflict between the CC and Secretariat on the one hand and the members 
of NEC on the other. 	The latter, especially the former TANU vanguards, 
felt that the CC was trying to usurp the powers of the NEC. Secretariat 
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members, on the other hand, felt that the proper procedure was for 
policies to be passed from the Secretariat and CC to the NEC. This 
stemmed from the belief that "debates of the vanguards have only the 
power of convictions" (interview with high ranking Party official, July 
1981), and that there was "a higher rate of failure of platform policies" 
because the full implications of such policies could not be fully consider 
within a debate forum. (interview with Party official, July 1981). 
The Party in its CCM phase has thus recognised the need for researU 
as a prelude to policy-making. 	This means that development policies are 
to be undertaken on a more systematic basis. 	One outcome of this method 
is TIJA (1980) 5  a policy on Productivity. A second positive aspect, derir 
from the creation of the Secretariat, is a new recognition of the need 
to co-ordinate policy-making activities with the Government. 	Again, the 
policy of Tija was a product of such liaison (interview with members of 
Party Secretariat, July 1981). 	The problem of co-ordination between the 
Secretariat and the Cabinet for instance is greatly facilitated if a M11bE 
of the Cabinet in charge of one of the strategic ministries is also a 
member of the Central Committee. 	Problems from both sides of the roles 
can be aired on a more 'equal' basis (interview with members of Party 
Secretariat, July 1981). 
Despite these promising changes, however, during the years 1974-82 
there were still fundamental differences between Government and Party vie 
of development and approaches to policy-making. 	The former, again, becaL 
of its institutional functions as an implementor and caretaker of the 
national economy, considered implementation problems and capacity as input 
into policy-making. 	As the 1974-5 crisis began to take its toll, this 
factor led it to adopt once again a view of development in which producti 
private capital and labour discipline were stressed. 	The Party on the 
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other hand, as a political institution, continued to see human and 
political mobilisation as factors capable of overcoming objective 
constraints. 
GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES: EMPHASIS ON PRODUCTION 
The economic crisis of 1974/75 undermined the influence of the 
supporters of the dependency thesis within the Government and strengthened 
the previous minority viewpoint which has consistently stressed problems 
of production. 	I shall call the latter the production. 	group. Another 
result of the crisis was that Government began to take a more active and 
aggressive approach towards policy-making on a de facto basis in an attempt 
to expand production. 	The most dynamic supporters of this approach during 
this period were the Minister of Industry, Msuya and the Minister of Finance, 
Mtei. 
As soon as the food crisis was over in 1975 attention was focussed 
on the need to expand manufacturing production. 	The aim was to reduce 
the shortages of consumer goods which were being experienced as well as 
to mobilise local capital to invest and expand production. 	The period 
has become known as the 'liberalising period' in Tanzania's development. 
We shall consider the various measures which were introduced by the 
Government in an attempt to improve the economic situation. 
Encouragement of private capital 
The most important measure during this period was the open encouragement 
to private capital which was given by Government and the President. The 
Minister of Industries as well as the President toured private and state 
industries in a bid to boost 	production. 	A meeting of private manu- 
facturers was called at the Diamond Jubilee Hall in 1977 to discuss their 
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problems. 	This was the first meeting of private capitalists since 1967. 
The Regional Commissioners also attended the meeting. 
The outcome of the meeting was the policy of De-confinement which 
meant that private capital could by-pass state-owned agencies when they 
ordered their imports. The policy of De-confinement was meant to ease 
and speed up the bureaucratic process, thus allowing private capital a 
freer hand to expand production. It was facilitated by the favourable 
conditions of foreign exchange which existed during 1976/77 as a result 
of the coffee boom. We shall consider in greater detail the policy on 
Private Capital and that of De-confinement in the case studies in Part III. 
Labour discipline and monetary rewards 
By 1975 the policy of Mwongozo had been brought to a halt by the 
Government and there were attempts by Government to re-assert discipline 
in factories and work places. 	Nyerere argued that "It is now quite clear 
that we have to take a stronger stand against any lack of discipline" 
(Nyerere, 1975: 21). 	New legislation was also being prepared which aimed 
to establish disiplinary committees, consisting of management, employees 
and Party members in industries and factories. 	The responsibilities of 
the committees would include dismissals and premature retirement, as well 
as rewards (wage increases) related to productivity (Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 1978, 4: 2). 
Mtei, the Minister of Finance in the Third Five Year Plan (1977-1981) 
also stressed that previous plans had failed through inefficiency and lack 
of hard work. 	There was to be more emphasis on discipline and stricter 
accounting methods. 	He also suggested that earnings should be based on 
work done. 	Effort was to be rewarded, and such measures would also be 
extended to peasants via producer prices (Economist Intelligence Unit, 
1978, 1: 2). 	In the same budget speech, Mtei stated that a study of 
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incentives to increase production was to be undertaken by government and 
also a study of export promotion (Ibid). 	In the 1978/79 development 
expenditure allocation, priority was given to directly productive 
activities, mainly industry (which received 29% of total expenditure), 
and economic infrastructure (37%), with emphasis on transport and communi-
cations. 	The social infrastructure, defined as water supply, education, 
health and the new capital and defence, came third, with some 20% of the 
total CEconomist Intelligence Unit, 1978, 3: 3). 
We can therefore see that the first major economic crisis of 1974/75 
was taken very seriously by Government and led to a serious re-consideration 
of the approach which had guided the 1969-1974 p0 licies. 	Government also 
took a more active part in policy-making. 	Thus, there was a reassertion 
of economic considerations in the measures passed by the policy-making 
bodies in Tanzania during this period. 
Other measures taken have been described as follows: 
Primary school fees have been reintroduced 
and other benefit taxes or alternative costs 
recovery mechanisms are under consideration 
In an effort to improve parastatal efficiency, 
the Government closed down a loss-making 
transport parastatal, dismissed redundant 
workers in several parastatals, and closed 
loss-making public butcheries, with the return 
of this activity to the private sector. 
(World Bank, 1977: xxvii) 
PARTY'S POLICIES - TRADE AND REDISTRIBUTION MEASURES 
The policy of villagisation created the need to make available basic 
amenities to the villagers (interview with high-ranking Party official, 
July 1981). 	The Party responded to these problems in the following way. 
In late 1974 the Party passed the policy of Universal Primary Education 
(UPE), and in early 1975, the policy of Universal Rural Water Supply (URWS) 
was brought forward by the Party from its original target (set by the 
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Government) of 1991 to 1980. 	These measures invariably increased 
Government's expenditure. 
Dissolution of the cooperatives, 1976 
It is difficult to trace exactly which organ of the state was 
responsible for the dissolution of the co-operatives. 	Government 
officials stated quite clearly that it was the Party which dissolved the 
Co-operatives, while the Party officials I interviewed stated equally 
categorically that the decision was made in the Government and then merely 
sentto the Party for ratification. 	This situation is perhaps explicable 
in terms of the ambiguous location of the Prime Minister's Office in this 
period, the then Prime Minister being a high-ranking Party official as 
well as head of the Government. 
The decision to dissolve the Co-operatives in 1976 was facilitated 
by a number of factors. 	First, the growing inefficiency and corruption 
of a number of co-operatives led to a situation where the producers were 
not being properly served. 	Second, , the villagisation process had disrupted 
many of the primary societies, and third, the 1975 Village Act had designed 
the new villages to be self-reliant in the sense that they were to serve 
their own marketing needs. With the dissolution of the co-operatives, their 
role in food procurement was passed to the National Milling Corporation (NMC). 
Operation Maduka, 1976 
Another important policy passed was the Operation Maduka, introduced 
by the Prime Minister in May 1976. The policy called for the closure of 
private retail shops and their replacement by shops run by the village 
governments in the rural areas, while in the urban areas private shops 
would be replaced by state shops. 	Party officials in the regions began 
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to implement the policy as soon as it was announced by closing down 
private shops. 
It would appear from these policies - universal primary education, 
universal rural water supply, dissolution of the co-operatives and 
Operation Maduka - that the Party was implementing policies which were 
mainly geared to social problems; and that the issues of timing and 
of economic constraints were still of secondary concern. 	This would 
indicate that the Party had remained very consistent in its way of formu-
lating policies and that the first economic crisis did not have a major 
effect on the Party activists' pattern of thinking. 
I can conclude this section by stating that the Party and Government 
were adopting opposing policies. 	While the Government responded to the 
economic crisis by evolving policies aimed at stabilising production and 
encouraging private capital while minimising recurrent costs, the Party 
was pursuing policies in other sectors of the economy which increased 
recurrent expenditure, curtailed the role of private capital and de-
stabilised production through changes in marketing and trade. This would 
force me to conclude that the Party and Government were not operating in 
a consistent fashion but were pursuing policies which were contradictory 
and opposed. 
This conclusion is at variance with arguments such as those of 
Raikes (1976) and Lofchie (1978) that the state was 'liberalising' or 
adopting capitalist policies in this period. The formulation of the problem 
in terms of 'liberalising' is misleading in more than one way. First, the 
period of 'liberalising' also saw the Party promote its view of development 
based on the control of trade, which was completed with the take-over of 
the retail trade. 	Second, the idea of liberalising conjures up ideas 
of capitalism, thus concealing the fact that socialist policies must also 
consider economics in development. 
ECONOMIC CRISIS II: FIRST REACTIONS 
The period starting in 1979 was again a critical period for Tanzania. 
The second major economic crisis occurred only four years after that of 
1974/75 and it was also manifested in severe balance of payment problems. 
The following table illustrates the balance of trade position in the years 
immediately preceding the crisis. 
TABLE 8.1 
Trade Data ($ millions 
1973 	1974 	1975 	1976 	1977 	1978 
Merchandise 
Exports 	363.6 	399.2 	372.9 	490.0 	546.7 	473.6 
Merchandise 
Imports 	437.8 	660.4 	670.0 	555.4 	648.4 	1006.1 
Balance 
of Trade 	-74 	-261.1 	-297.1 	-65.2 	-101.7 	-532.5 
Source: IMF, September 1980, quoted in Agency for International 
Development, 1980). 
The balance of payments crisis affected Tanzania's import capacity. 	For 
instance, the estimated volume of imports other than foodgrains and 
petroleum in 1979 was 16% lower than in 1978 and only 3% higher than six 
years earlier in 1973 (World Bank, 1980: 86). 
As already stated in the Introduction, a severe balance of payments 
crisis for an economy such as Tanzania's has repercussions on all socio-
economic sectors, because practically every sector of the economy is 
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Although the President was attempting to direct attention to problems 
of production, members of the Party saw the problem of the scarcity 
of goods in relation to distribution and the exploitative role of the 
traders. 	This is evident in the following discussion by the veterans 
of the Party. 	Siyovelwa, a Regional Commissioner and member of the NEC, 
commented on the problem of scarcity of goods in the following manner: 
It is true that there are scarcities, the 
little that is available our colleagues 
(the businessmen) have decided to use for 
their benefit. It is unfortunate that 
necessities, which are needed by the 
peasants, are involved. 
Mr. Chairman, if you hear that we have 
taken steps to curb them, do not think that 
we are merely against them. 
(CCM, 1979: 15) 
This view received support from another Party veteran, Ngombale-Mwiru, 
another Regional Commissioner and a member of the National Executive 
Committee of the Party. He called for more control at the lower levels, 
i.e. at the level of retail trade. 	He argued that as long as "individual 
business men exist ... the problem of scarcity of goods will be rampant". 
What was needed, he argued, was a socialist base: 
What we need is a socialist base, and this 
has to be production. We believe that shops 
established by productive Ujamaa villages 
will be firm and prosperous. 
(CCM, 1979: 48) 
Another Party member, Wasira backed up the argument that the shortages 
of goods were caused by traders: 
There is a group of middlemen. These people 
make sure that the little available is not 
in circulation and if it is, it is exorbit-
antly priced. 
(CCM 1979: 51) 
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The discussion on scarcities of goods in terms of distribution 
problems and the role of private traders appears to reflect a rather 
resistant tendency in the Party. 	It is interesting to note that as 
late as 1979, at the height of the economic crisis, Party activists were 
still viewing shortages of goods in terms of distribution and traders, 
rather than in terms of production. If we compare this discussion with 
the 1963 NEC discussion of "the problem of food shortages in the country" 
(see Msekwa, 1977: 28), we can see how remarkably consistent the Party's 
view of development has been throughout the period. 
This does not mean that the Party did not discuss problems of 
production. 	As we saw, the policy of Politics is Agriculture was the 
result of such discussions. 	The problem of declining agricultural 
production was also discussed in the meeting of 1979. 	Siyovelwa, for 
instance, saw the way to increased production in producing more ploughs: 
Maybe, this is the opportunity to take up 
the Party's call to stop depending on 
tractors and use ploughs instead. 
(CCM, 1979: 15) 
Meanwhile Ngombale-Mwiru saw the solution in terms of increasing the role 
of state farms. He argued that: 
There is a chance to establish government 
or state farms. 	Public farms are socialist. 
Secondly, we should train people who will 
serve socialism at a village level. Third, 
we should research on methods to make 
agriculture successful. Our villages are 
bound to stagnate due to lack of sufficient 
expertise ... Now can't we get our agri-
cultural officers from the youth in our 
villages? 
(CCM, 1979: 48) 
The methodology of these discussions is again similar and characteristic 
of Party discussions. 	There was a tendency to avoid discussion of the 
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causes of agricu1tural decline or reviewing systematically the policies 
affecting agricultural production. Rather, ideas were put forward 
without any form of evidence as policy solutions. 
Reversal of Government's Dolicies 
The acute problems of foreign exchange and scarcities of basic 
consumer goods brought the Party back again to the fore in policy-making. 
The Party introduced the policy of Re-confinement (1979), thus reversing 
the Government's policy of De-confinement. 	The Party's policy of 
Re-confinement had two major aspects to it. 	First, the policy meant 
that private capital would have to import their requirements via the state 
agencies. 	In other words, they would no longer by-pass the state agencies 
as they had done under the policy of De-confinement. The second aspect 
of the policy related to manufacturers. 	Manufacturers would have to sell 
their products to the State Regional Trading Companies for their ultimate 
disposal to the consumers. 
The policy of Re-confinement thus aimed at curtailing private business 
at two levels: at the level of production and at the level of wholesale 
and retail trade. 	In the case of the former, the Party hoped to stop 
the outflow of foreign exchange which was occurring under the policy of 
De-confinement. In the case of the latter, i.e. control of wholesale and 
retail trade, the Party hoped that if distribution were controlled at both 
levels by state agencies and a quota-system was used to distribute goods, 
then these mechanisms would ensure that "the little that was produced 
would reach the people" (interview with Party official, July 1981). 
Heated debates took place between the Party and Government over the 
policy of Re-confinement; Government ministries such as Industry and 
Finance, opposed the idea of re-confinement. BothMinisters argued that 
M 
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the problem of shortage of goods was the result of production problems 
and that control of distribution would not be successful under conditions 
of scarcity: rather it would merely increase expenses for the regional 
trading companies (This is discussed further in the case study on Internal 
Trade). 
But the Party found a strong supporter for the policy of Re-confinement 
in the Minister of Trade, Kaduma, who was also, unlike the two productionist 
Ministers of Industry and Finance, in the Central Committee of the Party. 
Kaduma implemented the policy of Re-confinement, which had been initiated 
by the Party. 	Finally, the production — group's arguments were defeated 
as the severity of the balance of payment crisis of 1979/80/81 developed 
and necessitated even tighter control of limited foreign exchange. 	In 
other words, the conflict between the two views of development was made 
irrelevant by the enormity of the second crisis. 
ECONOMIC CRISIS II: CONFLICTING EXPLANATIONS b 
With the onset of the second major period of economic crisis, the 
debate about Tanzanian development policy has increasingly moved away from 
academic social-science circles to the multilateral agencies and the 
Tanzanian Government itself. We have seen that, traditionally, the most 
strategic ministries as well as the Bank of Tanzania have always taken 
a production 	view of development and of the causes of balance of payments 
problems. In 1979-1980, the Government in its reaction to external 
criticisms did not revert to a 'political' view of development but did rely 
heavily on external constraints arguments. 	We shall begin by examining 
Government's explanation of the crisis. 
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Official explanation of Tanzania's crisis 
The official explanation of the Government on the crisis of 1979-
1980/81 emphasised external constraints. 	Such factors as weather 
conditions, falling prices for agricultural exports and rising imported-
goods and petroleum prices, reduced the country's capacity to earn 
foreign exchange while increasing the import bill. 	These factors were 
further aggravated by the collapse of the East African Community and the 
War with Uganda which involved the country in more financial burdens 
(Nyerere, 1980; Malima, 1980). 
The following Memorandum written by the Minister of Finance on 
August 18, 1980, clearly illustrates the Government's position. After 
the impact of the first oil-price increase in 1974: 
a series of other events beyond our control 
placed further strains on the economy, 
especially on the balance of payments. The 
sudden collapse of the East African Community 
created major dislocations, necessitating 
considerable unplanned re-allocations of 
personnel as well as domestic and foreign 
exchange resources to shore up and rebuild 
the vital transportation and communications 
sector. More recently, the invasion of our 
territory and our consequent conflict with 
the former Ugandan regime has had a high cost 
in domestic resources, foreign exchange and 
disruption of production. At the same time, 
like all non-oil developing countries, Tanzania 
has been affected very adversely by the further 
steep rise in oil prices as well as by the economic 
slowdown and rapid inflation in the major 
countries. 
(cited in US Agency for International 
Development, 1980: 49) 
The Memorandum stated that the external factors outlined above affected 
internal development: 
With the increasing shortage of foreign 
exchange, restrictions on payments for 
imports as well as for certain services 
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and transfers were tightened ... In 
general, therefore, imports declined in 
relation to GDP, and the resulting 
shortages of raw materials and inter-
mediate goods led to substantial under-
utilisation of industrial capacity and 
considerable disrepair of infrastructure 
facilities. Thus, while the external 
payments situation became increasingly 
difficult, the growth of most economic 
sectors slowed and pressures on prices 
intensified. 
(Ibid) 
The official explanation of the crisis, then, stressed exogenous factors. 
The argument was that a series of events beyond the control of the 
Government were responsible for the crisis. In other words, had they 
not occurred, Tanzania's economic performance would not have been in 
such a critical situation. 
Multilateral Agencies' explanations of Tanzanian economic crises 
Multilateral aid agencies on the other hand have explained Tanzania's 
two economic crises in relation to problems of production; that is, they 
have focussed primarily on the structure and performance of the domestic 
economy. 	According to a World Bank Memorandum: 
the underlying weakness are of a 
more long-term nature and related primarily 
to the structure and performance of the 
domestic economy. These include declining 
export volumes, disappointing growth in the 
monetized and productive sectors, and poor 
maintenance of existing capital stock and 
infrastructure, especially in agriculture 
and transport. 
(World Bank, 1981: 1) 
The World Bank also saw that policies were major contributory factors 
towards declining production. 	In relation to the decline of agricultural 
production, the report stated: 
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The general direction of the Government's 
post-Arusha agriculture strategy has 
tended to emphasise the transformation 
of the institutional structure of rural 
development (through the formation of 
villages and increasing public involvement 
in the sector) over measures designed 
to improve agricultural production directly. 
(Ibid) 
In relation to the poor performance of the manufacturing sector, the 
Bank Memorandum stated that: 
This poor growth performance does not indicate 
any slackening of the investment effort (the 
gross investment ratio has remained 
commendably high at more than 20% of GDP), but 
rather reflects the low return on investment 
in Tanzania which has been a major concern 
for a number of years. 
(Ibid) 
A recent USAID report entitled Tanzanian Development Performance 
and Implications for Development Assistance (1980) also focussed attention 
on internal factors as the cause of poor performance. It viewed the 
Tanzanian economy as a crisis-prone economy, which, if not remedied, 
would be unable to cope with adverse exogenous factors. The report 
specifically blamed policies. 	Thus: 
Public intervention in economic activity 
e.g. price setting, the patterns of 
public investment, substitution of public 
for private enterprises in transportation 
and distribution, have had the effect 
of substantially reducing economic efficiency 
without significantly improving well-being 
through greater equity. 
(Ibid: 1) 
In relation to the problems of cash crop agriculture, the report pointed 
out: 
Export crop producer prices have declined 
in real terms and relative to food crops, 
while marketing costs and export taxes 
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have increased disproportionately. 
Overall, pricing policy has caused 
serious misallocation and major deficits 
in the National Milling Corporation. 
The NMC deficits have in turn contributed 
to inflation which, in combination with 
declining export volumes, has weakened 
the Tanzanian international trade position 
and made the economy more susceptible to 
adverse international changes such as oil 
price increases. 
(Ibid: iii) 
The theme of these explanations is that because of the weaknesses within 
the domestic economy (chiefly as a result of policy deficiencies) the 
Tanzanian economy was unable to cope with external problems. 
External or Internal explanations of the crisis 
The external conditions which the official explanation emphasised 
did have adverse effects on the economy. For instance, the estimates 
of the budgetary cost of the war with Uganda was at $500 million (US Agency 
for Development, 1980: 20) and 'over 2000 million shillings ($245 million) 
had to be spent on projects arising from the breakup of the East African 
Community" (Malima, 1980). 	In addition, Tanzania's terms of trade fell 
by 20% during this period (US Agency for Development, 1980: 22). 	The price 
of petroleum imports rose to an estimated $172 million, or 16% of total 
imports (World Bank, 1980: 87). 	This meant that Tanzania had to assign 
a larger proportion of her export earnings merely to pay for fuel, as 
against her needs for capital and intermediate goods and other requirements. 
But at the same time, the explanations offered by the multilateral 
agencies are also valid. 	We might argue that both the external and 
internal explanations are correct, and that they are not contradictory 
because they focus attention on different aspects of the economy. 	Such 
an argument may be correct but it is necessary to go beyond this and 
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question the methodology of the external constraints explanation as an 
approach to development problems. 
The methodology of the external constraints argument has similarities 
with certain forms of the dependency thesis. 	The 'external' is expected 
to be harmonious and ideal for 'internal' policies to function properly. 
The external world includes for this purpose, world market prices, the 
policies of neighbouring countries and environmental factors, such as 
weather conditions. If external conditions become adverse in any manner - 
politically, economically or meteorologically - then internal policies are 
expected to fail in achieving their goals. There are certain problems 
with such a methodology. 
First, it means that what is examined and regarded as problematic 
is the external world and not internal policies; but what is examined 
and relied upon for development purposes, is beyond the control of the 
Tanzanian authorities. While what is left unexamined is within its own 
control. Such a methodology is obviously self-defeating. As Nyerere 
rightly acknowledged in 1967 "it is useless to complain that we are poor 
or that world prices are low for this is like complaining that there are 
no rains" (Tanu, Mwanza, 1967: 40). 
Second, the methodology expects the external to be stable, or at least 
predictable. 	The external world is supposed to 'fit in' with domestic 
policies. 	But this assumption has been and is likely to remain unrealistic. 
Finally, one might ask: if policies are not evolved to cope with the 
external world in the above sense, what then are policies for? 	The external 
world will always be problematic and the success.or failure of policies 
must surely be assessed in terms of their success in coping with external 
shocks, by minimising their impact on socio-econmic and political life. 
We can therefore conclude that the methodology of the external constraints 
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arguments is flawed because it idealises the development process in a 
way that diverts attention from the most pressing policy issues.. 
But why did the Government adopt the external constraints explanation 
of the crisis and apparently abandon its production 	view of development? 
Two reasons account for this change. 	First, it appears that there was an 
instruction from the Party to the Government specifically to reject 
criticisms which implied that Tanzania's socialism haa failed (interview 
with Party official, July 1981). 	This was apparent in the article 
published by African Confidential in July 16 1980 entitled, 11Tanzania: 
An End of the Dream", which argued that the present economic crisis had 
been the result of Tanzania's socialist policies. 	The Government of 
Tanzania answered at length, arguing that Tanzania's policies were being 
criticised, not because they had failed to serve the people, but because 
they were succeeding. 	This success, it stressed, is "the real threat 
to the enemies of Tanzania, who would like Tanzania to fail so that they 
can use its failure as another example of the impracticality of socialism' 
(Daily News, 1980). 	Second, the external constraints argument which 
Government has used can also be seen as a useful tactic in dealing with 
external agencies. 
AcceDtance of role of internal factors 
As early as1980 Nyirabu, the Governor of the Bank of Tanzania, 
went contrary to the official explanation by stressing that internal 
weaknesses were major contributory factors to the crisis. In this speech 
to the Economic Society of Tanzania, Nyirabu stated that: 
the present economic situation has not 
arisen from causes of recent and external 
origin only but is a culmination of the 
weakness in our system aggravated by these 
causes (external). 
(Nyirabu, 1980: 5, emphasis added) 
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And: 
we would have been in a better position to 
absorb the shocks originating mainly outside 
the country, if our economy itself was i 
a healthy condition. 
(Ibid: 3) 
By 1981 it would appear that both the Party and the Government had 
modified their explanations and come to accept that the economic crisis 
Tanzania was facing was the result of both external and internal factors. 
These views were outlined in the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs 
publication (1982) "National Economic Survival Programme for 1981 and 1982" 
and the Party's Mwongozo wa CCM (1981). 	Since the explanation for the 
crisis in the two documents are similar I have summarised them together. 
Both documents argued that the crisis Tanzania was experiencing 
was not unique to Tanzania and that other non-oil--exporting countries of 
different political philosophies were also experiencing a similar crisis. 
Both documents identified as causes increases in petroleum prices, increases 
in the prices of other imports and declining export prices. The example 
given in each of the document was that "whereas in 1972 we needed about 
5 tons of tea to be able to purchase one tractor, in 1981 17 tons of tea 
had to be exported in order to purchase the same tractor" (The National 
Economic Survival Programme, 1982: 1; CCM Mwongozo, 1981: 20). 
Both documents also acknowledged that internal factors contributed 
to the crisis. 	These were adverse weather conditions, the war with 
Idi Amin; and the decline in output and productivity in various productive 
sectors and services (NESP, 1982: 2; CCM Mwongozo, 1981: 21122). 	The 
Party doucment further stated that another major internal weakness was 
that as a nation Tanzania did not fully utilise the Government, Party and 
People's capacity to find solutions to economic problems (CCM Mwongozo, 1981: 
31). 	We can therefore conclude that by 1981 there was acceptance by both 
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organs of the state that internal factors including those pertaining 
mainly to production were contributory to the crisis. 
These documents also show that there is now a greater degree of 
co-ordination between the two organs than in the recent past. 	The 
Policy on Tija (1980) which was a product of both Government and Party 
efforts, also indicates that by 1980 the Party had accepted the principle 
of material incentives as a reward in work. This is definitely a change 
from the 1969-1974 period when the Party relied mainly on ideology and 
mobilisation, best exemplified in Mwongozo, to increase production. Tija 
is a recognition also of individual as opposed to collective incentives. 
This change also illustrates that policy-makers are capable of 
re-interpreting socialism according to new needs and demands, and that 
Tanzania's ideology is not static. 
In sum, we might say that by 1980 the Party had moved and modified 
its position slightly, to accommodate Government's priorities and elements 
of its view of development. 
CONCLUSION 
The period from the end of the first crisis to the beginning of the 
second crisis brought about a series of reversals and counter-reversals of 
policies. 	Towards the end of the 1970s, Party and Government were pursuing 
different policies in different sectors of the economy; but as the full 
depth of the economic crisis began to be appreciated the two organs of the 
state came together to accept that internal factors were partly responsible 
for the crisis. 	These included the decline in the productive sectors of 
the economy. I would argue, however, that this unity was fragile, concealing 
contradictory approaches towards solving the crisis stemming from the under-
lying difference between Government and Party views of development. 
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CONCLUSION TO PART II 
The analysis of Part II has been able to document and explain the 
complexities of the Tanzanian development experience from 1967 to 1982 
based on an understanding of the tripartite system of Government, Party 
and President. 	We saw in Chapter Five how the Party's position and view 
of development was strengthened as the result of the Arusha Declaration 
and the 1965 Interim Constitution; but the Government was able to 
intervene to stop the Arusha Declaration from becoming too 'political'. 
The Government's success was mainly due to the President who had not 
completely abandoned a view of development which recognised the importance 
of economic constraints understood in conventional terms. It was on this 
basis that I argued that the Arusha Declaration was not an act but rather 
a process - each organ of the state was able to intervene at different 
stages of the process to assert its particular view of development. 	As 
the various organs' interests and views of development differed, I argued 
that the 'state' was not functioning as a 'homogeneous' entity. The 
President attempted to maintain both a political and a 'theoretical' 
balance between the Government and the Party. 
This situation, however, changed between 1969 and 1974 (Chapter Six). 
The President and Government adopted a 'political' approach, which in turn 
had begun to include new ideas about ideology and mobilisation as instruments 
for bringing about socialist transformation. 	Although the intellectual 
origins of these 'political' approaches differed from one organ to another, 
nevertheless, there was a common underlying element in the new pattern of 
develppment thinking: economics was de-emphasised in favour of political 
goals. On this basis, I argued that the real revolution in Tanzanian 
development policy occurred between 1969-1974 and not with the Arusha 
Declaration in 1967. 
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The consequences of these policies for the development process, and 
in particular the crisis of 1974-75, were examined in Chapter Seven. 	A 
critical re-examination was made of both the 'radical' and the 'pragmatic' 
dependency interpretations of the Tanzanian situation, and both were 
found inadequate to explain the Tanzanian experience. 	The external and 
internal constraints arguments were also examined and the former did not 
stand up to a serious re-examination of its implications. On this basis, 
I argued that internal policies were responsible for the crisis because they 
weakened the economy's capacity to cope with adverse economic conditions. 
By downgrading economic factors in development, politically-orientated 
policies created social problems for the masses, which in turn compromised 
the political aims of Tanzanian socialism. 
In the final chapter of this Part, I looked at the period following 
the first major economic crisis. I argued that the crisis forced the 
Government to abandon its 'political' approach to development and to 
revertto its traditional concern for economic growth as the basis of 
develppment. 	This shift in Tanzanian development policy has come to be 
known as the 'liberalisation' period. 	But I showed that this categoris- 
ation is misleading, because the Party at the same time was continuing 
to formulate policies based on a 'political' approach in different sectors 
of the economy, notably in trade. 	As the 1979 crisis became more extreme, 
the debate over the validity of these two views of development became 
submerged as the two organs in their different ways attempted to cope with 
the crisis. 
* 	* * * 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 
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Throughout Parts I and II I have attempted to show that the neo-
Marxist radical approach has failed to offer an adequate explanation 
of the Tanzanian development experience. 	The thesis that policies 
were aborted because they conflicted with the class interests of the 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie has not been supported. 	Second, the assumption 
that the state in Tanzania is a homogeneous entity used by the class in 
power to further their class interests has not stood up. 	My analysis 
has shown that there are conflicts between the two main organs of the 
state, that this conflict is reflected in different views of development 
and that this has a decisive effect on the shape of Tanzanian development 
policies. 	We have also seen how policy measures were undertaken 
which proved to be counter-productive to the class interests of those in 
power. 	Third, I have attempted to show that the dependency approach 
which most radical writers used in analysing Tanzania's development 
experience was misleading; it led to the identification of a false 
problem, while deflecting attention from real ones. 
Equally Green's position that policies failed because of implementation 
problems and adverse exogenous factors is untenable. 	This position has 
been rectified by Hyden's insistence that the Tanzanian development 
experience can only be understood in terms of faulty policy-making. But 
Hyden's explanation falls short of relating the Tanzanian experience to 
its political-institution context, and his analysis of policy-makers 
attitudes is problematic in various ways. 	Why have conventional economic 
considerations played such a secondary role in Tanzanian development - 
despite pronouncements to the contrary? 	Will the acceptance of 'internal 
factors' as contributory to the latest economic crisis lead to the adoption 
of common policy-solutions by Party and Government, or is the conflict of 
views of development between Party and Government still alive and well 
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beneath a facade of agreements? 
In order to understand the development experience of Tanzania in 
the recent past as well as to answer these questions about the future, 
we have to understand the types of relations that have characterised 
Party and Government. 	Most writers on the Tanzanian scene have ignored 
the conf1ictwithintIrelationship and, in particular, have ignored the 
consequences for developmental processes of the 1965 Interim Constitution. 
As I have attempted to establish throughout the thesis, we can only under-
stand Tanzania's development experience by reference to the view of 
development held by the policy actors themselves and, in turn, to the 
political-institutional context of policy-making. 	Herein lies the source 
of destablisation in Tanzania's policy-making and implementation. 
Institutional arrangements created the situation whereby the Party 
could formulate policies taking into consideration only 'political' factors 
on the basis that the economics of implementing the policy was the 
responsibility of Government. 	They also created the situation whereby 
each organ of the state could blame the other for economic problems 
or policy-failures. 	Thus representatives of the Party could argue that 
the right policies had been formulated but failed because of bad imple-
mentation, while members of the Government could argue that implementation 
problems were the result of faulty policy-making. These two contending 
types of explanation have to a certain degree found support in the various 
authors, depending on their ideological affinities. But the consequences 
of policies and the pattern of implementation problems would strongly 
indicate that institutional factors have a strong bearing on this experience. 
In Part III of the thesis I have chosen three case studies - the 
policy on Private Capital, the policy on Internal Trade and the policy on 
Rural and Agricultural Development - to illustrate in more specific terms 
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the types of problems which emerged as a result of an institutional 
arrangement which separates policy-making from policy implementation. 
I shall continue tracing out the themes first explored in Part I and II, 
namely that of the conflict between the two organs of state, the approach 
incorporated in the different policies, and their theoretical and 
empirical validity as elements of a development strategy. 	We shall see 
the same themes through the analysis of specific policies rather than 
from the broad perspective of Party and Government relations. 
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PART III 
CASE STUDIES: POLICIES ON PRIVATE CAPITAL, INTERJ'L 
TRADE AND AGRICULTURAL AND 	RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT 1967 - 1982. 
The purpose of the case studies is to provide further empirical 
evidence on the Tanzania development experience in relation to these 
themes - the relationship between the Party and Government, the views of 
development held by the Party and Government, and the socio-economic 
effects on the development processes of policies which do not give 
sufficient weight to economic constraints. 	These issues will be 
analysed from the point of view of the policies themselves and in relation 
to the tripartite system of the Party, Government and the President. 
In each case study I will show how the policy advocated by each of 
the three organs of the state, in the period 1970-1982, was determined 
by the beliefs and understanding of the policy-makers themselves. (This 
will dispel the neo-Marxists explanations that policies can be understood 
in terms of the class interests of those in power). 	Secondly, in each 
of the case studies, I will investigate whether there was a conflict between 
the Government and the Party. 	This situation would account for seemingly 
contradictory policies. 	Thirdly, I hope the case studies will illustrate 
empirically the extent to which problems were generated as a result of 
policies which consistently ignored economics. 	This would not only account 
for the crisis-prone economy 	of Tanzania, but also provide an answer to 
Green's form of analysis, namely that the problems Tanzania has been 
experiencing are merely the result of implementation problems. 	This 
empirical evidence should also provide an answer to the radicals' arguments 
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that more'political' policies are required in creating socialist development. 
In addition, I hope that the three case studies will provide useful 
insights into how policy-making directly bears on implementation, and into 
the connection between the conception of policies and their consequences. 
These two factors cannot be separated and isolated in different compartments. 
Problems develop and assume their own development momentum in the development 
process. 	Reversal of policies or even modifications cannot reverse the 
situation. 	Rather a more complex situation is created demanding more 
difficult solutions. 
Finally, since the creation of Chama Cha Mapinduzi in 1977 which 
replaced Tanu, there has been far more research conducted by the Party 
Secretariat on development issues and a more mature approach manifested 
in their willingness to co-ordinate and discuss problems with the Government, 
parastatal agencies etc. 	In addition, the second economic crisis, in 
1980/81, led many Party officials to accept and re-consider the necessity 
for production in development. 	Nevertheless, despite these positive 
changes, it is still possible to argue that there remains a basic conflict 
between the Party's view of development and the Government's. 	This would 
indicate that views of development held by policy-makers exert 	a con- 
siderable influence on how problems are conceptualised and policy-solutions 
derived. 	I would argue that a resolution of the conflict is a prerequisite 
for development-stability. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE POLICY ON PRIVATE CAPITAL 
The policy on private capital is important because it has impli-
cations for all the most strategic economic sectors of the country. These 
are the agricultural, manufacturing, transport and commercial sectors. 
As we have already seen it was over the role of private capital that the 
difference between the Party. and the Government was most acute. 
The analysis in Parts One and Two of the thesis showed that there 
existed contradictory attitudes towards the role of private capital in 
Tanzania. 	Despite immense opposition from the Party activists (1962- 
1966) the Government continued to encourage the role of private investment 
and in 1963 adopted the policy of FIPA. 	The Government was not prepared 
to give in to Party demands on the issue of private capital because it was 
closely related to its objective of attaining rapid economic growth. 
In 1967, however, the President nationalised foreign capital,though 
he resisted the Party activists' demands to nationalise local capital. 
On this basis, I argued that the President was operating within conventional 
ideas of development because he still recognised the importance of economic 
constraints cn development. 	This position also accounted for the Government's 
success at curtailing further nationalisation. In the policy statement 
'Public Ownership in Tanzania' (1967) the Government, by categorising the 
different forms of manufacturing activities in relation to the different 
types of ownership, was logically able to argue that private capital was 
required in Tanzania. 
However, between 1969 and 1974, the conventional view of development 
was replaced by a political approach to development. 	One of the consequences 
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of this view of development was the rapid expansion of the public sector, 
which came to replace private capital as the generator of growth. 	But 
private capital continued to expand. 	By 1975 private investment still 
constituted a quarter of the nation's monetary fixed investment (World 
Bank, 1977: xxiv). 	Again between 1976-1979 private capital was subjected 
to contradictory pressures. 	The Government encouraged it in the area of 
production, while the Party discouraged it in trade. 
How can we explain this contradictory attitude towards private 
capital? 	Does or does not the 'state' want private capital in development? 
This chapter will attempt to look into the Party's and the Government's 
policies towards private capital, paying particular attention to the period 
1969-1982. 	The aim of this chapter is to establish the proposition that 
the continuing conflict between the Party and the Government has destabil- 
ising influences on the development process. 	I shall also argue that this 
conflict can be located in the manner in which the Party and the Government 
formulate their policies. 	The Party's continued rejection of private 
capital is based on political and ideological considerations while the 
Government's is based on the recognition that additional capital and skills 
are needed to develop the economy. 	These differences can be further traced 
to the institutional arrangement of policy-making in Tanzania. 
THE PRIMACY OF POLITICS IN DEVELOPMENT: 1969-1974 
The conventional view of development 
We saw in Chapter Six how the conventional view of development became 
a minority view in official circles, and was replaced by a political 
approach towards development, which had emphasised, for different practical 
and theoretical reasons, the expansion and role of the state sector in 
development. 	Although the conventional view of development was in a 
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minority, nevertheless it was able to exert a limited degree of influence 
because it was held by members who controlled the financial institutions, 
and who were most concerned with monetary matters, repayments of debts, 
and economic growth. 	The influence of the conventional view of develop- 
ment was strongly reflected in the area of private investments. This view 
argued that the Arusha Declaration allowed for the role of private capital 
in certain sectors of the economy and as a result the 1963 FIPA Act was 
not repealed. 
As a result of this definition, the Minister of Finance, Jamal, in 
his guidance to the National Bank of Commerce (NBC), was able to argue 
that if a privately run business contributedto the economy, then the NBC 
could consider it for credits: 
If an efficient privately run economic 
enterprise producing goods or services for 
the public is threatened with reduction or 
withholding of bank facilities so that the 
banking system meets the requirements of 
publicly owned but irresponsibly run enter- 
prise or enterprises, then this cannot be 
called construction at all, least of all 
socialist construction. 
(Mwase, 1974: 15) 
Jamal's argument for the support of private capital is illustrative of his 
concern with economic growth and economic contribution. 	But when the 
National Bank of Commerce (NBC) adhered to the principle of commercial 
viability as a criteriDnfor issuing loans and credits to the private sector, 
it was criticised. 	As the General Manager of the NBC, Nsekela stated in 
June 1974: 
The NBC continues to lend to the private 
sector. We are frequently told that this 
constitutes assisting and encouraging 
capitalism and hence runs contrary to the 
declared goals of socialism. 
But a unilateral decision by the NBC to cease 
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lending to the private sector would achieve 
nothing but chaos. So it is the Central 
Bank which dictates the rate of socialisation 
of the means of production, subject at all 
times to skilled manpower constraints, and it 
would be presumptious of the NBC to attempt 
to dictate this rate - particularly when 
official policy in any case guarantees a role 
- a limited one but nevertheless important 
role, for the private sector. 
(cited in Mwase, 1974: 19) 
But political pressures continued to be exerted during the period 
1969-1974 on both the financial institutions and the parastatals in the 
manufacturing sector, to discriminate against private capital and to 
favour ujamaa villages, the co-operatives or state-organisations. (inter -
view with high ranking Government official, July 1981). 	This political 
situation affected the financial state agencies, who were no longer sure 
of their position vis-a-vis the private sector. 	For instance, the 
Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB) wanted clarification over its position 
vis-a-vis the private sector. It wanted to know whether it could make 
loans or participate in joint enterprises with private capital. 	TIB wrote 
to the Minister of Finance for clarification but the latter did not respond 
(interview with senior Government official, July 1981). 	According to my 
source of information, the political climate that existed made it difficult 
for the Government to encourage private investments in Tanzania. 	Any such 
decisions had to be checked to see if they confrncL -o, political 
requirements, which were not precisely spelt out. 	Some officials in the 
Government were not prepared to commit themselves lest they were considered 
to be promoting capitalism. 	As a result, many decisions relating to the 
investments by the private sectorwere neglected and not acted upon (interview 
with senior Government officials, July 1981). 
Parallel to this, however, was the action taken by the Government 
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itself to control foreign capital. 	Although the 1963 FIPA Act was not 
repealed, nevertheless, foreign capital was subjected to further forms 
of control during the 1970s. 	First, all companies paid a corporate tax 
of 45% of net profits. 	In addition, companies paid a withholding tax 
of 15% on profits remitted to foreign countries, and 20% on management 
and licence fees. 	In 1972 the Specified Companies Act was introduced 
which, among other restrictions, empowered the Minister of Finance to 
limit the dividends of the Specified Companies if he considered it to be 
in the national interest. 	Secondly, the Specified Companies were also 
required to submit their annual cash flow budget to the Minister of Finance 
and he could require them to invest money in Government securities (Neers, 
1974). 
In addition, the Government established the Tanzania General 
Superintendence Company, (1972) in co-operation with a Swiss Company, 
to check over-pricing and other forms of manipulation which were often 
exercised by foreign capital. 	For instance, the Swiss Company inspected 
the shipment of goods into Tanzania in order to check that qualities, 
quantities and prices were correct. 	And in 1971 a revision of existing 
management contracts took place - all new management contracts had to be 
approved by the Economic Committee of the Cabinet (ECC). 
On the basis of these measures, Neers argued that the Tanzanian 
Government did not want foreign capital in the country. But most of the 
measures passed by the Government described above were passed during the 
1970s and reflected the strong anti-foreign capital attitude held by the 
dependency-propounders within the Government. 	On the other hand, the 
policy on the Specified Companies was passed by the Ministry of Finance 
(a traditional supporter of private capital). 	This Act, however, was 	a 
reflection of its concern and responsibility to conserve foreign exchange 
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during the 1971 mini crisis rather than a general hostility towards 
foreign capital. 	However, these measures reinforced the belief both 
inside and outside the country that Tanzania did not want foreign capital 
(Neers, 1974). 
But industries based on private capital, notably local capital, 
continued to grow - thus in 1966 there were 438 manufacturing establish-
ments, out of which 392 or 89.5% were privately owned, and only 46 or 
10.5% were public; in 1972 there were 497 manufacturing enterprises out 
of which 405 or 81.5% were private and 92 or 18.5% were public 
(Russallia, 1978: 22). 	Thus, despite the political hostility which 
existed during the period of the primacy of politics, private capital 
expanded. 	The growth was haphazard in the sen 1se that there was no 
official policy to encourage or direct it. 
According to an interview with a long established local financier, 
the situation was extremely difficult for local investors despite the 
official policy of allowing private capitaL, in certain industries. 	An 
investor had no forum to assist him. 	The co-ordinating mechanism between 
the Government and private capital had died a natural death after the Arusha 
Declaration and the Chamber of Commerce was ineffective. 	This situation 
was further aggravated by the personal attitude of key-figures, such as 
the principal secretaries of the ministries or even individual ministers. 
Some of them accepted private capital investments and were helpful, others 
were hostile or refused to act on decisions, thus frustrating private 
investors. 	In addition the different financial institutions and the 
different ministries all worked with different criteria for evaluating 
private investments, so that the private investor was often subjected to 
different pressures and demands (interview, August 1981). 	It was extremely 
difficult in such a situation to know what were the rights and duties of 
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private investors. 
THE LIBERALISATION PERIOD 
The economic crisis of 1974/75 and the failure of the parastatals 
to generate surpluses created the right conditions for the Government 
to adopt a more agressive policy of encouraging private capital. The 
minority view within Government circles became more outspoken and dominant. 
A meeting of private businessmen was called in Dar es Salaam on 8 October, 
1977 to discuss problems ofproduction. 	The meeting was chaired by the 
Regional Secretary, CCM. 	Both Party and Government officials were 
invited. Private capital voiced the following complaints: 
Overdraft facilities to private capital eYe. very limited. 
Thus expansion of private manufacturers was very slow 
because they had to expand by utilising profits which 
in a normal commercial system was considered to be the 
most expensive way of financing expansion. 
Foreign exchange allocation was very small, especially 
for raw materials and machinery needed to produce goods 
for home consumption, and in particular for export 
Travel allowances for private businessmen to visit their 
business contacts, to go on conferences, study tours etc. 
were very hard to come by. Travel allowances to Government 
servants and parastatal employees were almost automatic, 
even if such trips would not help production or improve 
export markets, so much so, that a number of these 
trips had come to be termed 'shopping sprees'. 
The Foreign Branch of the National Bank of Commerce was 
very slow in processing Letters of Credit and remitting 
funds to the Principals. 
There was much interference in the management of industries 
by political decisions and a lot of manhours were lost on 
meeting dignatories, ngomas, sports, bands, peoples militia 
meetings, processions, workers education etc. 
The worker was over-protected by the Security of Employment 
Act and Clause 15 of Mwongozo while the Manager was not 
protected, not even listened to, and was just left in the 
cold. 
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7 	dth the Party Branches, NUTA Branches and Workers 
Councils are concerned with workeçs' rights and do 
not want to concern themselves with productior . 
These complaints ?nded with the following statement: 
• In general, the private businessman is everywhere, 
but wherever he goes and whatever he does, he receives 
pr'wtically no help. He has to fight all the way and 
always comes last,TFie Government comes first, then 
the Parastatals, and last of all, the Private sector. 
Private business has no friends and we may even wonder 
• whether the Income Tax man likes the private business 
• mans although, comparatively, the private businessman 
contributed substantially to the income of this nation. 
(BIT Private Capital Problems 1977) 
The type of complaints given by private capital also illustrated the 
contraints under, which it was operating and reflected its ambiguous 
situation in Tanzania's development. 
After the meeting at Oar es Salaam the Government adopted the 
policy of De-confinement, which meant that private capital could by-pass 
state-owned agencies in their procedure to import goods from abroad. 
The Government's aim was to boost production and alleviate the shortage 
of consumer goods, which was being experienced in the country. 	The 
main supporters of this position were the ministries of Finance and 
Industry. 	It is worth noting in passing that although various ministries 
were affected by the economic crisis of 1974/75, it was only these two 
ministries which attempted to re-examine policies as a means of finding 
solutions to the crisis. 
Throughout 1978-1979 the Minister of Industry, Msuya, continued to 
mobilise and encourage private investors to invest in production 
The Minister said, 'members of the Chamber 
of Commerce or prospective industrialists 
in Tanzania were invited to explore the 
possibilities of partnership with the District 
Development Corporation. 	Also that regional 
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authorities would be too willing to 
assist in the identification of investment 
possibilities for joint ventures. 
(Daily News, March 3, 1978) 
Other measures which were taken by the Minister of Industry to encourage 
private capital included the decision to decentralise the authority to 
issue licences to private investors in the region. 	Previously, such 
authority came from Dar es Salaam. 	Thus when the Minister presented 
his ministry's estimates for 1978/79 -10 Parliament, he said that he was 
going to introduce new legislation under which regions would be given 
powers to issue licences for the setting up of medium and small industries 
in districts and villages with effect from 1978/79. (Minister of Industry, 
June 30, 1978). 	In addition, the Ministry of Industries published two 
booklets A Manual for Investors in Tanzania (1980) and A Handbook for the 
Promotion of Industrial Projects (1980). 	According to the Daily News 
(5.7.1980) 'the booklets are intended to attract private capital and 
defined an investor to include local or foreign governments, institutions, 
companies and individuals wishing to invest capital, management or technical 
skills in the country". 
The policy of encouraging private capital received support from the 
third policy-making organ, the President. 	Nyerere went on a tour of 
industries in 1977 in Arusha and Dar es Salaam and called on the Party and 
the Government leaders to help the development not only of public institutions, 
but also of private ones. 	Nyerere stated: 
All said private companies to a great extent 
have taken a bold and leading position in 
providing import substitutes where otherwise 
the recent foreign exchange restrictions would 
have been hard. And certainly, one of the 
major reasons why the closure of the border 
with Kenya has not at all been felt here, is 
because all but a few of the goods we used to 
buy fromthem are now manufactured locally. 
(Daily News, October 28, 1977) 
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In 1979 the President elaborated on the policy of private capital 
in Tanzania's development. He stated that the Public Ownership Policy 
(1967) of the Arusha Declaration allowed the role of private capital 
in development. 	Thus: 
Plan to monitor private firms 
Mwalimu said that the Arusha Declaration defined 
the place of the private sector in the country's 
economy. 	He said he was, therefore, not worried 
about the existence of private industries as such, 
as long as there was committed Party membership 
and leadership. 
Mwalimu wondered whether the Party leadership 
was very clear on this issue. He said he was 
not sure whether all Party leaders knew that 
private investments were deliberately allowed 
in some areas where presently public partici-
pation was either not possible or called for. 
(Daily News, November 6, 1979) 
We could therefore argue that from 1976 onwards the Government, and to a 
considerable extent the President, viewed private capital as a positive 
economic force contributing to the well-being of the economy. 	More 
specifically, the Ministry of Industry took measures to promote its 
development in the country. 	Also the President related the role of 
private capitai to the Public Ownership policy of the Arusha Declaration. 
THE SECOND ECONOMIC CRISIS 
The liberalisation period was brought to an end by problems of 
foreign exchange. 	The effects of war expenditure and adverse terms of 
trade were aggravated by the liberalisation of import restrictions in 
1978 (US Agency for International Development, 1980: 22). 	The total 
effect was another severe balance of payment crisis. 	In addition 
according to a Government source, the policy of liberalisation had not 
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been properly worked out. 	There was no form of mechanism to assess 
the amount of foreign exchange that was sent out to buy imports and 
the actual production that was taking place (interview with senior 
Government official, July 1981). 	The loss of foreign exchange forced 
the Party to intervene at the level of policy-making and initiated the 
policy of Re-confinement, which was implemented by the Minister of Trade, 
Kaduma. 	This policy of Re-confinement meant that private capital was 
subjected to control at two levels. 	First at the level of production 
where it had to order its import requirements through the state agencies. 
Second, at the level of distribution which meant that private industries 
had to sell their goods through state-owned agencies. This policy will 
be considered in greater detail in the second case study. 
But it is also true to say that the Party has neverynct. a statement 
supporting or even clarifying the Government's position on the role of 
private capital. 	Indeed, it appeared that many Party officials were 
concerned about the call to encourage private capital in development. 	A 
research paper on private capital by a research unit 
within 	the Party, expressed concern over the growth of the private 
sector. 	Basically, the paper showed that private capital had increased 
despite the Arusha Declaration, and that this policy was contrary to the 
ideology of socialism and self-reliance. 	It argued that the Arusha 
Declaration position in relation to private capital was ambiguous, and 
that there was a need for a clearer policy on private capital. It argued 
that private capital was the source of capitalism and exploitation, and 
that such a policy could create problems for the policy of Ujamaa. 	The 
paper stated that it was time to fight the development of capitalism and 
exploitation, lest its development should undermine the policy of socialism. 
The paper was sent to the Central Committee for further deliberation. 
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(based on interview withwell placed sources, July 1981). 
As the second economic crisis continued to develop, and economic 
problems became more serious and acute, it became more urgent for Government 
to seek clarification on the role of private capital vis-a-vis the 
different sectors of the economy. 	In May 1980 a National Executive 
Committee seminar was held at Arusha. 	A number of issues were discussed, 
among them was the policy on private capital. 	Some members voiced 
concern over the state of agriculture and argued that there was a need to 
promote individual capitalists into investing in the agricultural sector. 
While the Minister of Industry called for the mobilisation of private 
capital in the manufacturing sector, the President did not commit himself 
on agriculture (interview with Party officials, August 1981). 	The idea 
of 'strategic retreat' was used by members at the seminar to support their 
arguments for private investment in the economy. 	The argument was that 
it was sometimes necessary for socialism to take a step backward in order 
to leap forward. 
The Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs, Professor Malima 
(1980a) gave a paper entitled 'Private Capital' at the NEC seminar in Arusha. 
Professor Malima was also a member of the Central Committee and he was 
also the Secretary of Planning at the Party's Central Committee, a position 
he held as a result of his ministerial responsibilities. Theoretically, 
therefore, Professor Malima was in a better position to co-ordinate both 
ministerial and Party affairs. 
The tension from this dual position was reflected in his paper on 
private capital. 	On the one hand, the paper argued that there was a 
need to expand all industries, including private ones, and make them all 
part of the national development plans. 	On the other hand, the paper 
illustrated the hostility towards private capital which stemmed from the 
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ideology of socialism. 	Malima attempted to combine these contra- 
dictory demands by arguing for the control of private capital, which 
implied, however, that private capital should continue, albeit temporarily. 
Malima argued that there was a need to strengthen Tanzania 1 s policy 
of self-reliance and socialism, and that it would be necessary to make 
the state-owned sectors of the economy more powerful than the sector 
based on private capital. 	The paper then pointed to the various dangers 
which were posed by the existence of a growing private sector. 	First 
the need and necessity to make the state-sector more powerful than the 
sector based on private capital, because the paper argued that uwe  can find 
ourselves creating a situation whereby ants would eat into our foundations, 
leading to the collapse of our house, and thus allow the private sector to 
become more powerful" (Malima, 1980a: 2). 	The second type of problem was 
the competition which was created as a result of allowing the private 
sector to co-exist with the state sector. 	But when problems occurred in 
the latter, people preferred to disband the state sector (Ibid: 19). 
The paper also showed the type of dangers that could develop from 
having the Party infiltrated by capitalists. 	First by criticising the 
policy of ujamaa. 	Such criticisms could divide the Party on crucial 
policy grounds. 	Second, capitalists could act as 'god-fathers' to party 
officials. 	Third, there was the danger of some leaders of the Party, 
Government and Parastatals associating themselves with capitalists (Malima, 
1980a: 18,19,20). 
After having pointed out the political dangers emanating from 
private capital, the paper then outlined various proposals of how to deal 
with private capital. 	These ranged from the possibility of nationalisation, 
to the need to control and monitor the private sector and the discrimination 
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of resources in favour of the state agencies (Malima, 1980a: 24). 	But 
the paper accepted the existence of private capital in the economy. It 
stated: 
In general to allow the existence of 
private capital is a temporary measure. 
This step should not be seen as an 
attempt to destroy the policy of Ujamaa. 
As far as the agricultural sector is 
concerned, the private sector should not 
be allowed to function there at all. 
Likewise trade/commerce should be in the 
hands of the state. 
The time, has come to fight capitalism and 
exploitation and their temptations, other-
wise, the roots of capitalism will continue 
to expand and spread. 
(Ibid: 28) 
There were certain similarities between Malima's paper and the CCM 
research paper 	on private capital. 	Both expressed antagonism 
towards the growth of private capital and both emphasised the political 
dangers that could be derived from such a situation. 	But while the CC\ 
research paper was implicitly arguing for the total abolition of private 
capital in Tanzania, Malima's paper was arguing for a 'strategic retreat' 
to allow private capital to continue, as a temporary measure, in certain 
defined'areas of the economy but under conditions of supervision. 	This 
was no doubt a move to accommodate economic constraints. 
According to my source of information, Malima's paper was unable to 
convince either the production-lobby 	within the Party and the Government 
or the ideology-orientated group within the Party. 	The latter were not 
convinced by Malima's arguments for a 'temporary compromise' with capitalism, 
which they viewed as politically unacceptable. 	Malima's paper was rejected 
by both sides. (interview with Party official, Augpst 1981). .. 
Indeed, the recent CCM document, Mwongozo wa CC1, 1981 appears to 6e 
a direct criticism of the production-group 	within theGovernment'and the 
-343- 
Party: 
Today capitalist tendencies have grown 
more in the country than in the period before 
the Arusha Declaration because even though 
the public sector has increased the inability 
to fight it has allowed capitalism to expand 
and infiltrate the public sector. That is why 
capitalism has dared to come out into the open 
to slander socialism, to confuse some of the 
leaders and to try to convince us to change 
our policy. 
(CCM, 1981, Mwongozo wa CCM, 52: 39) 
The Party's position on the policy of private capital is derived from two 
important factors. 	First, its view of development; this has been 
influenced by the ideology of socialism, which has becane an important 
input into policy-making. 	Second, by the institutional arrangement of 
policy-making which enabled the Party to formulate policies taking into 
consideration only 'political' factors. 
The following interview conducted by the author with senior Party 
officials illustrates very clearly that the Party does consider ideology 
as crucial in Tanzania: 
Socialising the economy is equated with 
socialism. 	There is an acceptance that 
policies may be wrong, because not enough 
research was done, but a belief that 
socialism is the correct policy and that it 
is superior to capitalism. 
(interview with high ranking Party 
Official, August 1981) 
A discussion with the Party Economic Committee of the Secretariat also 
focussed on the same issue: 
The Party's 6olicies are going to be 
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socialism, to control the commanding 
heights of the economy. Not only for the 
sake of ownership but also to ensure that 
no exploitation takes place. The State 
has to control the wealth of,cOuntry. 
(interview with Party officials, 
July 1981) 
The Party's position on private capital has been influenced by 
its understanding of the ideology of socialism. 	This understanding, 
however, has been further consolidated by the institutional arrangement 
for policy-making, which does not consider implementation problems as 
inputs into policy formulation. 	Thus 
The problem of capacity would take place 
during implementation 
(interview with senior member of 
the Party and a Regional Commissioner 
July 1981). 
This view of the Party, that implementation problems are extrinsic to 
policy-making, was also supported by a Government official. 	Thus 
Politics is supreme 
Political decisions come first 
If we wait for economicsthen 
politics goes out of the way 
(interview with senior Government 
official, July 1981) 
We can see that certain members of the Government have accepted the principle 
that policy formulation should be based essentially on 'politics', because 
it was believed that , considerations of economics into policy-making 
would negate the political aims of the country. 	Butas we have already 
seen in this case study,this interpretation of 'politics' may not be shared 
by either the President orthe production-group within the Government. 
The President's position in relation to the role of private capital 
can be understood thus: 	Nyerere's understanding of socialism, especially 
during the period of economic crisis, has become increasingly pragmatic 
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in the sense that he has stressed the need to consider the Tanzanian 
situation. 	Thus (Daily News, July 30, 1981 - Promote socialist thought - 
Nyerere) the President, as CCM Chairman, urged the Party's ideological 
colleges to continue their role of promoting socialist dialogue, encouraging 
freedom of thought and discussion. 	Nyerere however also stated: 
In our free thought we must never become 
mere receptacles for foreign ideologies. 
We must become masters of our own destiny, 
digesting and analysing ideas in the context 
of the situation obtaininQ in the country. 
(Daily News, July 30, 1981, 
emphasis added) 
This, he explained, did not mean rejecting ideas from other people. People 
must learn from the social systems of other countries in order to evolve 
a socialist, just and democratic society in the country. 
I would argue that the President's understanding of socialism differs 
from the Party's in the following sense: 	Nyerere, in stressing that the 
Tanzanian situation should be considered in the formulation of Tanzania's 
ideology of socialism, implies that the concrete problems of Tanzania must 
be taken into consideration and that the ideology of socialism should not 
be conceptualised, as for instance Marx and Engels did in 19th century 
European conditions, because problems of development are different. This 
interpretation of socialism also enhances the President's institutional 
role as a mediator between the Party and the Government. It is within 
this context that we can understand the President's support for private 
capital and his insistence that the policy of Public Ownership was still 
valid. 	This interpretation of Tanzania's socialism, however, is closer 
to the position he had held in 1967 at the time of the Arusha Declaration 
than to the one he held between 1969-1974. 
We could argue that the President and the Government take into 
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consideration economic constraints in formulating their policies, but 
the Party has remained firm in its insistence on considering constraints 
as extrinsic to policy-making. 	This situation accounts for the 
ambiguous situation of the role of private capital in Tanzania's develop- 
ment. 	For instance, no mention of private capital was made in the Third 
Five Year Development Plan (1976-1981). 	As the Minister of Planning and 
Economic Affairs, Malima (1980a: 16) stated, "Our development plans have 
been prepared as if the private sector does not exist". 	The uncertainty 
of the role of private.capital is further illustrated in the long term 
Development Plan (1981-2000) which states: 
As regards production, by the year 2000 
more than 70% will have to be produced by 
the public sector. However, to achieve 
this, we have to know where we are now so 
that we can devise the means of achieving 
the above goal. 	Furthermore, before the 
commencement of the fourth Five Year Plan, 
the Party will have charted the role the 
private sector will play in an economy 
heading for socialism. 
(Long Term Plan, 1981-2000: 26, 
emphasis added 
I would argue that this uncertainty is harmful for development 
because it restrains the Government from planning and co-ordinating 
the activities of private capital, especially after the development 
experience of 1969-1974. Various studies have shown the need for 
private capital in Tanzania's development. 	Two such major studies were 
from the East African Management Institute which had been commissioned 
by the Tanzania Board of Internal Trade. 	Thus: 
What is lacking is the encouragement for a 
limited private enterprise in the transport 
sector, as exists in trade and industry. 
(EAMI, 1978: 4) 
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And: 
It is recommended, therefore, that the BIT, 
in cooperation with NDC and other interested 
government bodies, take positive steps to 
encourage foreign investment in selected 
industries. 
(EASMI, 1979: 68) 
But a government Circular No. 2 of 1980 from the Prime Minister's Office 
stated that state financial firms and other state agencies must serve 
public firms first. 	It warned that violation of the directive by any 
of the state bodies would be considered as an act of sabotage against 
efforts to build socialism and would not be tolerated (Daily News, 
March 20, 1980). 	It is difficult in the prevailing conditions of un- 
certainties, to know whether this official statement was of a long-term 
policy significance, or whether it was ofshort term nature to assist 
the Government in coping with the crisis. 
The uncertainty is also harmful because it creates conditions 
for such malpracticesas corruption, and the tendency for private capital 
to invest in projects with a high and fast return, but which require 
very little investment in the economy. 	This uncertainty has also affected 
policies in other areas of the economy, as we shall see in the two case 
studies on internal trade and agricultural policies. 
CONCLUSI ON 
On the basis of this case study on private capital in Tanzania we 
can conclude, firstly, that the state in Tanzania is not homogeneous as 
radicals have assumed. 	Secondly, that the difference between the two 
organs of the state cannot be understood in terms of class interests, but 
only in terms of their conflicting institutional demands and their views 
of development. 	The Government's attitude towards private capital is 
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determined by its concern for economic growth, especially after the 
failure of the state sector to produce growth, and by its institutional 
obligation to consider implementation and capacity as factors in policy-
solutions. 	The Party's attitude, on the other hand, is determined by 
the ideology of socialism, and the institutional arrangement for policy-
making, which enables the Party to formulate policies on the basis of 
'political' factors alone. 	These two opposing stands appear irreconcilable 
since they are located, in the final analysis, in the different instit-
utional functions and responsibilities of the two organs of the state. 
However, this conflict has destabilising effects on the development process. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
THE POLICY OF NATIONALISATION OF THE INTERNAL 
TRADE SYSTEM: 1967-1982 
The policy of nationalisation of trade is another area which clearly 
brings out the three themes of the thesis - the relationship between the 
Party and the Government; the effects on development processe.ôf policies 
which failed to give suficient weight to economic constraintshe views 
of development prevailing in the different organs of the state. ' /The 
policy of nationalisation began with the limited nationalisation of foreign 
firms after the Arusha Declaration (1967). 	They had been mainly involved 
in the import-export business. 	The policy intensified and led to the 
nationalisation of local capital. involving both wholesale trade (1970) 
and retail trade (1976). 	By 1981 the internal trade policy had become 
comprehensive, stretching from the nationalisation of the wholesale, sub-
wholesale and retail trade, and covering the whole of the distribution 
system from the importers at the national level to the consumers in the 
remotest villages. 	It also included the policy of Confinement (1967), 
which meant that the state agencies (the confinees) were given monopoly 
to import certain goods as well as to sell certain items. 
Such a gigantic network of state control. stretching from the level 
of production to that of distribution, had also become an integral aspect 
of the Tanzanian economy. 	In its aim to elim,ir½ate the private trader. 
the Party was willing to go far in its attemptto control the distribution 
networks of trade. 	This case study will illustrate the basic problem 
through the analysis of the conflict between the capacity of the economy 
on the one hand. and on the other. the way in which policies were 
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foçrnulated which continuously imposed increasing demands on a fragile 
and over-stretched human, physical, social, capital and infrastructural 
facilities. 	The exposition of this conflict will illustrate that 
Tanzania's policies and their problems cannot be understood in terms of 
either the class-analysis explanation of the radicals or the implementation 
explanation of Green. 	Rather, the Tanzania development experience has 
to beunderstood in relation to the specific manner in which policy-makers 
formulated their policies. 
During each policy review in this case study, several problems of 
policy-making and implementation have recurred. 	The clearest and most 
appropriate way to demonstrate this is to look into it thematically - from 
the point of view of the different levels and aspects of the trade system - 
so that we can follow each policy and the types of problems generated step 
by step. 	This approach will also enable me to relate the formulation 
and implementation of policies to the political-institutional arrangements. 
It will illustrate empirically how each initial policy created the conditions 
for another policy-solution, leading to the creation of more complex problems 
in development. 
The chapter will be divided into two major sections. 	The first part 
will examine the policy of nationalisation of trade from 1967-1980, paying 
particular attention to the most important policy decisions which were, 
the Arusha Declaration which nationalised the foreign import-export firms 
(1967), the Presidential Circular which led to the nationalisation of the 
wholesale trade (1970), the policy of Operation Maduka which led to the 
take-d\,er of retail trade (1976) and the Prime Minister's Circular 1/80 
on retail trade. 	The analysis of these policies will seek to show their 
cor)crete effects for the development process. 
The second section of the chapter will examine the policies of 
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De-confinement (1977) and Re-confinement (1980). 	These will be discussed 
within the context of the economic crisis. 	These policies illustrate 
the Party's and the Government's views of development and the relation- 
ship between these two organs of the state. 	A dimension which appears 
more forcefully in this chapter (in both the two sections) is the adoption 
of the Party's approach to policy-making by certain Government ministries, 
which since 1980 has created a more complex situation in the understanding 
of Party and Government relations. 	While the conflictual dichotomy 
between Party and Government is still valid (in terms of their views of 
development and institutional arrangements for policy-making and imple-
mentation), in recent years this conflict appears to have permeated each 
organ. 
MAJOR POLICY-DECISIONS 1967-1982 
The creation of the State Trading Corporation (1967) 
We saw in Part One that the Government's policy was to maintain 
private activity in commerce. 	The study on internal trade by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (1962) has also demonstrated that internal 
trade in Tanzania based on the private trader was cheap and efficient, 
considering the vastness of the territory with poor infrastructural 
facilities and the low purchasing power of the majority of the population. 
We have also seen how the Party activists had criticised this policy and 
had pressed for their replacement by the co-operatives. 	In the early 
1960s the Government partly gave in to these Party demands and there was, 
as a result, a rapid expansion of the co-operatives. 	By 1966, however, 
the co-operatives were in dire financial problems. 
In 1967 following the Arusha Declaration, policies, foreign capital 
was nationalised. 	Firms included were Smith McKenzie, Bauman, Dalgety, 
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Intrata, Wigglesworth and Tom. 	These firms had been mainly involved 
in the export-import business. 	The State Trading Corporation (STC) 
was created to take over the functions of the foreign export-import firms. 
What kind of problems did the policy-making style of the Arusha Declaration 
have on the State Trading Corporation? 
Like other major parastatals that were formed 
in the wake of the Arusha Declaration, the STC, 
of necessity was created virtually overnight. 
The nationalised companies had trading policies, 
procedures, systems and management practices 
that varied substantially. 	And to streamline 
these diversities into an active homogeneous 
entity required a lot of time and brain work 
which we could not afford at that time. 
(Mwapachu, 1974: 2) 
By 1968 the SIC had managed to dissolve all the nationalised companies and 
establish the divisions between the various kinds of merchandise as a 
means of rationalising the import trade. 	These divisions were: General 
Merchandise, Groceries, Agricultural Machinery and Technical, Textile, 
Shipping and Export Marketing. 	But even this attempt at systematising 
the import trade was inadequate: 
The STC which had been re-born was but a 
conglomeration of diverse business operations 
and when this structure was adopted it was 
clear from the start that it would be short-
lived. 	Again, the set-up was diffuse, 
responsibilities and authority were not 
clearly demarcated and management systems were 
rudimentary. 	Indeed, it was at this time, 
that the SIC began to experience operational 
problems. 
(Mwapachu. 1974: 2) 
And: 
In addition to the nebulous structure this was 
a period of uncertainty on the part of the 
worker. Both Managers and ordinary workers 
started to feel that the ground was moving 
under their feet and in the absence of properly 
conceived organisation structure, working 
relationship and operational systems, each 
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worker s in order to preserve his image. 
clung tenaciously to his old ways, work 
methods and operational systems. 	There 
were others, who left. 	Some of the staff 
who left were highly experienced people. 
the majority of whom came from the accounting 
area. 	As a result of both these factors 
the operational performance of the corporation 
was dangerously coming to a breakdown. 
(Mwapachu, 1974: 3) 
Thus the problems of organisation and manpower began to affect the operations 
of the Corporation. 	As a result of operational and organi'sational problems, 
the SIC called the McKinsey Consultants, who were then re-organising the 
National Development Corporation, to study the problems of the STC and 
off er recommendations. 
The Presidential Directive on the wholsa1e trade (1970) 
Meanwhile, before the State Trading Corporation had time to assimi-
late the McKinsey report and to reorganise itself properly, in February 
1970 a Presidential Directive nationalised wholesale trade. 
This decision gave the SIC additional tasks, thus instead of its 
initial export-import responsibilities, the STC had the additional tasks 
of distributing goods nationally: 
Compounding these difficulties have been 
the Government's directive of February 1970 
to take over import and wholesale trade 
throughout Tanzania 
the decision by the Government to direct 
the STC to replace 400 private importers, 400 
private wholesalers and some 4,000 sub-wholesalers 
came at a critical time of the Corporation's 
history. 
(STC, 1971: 2) 
The SIC was unable to cope with these new responsibilities and it was 
spon experiencing severe operational problems, which in their turn, affected 
the consumers. 	Thus between 1970 and 1971 there was a public outcry at 
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SIC inefficiency. 	Members of the public were experiencing problems 
in obtaining such essential items as maize mill flour, wheat flour, 
rice, cooking oil, milk, medicine, sugar, spare parts etc. (Parliamentary 
Select Committee, 1972: 2). 
As a result of the public outcry, a parliamentary Select Committee 
was appointed to investigate the problems of the SIC. 	The Committee 
found that there was no system of accounting, no form of co-ordination 
existed between the STC headquarters and its branches in the regions. 
and finally, the SIC had no idea of the needs and requirements of the 
consumers. 	The Committee pointed to problems of manpower, godowns and 
infrastructure as obstacles which hindered the smooth operations of the 
SIC. 	It recommended that the STC be decentralised (Parliamentary Select 
Committee, 1972: v: vii). 
The State Trading Corporation in turn pointed to various factors 
which impinged on its operations. 	First, a national trading agency. with 
responsibilities for imports and wholesale functions. needed to possess a 
vast knowledge of both the foreign and domestic market conditions, to enable 
it to plan and organise its work systematically. 	But the SIC lacked 
such knowledge because it did not possess adequate manpower. 	This problem 
was explained by the SIC in the following manner: 
SIC business is very complex and requires 
trained personnel if part of the current 
marketing problems are to be solved. 	One 
salesman cannot sell the full range of het-
erogeneous product lines held by a Branch 
and to all its varied private and commercial 
customers. STC sells technically complex 
products, thousands of lines constantly 
unrelated lines. 	The stock list is constantly 
growing. This means salesmen of various 
experience have therefore to be sought. and 
these are not easy to find. 
(SIC. 1971: 9) 
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Thus the complexity of the SIC functions was made more difficult by 
the absence of qualified personnel 	Despite the various attempts 
made by the SIC at crash training, on-the-job training etc., the problem 
was not solved. 	Short-term training could not be a substitute for 
experience. 	As a result an inexperienced and relatively young manpower 
was pushed to man a demanding sector of the economy. 
Undoubtedly. therefore, one of the major 
weaknesses of the STC right from its 
inception was the low calibre of the staff 
compliment. 
(Mwapachu, 1974: 4) 
Poor manpower was soon manifested into operational problems thus: 
Contrary to what we had expected, operational 
problems which were dramatically manifested 
in varying forms such as poor information flow 
and the resulting lack of management information 
upon which to evaluate performance, shortages in 
the midst of overstocks, scarcity and misuse of 
finance, low moralof staff, high labour turnover, 
and the increasing line of STC overdraft and 
foreign exchange utilisation were some of the 
other signs of SIC inefficiency 
(Ibid) 
In addition. the SIC suffered from capital and funds shortages. 	No 
provisions were made by the Treasury to enable the SIC to accomplish 
the policy of nationalisation of trade programmes: 
So far the STC has received nothing from 
Government to aid it implement the trade 
socialisation exercise takeover. This has 
resulted into the Corporation being unable to 
properly plan its finances 	In the absence 
of sufficient funds generated from its own 
corporations the SIC has at times therefore been 
forced to finance its capital expansion programme 
from the National Bank of Commerce overdrafts 
which is inappropriate. Unless Government is 
going to inject funds in STC in the form of 
equity capital the financial viability of the 
Corporation will continue to be at stake as SIC 
cash flow will not warrant servicing of a big 
loan, simply because it is trading on a very small 
gross margin. 
(SIC, 1971: 15) 
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Shortage of funds made SIC a risk enterprise to other state institutions 
and financiers in Tanzania: 
To such institutions it would appear that 
the SIC is in somewhat a precarious 
financial position where at any time 
Treasury could demand payment and the 
Banks could reduce or recall funds advanced 
on overdraft. 	It would appear that to 
conduct business dealings with the STC 
involves the acceptance of considerable 
risks. 
(SIC, 1971: 16) 
Another problem (which also affected the SIC efficiency) was transport. 
SIC had to move merchandise over distances averaging 300 miles from its 
central godowns in Dar es Salaam, but there were inadequate numbers of 
railway wagons, and an inefficient road transport system. 	Furthermore, 
lack of storage facilities even in Dar es Salaam, made it difficult for 
the SIC to cleargoods from the port, which in turn increased its 
deniurrage charges. 	Godowns were often sub-standard and led to the 
deterioration of goods as well as to losses. 	
Mt 
Finally, the STC General Manager pointedthat the responsibility of 
fulfilling the policy of socialisation of trade did not rest with the STC 
alone: 
What possibly has not been fully appreciated up 
to this stage is the fact that the attainment 
of the socialisation objective is not only an SIC 
matter but actively involve other relevant bodies 
like the National Bank of Commerce, the Bank of 
Ianzania, the 'Investment Bank', and the Treasury. 
It is, therefore, their duty just as is STC's in 
implementing the programme in declaring the total 
funds each has that can be allocated to the STC 
periodically, both fixed and working capital. 
Because without knowing about this, how can the 
STC realistically draw its plans? 
(SIC, 1970: 17) 
Five years later in 1971 after its creation, the State Trading Corporation 
collapsed. 	The Corporation had over Ish 45,000 million as liabilities 
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as at 31st January 1978 (BIT, 1978). 	Green (1980: 14) 
conceded that the collapse of the SIC contributed to the mini-crisis of 
1970-71. 
Explanations offered for the failure of the SIC 
Green saw the failure of the State Trading Corporation mainly as 
the result of implementation, brought about by the McKinsey Consultant 
recommend at ions (Green, 1980: 14). 	It is true that the highly centralised 
structure of the SIC which the McKinsey Consultants had advocatedas 
unsuitable for Tanzania; but the recommendations were based on 
assumption that infrastructural facilities and manpower were available, 
at least to a certain degree, to maintain a state organisation with 
nation-wide responsibilities. 	The fact that these inputs were absent 
in the first place cannot be blamed on a foreign consultant, who was 
anyway, invited by the Government. 	Green's attempts to reduce the failure 
of the SIC to 	'foreign consultants' is an attempt to deflect attention 
from the examination of policies. 
Another explanation for the failure of the STC has come from Resnick 
(1981). 	Although Resnick emphasised the types of economic problems which 
afflicted the SIC, nevertheless, he still maintained that the failure of 
the SIC was the result of class- interests. 	Thus: 
Internal class, structural and institutional 
contradictions created special difficulties 
for the STC in its attempts to reorganise the 
trading sector in such a way as to suit the 
needs of the country's socialist goals and 
economic needs, as well as for its efforts 
to get out of trouble subsequently. 
(Resnick, 1981: 254) 
Resnick offers no evidence of how the class interests of the bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie, for instance, could have benefit ed from the collapse of 
the State Trading Corporation. 
I have argued and have empirically demonstrated that the nature of 
policy-making with its characteristic tendency to exclude the consideration 
of economic constraints created and accounts for the implementation 
problems of the SIC and its subsequent failure. 	This explanation appears 
to be supported by the SIC, as the following passage illustrates: 
The SIC management would merely wish to 
reiterate here that within a period of four 
years the Corporation's import and wholesale 
trade has grown from Shs 300 million in 1967 
to Shs 600 million in 1971, representing a 
100% growth. 
No organisation anywhere placed with such an 
objective before it and having had to grow 
its activities throughout without a breathing 
space to consolidate itself could really 
escape meeting the difficulties as those the 
SIC is today facing. 
(SIC, 1971: 2) 
The President also accepted that the manner in which policies were 
passed contributed to the problems of the SIC. 	At the Tanu National 
Conference in Dar es Salaam in 1971, Nyerere stated: 
It is hardly surprising that the SIC has 
experienced more problems than any of the 
other public enterprises. At no time have 
we given the STC time to consolidate its 
existing operations before instructing it 
to undertake new tasks. 
A leisurely progress towards socialisation of 
trade has been impossible because the necessity 
to rationalise the whole distribution system, 
and the need to reduce the period of business 
uncertainty have all required quick action. 
(cited in Mwapachu, 1974: 10) 
Thus the characteristics of the policy-style were explained by the President 
as politically necessary. 
The creation of a new trading system 
The Government was deeply concerned about the problems and subsequent 
failure of the STC. 	A high level bureaucrat, Apieyo, was sent to the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry to investigate the problems and his 
recommendations were submitted in the form of an ECC paper to the Cabinet. 
The latter, in turn, was able to instruct the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, to find a way of restructuring the STC. 	An inter-ministerial 
Committee was formed which was composed of an implementation committee 
and a task force. 	Its recommendation was forwarded to the Cabinet 
(interview with senior Government official, July 1981). 
The recommendation of the inter-ministerial committee called for 
the STCs diverse functions to be divided according to the different 
product-lines. 	It also recommended that the STC be decentralised. 
This was to allow the branches in the regions to exercise greater control 
of their activities and facilitate efficiency and co-ordination of their 
business. 	The inter-ministerial committee also gave detailed analysis 
and breakdown of the economic inputs which would be required to facilitate 
the programme of the nationalisation of import-export and wholesale 
business. 	For instance, it recommended that a total sum of Tsh 87 million 
would be required to fulfil the policy of socialisation of trade (STC 
n.a. [19721:iV). 
Between 1973 and 1974 the STC was decentralised and reorganised 
into Six Importing Companies and 18 (later 20) Regional Trading Companies. 
The functions of the former were to import merchandise in relation to their 
specialisations. 	The latter were to serve as wholesalers in the regions. 
In 1973 the Board of Internal Trade (BIT) was set up to link the six 
Importing Companies and the Regional Trading Companies. 	The BIT's role 
was to supervise and co-ordinate internal trade affairs as well as to 
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conduct research and to deal with policy-issues relating to internal 
trade generally. 	The BIT was also responsible, on behalf of the RTCs 
and the Importing Companies, for the negotiation of loans and discussion 
of policy-issues with the different ministries and financial institutions. 
Thus although the RTCs and Importing Companies were autonomous in their 
everyday business activities, they were linked in matters of policy to 
the BIT, which was in turn responsible to the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry. 
The new trading structure thus attempted to avoid the problems 
of the STC derived from its highly centralised structure. It allowed 
for the autonomy of the regional trading companies in their business 
activities and allowed for the specialisation of knowledge to develop with 
the creation of the importation companies. 	At the same time, it imposed 
a unified national structure by integrating these diverse companies into 
the BIT. 
Old problems in new trading system 
But the new trading system was still afflicted by the same problems 
as those of the defunct State Trading Corporation. 	One such problem was 
the shortage of capital. 	Thus: 
The new trade system also is still forced 
to exist with a weak capital structure having 
neither equity nor loan capital for any of 
the specified companies. In this respect the 
companies are mere replicas of their 
predecessor. 
Attempts to get fixed capital from the Treasury 
to strengthen the capital bases of the companies 
have so far proved fruitless. We are therefore 
forced to continue relying on overdraft with the 
attendant high interest rates. 
The majority of the companies have an inadequate 
fixed assets portfolio to support their volume 
-36 1- 
of business and this will continue to 
hamper their operating efficiency until 
the necessary capital is made available. 
(BIT, n.a.[19761:7) 
The problem of equity capital was again emphasised in the 1975 General 
Managers Convention meeting, which decided that: 
Till the Treasury has been able to provide 
suitable equity for the companies it would 
not be possible for the companies to pay 
t 
	
	dividends out of the earnings since these 
are tied up in stocks. 
(BIT, 1976a) 
Shprtage of funds for the BIT companies hindered their development; thus: 
Lack of adequate funds to invest in fixed 
assets such as godowns, transportation 
facilities and the working capital has had 
tremendous Idverse effects on the efficiency 
and expansion of the system. 
Almost all tñe trading institutions in the 
public sector are operating without equity 
capital and therefore placing heavy reliance 
on the bank overdraft facilities. BIT group 
of companies account for about 50% of the 
total bank lending to trade sector. This 
situation is not only insufficient but also 
very expensive to the trading system in terms 
of financial charges that accrue to overdraft 
facil ities. 
(BIT, n.a. [1979]: 10) 
Another problem was in manpower. The inter-ministerial Committee 
had recommended that the BIT system required over 900 qualified and 
trained personnel to make the system work. 	But there was no such manpower 
available in Tanzania. 	Thus: 
Non-availability of skilled manpower is 
yet another problem facing the BIT 
distribution system. We are all aware that 
the failure of several co-operative societies, 
the STC and recently NATEX were all among 
other things, due to lack of skilled manpower. 
The importance'of this fact cannot be over-
emphasised. 
(BIT, n.a. [1979]: 9) 
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A similar story was seen in other areas. For instance, the inter-
ministerial Committee recommended that the trading system would require 
near126,000 sq. ft. of additional godowns in Dar es Salaam, and up-
countr5'to'support the full control of wholesale trade, while the 
Regional 'Trading Corporations' and Districts' wholesale shops would need 
225,000 sq.ft. 	But funds for the construction of storage facilities 
and wholesale shops in the regions were not forthcoming: 
BIT should ensure that finance for warehousing 
projects is obtained from the government since 
many companies are facing acute problems in 
this area. 
(BIT, 1976a) 
Lack of Proper storage facilities created and led to other problems: 
There has been considerable stock losses 
due to damages, pilferages, in addition to 
the high overhead costs arising from the need 
to have more godown personnel, extra rental 
and other administrative costs. Moreover, 
the ir'adequacy of the storage space often is 
responsible for some of the shortages of goods 
experienced in the regions and in the districts. 
(BIT, n.a. [1979] 9) 
Another area was in transportation. 	The BIT commissioned the East 
African Management Institute, EASMI, to conduct a study on transportation 
problems besetting the new trading system. 	The EASMI report stated: 
The number of vehicles and capacity of the 
RTC road fleet is not sufficient to provide 
good transport facilities for movement of 
the RTC goods to districts and villages. Either 
the number of vehicles is insufficient or lack 
of spare parts is causing shortages, inadequate 
and irregular deliveries of goods. The RTCs 
vehicles are normally fully loaded going out from 
the RTCs, but only occasionally having a return 
load. 	Low utilisation of the capacity affects 
the cost of operations. 
(EASMI, 8.4.8: 1978) 
And: 
The shortage of goods in the regions, districts 
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and villages is a result of insufficient 
transport facilities and inadequate supply 
from manufacturers. 
(Ibid, 8.4.14) 
Finally, the report found that the average number of people served by a 
typical RTC was 725,000 or 5% of the total population when transposed 
to the whole country. 	Thus an insignificant number was actually serviced 
by the RTC. 
To conclude this section, the pattern of implementation problems 
that was experienced by both the SIC and the new trading system under 
BIT strongly indicates that they were the result of faulty policy-making. 
As I have emphasised throughout the thesis, a policy-making style which 
excludes the considerations of economic factors is bound to create 
implementation problems. This point is illustrated particularly by the 
experience of BIT. 	Although the inter-ministerial committee had worked 
out the breakdown of the economic inputs required for the implementation 
of the nationalisation policies, nevertheless, the mere 'planning' of 
these resources did not guarantee their availability. 	This would strongly 
indicate that establishing new bureaucratic organisations with new ideas 
is no substitute for basing policy-making on available resources. 	In 
the next section we shall see a similar pattern of implementation problems 
occurring when four years later retail trade was 'socialised'. 
More 'Political' Policies: 1976 
Although the new trading system was facing difficulties and problems, 
nevertheless additional 'political' decisions were taken in 1976 which 
increased the functions of the trading system towards breaking point. The 
first was the decision to dissolve the Co-operatives. 	Some of the functions 
which the Co-operatives were involved in, such as the distribution of staple 
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foods, which included, cooking oil, beans, maize, wheat flour, kerosine 
oil etc., were passed on to the BIT trading system. These new functions 
were an additional burden on the RTC, as the following passage illustrates: 
and to the extent that these items 
are the basic necessities for the 
ordinary consumer, the RTCs unlike 
hitherto are now handling very sensitive 
products. Any failure on the part of the 
RTCs will be felt almost instantaneously 
by the common man. To be able to distribute 
all these items to the numerous distribution 
outlets demands a very high degree of skill 
and competence. 
(BIT, 19766:2) 
The second decision which aggravated the new BIT trading system was the 
policy of Operation Maduka which socialised' retail trade. This policy 
is important for various reasons, which will become apparent but also 
because it set the motion for the complete control of internal trade. 
It is therefore necessary to digress and consider the context of the 
policy of Operation Maduka, before we look into the problems of imple-
mentation which faced the new trading system. 
The policy of Operation Maduka was passed by the Prime Minister, Kawawa 
who was implementing a general Party directive of 1974, which had stated 
that villages should open their own shops. 	As a result, the actual 
decision in 1976 did not have to be referred to the Party (interview with 
Party officials, July 1981). 	As soon as the policy was announced by the 
Prime Minister, Party activists throughout the country began to implement 
it by closing down private shops. 	This was done, however, without first 
ensuring that there were alternative forms of shops to cater for peoples 
needs. 	One region, for instance, closed down 40 private shops and stated 
that the business once handled by these shops would be taken care by three 
Ujamaa shops (BIT, 1976c: 1). 	This situation created immense problems 
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and tension for the general public. 	Private shop-keepers, especially 
in the regions, refused to restock their shops and allowed their goods 
to run down. 	The President, the third policy-making organ, intervened, 
and with the words "Stop it" (Daily News, May 23, 1976), brought the 
process of closing down private shops to a halt. The President explained: 
The Party policy is to open co-operative 
shops and not to close down private shops. 
Private shops will die a natural death when 
sufficient co-operative shops run by 
competent people are opened. 
(Daily News, May 23, 1976) 
The President also warned that closing down private shops at random without 
opening others to replace them would cause the government to suffer losses 
in revenue and would result in genuine complaints from the public (Ibid). 
The President's intervention at the level of policy-making was therefore 
meant to stop the creation of more complex problems from emerging. His 
strategic position as a balancing force between the Party and the Government 
was illustrated by his intervention. 	*; 
The Prime Minister's Office, in turn, issued further clarifications 
on the implementation of Operation Maduka. 	Part of the guidelines called 
for the need to ensure that shortages of commodities and consumer goods in 
the urban and the rural areas were averted in the implementation of the 
programme. 	It affirmed that "in urban areas with a large population, it 
would be necessary to take cautious steps before closing down privately 
owned shops" (cited in BIT, 1976c:1). 	Likewise, in the villages where 
ujamaa shops did not satisfy consumer demands, "private shops should be 
allowed to operate as systems and plans are being developed to start 
ujamaa shops" (cited in BIT, 1976c:l). 
But despite this clarification, "some of the regional and district 
leaders have gone anead to implement the operation without advice or 
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guidance from the Ministry of Trade" (Ibid: 2). 	In addition, the 
confidence of many shop-keepers, especially in the rural areas, had been 
undermined and many allowed their stock to run down. 
BIT reaction to the policy of Operation Maduka 
The reaction of the Board of Internal Trade to the policy of Operation 
Maduka was summed up in a press release. 	The press statement condemned 
the steps taken by some of the regions to close down private retail shops 
without any form of preparation and stated that "if this trend is not 
immediately arrested not only would it defeat the objectives of the 
operation, not only will it bring about untold hardships to the people, 
but would also frustrate and impair our industrial productions and our 
struggling economy". 	The statement continued: 
But if there is need for these national 
institutions to take over these private 
shops now, the Board of Directors have 
proposed that there is also need to see 
whether the institutions have the 
business capability to do so. 
It has been observed that some leaders in 
the çlistricts and regions have taken up 
this matter without giving thought to its 
attendant intricacy and expertise necessary 
to make the programme a success. 
(BIT, 1976c:2) 
The statement by BIT pointed to the necessity of considering the capacity 
of the national institutions in policy-making. 
The second major problem which the statement pointed to was the 
worsening of the state of internal trade because 
mills and parastatals are stuck up with 
goods now piling up in the godowns. The 
reason is that the private traders and 
merchants, who are the majority, do not 
want to buy any more stock since they do 
not know when their shops would close down. 
(BIT, 1976c:3) 
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The statement pointed to the possible disruptive effects of the policy 
generally: 
there is a big danger that the people 
would be affected by being deprived of this 
essential service and also the factories in 
the country would face difficulties due to 
failure to dispose of their production. 
This problem is even more manifest when 
considering the poor financial and inadequate 
expertise of the institutions supposed to 
take over private business. Also there is 
a danger that the villagers would not get 
their essential needs in the event of the 
closure of the private owned shops without 
a reasonable alternative. 
(BIT, 1976c:3) 
The above statements by BIT therefore called attention to the weakness 
of the state trading institutions and problems that could be generated 
arising from inadequate access to retail facilities. 	In other words, 
the BIT was attempting to bring problems of capacity to bear at the level 
of policy-making. 
But the disruption of retail trade, especially in the rural areas, 
had already occurred and the process could not be reversed. 	Under these 
new conditions it became necessary to see that village shops were increased 
as well as turned into viable enterprises. 	In 1977 a committee composed 
of the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Trade, the Board of Internal 
Trade and the Co-operative College, Moshi, was formed to study the problems 
faced by the village shops. 	Their report may have played a crucial role 
in influencing the 1980 Prime Minister's Office Circular on retail trade. 
The report found that there was a downward trend in business in 
villages. 	The major causes which were identified for the poor state of 
the village shops were lack of skilled shopkeepers and accountants, and 
low capital. 	Many village shops could not buy enough assorted goods to 
last for a reasonable length of time, which could have reduced their 
transportation costs. 	The general shortage of essential commodities 
was also another serious problem affecting the viabi1iy of village 
shops. 	Finally, the villagers did not understand the benefits of having 
a village shop because, among the reasons given, the prices of goods 
from a village shop did not differ from that of a private shop. 	The 
committee also found that the villagers were afraid of losing the money 
they had invested in the village shop and that there were no procedures 
on how the profits were to be distributed. 	Another acute problem faced 
by the village shops was that of book keeping. 	The report suggested 
that training of both book-keepers and shop-keepers should be undertaken, 
bank loans to village shops should be made available, and it recommended 
that a sum of Tsh 20,000, as initial capital, should be made available 
to each village shop so as to ensure its financial viability (PMO, 1977). 
The Prime Ministers Office responded to the investigation by the 
committee on village shops by setting up a crash course for village shop-
keepers and accountants. 	The task was immense. There were 6,117 village 
shops and 1,274 co-operative shops. 	The aim was to have a shop in each 
village and at each place of work by 1980. 	These village shops were 
expected to give services to approximately 13,000,000 villagers, who were 
living in 7,631 villages (PMO, 1980a: 1). 	The problem was to train the 
manpower required for village shops and a programme was drawn up phased 
over three years up to 198112 for the 720 places a year that wo-vt available 
for such courses. 	Furthermore, a sum of Tsh 10,753,725/- a year was to 
be put aside each year for the training programme. 	The minimum require- 
ment for the applicants of shop keeper and accountant was Std. vii (complete 
Primary Education) (Ibid: 3). 	As a result, there was a vast activity 
geared to the training of village shop management. 
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The Prime Minister's Circular 1/80 
On the basis of this programme the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) 
issued a Circular 1/80 on retail trade, which stated among other things 
that "the sector of internal trade should be in the hands of mass controlled 
instrument (that is, villages and co-operatives)" (Ibid: 1). 	In relation 
to retail trade, the 1980 Circular stated that from henceforth, essentials 
would be sold to: 
village shops 
Workers Co-operatives 
ci Co-operatives under the superyision  of the 
association of the Party 
di Co-operatives in town streets 
through the Board of Internal Trade's agents 
religious organisations. 
The Circular also gave deadlines for the closure of private shop-keepers. 
Thus: 
- in the villages by March, 1981 
- in small towns by April, 1982 
- in towns by April, 1983 
(PMO Circular 1/80: 1) 
Thus we can state that by 1980 the Prime Minister's Office had accepted 
that private trade was to be totally phased out in Tanzania and that 
measures were undertaken to create alternative forms of retail outlet. 
The Ministry of Trade and the Board of Internal Trade were expected by 
the Prime Minister's Office to take over the functions of retail trade. 
According to a further directive from the Prime Minister's Office, "they 
were required to provide guidance and expertise to the villages in the 
planning and opening of Ujamaa shops together with ensuring an adequate 
and smooth flow of goods to the shops by way of preferential allocation 
of goods and provision of physical facilities' (PMO, 1980b: 1). 
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And: 
RTCs are also expected to train the shops 
personnel in the area of retail management 
as well as seeing that the shops are following 
effective control systems and procedures. So 
as to discharge this function most expeditiously 
the RTC5 will have to open retail shops in the 
Regional and District Headquarters and where 
necessary in the wards that will serve as training 
schools for the people running the ujamaa shops. 
(Ibid: 7) 
The BIT trading system was therefore expected to expand from regional 
level to districts and ward levels to meet the requirements of the policy 
of Operation Maduka. 
The 1980 Circular on retail trade issued by the Prime Minister's 
Office was based on the assumption that, if the obstacles creating the 
unviability of village shops were removed through educational training, 
access to capital e1., then there would be no reason why the policy of 
Operation Maduka could not be successfully and systematically implemented. 
The Prime Minister's Office's sphere of action was in removing these 
obstacles and to this.end, a programme of action was evolved. On the 
basis of these planning projections, it issued the 1/80 Circular that 
private trade would be phased out within the time limits given. It is 
worth noting in passing that'the Government did not sabotage 'radical' 
policies, on the contrary, it made available resources for their imple-
mentation. 
In a paper (1980) commenting on the Prime Minister's Circular, the 
0Lk Board of Internal Trade pointed/that it appeared that "the basic 
consideration is the speed of implementing this objective given the limited 
o± 	(the RTCs') disposal and the rather insurmountable environmental constraints 
associated with this exercise in the present circumstances". 	The paper 
warned that: 
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We have to learn from the failures of 
SIC and NATEX in the inherent dangers 
of going too fast into new spheres of 
experience, proper planning and development 
of effective and efficient system and 
procedure. 
(BIT, 1980: 2) 
The BIT paper pointed to the dangers of expanding the state trading 
system without proper manpower: 
The burden of staffing the tarafa (divisional) 
branches leave alone the current shortage 
of skilled and experienced manpower at the 
district level, will put a big strain on 
the country's limited manpower resource 
(BIT, 1980: 	)' 
The paper then repeated all the problems which hindered large-scale 
trading operations in Tanzania. 	These were the shortage of warehouses, 
shops and offices; and the absence of banking facilities, insurance, 
post and telephone services. 	These problems were particularly acute in 
remote areas of the country. 	The paper commented thus: 
What possibly has not been fully appreciated 
up to this stage is the fact that the 
attainment of the set objective is not only 
a BIT system matter, but actively involve other 
relevant bodies, NBC, Treasury, and other 
financial institutions. It is therefore their 
duty, as is ours in implementing the programme 
by giving financial support to BIT and RTCs. 
And: 
The government together with other public 
institutions will have to play a key role 
in providing basic infrastructure where it 
is lacking particularly telephone links, 
electricity, banking and reliable roads 
An equally important requirement is premises 
for shop operations, storage and residence 
and the necessary lorries and vans with which 
to transport goods to different locations. 
(BIT, 1980: 4) 
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The paper concluded that: 
Implementation of this programme is fraught 
with environmental and internal constraints. 
(Ibid: 7) 
It would be pertinent to note that the Board of Internal Trade, the main 
implementing agency of the internal trade was not consulted on the Prime 
Minister's Circular. 
Meanwhile, a 1979 survey undertaken by the Department of Ujamaa and 
Co-operatives in the Prime Minister's Office to assess the training 
programme of the village shop-keepers and accountants, found that by 1980 
there were: 
5,800 villages without an appointed 
trained book-keeper. 
(PMO, 1980e:29) 
The survey also found that: 
A total of 2,128 of those (2,284) trained 
by the Prime Minister's Office during 
recent years were not working in village 
shops at the time of the survey. 
(Ibid: 33) 
Miong the reasons given were that shop-keepers had been trained for 
villages which had no shops, some shops had been discontinued, and short-
training had neither 'created confidence among the village leaders nor 
made the people capable or interested in the jobs" (Ibid: 34). 	The 
report concluded that: 
A lot of money invested in the training 
of village shop-keepers has been lost - 
at least temporarily. 
(Ibid: 34) 
In addition the report found that it was difficult to find candidates 
with a complete primary education of standard VII, who would qualify as 
entrants for the training programme. 	Furthermore, the five weeks 
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training did not appear to be sufficient to turn a person into a good 
book-keeper, capable of keeping even a simple financial statement. 
The survey recommended more training to enable book_keeping/become a 
tool of management (Ibid: 75). 	Thus the managerial problems facing 
national institutions were by 1980 extended to villagers. 
This part of the chapter devoted to major policies leads to three 
conclusions. 	First, in regard to internal trade issues the Prime Minister's 
Office adopted a more forceful 'political' approach, which brought it 
closer to the Party's way of formulating policies. 	This was especially 
true, as we haveseen, of the policy of Operation Maduka (1976). Although 
the Circular 1/80 on the implementation of Operation Maduka attempted to 
consider implementation problems and evolved a programme for solving 
them, it failed to consider other problems, which fell outside the mini-
sterial responsibilities of the PMO. 	This problem would have been avoided 
had the Board of Internal Trade been consulted. 	As a result, these two 
policies created immense additional problems and responsibilities for the 
trading structure, at a period when the general economic conditions in 
the country were far from stable. 
These two tendencies - the pOor co-ordination and the tendency not 
to consider implementation - are not 	new and strange phenomena in the 
conduct of the Government. 	We saw in Chapter Six (The Primacy of Politics 
in Development 1969-1974) how the Cabinet was considerably weakened as a 
mechanism for the co-ordination of policies and that it had changed its 
methods of policy-consideration from a collective form of decision-making 
based on research to the tendency where policies became identified with 
particular personalities or where policies were adopted because they 
appeared to be a 'good idea'. 	Thus the examples given in this chapter 
are a further illustration of this tendency but are now seen from the 
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perspective of individual ministries, rather than from that of the Cabinet 
as a whole. 
My second conclusion is that all the three major organs of the state, 
that is, the President, the Government and the Party, have, in the course 
of furthering the aims of the nationalisation of internal trade, failed 
to give due consideration to implementation problems. 	This was because 
each organ of the state considered its policies 'political', which meant 
that they did not have to include the consideration of implementation 
problems. 	The latter were thought of as outside the responsibility of 
policy-makers. 	This accounts for the familiar pattern of implementation 
problems leading to policy-failures. 
Third, the above characteristics of policy-making introduced 
destabilising processes into the trade sector and into the development 
process generally. 	Although the President intervened to maintain a 
balance when the process generated by one policy became too extreme to 
be coped with by another organ of the state, nevertheless, it was often 
almost impossible, even by Presidential decree, to reverse the consequences 
of a policy once it had been set in motion. 
SCARCITIES OF ESSENTIALS 1976-1982 AND THE SEARCH FOR POLICY SOLUTIONS 
The second major section of the chapter will consider the period 
1976-1982 paying particular attention to the policies of De-confinement 
and Re-confinement. 	The discussion of these policies will be situated 
within the context of the continued economic problems in Tanzania. 
Tanzania experienced widespread shortages of goods throughout the country 
during and after the economic crisis of 1974/75. 	As soon as the problem 
of famine was averted, the Party was able to concentrate its attention 
on the problem of scarcity of consumer goods. A meeting was called by 
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the Economic Sub-committee of the Central Committee in November, 1976, 
which was also attended by the members of the Board of Internal Trade. 
The meeting was held in Mwanza. 	The Economic Sub-committee saw the 
problem of shortage of goods essentially in terms of distribution 
problems although it accepted that there was low production. It emphasised 
the argument that the little that was available should be equally dis-
tributed to all and called for a procedure which would equally distribute 
goods to all the people without any form of favouritism. It proposed a 
system of quotas based on regional requirements. 	Products which were 
to be controlled were basic items such as textiles, flour, rice, cement, 
corrugated iron sheets, salt, cooking oil, etc. 	It also emphasised its 
support for controlling retail trade (Tanu, 1976: 3-7). 
The problems of scarcities of goods continued unabated throughout 
1977. 	Again, the Economic sub-committee of the Tanu Central Committee 
called another meeting between 3-5 January, 1977, which was to discuss 
barriers to the smooth operation. of distribution and the shortage of 
essential items in the country. 	The objective of the meeting was to find 
immediate solutions to the problems of distribution. 	This meeting was 
attended by different parastatals involved in production, trade and other 
economic activities. 
The chairman of the meeting was also the chairman of Tanu's Economic 
Sub-committee, so that his views can be taken as a good indication of the 
general attitude of the Party. 	The chairman argued that a number of 
public corporations had slackened their vigour in offering efficient 
service to the public and that the practice of distributing goods without 
proper analysis of the market conditions accounted for the confusion in 
this area of the economy. 	In addition, the lack of co-operation and 
co-ordination among the institutions dealing with the different sectors 
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of the economy, such as production, distribution, transportation and 
the Price Control Commission, were largely responsible for the 'pathetic' 
situation in the distribution of trade. 	He also stated that poor 
management and transport bottlenecks were responsible for the inefficiency 
within this sector (BIT, 1977). 
However, a persistent cause to the problem of scarcities of goods 
was traced to the problem of poor production. 	For instance, the Board 
of Internal Trade pointed to the problems affecting the distribution 
system, such as insufficient domestic production of essential commodities, 
problems of transportation and warehouse facilities. 	The representative 
for textile production stated that the demand for all types of textiles 
in 1977 was estimated at 395 million metres, but the mills were able to 
produce only 93 million metres. 
A similar problem affected the sugar industries. 	Thus the General 
Manager of the Sugar Development Corporation admitted that sugar production 
had been overtaken by rising consumption demands. 	Whereas in 1975/76 
the demand for sugar was put at 140,000 metric tons a year, the plants 
were able to produce only 63.4% of their capacity of 95,674 tons, due to 
the drought, breakdowns of the machines caused by the lack of spare parts, 
poor transportation and limited raw material inputs, namely sugar cane. 
In relation to the cooking oil shortage, it was discovered that no one 
knew the demand for it in the country. 	Cement production was well 
below demands 	in 1976 the factory produced only 241,000 tons instead of 
340,000 tons, which was its production capacity. Problems besetting this 
industry were again cited as shortages of spare parts, water and machines, 
machine breakdowns and lack of transport facilities. In relation to the 
shortage of salt, the State Mining Corporation stated that the production 
of salt was 41,000 tons while demand was put at 60,000 tons (BIT, 1977). 
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The problem of shortage of goods was thus explained by those 
involved in their production in terms of low domestic production. This 
in turn was explained as a result of the shortage of major inputs, such 
as spare parts ,\ breakdown in water 	The Party, however, appeared 
to circumvent the problems of production because it continued to stress 
distribution problems and brought measures to control the distribution 
networks of trade. 	Thus in 1977 a CCM directive No. 27 stated that 
internal trade should be well planned, especially on distribution, and 
that constant price changes should be avoided. In 1976 the Party recommended 
that the Ministry of Commerce and Industry should be split into two 
separate ministries. 	The aim was to enable the mounting problems in 
the trade sector to be dealt with separately and properly; but this 
decision also indicated that the Party was viewing the problems within 
the trade sector in isolation from the problems of production. 	As we 
shall see later, the separation of these two ministries, created immense 
problems of co-ordination of policies between trade and industry, especially 
since the two Ministers were at loggerheads with each other. 
Meanwhile, the Government, especially the production-orientated 
group, stressed the need to expand production and mobilised private capital 
to invest in production. 	The President supported the production-lobby aT 
the Government. This was the 'liberalisation' period. 	The business 
community was asked to put forward their complaints at a meeting held at 
the Diamond Jubilee Hall on 8th October, 1977. 	The meeting was chaired 
by the Regional Secretary of the Party, CCM. 	In this meeting, the 
business community pointed to how the policy of Confinement affected the 
production process: 
- Confiriees (state agencies) were not ordering 
enough material or machinery and they were 
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not systematic in their ordering. This 
tended to disrupt production. 
- Confinees did not do enough market research before 
they imported goods or machinery. 
- Confinees did not order sufficient goods to meet 
production targets of the various manufacturers. 
They also refused to endorse licences for the 
importation of such goods by the manufacturers 
even when the state agencies did not have them 
in stock or on order. 
- The profit margins made by the Confinees on machinery 
and materials were too high thus making production 
costs more expensive. 	This in turn made manufactured 
goods uncompetitive on the external markets. 
- No business ethics were followed. 
(BIT, 1977a) 
Thus the manufacturers argued that the policy of Confinement affected 
production in a number of ways. 	Low production in turn created the 
problem of scarcitj 	of goods. 	In response to complaints about the 
effects of the policy of Confinement on production, the President then 
directed all Regional Party Secretaries throughout the country to hold 
discussions with leaders of the manufacturing industries on the types of 
problems being faced by the industries. 	The Regional Secretaries were 
directed to submit their reports to the President. 	In nearly all the 
meetings held throughout the country, the performance of the existing 
system of importation and distribution of goods through confinees (state 
agencies) were seen as the major cause of the poor performance of the 
industries. 
As a result of these reports, the President held a meeting in which 
among others, the representatives of the 1 Trade, Industry, Treasury, the 
Board of Internal Trade and the Bank of Tanzania, attended to discuss the 
problems, brought forward by the manufacturing sector. 	The outcome of 
this inter-ministerial consultation was the creation of a committee under 
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the leadership of the Treasury. 	The latter was directed to prepare 
an ECC paper on how the importation and distribution system could be 
re-organised so as to increase the efficiency of local industries. The 
ECC paper was prepared and discussed by the Cabinet, which agreed to the 
policy of De-confinement, which meant that local industries would by-pass 
the confinees when they imported their requirements. 	As a result of 
this decision, an Implementation Committee was set up to effect the policy 
of De-confinement (interview with high ranking Government official, July 
1981). 
The policy of De-confinement 
The policy of De-confinement was defined to include the following 
aspects: 
- All the manufacturing industries were to be permitted 
to import their raw materials and spare parts without 
passing through the existing confinees. 
- The raw materials manufactured locally were to be sold 
directly to the consuming industries. 
- All imported consumer items, except raw materials and 
spare parts, were to be imported and distributed 
through the state agencies. 
- Local industries which were able to distribute their 
products directly to the market were to be free to do 
so, however, bearing in mind that the BIT could intervene 
to ensure equitable distribution throughout the country. 
(BIT, 1978a) 
The major concern voiced by the Board of Internal Trade over the policy of 
De-confinement was that it would lead to financial losses by the National 
Trading Corporations since the policy would reduce their business volume. 
The BIT also pointed to the dangers of foreign exchange flight (interview 
with Government official, July 1981). It appeared, however, that since 
the problems of production were viewed as most critical and there was 
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availability of foreign exchange as the result of the coffee boom - 
the policy of De-confinement was implemented. 
As anticipated by the BIT, the policy of liberalisation led to the 
flight of foreign exchange. 	Green (1980: 107) for instance states that, 
"the impact on the balance of payments was drastic foreign exchange 
reserves fell rapidly and without respite". 	This problem, however, was 
also aggravated by the Uganda War and adverse terms of trade. 	The policy 
of De-confinement also led to the loss of profits by the National Trading 
Companies (BIT, 1979). 	Finally, with the removal of state control 
goods became freely circulated and were consumed mainly in the urban areas. 
Since demand still surpassed supply, goods failed to reach the regions, 
or if they did, exorbitant prices were charged. 	The following quotations 
illustrate the situation: 
Trader pays 3,500/- for Siha over-charging (Daily News, 7.7.1979) 
Traders cheat on shirting materials (Daily News, 8.9.1977) 
Mwanza traders under fire 	(Daily News, 6.1.1979) 
These problems - outflow of foreign exchange, the losses of the parastatals 
and the unofficial prices - forced the Party again into the fore of policy-
making. 
The policy of Re-confinement: 1980 
The Party called a meeting of the state agencies involved in matters 
of trade and foreign exchange as well as of production. 	Among those who 
attended were the BIT, the Ministers of Trade and of Industry. The aim 
of the meeting was to discuss the problems of foreign exchange flight and 
the scarcities of goods. 	There was an intense and heated debate between 
the Minister of Trade, Kaduma, and the Minister of Industry, Msuya. 
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The Minister of Industry argued that the scarcity of consumer goods 
was the result of low production rather than of distribution problems. 
Industries were not producing enough consumer goods to meet national 
requirements. 	He also argued that a policy of Re-confinement would result 
in aggravating problems at the production level. 
This position, however, was opposed by the Minister of Trade, 
Kaduma, who argued that goods were not reaching the people and that higher 
prices occurred because of lack of control at the distribution level. He 
urged that the distribution system should be controlled in order to ensure 
that the "little that was produced must reach the people". 	Kaduma, a 
member of the Central Committee, was using the arguments proposed by the 
seminar on trade held by the Economic Sub-committee of the Central 
Committee in 1976. 	The Party accepted Kaduma's arguments. and initiated 
the policy of Re-confinement. 
In an interview conducted by the author with Party officials, I 
asked whether the policy of Re-confinement was a reflection of the Party's 
traditional hostility towards private capital. I was told that the decision 
to re-introduce the policy was taken mainly as an attempt to stop the 
foreign exchange flight, while that of the control of the distribution 
outlets was made to ensure that the "little that was produced reached the 
people" (interview with Party officials, July 1981). 	Thus the decision 
to reintroduce the policy of Re-confinement was based on social and foreign-
exchange considerations. 
The Minister of Trade, Kaduma, implemented the policy of Re-confinement 
on 1st March 1980 in relation to imports, and on 20th March 1980 in relation 
to the redistribution of internally produced goods. The latter was to 
ensure that goods were sold at the official prices (interview with Party 
officials, July 1981). 	The policy of Re-confinement, which was implemented 
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by the Minister of Trade, coincided with the Prime Minister's Circular 
1/80, which, as we have already seen, called for the phasing out of 
the private shop-keepers within a time-set period. 	According to my 
source of information, both the two agents of the Government had issued 
and implemented the policies independently of each other. 	Despite this 
lack of co-ordination, however, both shared the common aim of furthering 
the interests of socialism at the expense of the private trader. According 
to my source, the Ministry of Trade was very pleased with the Prime 
Minister's Circular because it enabled the former to 'link up' the policy 
of Confinement to the Circular of 1/80, which called for the abolition of 
private retail trade in the urban and the rural areas by 1983 and 1981/2 
respectively (interview with senior Government official, July 1981). As 
we shall see it enabled the Ministry to form a comprehensive new policy 
on internal trade. 
The nee.d for the Ministry of Trade to 'explain' its new policies was 
made more urgent and necessary because the policy of Re-confinement 
aroused immense resentment both among the general public and other 
government institutions. 	It appeared that the Ministry of Trade, did not 
consult or co-ordinate the policy of Re-confinement with other ministries 
but chose to implement the policy single-handed. 	As a result, the 
Ministry of Trade found itself practically isolated from other ministries. 
This in turn affected the implementation of the policy of Re-confinement, 
since the aid and co-operation of other ministries and government agencies 
were essential to its success. 
Ideology as an input into policy-making 
The Minister of Trade, Kaduma, became strongly identified with the 
policy of Re-confinement. 	Increasingly Kaduma began to explain the 
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policy of Re-confinement in terms of the ideology of socialism and self-
reliance, thus attempting to illustrate an ideological continuity with 
the policy of the Arusha Declaration. 	As a result, the policy became 
increasingly viewed as a 'political' policy. 	In a seminar organised 
by the Tanzania Investment Bank and held at Arusha in 1980, Kaduma gave 
a paper in which he argued that the compelling reasons for the policy of 
Re-confinement were political (1980: 7) and that the policy of Confinement 
has as its ideological basis the policy of socialism and self-reliance 
which is amply elaborated in the Arusha Declaration (Ibid: 5). 	Kaduma 
stated that the meaning and implications of the Arusha Declaration on 
trade weYQ. quite clear, "that those trade functions related to import, 
export and wholesale will be confined to organisations which will facilitate 
for the workers and peasants to exercise their control and ownership" 
(Ibid: 5). 	He argued that the policy of Re-confinement would allow 
for professional specialisation to develop because it would be carried 
out by specialised bodies, who would be equipped with the expertise, 
experience and skills (Ibid: 5 & 10). 
Kaduma appeared to be more concerned with maintaining an ideological 
consistency than lnrnairitaining an economic consistency between the conception 
of the policy and its capacity for implementation. 	In his 1980/81 Budget 
speech to Parliament, Kaduma said that the Arusha Declaration had stated 
that external and wholesale trade were part of the 'commanding heights' 
of the economy, which needed to be controlled by public parastatals; but 
he argued that retail trade did not seem to have been clearly seen as an 
important link with the wholesale trade, since it was left to continue in 
the hands of individuals (Ministryof Trade, 1980: 70). 	The Minister 
then illustrated the economic significance of the retail trade, which 
included its capacity to generate wealth, but he argued, such wealth did 
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not accrue to the nation, because retail trade was controlled by 
private traders who did not invest their profits in industries or banks. 
It was therefore necessary to complete the take-over of the trade sectors 
in order to have access to the profits, which would be invested in the 
economy. 	Kaduma went on to explain that recent policies such as the 
Prime Minister's Circular 1/80W. meant to replace private trade and 
allow for the surpluses derived from internal trade to be controlled 
socially for the benefit of everyone: 
As I have already explained, this policy 
aims at placing all trade undertakings in the 
hands of the public parastatals. The sole means 
to achieve this, is through the establishment 
of a number of strong public-owned shops as 
soon as possible. 
(Ministry of Trade, 1980: 73) 
He then stated that it was the responsibilit9 	of regional, district and 
village leaders to see that there were sufficient mass-owned shops in 
their respective areas. "At a national level" he added, "we will no 
longer issue licences toestablish individual shops". 	In relation to 
the policy of the Re-confinement of products which were to be sold solely 
to the state-owned agencies, the Minister stated that the "aim of this 
procedure is to completely erase the private entreprenuer". (Ibid: 78). 
Thus the new policy on Internal Trade aimed at eliminating the private 
trader from retail shopand from distribution levels. 
A similar explanation of the new policy on internal trade was used 
in an official publication of the Ministry of Trade entitled Sera ya 
Biashara ya Ndani (1980) which set out the argument that the new policy 
of internal trade was a good policy, because, 
if we remove the national problems, of 
the lack of vehicles, bad roads, lack of 
capital etc., we can generally say that 
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we have bodies that understand their 
duties. 
(Ministry of Trade, 1980a:para. 16: 7) 
The above passage succinctly illustrates a major argument of the thesis, 
that policy-making in Tanzania excludes the consideration of national 
problems. 
The state of internal trade in Tanzania: 1980-1982 
The state of internal trade in Tanzania was best summarised by the 
Board of Internal Trade: 
The Tanzanian distribution system is beset 
with a number of problems, namely the lack of 
adequate physical facilities, skilled and 
experienced manpower, finance to meet the 
working capital requirements, the poor road 
network in the country, low margins for 
textiles and provisional items, political 
and parochial overtones, black markets and 
smuggling and shortage of essential items. 
(BIT, na f19793: 7) 
The Ministry of Trade and the Party have responded to these problems 
by bringing measures to bear at the distribution level. 	Thus new 
regulations were brought to curb the private trader who was blamed for 
the shortage of goods and the higher prices (Daily News, 7.1.1980; 
29.1.1981). 	One such control was the new Business Licencing Miendment 
Bill, which sought to restrict the issuing of licences only to business- 
men who had premises. 	This was an attempt to eliminate bogus business- 
men, who were out to make a quick profit, a phenomenon which Shivji (1976: 84) 
had already observed emerging in the business community. Another measure 
was the Ministry of Trade's policy that no new licences would be issued 
Sw" 
to private shops except in specialised fields,as those of spare parts, 
pharmacies and garages (Daily News, 15.3.1980). 	The objective of this 
SM 
new control was summed up as: 
to crack down on unscrupulous businessmen. 
Ndugu Kaduma said rigorous enforcement of the 
procedures would tremendously reduce and 
possibly eradicate hoarding, black marketeering 
and smuggling. He observed that if it were not 
for a few greedy businessmen, scarce commodities 
would be conveniently shared among the people. 
(Daily News, 17.2.1980, emphasis 
added) 
In 1981 the CCM Executive Council ordered the control of the 
distribution of basic items. 	This was to ensure that each region 
obtained the quota allocated to it. 	Thus: 
The NEC members in their analysis of the 
cause of shortages, were satisfied that 
although available goods would not satisfy 
everybodys needs, there was little effort 
to distribute whatever w as available 
eq u i tab ly. 
(Daily News, 11.1.1981) 
Thus by 1981 the Party finally accepted the fact that it was an impossible 
task to satisfy national requirements of essential items merely by re-
organising the distribution system. 	This acceptance modified its goal 
to that of equitable distribution of goods in the regions. 
But despite the control of prices, quota systems, and control of 
distribution networks, unofficial prices have continued to be charged for 
basic items, putting them far above the reach of the ordinary man and 
woman. 	Jamal recognised the difficulty of controlling prices amidst 
shortages when he stated in 1974: 
There will always be a price which a buyer 
will pay and a seller will accept - as long as 
demand outstrips supply or availability of 
consumer goods through production, controlling 
prices at fixed levels will be a very difficult 
task, almost impossible. 
(EASMI, 1979: 1) 
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Jamal's views have been proven correct by events. 	The explanation 
given by the Price Commissioner as to the weakness of the price control 
would also support the argument that it is difficult to control prices 
under conditions of scarcitiy 
Extreme shortage of goods in the market 
make enforcement of price control difficult 
because the consumer who is our Price 
Inspector number one becomes willing to pay 
a price which is higher than the controlled 
price. In view of this cases of over- 
charging are not reported, efforts directed 
at the enforcement of price control are 
impaired. 
(Mongi, 1980: 20) 
The analysis of this section therefore illustrates that basically control 
of distribution is ineffective in conditions of scarcit>/ , which are 
rooted in chronic problems of production. 
The second part of this chapter has documented how policies were 
formulated independently of consideration3of implementation capacity. 
Thus I would argue, problems that were generated from such a policy-
making style cannot be seen as mere implementation problems, but must 
be related to the manner in which policies were formulated. 	While this 
approach towards policy-making characterised Government-Party relations 
(because of the institutional division of functions based on the 1965 
Interim Constitution), by 1976 it would appear that it had also been 
adopted by the Government itself. 
CONCLUSION 
This case study, on the investigation of policies on internal 
trade, ha highlighted a number of important issues which can help us 
1.1. 
Is'. 
understand the development experience of Tanzania. The case study 
has demonstrated that the implementation problems of the STC and its 
subsequent failure as well as those besetting the new trading system 
under the Board of Internal Trade, were the result of faulty p01 icy-
making. 	We have seen how two organs of the state (the President and 
the Party) formulated major policies pertaining to the trade sector 
without giving due consideration to the economic problems i'nvolved in 
the implementation of the policies. 	Between 1967-1976, a period of 
only nine years, Tanzania's nationalisation of external and internal trade 
was completed. 	Policies nationalising major areas of the trade sector 
were taken after only a short intermediate period, increasing the burden 
on the existing state trade organisation (1967, 1979, 1976). 
It is difficult to see how rational men could pursue such a course 
of action, when the evidence derived from each previous policy was so 
evident. 	The thesis has offered two explanations. 	First, institutional 
arrangements separated the function of policy-making from that of imple-
mentation, creating the conditions whereby policy-makers wrongly believed 
that the implementation problems were extrinsic to policy-making. 	This 
encouraged a reckless tendency where policy-makers could virtually ignore 
certain kinds of national problems. 	This tendency was legitimised by 
being conceived as a proper 'political' approach. 
Thus the objective arrangement for policy-making permitted the 
emergence of a subjective view of development, which removed any form of 
restraint on the personal views of leaders. 	The persistent tendency of 
the Party activists in insisting that the problems of scarcity of goods 
was the result of distribution - despite evidence to the contrary - 
deflected the energies of the Party from coming to grips with the real 
and more complex problems of raising production and productivity. This 
ME 
situation in turn destabilised the development process, creating 
problems of implementation Which the implementors were incapable of 
resolving. 
A final word can be said about alternative interpretations of 
the Tanzanian experience. 	On the basis of the case study on internal 
trade, we have seen that the implementation problems experienced by 
the state agencies in the trade sector can be directly related to the 
way in which policy-making has been undertaken in Tanzania. This means 
that these problems cannot be seen as mere 'implementation problems' 
in the manner of Green. 	The 'implementation' problems faced by the 
STC and the BIT were the result of faulty policy-making. Nor , on the 
other hand, can the failure of these state agencies be explained in terms 
of the class interests of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. 	In fact, the 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie had far more to gain from successful state 
organisations than from weak and tottering parastatals. 	It was surely 
in its class interests to see that the state sector functioned profitably 
and smoothly; the fact that it has failed to do so would indicate that 
the problems confronted were beyond its class and institutional powers. 
Finally, I would argue once again that the state in Tanzania is not homo- 
geneous. 	Each organ of the state, and each agency within it, appears to 
go its own way. The President, like Hercul's, struggles to maintain a 
balance between the two opposing organs. In this sense it is a mistake 
to try and assign the state a uniform class character. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
CASE STUDY: AGRICULTURAL GROWTH AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
We saw in the Introduction that the most distinguishing factor 
about Tanzania socialism was its emphasis on rural development. This 
policy received support from social scientists and aid donors such as 
the International Labour Organisation and the World Bank. In particular, 
Tanzania's development, priorities were similar to that of a rising tide 
of development theory in the late 1960s and 1970s which called for 
development to be rural-based (Lipton, 1977, Schumacher, 1973). 
But despite a seemingly correct approach to development supported 
by political changes and administrative re-organisation 1 all orientated 
towards developing the rural sector, the performance of the rural economy 
has been persistently disappointing. 	To recapitulate, within a period 
of merely 12 years the following policy-changes have taken place: 
1967 	Announcement of the policy of Ujamaa. The policy 
was to be based on communal production, it was 
to be voluntary and progressive farmers were not 
to be excluded or discriminated against. 
1969 	The Presidential Circular 1/69. It called for 
the establishment of Ujamaa villages to be 
compulsory and nationwide. 	Positive discrim- 
ination was to be given to ujarnaa villages 
vis-a-vis individual peasants/farmers. 
1972 	"No future for capitalist farmers". 
State and co-operative farming are the only 
two forms that agriculture can now take in 
Tanzania bound towards socialism, President 
Nyerere told West Kilimanjaro settlers in 
r4ashi. Mwalimu said that there was no future 
for individual large-scale farmers in Tanzania 
(Daily News, 4.6.1972). 
1971-72 	Limited operations moving peasants into 
villages: Operations Dodoma, Chunya and Kigoma. 
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1973 	The President announced "To live in villages 
is an order" (Daily News, 6.11.1973). The 
policy of villagisation was undertaken 
nationwide and it was to be completed by 
November 1974. 
1981 	"Nyerere - Largescale farmers are Welcome" 
(Daily News, 6.6.1981). 
How can we explain this succession of policy-changes? 	What have been 
the consequences Qf policy-instability on the development process in this 
strategic sector of the Tanzanian economy? 
The chapter will be divided into four sections. At the risk of some 
repetition, the first section will review the prevailing interpretations 
o f  Ujamaa, villagisation and agricultural development. 	The second section 
will examine the Ujamaa era, from 1967 to 1973. I shall use my approach 
to advance an alternative explanation of the problems which faced the 
policy of Ujamaa. 	The third part will look into the policy of villagi- 
sation and the fourth part will consider the agricultural sector from 
1977 - 1982. 
RECAPITULATION: MAJOR INTERPRETATIONS OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
Explanations offered for the failure of Ujamaa 
We have seen in the Introduction that radical writers such asRaikes 
(1975), Von Freyhold (1979), Shivji (1976), Coulson (1975) have attributed 
the failure of the ujamaa policy to the class interests of the bureau-
cratic bourgeoisie. 	Musti's (1978) explanation quoted below echoes the 
views of the radicals: 
Despite pronouncements to the contrary, the 
Ujamaa policy was never intended to be the 
basis of a new development strategy for Tanzania. 
'Socialism' only meant a different property 
relation - state involvement - for the most 
important economic enterprises in the country. 
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f43reover, the state limited its inter- 
vention to formal control, with no critical 
apprai!sal of the ends of production or the 
modes'tf production. Thus, after a number 
of years of experience with 'socialism', 
the Tanzanian economic structure remained 
essentially what it had been at the time of 
independence. 
(Musti, 1978: 78) 
Von Freyhold's Ujamaa villages in Tanzania (1979) is a detailed attempt 
to explain the reasons for the failure of Ujamaa in Tanzania, and 
therefore I shall review it at some length. 	According to von Freyhold, 
the failure of commurIisation was the result of "inherent contradictions 
'1 
between the revolutionary aims of the programme and its reformist form, 
which eventually led to an impasse which could not be surmounted" (Von 
Freyhold, 1979: xii). 	She further argues that ujamaa (coinmunalisation 
of peasant production) was not only possible in Tanzania but provided 
an ideal framework for agricultural development. 	Corrvuna1isation of 
production would enable the peasants 
to establish more direct contacts with each 
other and with economic and political 
institutions in town and thus recapture control 
over their lives and their productive process. 
(Ibid: 27, emphasis added) 
Communalisation would enable peasants to regain their autonomous life-style 
and make them self-reliant. 
Von Freyhold goes on to document the different methods that were 
used to implement ujamaa, ranging from the 'stick', to the 'carrot'. 
But, "there were just not enough sticks and carrots around to sustain 
the villages that had been created" (Ibid: 50). 	Other government forms 
of assistance such as the Bwana shambas, rural development assistants, 
Tanu secretaries, ward executives and teachers, all failed. 	Meanwhile, 
wealthy village leaders and richer farmer/peasants opposed communalisation. 
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But the poor peasants themselves were also not willing to 
communalise; for most people in most villages their private farms 
still remained their primary focus of interest" (Ibid: 83). 	Finally, 
however, the state, that is, the bureaucrats, sabotaged ujamaa by forming 
an alliance with the metropolitan bourgeoisie and the World Bank, who 
favoured export production and individual small-scale producers. Ujamaa 
was changed from a revolutionary concept to a tool serving the class 
interests of the bureaucrats. 	Thus: 
Eventual ly the bureaucracy managed to turn 
the slogan of Lijamaa into a tool which would 
be used for its own purposes. Workers could be 
told that their wage claims were illegitimate 
because the nation needed the funds for 
socialist reconstruction of the countryside 
and that compared to the peasants they were 
selfish individualists. 	The unemployed could 
be collected and sent back to the villages to,. 
build ujamaa. Kujaks and peasants who stood 
up to oppose certain bureaucratic measurs and 
orders could be told that they obstructed 
ujamaa and in the end even the subordination of 
the peasantry under a new authoritarian 
bureaucracy that reached down to the village 
level could be' legitimised in the name of 
Uj am a a. 
(Von Freyhold, 1979: 120) 
Many of the weaknesses of the radical explanations discussed in the 
Introduction are also reflected in Von Freyhold's analysis of the policy 
of Ujamaa. 	Von Freyhold's approach is to contrast an ideal version of 
development with an empirical reality. First, her idea of the potential 
benefits of commurualisation is not based on any study of the socio-economic 
reality and capabilities of poor peasants in Tanzania. In fact, often 
enough, her own empirical data contradict her assumptions. For instance 
she notes: 
Most of the village members were not used to 
any conscious planning and had no idea of how 
their private experiences on their small farms 
could be of any use to a larger enterprise 
(such as a communal farm). 
(Ibid: 84) 
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Democratic planning was something the ordinary 
villagers were not yet capable of, mainly 
because they had no ideas about development 
strategies. 
(Ibid: 85) 
To some extent the absence of financial control 
could be blamed on the low level of education 
of leaders and villagers. In some villages even 
the leaders were illiterate and in the majority 
of the villages most members would not have been 
able to read a simple financial statement. 
There were some programmes to train a few 
villagers in book-keeping but most villagers 
would have had to wait for years to have any 
of their members trained. Villagers did not 
know what kind of records they should keep 
and in some of the more remote places they even 
lacked stationery for recording anything. 
(Ibid: 87) 
It is extremely difficult to see how, under these conditions, comunalisation 
could have been a viable organisational structure for poor peasants. 
Communalisation is a very complex form oforganisation and creates heavy 
demands for organisational skills. 
There are two further ways in which von Freyhold proceeds by contrasting 
reality with an ideal situation. 	She argues that the failure to implement 
socialism was the result of Tanzani&s failure to eliminate links with 
international capitalism, and that related to this was the failure to 
create political cadres who could mobilise the peasantry. 	We have already 
seen in the Introduction that the dependency ideas/arguments of the 
delinking of the economy from international capitalism failed to stand 
up to a serious re-examination. 	On the second point, von Freyhold writes: 
The first step towards a transformation of 
the state economy and the peasant economy 
would have had to be a political change, a 
change putting workers and peasants in power. 
But instead of embarking on the task of 
And: 
And: 
political mobilisation from which such a 
change might have resulted, the Party 
intellectuals who supported the policy of 
'socialism in the countryside' were urging 
the peasants to conirnunalise within the 
existing political and economic structure. 
(1979: 121) 
The suggestion that political cadres would have been more successful in 
implementing the policy of Ujamaa is not supported, however, by evidence. 
An intelligent guess can be made that the problems of implementation - 
the shortage of technical assistance, infrastructural problems, problems 
of co-ordination between the different agencies, the lack of capacity 
within the poor peasantry themselves - would not disappear merely because 
of the creation of 'political cadres'. 
We can therefore see that von Freyhold's approach to analysing the 
failure of Ujamaa is extremely idealistic. 	Once we have questioned her 
assumptions (which her excellent case material helps us to do) then very 
little evidence remains either for the thesis of class-sabotage of Ujamaa 
or for the viability of Ujamaa as a development policy. On this basis I 
would argue that her well-researched book fails to give an adequate 
explanation for the failure of ujamaa. 
We saw in the Introduction that a second type of explanation of 
Tanzania's radical policies has come from pragmatic dependery analysis 
such as Green. 	Green has argued that Tanzania's policies are correct 
but that they have experienced problems at the level of implementation. 
I have already criticised Green's approach which views problems as extrinsic 
to policies. Suffice it to restate my argument, that implementation 
problems must be anticipated by policy-makers because failure to do so 
is likely to defeat the political and social aims which inspired the 
policy in the first place. 
A third type of explanation for the failure of Ujamaa comes from 
P. 0. Box 58480, 
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Hyden (1980). 	Hyden's major argument. is that the policy failed because 
of its own intrinsic deficiencies as a policy of development. Briefly 
summarised, the policy failed to meet the needs and requirements of the 
Government, especially its need for agricultural growth. 	Secondly, the 
Party's offer of free social services and other amenities to the ujamaa 
villages reduced the Government's effectiveness in making the peasants 
produce more. 	Thirdly, policy-makers assumed a peasant capacity far 
beyond what the peasants were really capable of (Hyden, 1980: 109). 
Hyden's explanation of the failure of Ujamaa is more convincing 
than the others. But how could a major policy such as Ujamaa ignore 
such fundamental aspects of development? 	How could policy-makers overlook 
the problem of providing effective incentives to peasant producers? Why 
did policy-makers over-estimate the capacity of peasants and their own 
capacity in the implementation of the policy? 	These are some of the 
questions which Hyden's book has raised but to which he has not provided 
satisfactory answers. I would argue that we can only understand why 
crucial factors pertaining to the policy of ujamaa were not given 
sufficient consideration by examining the institutional relationship 
between the three organs of the state and their practice of formulating 
policies. Herein lies the simplest explanation of the failure of Ujamaa 
in Tanzania. 
Academic explanations for the policy of villagisation 
We have seen in the Introduction that most academics were shocked 
by the massive physical relocation of peasants into village settlements 
and by the methods that were employed in implementing this policy. Radical 
writers have explained villagisation in terms of the class interests of 
the bureaucratic bourgeoisie in controlling peasant production. 	This 
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argument has been summarised by Coulson (1977: 95) as follows: 
Finally, a set of arguments deriving from 
Shivji (1976) and put forward in different 
ways by Boesen (1976) and Leonard (1976) 
claim that the object of villagisation is 
for the officials to control peasant 
production and thus achieve control of all 
the means of production in the country. 
In Boesen's analysis, as in Coulson's 
of 1975, there are two antangonistic 
classes, the peasants and the bureaucrats, 
with the bureaucrats unable to produce 
themselves and thus dependent on getting 
production out of the peasants. Leonard 
adds a third class, the kulaks, or emerging 
African. capitalist farmers and small 
businessmen. 	In his view collective 
agriculture is the only alternative to 
kulak production if peasant agriculture is 
to be expanded in scale and ultimately 
raised to a higher technical level. 
QJjJ 	O.$ 
Thus villagisation wasAthe  class interests of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. 
The latter have to control peasant production in order to obtain surplus 
to develop the economy. 
Lofchie (1978), however, argues that villagisation, with its 
emphasis on block as opposed to communal production, signified the 
abandonment of socialism. As Lofchie states, "Villagisation without 
socialism is, in effect, the current policy" (1978: 451). 	This change 
was brought about by the failure to achieve ujamaa because of peasants 
resistance and the resulting famine. Thus: 
Following the agrarian crisis, Tanzania 
embarked upon a process of gradual economic 
liberlisation. 	The roots of this policy 
can be dated as early as the Fall of 1974, 
with the decision to de-emphasise collect-
ivism as a goal of the villagisation 
programme and, thereby, to make individual 
farming a fundamental institution in the 
rural sector. 
(Lofchie, 1978: 458) 
Lofchie's argument which sees villagisation as a form of liberalisation 
SME 
is not entirely opposed to the one advanced earlier. 	Both rest on 
the argument that socialism has been abandoned, but for different 
reasons: in the former case because of the class interests of the 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie, in the latter because of policy deficiencies. 
The third type of explanation for villagisation has come from 
Hyden (1980). 	Hyden explained the policy of villagisation as an attempt 
by the Party and Government to capture the peasantry. 	Villagisation 
of the peasantry created a situation where both Government and Party could 
intervene more easily in terms of providing social services, and achieving 
the political and economic integration of the peasantry into the wider 
structure of society. 	Hyden argues further that increasingly Tanu has 
used policies based on a 'political market-place' as the principal forum 
for interaction with the peasants. (Hyden, 1980: 131). 	Other major 
policies following the political-market method were the dissolution of 
the co-operatives in 1976, the policy of Operation Maduka 1976, and the 
replacement of District Councils with the decentralisation system (1972). 
According to Hyden, the removal of these agencies also removed petty 
capitalists, petty bourgeoisie and petty traders from interacting with 
the peasants, making them interact directly with Party and government 
agencies. 	Further, the Party now dealt with the peasants on the basis 
of 'operations' and 'campaigns'. 	Although such an approach might appear 
to be more authoritarian, nevertheless, Hyden is optimistic about the 
achievements of policies based on a political market: 
There is little doubt that in spite of 
bureaucratic high-handedness and other 
excesses, the new policy measures were 
successful in some respects. People have 
by and large accepted their new locations 
of domicile and production. Production 
has also increased in many villages, although 
it is too early to say how far this can be 
attributed to villagisation and the other 
policy measures taken during this period. 
(Hyden, 1980: 152) 
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There are certain similarities among the different explanations 
offered on villagisation. 	There is an acceptance that villagisation 
will enable the bureaucratic class to control peasants more effectively 
and that this will lead to greater production as well as to increased 
surpluses. 
But there are certain problems. First, all these explanations 
assume, once again, that the 'state' was acting as a homogeneous entity 
and that the policy was a rational attempt by the 'state' o control 
the production of peasants. 	These explanations are in4t premised on 
assumptions similar to those made by Nyerere and the Party,. namely, that 
villagisation would enable the state to give social amenities to peasants 
and thereafter improve the production process. 	Both these assumptions 
assume the availability of material capacities, which in practice proved 
to be lacking. Coulson (1977: 94) has posed a seriou s question which 
is significant at this point: Why did the Government (in the policy of 
villagisation) create impossible demands for services which it must have 
known it could not fulfil? 
Hyden's answer to such questions that the policy was based on a 
political-market, which is defined in such a way as to relegate economic 
consequences to secondary importance. 	This form of interpretation leads 
in the final analysis to a rationalisation of faulty policy-making. Today, 
in the 1980s, many of the policies based on the political-market such as 
the Dissolution of the Co-operatives (1976) and the disbanding of the 
District Council system (1972), are now being re-introduced. It is 
difficult to explain these policy changes without critically re-examining 
the political-market concept. A better approach is to differentiate between 
the organs of the state, and pursue the different views of development 
prevailing in these organs. 	Thus in line with the approach taken in 
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Parts One and Two, I propose to examine the various policies adopted for 
the agricultural sector in relation to the policy-making institutions. 
As in the previous chapters, this approach will enable me to pursue 
in more specific terms, the themes broadly documented in Parts One and 
Two, that there are conflicts of views and interests between the three 
organs of the state; that policy-failures are frequently the result of 
faulty policy-making; and that faulty policy-making results from the 
way the various organs of the state formulate their policies. These 
themes constitute an alternative explanation of the types of problems 
and the policy-changes that have been experienced in this sector. 
As in the other case studies, I shall argue that the problems within 
this important sector of the economy can be traced to the conflict and 
institutional relationship between the three organs of the state, that 
is, the Presidency, the Party and the Government. 	I hope to show that 
in terms of their views on agriculture, the President and the Party were 
closer than either of them was to the Government. 	The policies formulated 
by the first two organs failed to incorporate the Government's needs, 
problems and priorities. 	However, the effects of failure on agriculture 
were intensified, especially in the 1970s, by the conduct of the Ministry 
of Agriculture, whose effectiveness appears to have been greatly reduced 
by poor leadership. 	It compromised its principles on economic growth. 
A more dynamic leadership might have been able to offset the effects of 
the Party and the President's approach to development. 	Yet most of 
the neglect in the agricultural sector can be traced to this period. 
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THE UJAMAA ERA 
We saw in Parts One and Two that Tanzania had a tripartite system 
of policy-making, involving the Government, the Party and the President. 
These three organs of the state had different priorities and concerns, 
all of which affected the agricultural sector. 	I showed in Part One 
that the Government's view of development saw economic growth as a pre- 
condition to development. 	The policy of the Ministry of Agriculture 
(MOA) was to encourage the development of the 'progressive farmers' and 
maintain commercial farming because of their important contributions to 
GOP. 	In relation to the subsistence peasants, Government relied on trade 
and market incentives to integrate them into commodity production (Plans, 
1961-63; 1964-1969). 
However, superimposed on this view, was another approach sponsored 
mainly by the President. 	In 1962 Nyerere called for a policy of rural 
development based on village settlements (Hansard, 1962, Col: 7). 	This 
view of development was aimed at bringing the subsistence peasants living 
in scattered homesteads, who constituted the majority of the people, to 
live in village settlements so that modern social welfare services could 
be made available to them. 	Nyerere's view of development incorporated 
re-distributive concerns and the re-organisation of peasant settlements. 
Running concurrently with the President's and the Government's views 
of development was another view articulated mainly by Party activists. 
This focussed on marketing relations and had implications for the agri-
cultural sector because of the close relations, in more than one way, 
between production and marketing. 	As we saw in Part One, the Party 
activists pressed for the replacement of private traders by state agencies 
and the co-operatives. 
The Government (1963-1966) attempted to deal with these two major 
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views without abandoning its own concern over economic growth. Thus 
in relation to the President's idea of village settlements, which was 
supported by the World Bank in the form of the 'transformation' approach, 
the Government created a Ministry of Lands, Settlement and Water 
Development which became responsible for the early villagisation programme. 
In addition, a Village Settlement Agency was created to initiate pilot 
settlements. 	In relation to the Party's pressures and demands, the 
Government in 1962 created the National Agricultural Produce Board, which 
was given a monopoly, over maize marketing, and in 1963 gave into the 
demands for the rapid expansion of the co-operatives. 	As a result, the 
total volume of produce handled by the co-operatives grew from 145,000 
tons in 1960 to almost 500,000 tons in 1965 (World Bank, 1977: vi: 22). 
By 1966, however, these two major politically motivated policies 
were in difficulties. 	The village settlement schemes were abandoned. 
And in relation to the co-operatives, the Government was forced to intervene. 
In 1967 some 16 unions were taken over directly by the Government (World 
Bank, Ibid: 23). 	By 1966 it was evident that policies which were 
motivated by purely political pressures and which ignored economic 
considerations were creating immensd development problems. On the other 
hand, government agricultural policies, which were not politically 
interfered with, were proving successful and were maintained until 1968. 
These apparent lessons of agricultural policy-making in the 1960s were 
overlooked by policy-makers, however, in the creation of the One Party 
State as we have seen, the Constitution separated the powers to formulate 
policies from those of implementation and vested them in different organs. 
This created the context in which the Party could formulate policies taking 
into consideration only 'political' factors while the 'economics' of the 
policy was considered the responsibility of the Government. 
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The Arusha Declaration, 1967 
The policy of Ujamaa (1967) initiated by the President and passed 
by the Party called for peasants to live together cultivating land 
communally as a way of raising their standard of living as well as of 
generating more agricultural output. 	It would also enable the Government 
to give services to the ujamaa villages. 	In 1967 the President was 
against private commercial farming but he was not against the 'progressive 
farmers'; as a result, the Government came to rely even more heavily on 
the progressive farmer for economic growth. 	As I argued in Part One 
Nyerere was operating at this stage within the framework of conventional 
ideas which saw economic growth as essential to development. 
The Presidential Circular 1/69 on Uiamaa 
But two years later Nyerere changed his position vis-a-vis the 
progressive farmers, who now came to be considered as obstacles to 
ujamaa. 	Secondly, Nyerere argued for a frontal approach in the imple- 
mentation of the policy of Ujamaa Vijinini.(1969-1974). 	Thirdly, the 
Party became the main agent for implementing it. This policy is crucial 
because it displaced totally the Government's concern for economic growth. 
Why did the President change his mind? 	I posed this question to a 
close confidante of Nyerere. 	According to the interviewee, the President 
changed his mind and introduced the Circular because the policy of Ujamaa 
was not being seriously implemented between 1967-1969. 	The initiative 
was mainly left to local party functionaries who lacked support from 
national institution 	(interview with high ranking Government official, 
July 1981). 	The Circular was an attempt to create an institutional 
structure at regional, district and national levels which would. assist in 
the implementation of the programme. As we saw, the President gave a high 
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priority to socialist organisation at the expense, if need be, of 
agricultural production. This was the period of the primacy of 
politicj in development. 
The Government (consisting mainly of the production-orientated 
group such as Jamal, Msuya, Helleiner, for instance) warned the President 
against a frontal approach to implementing Ujaniaa and advised him that 
individual small-scale peasant farming was more efficient (Pratt, 1972: 424). 
But the timing of Presidential Circular 1/69 also coincided with a 
deteriorating conditi.on in the agricultural sector. 	By 1969 it was 
already apparent to the Government that there were grave problems mani-
fested in falling agricultural production and marketing problems (Kriesel 
report, 1970). 	Like the 1966 Presidential Enquiry into the Co-operatives, 
the Kriesel Report (1970) stated that the problems of the co-operatives, 
which were affecting marketing and which in turn affected production, 
were because: 
societies and unions were hastily formed 
and necessarily manned by untrained and 
inexperienced staff. Marketing costs per 
unit have risen substantially and some 
services have deteriorated. 
(Kriesel Report, 1979: 1) 
elm 
A growing disrespect for law and regulations 
within the country because of the inability 
to cope with widespread violations. This 
development can have serious implications 
beyond the marketing system. 
(Ibid: 21) 
The Presidential Circular 1/69 thus introduced a new dimension into the 
problems of the agricultural sector. 	The policy of Ujamaa was only 
incorporated into the 2nd Five Year Plan after the President had insisted 
and had rejected the first draft, which had made no mention of ujamaa 
farms (Coulson, 1977: 25). 1 would argue that, in order to guarantee 
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production, the Government introduced the idea of state farms in the 
1969-1974 Plan. 	The Government's reluctance to incorporate the 
policy of Ujamaa into the Development Plan has often been viewed as 
exemplifying class opposition to the policy. 	Musti (1978: 35) for 
instance, argues that the introduction of state farms represented "a 
lack of confidence in the development of the ujamaa villages only two 
years after their conceptualisation". But I would argue that the 
Government's cautious attitude towards ujamaa in 1969 was warranted, 
given the types of problems which the agricultural sector was already 
experiencing and the implementation capacity of the Party and Government. 
As we shall see later, it was precisely these factors which created 
problems at the implementation level. 
In concluding this section we might say that the 'state' was 
failing to act as a homogeneous entity in a number of ways. First, the 
Presidential Circular 1/69 did not address itself to the prevailing 
agricultural conditions, which were a concern for the Government. It 
gave greater stress to rural development aspects than to production. 
Secondly, it discriminated against the progressive farmers, upon whom the 
Government was dependent for marketed output, before viable alternative 
forms had been established, and finally, it came at a period when the 
agricultural sector was already experiencing problems and instability. 
These problems show that the President and the Government especially 
those who were concerned with the conventional view were operating at 
cross purposes; their interests, their priorities and their understanding 
of development problems were different. 
We shall now turn to the type of institutional arrangements which 
were created for the implementation of the policy of Ujamea. We shall 
find that the unresolved conflict between the President and the Government 
iEII! 
was reflected in the implementation of ujamaa as both organs of the 
state emphasised their own priorities and views of development. 
Institutions and the imDlenlentation of Uianiaa 
The institutional arrangements for the implementation of Ujamaa 
were the product of the 1969 Presidential Circular, which created the 
organisational structures whereby all three organs of the state - the 
d. 
Present, the Party and the Government - were to be involved in the policy. 
First, the Presidential Circular 1/69 led to the creation of a whole new 
ministry, the Ministry of Regional Administration and Rural Development. 
After 1972, this ministry was re-organised to form the Prime Minister's' 
Office. 	According to the Circular, the Ministry was to be a guide in 
organising the villages, assuring the provision of social services and 
assisting villages to organise their production around the ujamaa 
principle (Nyerere, 1969). 	Secondly, the Ministry of Development Planning 
was responsible for integrating the ujamaa policy into the general economic 
policies of the nation (see 1969-1974 Plan) and to provide micro-plans 
for development. 
Thirdly, the Ministry of Agriculture was responsible for providing 
technical assistance and consulting services. It also ran its own 
programmes on the problems of ujamaa villages and on agricultural 
techniques (Musti, 1978: 74). 	These new functions were in addition to 
its traditional ones of overseeing crop production, extension and provision 
of inputs for specific programmes productive investments and the co-
ordination of marketing. 	These formed the Government agents for assisting 
Ujamaa development. 
There was also, however, a Presidential Planning Team which was 
directly responsible to the President. The group consisted of five 
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experts - in agriculture, co-operatives, land planning and hyd'au1ic 
development, and an ecQomist - guided by a Tanu official at the regional 
level (Musti, 1978: 68);. 
The third organ was the Party. 	We have already seen that the 
policy of Ujamaa was taken up by the Party in 1967 and that by 1969 the 
Party was also responsible for implementing it - because it was a 
political policy (Daily News, 25.9.1969). 	The Party came to assume three 
functions: elaborating the general political line, participating in 
the implementation of policy even at the administrative level, and 
mobilising the masses. 	The key figures in implementing the policy of 
ujamaa were the Regional and District Commissioners. 	Their responsibilities 
included that of co-ordinating the operations of administrators in their 
regions, assuring the implementation of national policy and controlling 
the lower Party levels (Musti, 1978: 66). 	However, they were in a position 
to call on both Party and Government officials in their regions to prepare 
and implement the programme. 
We can therefore see that all three organs of the state were involved 
in various degrees in the implementation of the policy; this is an 
indication that the policy of Ujamaa was taken seriously enough by policy-
makers to warrant institutional re-arrangements. 
Two views of development - rural development and export production 
The unresolved conflict of interests between the President and the 
Party on the one hand, and the Government on the other, created a situation 
whereby two tendencies in development policy were running concurrently 
in Tanzanian agriculture between 1969-1974. 	On the one hand was the 
President's and the Party's policy of socialist rural development which 
prohibited the employment of labour, while on the other was the Government's 
emphasis on export production and individual peasant enterprises 
(with a market in hired labour). 
The President and the Party: 	Under the new institutional arrangements 
the Party was the main mobiliser and implementor of Ujamaa. 	The 
Regional Development Fund, with 20 million shillings, was put at the 
disposo..L 	of the Regional Commissioners for financing the initial 
overhead expenses of the ujamaa villages. 	Mobilisation of the peasantry 
to go Ujamaa during this stage was characterised by 'conuandisni' 
(Finucane, 1974; 	Raikes 1975; Von Freyhold 1979; Coulson 1975). 
As a result, the number of new villages created from 1969 to 1971 grew 
to 2500 with more than one million inhabitants. By December 1973 the 
number passed 5600 with two million inhabitants equal to 16% of the 
Tanzanian population (Musti, 1978: 51). 	Government agencies, especially 
financial institutions, were directed to favour ujamaa villages in terms 
of credits and inputs. McKinsey's (1974) report, however, states that 
for 1973-1974 the entire state budget including the funds of the TRDB 
amounted to 1855 million shillings, of which only 96 million or 5% went 
for ujamaa (cited in Musti, 1978: 64). 
Most of the funds used to finance Ujamaa development were seldom 
distributed according to economic criteria. 	There were political pressures 
emanating from the Party at national, regional and district levels for 
funds to be pushed into Ujamaa activities; 	politics prevailed over 
economic and technical judgements. As Hyden states: 
Ujamaa politics was tantamount to a deliberate 
neglect by most Party decision makers .of 
criteria such as efficiency, feasibility 
and viability. 
(Hyden, 1980: 112) 
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The modest level of Government support of such decisions with funds, 
credits and inputs cannot be taken as an indication of sabotage of the 
ujamaa policy if we consider the meagre resources available in the 
country. 
Large-scale capitalist farms in Iringa and Arusha were taken over 
and given to peasants. 	As Hyden states, "Tanzania's socialist policies 
after 1967 definitely reduced capitalist forms of production in the rural 
areas. Failure to acknowledge this means overlooking one of the 
achievements of ujamaa" (Hyden, 1980: 122). 	Various writers showed 
how richer peasants were attempting to control 'ujamaa villages' by 
assuming leadership or by declaring their farms ujamaa in the hope of 
obtaining the benefits of cheap fertilisers and credits. They also 
fraternized with the bureaucracy ( Sender, 1974; Raikes, 1975; 
Van Velsen 1973). 	This shows the difficult situation under which 
'capitalist' and progressive farmers were operating. 
Between 1969-1972 various 'operations' were undertaken, emphasising 
living in villages (Operations Rufiji in 1969, Dodoma in 1971, Kigoma and 
Mara in 1972). 	According to an interview with a Party official these 
operations were geared to solving specific problems: 
Each of these regions had specific problems 
such as floods, famine and migration which 
necessitated solutions. Party had to find 
solutions to these problems. 
(interview with high ranking Party 
official, July 1981) 
But solving these specific problems on the other hand, through villagisation it 
created other social problems, such as the need for education, water and 
health facilities. 	To this end, the 1971 Party National Congress had 
directed the Government to ensure that water should be made available 
to the people by 1990 and that schools and health facilities should reach 
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the population by 1980. (interview with senior Party official, July 1981). 
Thus we see here that the President and the Party were pursuing 
their policies of rural development which incorporated diverse elements 
of communal production, re-location of the population in village 
settlements and re-distributive measures. 
Government: 	The Government, on the other hand, was continuing with 
its traditional policy of emphasising cash crop production and cultivation 
by individual peasants-and farmers. This policy was also supported by 
the World Bank. 	According to Von Freyhold: 
Of the Tsh 2015.6 million which the World 
Bank (IDA and IBRD) had offered to Tanzania 
until the end of the Second Five Year Plan 
(1975), about 40 per cent was earmarked for 
agriculture. 	Of this, two thirds was to 
be used for the promotion of export crops, 
one-sixth for livestock development and the 
remainder for sugar development and some 
mixed projects. 	Until the end of 1975 
there was not a single project investing 
in the production of basic foodstuffs. 
(Von Freyhold, 1979: 108/9) 
The parastatals involved with agricultural development also showed a 
preference for exports: 
Between 1964/5 and 1974/5 the state and the 
parastatal enterprises allocated a total 
of Tsh 964 million to agricultural development. 
Of this 45 per cent was spent on export crops, 
26 per cent on livestock, 18 per cent on sugar 
but only 2 per cent on cereals and other basic 
food crops. 
(Ibid: 109) 
It has been argued that Tanzanian bureaucrats,as well as the World 
Bank, favoured individual peasant smallholders as opposed to communal 
production in terms of credits, extension services and other inputs. 
Thus for instance: 
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Of the seven main agricultural programmes 
.designed by the World Bank after the Arusha 
Declaration (tea, tobacco, cotton, sugar, 
.cashew nuts, maize, Kigoma 'integrated 
project') there has not been a single one 
which was exclusively or primarily directed 
towards communal farmers. The World Bank 
has preferred to deal with block fariris or 
.individual farmers. 
(Von Freyhold, 1979: 111) 
Writers sympathetic to Ujamaa as a radical programme of socialist 
rural development have explained Government emphasis on export production 
in terms of class interests of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie (Von Freyhold, 
1979; Musti, 1978). 	For instance, Von Freyhold states that: 
The state in Tanzania was in the hands of a 
class which did not support the self - 
organisation of the peasantry ... Self reliant 
development could not take place within this 
context because the creative potential of the 
peasantry remained submerged under kulak and 
bureaucratic hegemony. 
(1979: 108) 
Radical writers, such as Coulson (1977), Von Freyhold (1975) and Musti 
(1978) have also explained the limited material support given to Ujamaa 
by government as an indication of their class bias. 	But as Hyden states, 
"Virtually, all studies on Ujamaa production conclude that productivity 
on the communal farm was considerably below that on the private farms" 
(Hyden, 1980: 119). 	Also,repayments of debts to the TRDB has been more 
successful with private peasants for export crops than with peasants 
producing food crops (Ibid: 112). 	If communal production had proven 
economically viable and profitable, the Government would have financed 
it since as Musti recognises, "The major advantage of the villages in 
Kilimo's eyes was the possibility of reaching more peasants at lower costs" 
(Musti, 1978: 75). 	What most of these writers ignore is the Ministry 
of Agriculture's priority towards agricultural output and the need for 
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foreign exchange in the developmental processes. 	Secondly, their bias 
towards individual small-scale peasant production was because it was 
more efficient. 	The Government's responsibilities and priorities were 
defined in terms of economic parameters relating to costs, efficiency, 
and output, and this forced it to favour individual peasant production. 
We can therefore se that the organs of the state were pursuing their 
own policies and priorities in agriculture independently of each other. 
Attempts at institutional co-ordination between the Government, on 
the one hand, and the President and the Party on the other, in implementing 
ujamaa were also not successful. 	All three organs were implementing 
ujamaa in their own ways and according to their own institutional roles. 
For instance, in relation to the MOA: 
The support of Kilimo - a key ministry in the 
Ujamaa process was less than brilliant. 
Most of its investment went f or the state 
farms whose performance was disastrous. 
Moreover Kilimo never bothered to rethink 
its approach to agricultural development in 
regard to the ujamaa sector. That approach 
remained the provision of modern inputs and 
agricultural techniques without regard for 
new organisations of production, new modes 
of production. 
(Musti, 1978: 75) 
The Ministry of Development Planning failed to provide a strategy of 
integrating ujamaa into a national concept of development (Ibid: 71), while 
the Ministry of Rural Development failed to achieve its aim because 
"there was only a limited number of officials assigned to the ministry 
for the purpose of co-ordination and they lacked a methodology to guide 
them" (Musti, 1978: 73). 
The failure of institutional co-ordination dannot be explained 
in terms of class interests but only by reference to the conflict between 
the policy of Ujamaa and Government's concerns and responsibilities. It 
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is extremely difficult to see how Government could have effectively 
participated in implementing ujamaa when, first, it was outside its 
jurisdiction because it was a political policy, and, second, the whole 
thrust of ujamaa as it was conceptualised was contrary to ministerial 
responsibilities. 	Thus the institutional failure of co-ordination 
derives from the conflict in views of development between the President 
and the Party on the one hand and the Government on the other. 
The emergence of two problems and two solutions 
The divergence of interests and priorities between the organs of 
State became manifested in two diverse problems - that of economic growth 
and rural organisation. 	This in turn came to determine two different 
solutions. 	We shall first consider the problem of agricultural production 
and how the three organs attempted to deal with it. 
Declining agricultural production 
As Table 11.1 shows, between 1967 and 1972 the performance of the 
agricultural sector was very uneven. 	Apart from tobacco (flue-cured), 
tea and cashewnuts, the major export crops did poorly. 	In relation to 
the food crops, there was a marked decline in maize purchases in 1971/72 
and both wheat and rice purchases advanced unsteadily. 
The problem of declining production was discussed at the Party 
Annual Conference of 1972 held in Iringa from 15-20 May 1972. 	The Party 
adopted the policy of 'Politics is Agriculture'. No mention was made 
of communal production (THQ CIT 10.3.1.2. Mkutano wa Hamashauri Kuu ya 
Taifa, Mm. 11/72, Siasa ni Kilirno). The aim of the policy was to 
combat declining production. 	As a result, there was a shift in emphasis 
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from communal to block farming. According to Von Freyhold: 
By 1972 there was already a government directive 
advising the regions to promote block farms 
rather than communal farms. 
(Ibid, 1979: 112) 
At the 1973 Tanu Conference the President drew attention to the 
problem of declining production. 	He emphasised the need for increasing 
cash crops because of foreign exchange requirements. He also emphasised 
the need for expanding production in order to finance social services. 
Nyerere stated: 
There is no such thing as 'free' education, 
'free' medical services, 'free' water supply. 
There is no such thing as 'free' agricultural 
advice, 'free' planning services, 'free' 
defence or 'free' administration. 
(Nyerere, 1973) 
The view of development expressed by Nyerere on this occasion was very 
similar to the view of development held by the production-group within the 
Government. 	By 1973 Nyerere was accepting the fact that the implementation 
of ujamaa should not disrupt cash crop production: 
Also caution must be exercised in order 
to avoid a drop in production, because the 
nation as a whole cannot afford to lose any 
of the annual contribution which these areas 
now make to our foreign exchange through the 
sale of cotton, coffee, tea or tobacco etc. 
(Daily News, 24.9.1973) 
In 1973, unlike 	1969 to 1972, Nyerere was giving great emphasis to economic 
considerations, because problems of declining production especially of 
cash crops were becoming serious. 
What is important to note is that between 1972 and 1973, the three 
organs of the State caine together so to speak, in response to the 
increasing crisis in the agricultural sector, in order to cope with the 
problem. 	This led to policy shifts, from the earlier emphasis on communal 
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production to block farming and the acceptance of individual-based 
production in the cash-crop areas. 	The need for the organs of state 
to respond homogeneously to problems was referred to by the President 
in the same speech in 1973, when he stated: 
For if we are to carry out our intentions of 
development, Government and Tanu should be 
separate only as the arms and legs of a body 
are separate. If a load to be carried from one 
place to another, then body, arms and legs, all 
have to work together. So it should be with 
People, Tanu and Government. None can be 
thoroughly effective in its own task without 
activity from the others. 
(Nyerere, 1973: 22) 
The attempts at co-ordination of policies between the elements of 
the tripartite system between 1972-73 were in any case short-lived. 	As 
in the case of Ujamaa,the Party and President adopted the policy of 
Villagisation against the advice of the Government. 	In doing so, these 
two organs of the state re-asserted the rural development aspects at 
the expense of the Government's priority of economic growth. 
What is surprising, however, is that there were no attempts at 
price review by the Government, Party or the President. This was despite 
two important facts. 	First, the Kriesel Report (1970) had pointed to the 
declining purchasing power of the peasants; and second, the tripartite 
system of policy-making was after a long time operating homogeneously. 
As Lofchie states, "Tanzania's decision to maintain a low producer price 
for maize as late as 1972-3 defies easy explanation" (1978: 466). I would 
argue that the failure to increase producer prices is a reflection of the 
weakness of the Ministry of Agriculture during this period. It compromised 
its traditional principle of economic growth by ignoring the role of price 
incentives in production. 	This illustrates that the adoption of a more 
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homogeneous approach through the tripartite system is not a guarantee 	a 
of a correct solution. 
VILLAGISATION 
As the agricultural sector was experiencing problems in production 
and marketing, the progress of ujamaa development was also coming to a 
standstill by 1973. 	Nyerere was concerned with the slowing pace of ujamaa 
and decided on the policy of Villagisation, that is, the re-settling of 
all peasants into villages. 
The aim of the policy was again determined initially by re-distributive 
considerations. 	Villagisation, it was argued, would enable the government 
to provide services and to improve peasants' living standards. It would 
also improve their productivity. 	The idea of villagisation was again 
very similar to Nyerere's ideas expressed in 1962 and partially imple- 
mented between 1969-1972 in the various 'operations'. 	These ideas 
incorporated two major elements, the re-organisation of peasants and re-
distributive measures nationally. 
At the National Executive Meeting of the Party in 1973 Nyerere 
presented the idea of villagisation and argued that it was possible to 
separate the issues of "living together" from that of "working together" 
on a communal farm, and that these two issues could be tackled in different 
stages. 	According to Msekwa: 
The NEC discussed and accepted the President's 
submission, and directed that it should be 
implemented throughout the country. 
(Msekwa, 1977: 64) 
As a result the policy of Villagisation was adopted. The Daily News 
(23.81974) explained the policy in the following way: 
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Those who think they can avoid living in 
such villages are deluding themselves. 
Those who try to resist going into such 
villages are also fighting a lost cause. 
Every Tanzanian peasant will have to move 
and live in such villages. 	Anyone who 
refuses will be taken there by force. On 
this there will be no half measures. 
(cited in Taberi, 1975: 95) 
Within a span of merely three years the relocation of Tanzania's 
peasants in village settlements was achieved. 	As Nyerere stated, "there 
are about 13,065,000 people living together in 7,684 villages" (Nyerere, 
1977: 41), and: 
This is a tremendous achievement. It is an 
achievement of Tanu and Government leaders 
in cooperation with the people of Tanzania. 
It means that something like 70 per cent 
of our people moved their homes in the space 
of about three years. 
(Ibid: 42) 
According to Green et alia (1980: 93) the Government was against the 
policy of Villagisation because of the problems already occurring in the 
agricultural sector as analysed in the previous pages. "On the whole 
(the decision was taken against) technical advice, especially that of 
agricultural and local Government officials" (Ibid, 1980: 93). 	This 
indicates that the President and the Party were again setting aside 
Government priorities and production problems in the formulation of 
policies of development. 
It would appear that the Government had no funds for the Villagisation 
because there was no allocation in the budget for this purpose. 	To carry 
out the operation, funds had to be cut from other sources. 	The Government 
did not mobilise people or the militia. It was a very unpopular policy 
in Government circles (interview with senior Government official, August 1981). 
-42 1- 
Economic crisis 1974/75 
The policy of villagisation was implemented when various types of 
agricultural production were already declining, and it is argued that 
the policy aggravated the shortages of food during the 1974/75 famine. 
Various studies have documented this. 	For instance, Fivawa and Matango 
(1977) showed that 55% of the inhabitants in the district of Tarime 
attributed the fall in production in their area to the forced villag-
isation while 44% blamed the drought (cited in Musti, 1978: 60). 
As a result of thefamine, we saw that Tanzania had to import 
food grains draining her foreign reserves, which was further aggravated 
by the sharp rise in the price of oil and higher prices for other imported 
goods. 	By the end of 1974 Tanzania's foreign reserves were virtually 
exhausted (Lofchie, 1978: 455). 	6nder these conditions it is extremely 
difficult to accept Hyden's contention that policies based on a political- 
market are effective. 	On the contrary, I would argue on the basis of the 
above analysis, that policies of development which exclude considerations 
of production, growth and timing, are bound to aggravate rather than 
minimise the problems which may arise from natural disasters and/or events 
in the international economic system. 
The foregoing observations suggest an answer to Coulson's question 
as to why Government created impossible demands for services whidi it must 
have known it could not fulfil. 	At one level the answer is simple - 
the Government did not create these demands; rather they were created by 
the President and the Party. 	But this leads us to a second question. Why 
should the President and the Party have created impossible demands for 
services when they must have known that they would be difficult to fulfil? 
In fact, we have already seen that Nyerere was quite aware in 1973 about 
the financial implications of expanding social services, and of the 
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connection between production and the funding of social services. This 
question can only be answered as follows. 	As we have seen Nyerere's 
view of development has always been rural-development orientated; he 
believed that re-distributive policies would create development, in other 
words that people would work harder if the 'state' provided for them. 
He also believed firmly that peasants in nucleated villages would be able 
to produce more efficiently, and thus in one stroke the measure would 
solve both agricultural and rural development problems. 	It is hard to 
avoid the conclusion that, as on pretious occasions, the President allowed 
his personal convictions and enthusiasm to get the better of his perception 
of the objective constraints. 
Why did the Party then fail to consider Government problems of 
economic growth? 	In an interview with a member of the Party Secretariat, 
I asked whether the discussions on villagisation at the NEC took into 
consideration problems of production. 	The Party official answered that 
the NEC had instructed that villagisation should wait until after harvesting - 
so as not to destabilise production - but that Party officials in the 
regions began to implement the policy immediately. 	I also asked a high 
ranking Party official whether due consideration was given to the amount 
of finance that would be required to fund social services in the villages. 
He answered that the logistics of getting people into villages was the 
primary concern, and the economics were to be considered later (interview 
with Party officials, July 1981). 
These interviews illustrate two major points. 	First, the NEC was 
aware of the need not to destabilise production but the Party lacked the 
capacity to control and discipline its own leaders in the regions. Matango, 
(1971), for instance, referred to this problem when he stated that in some 
regions not enough guidelines were given to militiamen. 	Second, the 
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institutional arrangements for policy-making once again enabled the 
Party to make a major policy decision without giving due consideration 
to the implementation capacity of the Government. 	(We shall see later 
that the other policies for the rural sector such as the dissolution of 
the co-operatives and Operation Maduka followed a similar pattern). 
The Village Act, 1975 and more political policies 1976 
The problems which faced policy-makers after the villagisation 
programme were immense. 	There was an urgent need for basic social 
amenities, and to this end, the Party passed the policy of universal 
primary education and universal water supply. 	Furthermore, since the 
villages had been artificially created, it was necessary to create 
structures which would enable socio-economic activities to take place in 
them within defined parameters. 	In 1975 Parliament passed the Village 
and Ujamaa Act, which conferred legal status and powers on the village, 
enabling it, for instance, to obtain credits from financial institutions, 
to sell crops to the Crop Authorities and to enforce bye-laws vis-a-vis 
the villages. 
The Act also provided for the constitution of a village assembly 
consisting of all persons aged 18 years and above, and a village council 
to be elected by the village assembly. 	The village council was empowered 
to do "all such acts and things as are necesssary or expedient for the 
economic and social development of the viallage". It could plan and 
co-ordinate economic and social activities of the villagers. Five sub- 
committees, namely, finance, planning; production and marketing; education, 
culture and social welfare; works and transport; security and defence, 
provided the structure for organising developmental activities. 
The aim of the Village Act was to make the village a multi-purpose 
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co-operative, with the Village Council (led by the Chairman and Secretary) 
undertaking and performing various actions on behalf of the villagers. 
The Act was designed by members ofjLJjamaa and Co-operative Department of 
the Prime Minister's Office, though instructions for it had come from the 
Party (interiljew with Government officials, August 1981). 	It appears 
that the main preoccupation of the designers was to create a distributive 
arrangement which would eliminate the need for primary and secondary 
co-operatives, which, as we have seen, were experiencing problrns. It 
was believed that an arrangement which evolved out of the village itself 
(by-passing the Unions and primary societies) would be more efficient than 
the previous co-operatives, because it would leave the producer with more 
income. It was these ideas and beliefs which structured the design of 
the Village Act 1975; and as a result, although the Co-operative Unions 
and primary societies Qere still in existence, no mention of them was made 
in the Village Act. 
Meanwhile, the above ideas appear also to have been shared by a 
Government Task Force which was appointed by the Prime Minister's Office 
in May 1976 to identify the problems faced by the co-operatives in 
providing adequate crop purchasing services. 	The Task Force argued that 
the co-operative structures were inappropriate to the new changes in 
Tanzanian rural society. 	The existence of primary co-operative societies 
was considered incompatible with the Villagisation programme and the 
Village Act, which had made villages into primary marketing units (Marketing 
Development Bureau, 1977). 	As a result, Kawawa, the Prime Minister, 
dissolved the co-operatives in May 1976, and a new structure of crop 
marketing was instituted. 	This was designed to improve economic efficiency 
and peasant incomes while bringing marketing into line with the new 
political and social goals. 	The functions of the primary co-operatives 
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were taken over by the village, acting as a multi-purpose co-operative, 
while the functions of the dissolved Co-operative Unions were passed to 
national institutions, which were the District Development Corporations, 
Regional Trading Companies, the parastatal crop authorities and the 
National Milling Corporation. 	In the same year (1976) the Prime Minister 
Kawawa passed the policy of Operation Maduka, which led to the phasing 
out of private retail trade which were to be replaced by co-operative 
retail trade (see case study on Socialisation of Trade). 
Thus within a period of merely three years (1974-1976) the peasants 
of Tanzania were plunged from one intense form of instability, fear and 
insecurity to another, which touched the most crucial and sensitive areas 
of human existence - the physical destruction and relocation of their 
homes and the unfamiliarity of the new farming environment, the horrific 
experience of hunger and the threat of famine,oähe dis-organisation of 
marketing and distribution networks for their crops and the disruption of 
retail shops for access to such basic items as kerosene, sugar and salt. 
Such disorganisation in the rural economy can only be rationally 
explained by the conflicting policies and priorities of the three organs 
of the state and by the institutional 	arrangement for policy-making 
which allowed the President and the Party to exclude the Government in 
the formulation of development policies. 
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THE STATE OF AGRICULTURE: 	POLICIES 1977 - 1982 
The conflicts which characterised policies towards the agricultural 
section in the Villagisation phase have continued to be evident during 
the most recent period; but there are also significant points of 
agreement between the three organs of the state. 	Nyerere's position 
changed and moved closer to that of the Government as the economic crisis 
became more serious during 1979/80/81. 
Before we consider the different policies of the three organs of 
state it may be fruitful to recapitulate the significance of the agri-
cultural sector and the social groups involved in production. 	The 
following summary from the World Bank is adequate: 
Agriculture continues to dominate the Tanzanian 
economy, accounting for 50% of GDP and more than 
80% of export earnings. About 90% of Tanzania's 
population lives in rural areas, with approximately 
2.25 million farm families grouped together into 
8,000 villages. 
Smallholder farmers contribute about 75% of 
Tanzania's agricultural export earning and more 
than 80% of the value of marketed cereal 
production. 
Private large scale farming produces some 25% of 
coffee, 90% of tea, 50% of sugar and sisal, most 
wheat and part of maize and milk production still 
comes from private estates representing export 
earnings or import savings at present prices of some 
US $80 million annually. 	It also employs some 
90,000 persons and carries its activities largely 
independently of Government services. 
(World Bank, 1974: 1: 6) 
Besides the smallholder farmers, and large-scale farmers, there are 
also state farms run by parastatals. 	There are also block farms which 
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Were organised mainly by the Party under the Villagisation campaign. 
Thus the agricultural modes of production are fairly diversified. 
Policy Agreements: The virtues of Largescale Production 
The three organs of the state appear to have reached some agreement 
on three specific points pertaining to the agricultural sector. The first 
is the indispensibility of raising production (both of food and of cash 
crops). 	We saw how in the period of the primacy of politics (1969-1974) 
agricultural production was de-emphasised in favour of socialist organ- 
isation. 	In recent years, the President and the Party have gone out of 
their way to emphasise the need for increased agricultural production. 
The Party has identified four major roles for the agricultural sector: 
production of cash crops for primary processing; production of food crops 
and dairy products for domestic consumption; production of cash crops 
to generate foreign exchange; and "a strong agricultural sector to act as 
the backbone for industrial take-off and technology" (Daily News, 17.7.1980). 
The Party has also accepted the principle that productivity should 
be materially rewarded, as evidenced by its new policy of Sera ya Taifa 
ya Tija, Mapato na Bei (1980). Thus another area of contention between 
Government and President/Party has been removed. 
The third area where there appears to be agreement is on the new 
emphasis placed on large-scale farming as opposed to peasant production. 
The recent approach of both Party and Government towards the agricultural 
sector has been to emphasise large-scale farming based on modern forms of 
technology. 	We shall explore this in greater detail when we consider 
individually the approaches of the different organs of the state. 
There are numerous agencies participating in the agricultural 
sector. 	They include the Party, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Prime 
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Minister's Office, and the Parastatals. 	Thee are presently over a 
hundred parastatals which are directly concerned with agricultural 
production (World Bank, 1981: 12). 	The Prime Minister's Office is 
mainly responsible for rural development activities, while the Party has 
increasingly participated in the activities of agricultural production, 
in planning crop targets for regions and recommending certain crop 
choices for village production. 	What are the policy responses of these 
organs of the state? Particular emphasis will be given to the Party, 
the Government/MOA and Nyerere but references will also be made to the 
Prime Minister's Office. 
We know that institutionally, the Government/Ministry of Agriculture 
does not formulate policies. 	The following interview shows the position 
of the Ministry of Agriculture/Kilimo in terms of policy-making. 
Kilimo does not discuss policies 
we merely implement policies. 
Why? 
Kilimo has not done any forms of research 
on effects of policies as far as agriculture 
is concerned. 
Why? 
lJjamaa and Villagisation were placed under 
the Prime Minister - they were not placed 
under Kilimo. 
(interview with senior Government 
official, August 1981) 
However, despite the above (institutional barrier to policy-making) there 
is increasing evidence that the Government is in favour of large-scale 
farming as the basis for the modernisation of agriculture. 
This can be seen in the policy paper of the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) 
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entitled Agricultural Mechanisation Policy (1979). 	The paper attempts 
to situate a policy of mechanisation within the political approach to 
rural development called for by the Party and the President. 	The paper 
begins by stating.: 
Fundamentally, Tanzania's development focusses 
on rural development with agriculture as the 
basis. The aims of development are 11 social 
and economic equality both individual and regional 
21 self-reliance; 31 social and economic trans- 
formation of people and production methods. 
(MOA, 1979: 2) 
Nevertheless, agricultural mechanisation is defined to include the use 
of "tools, implements, and machines operated by human, animal or mechanical 
power to carry out all activities related to production and harvesting, 
handling and processing of agricultural production" (MOA, 1979: 1). This 
broad definition of mechanisation enables all categories of agricultural 
producer to be incorporated into the programme. 
The policy paper is guided by a high degree of economic rationality. 
It states that "further investment in tractors and power equipment by 
public institutions will only be encouraged where such institutions have 
developed the capability to efficiently utilise their existing inventory" 
and that "the introduction and support of mechanical power at village 
level will be undertaken only after measures to ensure efficient use are 
taken" (MOA, 1979: 7). 	This is an attempt to avoid the types of waste 
that occurred under early mechanisation policies. 
The policy paper also makes provision for credits. The paper 
states: 
Credit will be made available on appropriate 
terms to those providing necessary services, 
whether public or private e.g. machinery hire 
services, machinery manufacturers, machinery 
dealer/distributors. 
(MOA, 1979: 11) 
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A similar principle is applied to the village community, which will 
have to hire its mechanical power requirements. The aim is to have a 
mechanisation co-operative, which would then hire out its services to 
other villages. 	The policy aims to form mechanisation co-operatives 
at village level, then progressing upwards to form the Agro-Mechanisatin 
Centre at the national level (Dagg, 1980). 
The second major innovation which has been brought into agricultural 
development by the Ministry of Agriculture in the recent period is the 
Crop Monitoring and Early Warning Systems Project (1980). 	This is an 
attempt to predict harvests and hence avoid a repetition of the 1974/75 
famine experience, which took the Government and Party administrations 
by surprise. 
The main aim of the project is "to provide advance information and 
assessment to Government on crop production, stocks, supplies and 
utilisation of food grains for all the Regions of mainland Tanzania" 
(Kilimo, 1980: 1). 	It involves a complex process of data gathering 
on various food crops, their growth, planting dates, incidence of pests, 
diseases and local adverse weather conditions. These data are collected 
on a monthly basis and allow the project to evaluate the forthcoming 
harvest on a qualitative basis. 	This project illustrates the Ministry's 
emphasis on high level technology,and in turn indicates that the 
Decentralisation system, which was supposed to co-ordinate information, 
has not been very successful in this area. 
We can therefore see that the MOA's recent policy towards the 
agricultural sector is to emphasise a 'modernisation' approach, favouring 
large-scale production s mechanisation and use of advanced technology. 
This emphasis is not necessarily opposed by the Party. 	The Party has also 
emphasised large-scale production. 	For instance, in its recent publication 
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Mwongozo wa CCM 1981 the chapter entitled "Agricultural Revolution in the 
village is the first priority" outlines the Party's policy for bringing 
about changes in the agricultural sector. It emphasises large-scale 
farming (CCM, 1981: 80) and stressed the use of mechanisation, which 
includes the use of ploughs, modern implements and tractors (CCM, 1981: 84). 
Like the Ministry, the Party states that "the aim of the Party is to 
transform peasant hoe reliance to ploughs and tractors" (CCM, 1981: 86). 
We can therefore conclude that both Party and Government are pursuing 
a modernisation approach to agricultural development which favours large-
scale production as opposed to small-scale peasant production. 
Policy Conflicts: Communal versus Private Large-scale Production 
Although both organs of the state favour large-scale farming, there 
is, however, a conflict over how to achieve it. 	For instance, in 
interviews conducted with Kilimo officers it became clear that there was 
resentment against policies which prohibited large-scale farming based 
on private capita].. 	It was pointed out that private capital was allowed 
to invest in industry but that it was not allowed to invest in agriculture 
where it was equally needed. 	A clear policy on private large-scale 
farming was needed, argued Kilimo officers. 
The need for private large-scale farming has become more acute, 
especially since state farms and estates have not proven successful. 
Between 1980 and 1981 the Party was forced to intervene in a number of 
farms run by cash-crop authorities and under the authority of Kilimo to 
investigate problems of declining production and loss of funds as a result 
of mismanagement (interview with Party officials, July 1981). 	Several 
state farms such as NAFCO have also incurred losses. 
It appears that the Ministry of Agriculture has also failed to 
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maintain good husbandry conditions in both state farms and areas of 
peasant farming. 	Most of Tanzania's major export crops have been 
afflicted by disease because of bad husbandry. 	For instance, the weevil 
in sisal "has now become so widespread in East Africa that its exterm- 
ination is now virtually impossible" (Mlingano Report, 1980: 1). 	The 
report explains: 
Although potentially devasting in effect the 
presence of the sisal weevil in the sisal 
estates has been a subject of some neglect 
in the last 10 years. 
A survey carried out in 1976 by members of 
A.R.I. Mlingano revealed the lack of responses 
to the presence of the weevil and to practical 
insecticidal control. 
Work on sisal weevil control has been in 
progress only since January 1980 after a gap 
of 8 years. 
(Mlingano Report, 1980) 
Lack of good agricultural husbandry has also affected peasant-based 
crops, such as banana; thus,"since the year 1977 banana weevils and 
nematodes pest population appear to have increased abnormally' (Maruku 
Annual Report, 1979/80). 	Meanwhile, cashewnut crops and coconut trees 
have also been affected by disease (Cashewnut Authority, 1980; National 
Coconut Development Project, 1980). 	These reports indicate that the 
Ministry of Agriculture failed, over a long period, to maintain good 
husbandry methods in both state farms and peasant-based cash crop 
production, which, together with other problems, led to decline in 
production. 
The Party policy, on the other hand, does not favour private large-scale 
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farming. 	The Party calls for large-scale farming based on state farms 
and co-operative farms (CCM, 1981: 82), and "socialist agriculture" is 
given the first priority (Ibid: 88). 	The CCM document states that: 
The potentiality of the large communal 
production farm exists - provided there is 
the will, planning and proper leadership. 
(CCM, 1981: 83) 
The belief and conviction that peasants are capable of producing more 
on a communal basis was re-affirmed in an interview by a Regional 
Commissioner, who argued that peasants, if properly mobilised, educated, 
organised and given the necessary assistance (in terms of materil and 
leadership inputs) were capable of increased production (interview with 
Regional Commissioner, July 1981) 	This conviction was shared by mmbrs 
of the Party Secretariat whom I interviewed. Thus: 
Party believes that Tanzania has the capacity 
to produce more ... peasants have the capacity 
to generate foreign exchange ... problems of 
bottlenecks such as transportation etc. are 
the failure of parastatals, such as NMC. 
Peasants can put effort if the Party calls. 
(interview with Party officials, 
July 1981) 
The President's position in agricultural policy-making is crucial 
and, as I have already argued, his position can often tip the balance 
between Government's need for economic growth and the Party's policy of 
socialist organisation. 	For instance the following interview illustrates 
the important role the President plays vis-a-vis Party and Government 
relations. 
Professionals are not given enough time 
- no resource allocation. Policies are not 
tested at all. 
Most problems emerge as a result of dead-line 
given by the Party and also because policies 
are difficult to implement. 
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Policy makers cannot take into account 
implementation problems. The President 
is aware of implementation problems through 
the Cabinet, the ECC and is in a position 
to bend certain policies from the Party so 
that they can fit in with implementation 
problems. 
(interview with senior Government 
official, July 1981) 
This role of the Presidency explains the contradictory types of statements 
which the President has issued, for instance, between 1979-1981, reflecting 
the types of pressuresto which he is subjected. 	Between 1979-1980/81 
Nyerere has given contradictory statements, which reflect the types of 
pressures to which he is subjected. 	We shall consider the major 
statements he has given: 
Ujamaa here to stay, says Mwalimu 	(Daily News, Nov. 3, 1979) 
"People who think Tanzania will change her cherished 
policies of Socialism & Self-Reliance because of the 
current economic difficulties are wasting their time". 
"We shall never change", President Nyerere declared in 
Dar es Salaam yesterday. 
Ujamaa will be built in stages - Nyerere 	(Daily News, May 7, 1980) 
"The road to socialism is full of setbacks 
and at times it is necessary to retreat in 
order to advance further. Retreat is part 
of a strategy for consolidation". 
Large-scale farmers welcome - Nyerere 	(Daily News, June 6, 1981) 
"Tanzanians were free to engage in large scale 
farming, provided they did not encroach upon 
established villages in the country". 
The President's contradictory statements reflect the dilemmas 
of building a socialist country in a context of chronic economic crisis. 
They reflect his intermediate position vis-a-vis the Party and the 
Government. 	Nyerere's statement that private large-scale farming is 
welcomed was meant to appease the Government's concerns in regard to 
agricultural development; but there is no indication that the Party 
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accepted the President's pronouncement, since the question of private 
large-scale farming was not included in the CCM Mwongozo, 1981, which 
was published later. If anything, the CCM Mwongozo remained antag-
onistic towards private capital in the economy (CCM, 1981: 52). 
We can therefore conclude that while there is a broad agreement 
between the two organs of the state on the need for large-scale farming 
(as opposed to small-scale peasant production) and on mechanisation, 
there is a conflict between the methods of achieving these aims. 	The 
Party believes that peasants are capable of large-scale communal/co-operative 
production if properly mobilised, organised and assisted by both the Party 
and the Government. 	The Government, on the other hand, feels that private 
capital would be a cheaper and more productive way to achieve large-scale 
production, especially after the experience of 1969-1974. 
Although the Government has not come out directly with the argument 
that peasants are not capable of large-scale production, nevertheless, 
evidence from rural development experience would indicate that this is so. 
We shall now consider this evidence, which comes mainly from the Prime 
Minister's Office. 
Problems of large-scale communal and co-operative activities 
We have seen that the Party's policy in relation to the agricultural 
sector is to have socialist organisation, that is, to promote large-scale 
farming based on peasants' comunal and co-operative production. Agri-
cultural production should therefore be ujamaa production. The CCM 
Mwongozo, 1981 outlines the methods of achieving large-scale comunal 
production by peasants. It states that the Party would be obliged to do 
two things. 	First, it would have to educate peasants in agricultural 
husbandry and ensure that Government had proper plans for procuring 
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agricultural inputs cheaply for the peasants (CCM, 1981: 84). 	Secondly, 
the Party would have to ensure that there was a programme of planned 
work which would build up discipline and facilitate work responsibilities 
as well as professionalism. (CCM, Ibid: 87). 	The Party emphasises 
mobilisation, organisation and education as methods of bringing about 
an agricultural revolution. 	Education is considered essential by the 
Party because large-scale farming requires knowledge of management 
principles (CCM, 1981: 89). 
It would appear, however, that the Party's policy of large-scale 
production based on village/peasant communal efforts has not taken 
sufficient account of the specific types of problems besetting village 
society. 	Although the policy acknowledges the need for education for 
management, it is precisely in educated manpower that village economy is 
most deficient. 	For instance, the majority of village chairmen have 
less than Standard VII education, secretaries have a better education 
up to Standard VII but only 3.5% have more than Standard VIII. 	Village 
shop-keepers are also deficient in education; 42% have less than Standard 
VII (PMO, 1980e: 12-20). 
Various attempts to bring into the villages functional officers 
such as the Bwana Shamba, livestock officers and other district personnel 
(Fortman, 1978: 18) and the appointment of village management (1977) 
were designed to rectify these deficiencies at the village level. This, 
however, meant that Government had to subsidise village manpower by 
sending in officials, thus increasing bureaucracy and recurrent expenditure. 
The Prime Minister's Office undertook to train members of the Village 
Councils, and for 1978/79 the goal was to train 89,772 members of the 
Village Councils. 	But the programme had to be abandoned"because of the 
war and the resultant freezing of the programme funds" (Linjewile, 1979: 11). 
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The absence of managerial skills at village level was a major 
contributary cause to the problems of the Village Act, 1975, which was 
its failure to take adequate account of management capacity of peasants. 
The main preoccupation of the PMO in designing the Act was to create an 
arrangement for distribution which would by-pass the primary and secondary 
co-operatives, which were acting as 'middle-men' to the peasants. The 
Act envisaged that a system would evolve out of the villages themselves 
which would operate at a lower cost than the previous co-operatives. 
The Village Council would be responsible for crop procurement, and would 
sell crops to the Crop Authorities as well as negotiate loans with the 
TRDB. 
The Village Act was structured in such a manner that literacy, 
education and management skills became crucial factors in development; 
yet these were precisely the factors which were usually absent at village level. 
As a result, villagers were unable to conduct their collective business 
efficiently, the major item being crop procurement. 	Records were badly 
kept, and it was difficult to maintain a simple financial statement 
(interview with senior Government official, August 1981). 	Finally, those 
who were trained often ran away from the village, and short-term training 
courses did not prove very successful (PMO, 1980d:75). 	Finally, a lack 
of stores, safes, scales, lorries and roads, limited the effectiveness of 
villages in doing their own procQrement. (MDB, 1977). 	The failure to 
consider peasant capacity and facilities available in the villages came 
to negate the raison detre of the Village Act, which was to enable 
peasants to handle their crop procurement. 	The Village Act also aggravated 
problems for the IJjamaa na Ushirika Department as the following passage 
from its Head illustrates: 
a 
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The passing of the Village Act in 1975 had 
tremendous adverse effects on the ability 
and performance of our Deportment (PMO 
Ujamaa na Ushirika) to próvide the necessary 
management assistance to the co-operative 
movement 
I would venture to say that the Department, 
in respect of the size of its personnel 
population and the skills available to it, 
(only about 800 of them had the necessary 
training and work experience in the areas of 
management and accountancy) was not quite 
prepared to respond effectively to the needs 
for management assistance of a tremendous 
large number of village co-operatives expected 
to be registered under the Act. At the risk 
of appearing apologetic, it must be stated that 
we were destined to fail. 
(Linjewilla, 1979: 18) 
Thus it would appear that the designers of the Village Act in the Prime 
Minister's Office, Department of Ujamaa na Ushirika,'overlooked' its 
own Departmental's capacity in implementing the Act. 	These two instances 
indicate that the Prime Minister's Office (Department of Ujamaa na Ushirika) 
had during this period adopted a 'political' approach to rural development. 
From these experiences, I can argue that the Party's policy of 
emphasising large-scale production based on peasant communalisation/block/ 
co-operative efforts would create demands on resources which are scarce 
at the village level (such as managerial and organisational skills); and 
would incur greater costs for the Government through subsidies. 	For 
instance, Vail (1975: 30) estimated that it would cost between $25-30 
million which constituted 28-33% of the MOA's budget for the Second Five 
Year Plan period to provide each of the 4,920 villages existing in 1972 
with one tractor and related equipment. 	Since that time, the number of 
villages have increased, inflation has tripled and Government resources 
hadwind1ed. 	Finally, there is no evidence that the Party itself has 
seriously considered and evaluated its own capacity to sustain over a 
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long term period large-scale peasant communal production - without 
having to resort to coercion, which is a politically unacceptable method 
of mobilisation, and can have repercussions if maintained over a long 
period. 
The conflict between the Party and Government /MOA over agricultural 
policy has been reflected recently in changes relating to the institutional 
framework of rural development. 	As we have seen, the Prime Minister's 
Office was responsible for rural development, and a special department 
was crea!ted in 1969 entitled 'Ujamaa na Ushirika' which offered services 
and research on problems of rural development. It also provided training 
facilities for diverse activities. On the other hand, the Party was 
responsible for implementing ujamaa through mobilisation. 
In 1981 the PMO adopted the policy of community development and 
came out in favour of co-operatives, two policies associated with the 
'modernisation' ideas in operation in Tanzania between 1962 and 1966. 
The policy of Ujamaa, on the other hand, was sent to the Party for imple-
mentation. 	Why? 
Ujamaa is a national policy and it is only 
fair that it should come under the hegemony 
of the Party. 
(interview with PMO official, 
August 1981) 
Thus what appears to be happening is that the Government/PMO has reverted 
to a modernisation approach towards rural development, while the 'political' 
approach promoting socialist organisation has been returned to the Party. 
As in the case of agricultural policies proper, the Government/PMO and 
the Party are now pursuing different policies in a parallel way. 
This separation of policies is meant to increase the accountability 
of each organ of the state and to make it possible to assess progress of 
problems more clearly. This would indicate either that the conflict 
-440- 
which has characterised Government/Party relations has now become 
acceptable, or that the differences are irreconcilable, so that diverse 
policies of development have to be allowed to co-exist. 
We can conclude this section on recent policy-making for the rural 
sector/that the conflict between Party and Government is still evident; 
the former is still calling for agriculture based on socialist organ-
isation of large-scale farming by peasants, while the Government would 
prefer to have large-scale private farming. 	In Government circles it 
is believed that it would be more difficult to achieve large-scale farming 
based on socialist organisation of peasants because both the peasants 
themselves and the Party and Government lack the capacity to sustain the 
management of large-scale socialist farming. 	Nyerere has modified his 
position to allow large-scale private farming, but there is no evidence 
that his pronouncements were taken sufficiently seriously by the Party 
as to lead to policy modifications. 
Asaresult of these conflicts, there are diverse policies running 
concurrently in the agricultural sector. But the contradictionwhich 
this situation would otherwise have created have been muted by the economic 
crisis, as all the organs of the state in their different ways are on the 
defensive. 
Writers as different as Lofchie and Von Freyhold have tended to 
explain recent Tanzanian policies by merely referring to one trend in 
policy-making, arguing on this basis that Tanzania has abandoned 
socialism. 	As I have attempted to show, however, two different types 
of policies are being pursued independently of one another by two organs 
of the state, namely, conventional modernisation-type policies (pursued 
by the Governmerit)4nd the socialist organisation of agricultural and 
rural development (pursued by the Party). 	This creates a more complex 
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situation in development, as well as in understanding the state, than 
Lofchie and Von Freyhold allow. 
The co-existence of these diverse policies in such a crucial 
sector as agriculture indicates a broader conflict between Party and 
Government as to the types of solutions that are required to solve the 
country's economic problems. 	This conflict, as I have argued, can be 
traced partly to different conceptions of development. The Party's 
view of development has always been distribution-orientated and has 
relied more on human mobilisation to achieve results. 	But it is also, 
I have argued, a result of the 1965 Interim Constitution which allows 
the Party to formulate policies taking into consideration only political 
and social variables; here lies the root of an approach to development 
which does not take into consideration implementation problems or 
capacity. 	On the other hand, the Government's view of development has 
been influenced over the years by problems of implementation, and it 
has evolved its own policies on a de facto basis to solve them. 	The 
political-institutional arrangements thus explain to a large extent, 
the contradictory and problematic character of development policy in 
Tanzania. 
rn,'jri itciri 
The strains derived from the conflicting views of development of 
the three organs of the state, the President (rural development), the 
Party (marketing), and the Government (economic growth) have been reflected 
in the instability experienced by the agricultural sector in Tanzania. 
Although the Government,in the early 1960s, attempted to keep 
these issues separate as a way of safeguarding its priority of economic 
growth, by 1966 the agricultural sector was already experiencing problems 
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as a result of 'political' policies. This situation was further 
aggravated, first, by the new institutional arrangements which removed 
policy-making from the Government's sphere of responsibility and vested 
it in the Partyi and, second, by the increasing adoption of a 'political' 
approach to development by the President and the Party (1969-72). 	The 
Government became progressively weakened, with the consequence that its 
first priority, economic growth, was downgraded in favour of socialist 
rural development. 	The effects of this on the agricultural sector was 
intensified by the poor leadership provided by the Ministry of Agriculture 
during the early and mid-1970s. 
Beginning in 1972 the problem of sustaining economic growth began 
to be widely appreciated once again. 	The three organs of the state 
'came together' so to speak in an attempt to cope with the problems of 
declining production, leading to policy shifts from communal to block 
farming and to tolerance of individual farmers. 	Nevertheless, soon 
afterwards the President and the Party adopted the policy of Villagisation, 
setting aside once again Government's problems and concerns regarding 
the agricultural sector. 
Further 'political' policies were passed in 1976, which destabilised 
distribution and marketing networks in the rural areas. 	These were the 
policies of Operation Maduka and the dissolution of the Co-operatives, 
which increased the disorganisation in the rural society. 	An attempt by 
the Prime Minister's Office to regulate socio-economic life in the villages, 
the Village Act 1975, failed because the designers overlooked the limited 
managerial capacity of the peasants. 
In the 1980s the agricultural sector has been torn apart by inter-
locking problems of production, marketing, lack of retail facilities, 
transportation, and village organisation, in the context of the general 
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economic crisis of the country. 	All three organs of the state have 
once again 'come together' in a bid to increase production. 	But the 	- 
appearance of unity and stability conceals conflicting policies, which 
have been relegated from the political arena onto the development process. 
The Party and Government are each developing their own 'projects': 
the Government (Ministry of Agriculture, and the Prime Minister's Office) 
are adopting a modernisation approach to agriculture and rural development 
based on private capital while the Party continues to emphasise socialist 
organisation. 	The President has resumed his traditional role of alter- 
nating his support from one organ to the other, depending on whether he 
speaks as Head of Government or Head of the Party. 	This shows that the 
conflict between the theory of socialism and the existing objectiv 	apacit 
of the economy has not yet been resolved in Tanzania. 
IHER 
FOOTNOTE 
1. The Ministry of Regional Administration & Rural Development 1969; 
Decentralisation and the creation of the Prime Minister's Office, 
1972. 
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CONCLUSION TO PART III 
The analysis of the three case studies - on the policy of private 
capital, on internal trade and on agriculture and rural development - has 
confirrnedthe broad outlines of my analysis of development policy-making 
in Tanzania under the tripartite system. It has also documented com-
plexities which were only hinted at in Part I and II. 
Part III has confirmed the crucial role of the relationship between 
the Party and Government. 	In each of the case studies, we saw how there 
was a basic conflict •between the Party and Government's position. This 
difference, I argued, was traceable to the views of development held in 
these two organs and to their institutional functions. 	The Party's 
approach to development was greatly facilitated by the institutional 
arrangements for policy-making, which enabled the Party to continue up 
to the 1980s to consider implementation problems as extrinsic to p01 icy- 
making. 	The consequences of this approach for development were empirically 
demonstrated. 	Briefly summarised, development problems became aggravated 
creating destabilising effects on the development processes. 	The Party 
and Government were working at cross-purposes; the former's policies 
expanded the need for manpower and recurrent expenditure, while the latter 
was trying to minimise their expansion. 	Each organ was going its separate 
way, emphasising its own policies in particular areas of the economy. 
The Government adopted a 'political' approach to development (1969-
1974) relegating the production-minded group to a minority status. 	This 
affected the three policies analysed because economic growth was compromised 
during this period. However, when the production-orientated group became 
dominant once again during 1976-1982, their effectiveness was curtailed 
because certain ministries, notably the Prime Minister's Office and the 
-446- 
Ministry of Trade, persisted with a 'political ' approach in matters 
pertaining to rural development and trade. At this level, the Government 
ceased to function as a unitary entity. 
Superimposed on these trends is the determining influence of the 
Presidency. 	The President often played a strategic role because he could 
tip the balance between the Party and the Government by alternating his 
support from one organ to another. 	This role of the President was evident 
in all the three case studies. 	Thus in 1967 the President was closer to 
Government's position on the issue of private capital (Public Ownership 
policy), on internal trade - when he opposed the nationalisation of the 
wholesale and retail trade - and on agriculture, when he allowed and 
supported progressive farmers though he was against large-scale individual 
farming. 	Between 1969-1974, the Presidentchanged his position on all 
three issues. 	Again, between 1976 and 1982 the President modified his 
position on two crucial issues, the role of private capital in development 
and large-scale farming in agriculture, which brought him closer to 
Government's position. I would argue that the President tends to come closer 
to Government's position during periods of economic crisis and reverts to 
the Party's position when the crisis has been overcome. While this role 
allows him to maintain a 'balance' or 'unity' between the two opposing 
views of development, as well as creates flexibility in policies, it also 
created instability in development. 
These three elements were evident in various degrees in all the 
three case studies. At the same time, each policy-sector bears the imprint 
of one organ of the state more heavily than the others. 	Thus the 
influence of the Government, notably of the conventional view of development 
and the production-orientated group, is most evident in the policy on 
private capital. 	Except in the period 1969-1974 (during the primacy 
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of politics), the President supported Government's position. 	The Party 
never supported the Government's position on the role of private capital, 
and it has remained consistently antagonistic to private capital. 
The influence of the Party has been most strongly experienced in 
internal trade. 	As we saw in Parts I and II, internal trade was one 
of the traditional preoccupations of the Party. 	The Government did not 
favour the Party's policy of the nationalisation of the wholesale trade 
(1970), which was supported by the President. 	But neither the President 
nor the Government supported the Party's policy of Operation Maduka (1976), 
which 'socialised' retail trade. 
The President's influence has been most decisive in the agrarian 
sector. 	The President has shown a continuous and persistent tendency 
to give priority to rural social organisation at the expense, if necessary, 
of economic growth. 	In this he has received support from the Party. 
The Government did not favour the policies of Ujamaa or Villagisation 
but was powerless to stop them. 
These findings illustrate that development policy-making in Tanzania 
is an extremely complex process, which cannot be reduced to a single factor 
- be it class interests, or the President's personality. 	The tripartite 
system and the beliefs and understandings of the policy-makers play an 
important role in the formulation of policies, though one organ's view 
and emphasis may assume particular importance in a given sector or at a 
specific time. This situation allows for conflicting policies to be 
pursued in parallel, and for one type of policy to assume dominance while 
the other remains latent, to be revived at an appropriate time. 
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CONCLUSION 
The main task of this thesis has been to offer a new explanation 
of the Tanzanian development experience since 1962. I began by 
rejecting the class analysis and dependency approach of the radicals 
as well as Green's 'pragmatic dependency' approach and the official 
Tanzanian Government explanation with its heavy emphasis on exogenous 
factors. 	The thesis has also extended Hyden's work by offering an 
explanation of why policies which were self-evidently mistaken or counter-
productive were persistently pursued. 
The new explanation which has been offered combines an analysis of 
Tanzania's political institutions in terms of a tripartite system of 
policy-making and an analysis of the aims and ideologies of the policy-
makers. 	Thus the thesis has examined development policies within a 
political-institutional context by differentiating between the organs of 
the state - the President, the Party and the Government. 	This approach 
has enabled me to explain each policy in relation to the organ sponsoring 
it, and to examine its overall consequences for the development process 
in terms of the view of development, priorities and institutional functions 
of that organ. 	This approach has also enabled me to explore the often 
complex interrelationships of the tripartite system, presenting a more 
comprehensive understanding of the Tanzanian policy-making system and its 
effects on the development process. 	The thesis has examined the period 
1962 to 1982. I examined two historical periods, 1962 to 1966, and 1967 
to 1982. The transition between these periods is important because of the 
change in the institutional arrangements for policy-making. Prior to 
1965 the Government formulated policies and implemented them. 	After 1965 
'- 
with' the introduction of the Interim ConstitutionJthe Party formulated 
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policies and the Government implemented them. 	However, I argued that 
despite this institutional arrangement, Tanzania had in practice a tri-
partite system under which the President, the Party and the Government 
each influenced policy-making to a significant extent. 	This situation 
created a very complex situation in policy-making, which was further 
aggravated by the different priorities and views of development prevailing 
in the different organs of the state. 	Also, the institutional division 
of labour between policy-making and implementation introduced a destab-
ilising effect on the development process. 
The chronological chapters of the thesis pursued three themes - 
the relationship between the Party and the Government, the views of developilent 
held in the three organs of the state, and finally, the consequences of 
a 'political' approach for the development process. 	In addition, three 
case studies - on private capital, internal trade, and agriculture and 
rural development - were analysed in terms of the three themes. 
The analysis in Part I, 1962-65, showed that the state in Tanzania 
was not homogerus; there was a conflict between the Party and the 
Government and the President was sandwiched between them. 	This situation 
created instability in terms of policy-making because all three organs 
continued to formulate policies. 	On this basis I argued that Tanzania 
had a tripartite system of policy-making. 	One of the major concerns of 
the 1965 Interim Constitution was to find a working relationship between 
the Party and the Government, which indicates that the conflict between 
the two organs of the state was recognised as a serious political problem. 
The conflict between the Party and the Government was expressed 
in two opposing views of development. On the one hand was the Party's 
activists' view of development which called for immediate re-distributive 
measures and for increased state control of the economy. More specifically, 
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Party activists pressed for Africanisation and for a rapid expansion of 
the co-operatives to replace the Indian traders; and they were against 
investments by private capital. 	The Government on the other hand evolved 
policies which were based on the' encouragement of private capital in 
major sectors of the economy. 	Government's major priority was to achieve 
a faster rate of economic growth. 	Private investment was viewed as 
essential given the limited capital, manpower and technology that were 
available to the Government. 
The co-existence of these two views of development created uncertainties, 
especially vis-a-vis private capital. Between 1963 and 1964 the Government 
modified its position to accommodate the Party activists' pressures and 
demands. 	The Government incorporated limited re-distributive measures 
into the development programme, giving in to the Party's demands on the issue 
of Africanisation and on the expansion of the co-operatives; but it held firm 
on the issue of private capitaland proceeded to pass the FIPA Act to protect 
foreign capital in the eventuality of nationalisation. 	These measures 
failed, however, to appease the political demands of the Party activists. 
The President's support for the Government's position did not prevent him 
from supporting the Party's position also, and in this way, both organs 
could identify their positions with the President's and use the latter's 
speeches to counteract the policies of the other. 
Finally, Part I of the thesis examined the outcomes of the policies 
which were passed between 1962 and 1966. It was argued that policies that 
were not politically interfered with had a high degree of success,.while 
those which were implemented as a result of political pressures were already 
creating problems by 1966. 	Politically motivated policies undermined 
the conditions for the successful achievement of Tanzania's fundamental 
political goals. 
One of the aims of the 1965 Interim Constitution was to resolve the 
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conflict between the Party and the Government. 	It attempted to do this 
by separating the functions and thus clarifying the responsibilities 
of the two organs. The new institutional arrangement was that the Party 
became responsible for policy-making while the Government remained 
responsible for policy-implementation. 	I argued that this arrangement 
introduced a destabilising element into the development process because 
it created a wedge between the conception of policies and the practical- 
ities of their implementation. 	This problem was analysed in the second 
part of the thesis. 
Part II looked at the period 1962-1982 drawing again on an under-
standing of the interrelationships between the Government, the Party and 
the President. 	The tripartite system became more complex during this 
period, and this was reflected in the analysis of major policies of 
development. 	The complexities of these relationships as well as the 
changes that occurred over time within each organ were analysed and their 
influences on policies investigated and documented. 
In Chapter Five I argued that in the formulation of the policies of 
the Arusha Declaration, the Party, the Government and the President were 
not functioning as parts of a homogeneous entity. 	Each organ of the state 
had different priorities and concerns which it was able to bring to bear 
on the making of policy at different stages of the process. 	The analysis 
did not find any evidence that the class in power was formulating policies 
to further its own class interests. 	On the contrary, we saw that the Party 
and the Government were operating at cross-purposes. 	In Chapter Six, 
'The Primacy of Politics in Development 1969-1974 1 , I showed how, for the 
first time, the three organs of the state adopted views of development 
which had a common underlying theme, giving greater emphasis to political 
goals than to present economic constraints. 	The influence of these diverse 
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but convergent intellectual traditions was with reference to the Five 
Year Development Plan 1969-1974 as well as to the major policies passed 
during the period. 	A new dimension which added complexities to the 
Party-Government relationship was the change within the Government. In 
this phase the most influential sectors of the Government adopted a 
'political' approach to development, relegating the conventional view to 
a minority status. 	Thus the Government's view of development and its 
rQ\ 
working methods were no longerJhomogeneous as they had been during 1962-
1966. I argued on this basis that the real revolution in Tanzania's 
approach to development occurred between 1969-1974, and not with the 
Arusha Declaration as is commonly assumed. 
In Chapter Seven I examined the outcomes of the 'political 
policies and the resulting policy changes. I argued that the political 
policies were misguided because, failing to consider economics as inputs 
into policy-making, they weakened the economy's capacity to cope with 
exogenous factors. 	In Chapter Eight I looked at the period following the 
1974/75 crisis and argued that the Government and the Party were once again 
operating at cross-purposes. I documented this by tracing out the 
contradictory policies which were pursued between 1976 and 1982. 	With 
the economic crisis, (1974-75), the Government began once again to emphasise 
economic growth, the need to reduce recurrent expenditure and the encourage-
ment of private capital in productive sectors. 	The President supported 
the Government in this. 	The Party, on the other hand, continued with its 
traditional concern to replace private capital by co-operative shops in 
internal trade. 
As the second economic crisis continued to deepen, all the three 
organs of the state once again attempted to come together to solve the 
crisis, but this unity was fragile, concealing conflicting policies and 
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strategies. 	These conflicts became more apparent in Part III, which 
looked into individual policy areas in terms of interactions of the 
tripartite system. 
Part III again pursued the three themes of the thesis, and the 
evidence presented confirmed their importance. Each of the case studies 
illustrated that there was a strong conflict between the Party and the 
Government. 	This conflict was made more complex by the role the President 
played in relation to specific policies. 	Thus in the case study on 
private capital, the President was closer to Government's position than to 
the Party's during 1976-1982; though during 1969-1974, the President had 
been closer to the Party's position. 	In internal trade, the President 
supported the Party's demands for nationalisation of wholesale trade in 
the 1970s but neither the President nor the Government supported the 
Party on the policy of Operation Maduka in 1976. 	The policies on rural 
development were distinguished by the fact that they were mainly initiated 
by the President; the Party supported the President but the Government's 
support was lukewarm. 
Finally, the case studies also provided empirical data to illustrate 
how the problems of implementation which were experienced were related to 
faulty policy-making. 	The practice of formulating policies without 
reference to economic considerations, I have argued throughout, leads to 
policy-failures. 	In Tanzania in the 1970s this practice aggravated 
development problems. and weakened the economy's capacity to cope with 
exogenous shocks. 
This thesis has sought to reinterpret the Tanzanian development 
experience. It has not attempted to provide solutions to the many problems 
it has raised. On the other hand, I hope my analysis has provided a 
framework within which it will be possible to begin a discussion of the 
way forward towards better development policy-making in Tanza. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
Dates of Interviews 
Interviews with Party officials occurred on: 
1 July 1981 
II 	II 
13 	II 	II 
14 	II 	It 
15 	It 	It 
16 
21 
24 	II 	II 
25 	II If 
27 	II 	It 
28 
18 August 1981 
19 
20 
Interviews with Government officials cocurred on: 
18 June 1981 13 August 1981 
22 June 14 	11 
23 It is 
26 If 17 	II 	It 
2 July 
3 II 	II 
6 
9 II 	It 
10 II 	II 
16 II 	II 
22 II 	II 
23 II 
29 II 
30 II 	It 
12 August 
